Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
1. The present petition has been filed for quashing FIR No. 37 of 2017, dated 8.3.2017, registered at Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307, 323, 451 and 506 of IPC and order dated 9.5.2022, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kanga at Dharamshala, vide which the case was listed for framing of charges.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informants Saji Devi and Jeet Kumar filed a complaint before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Baijnath against 17 persons asserting that the informants started construction of a house in October 2016 after uprooting an old kucha slate posh house existing over the land comprised in Khata No. 117 min, Khasra No. 251, exclusively owned and possessed by Prem Chand husband of Saji Devi and father of Jeet Kumar. One Prabhushan was engaged as a mason with labourers to carry out the construction work. On 27.1.2017, Saji Devi and her daughter-in-law Shashi were present at the construction site. All the accused came armed with sticks and stones to the place of construction at about 2.00 PM. They abused and threatened the informants and their family members. They demolished the walls. Informant Saji Devi tried to pacify the accused and requested them not to interfere with the ongoing construction. Accused Bindu pushed informant Saji Devi and she fell. Shashi tried to intervene and rescue Saji Devi but the accused pushed her. The accused threatened to kill informant Saji Devi and her entire family members. Accused Mansri Devi was armed with a stick and inflicted a blow on the head of Saji Devi. The other accused also gave kicks and fist blows to her. Jeet Ram reached the spot with his friend Rakesh Kumar. He inquired from the accused why they had trespassed into the land owned and possessed by his father. He tried to pacify the accused and requested them not to take the law in their hand. Mukesh Kumar caught hold of Jeet Ram from his neck and pushed him to the ground. The other accused gave beating to him with sticks and fist blows. Accused Veena snatched the mobile phone of Jeet Ram. He sustained injuries on his back, left hand and left leg. The accused persons left the spot and threatened to kill the informant party whenever they would get an opportunity to do so. They caused a loss of ₹15,000/- by demolishing the construction. They also caused a loss of ₹10,990/- by taking away the articles of the informant. The matter was reported to the police. The police got the informant party medically examined but did not take any action. A complaint under Sections 107, 145, and 150 of Cr.PC was filed before the learned SDM. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be allowed and directions be issued to the police to register the FIR.
3. The application was forwarded to the police. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. The final opinion was obtained from the Medical Officer who stated that injury no. 1 sustained by Saji Devi was grievous and dangerous to life. Hence, an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC was also added. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.
4. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions from where it was assigned to the Court of Learned Additional Sessions Judge-III. Learned Additional Sessions Judge-III held that the pendency of the proceedings under Sections 107 and 145 of Cr.PC. is not material and does not constitute double jeopardy. There was sufficient material on record to frame charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 451, 506, 201 and 427 of IPC.
5. Aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the present petition has been filed asserting that FIR No. 37 of 2017 was registered on false allegations made by the informants. The Doctor stated that the informants had sustained simple injuries but he gave the final opinion that the nature of the injury was dangerous to life. The report was manipulated and the simple injuries could not be converted into injuries, which are dangerous to life. Initially, the informant had mentioned ten accused in the complaint made to the police which were increased to seventeen in the application under Section 156(3) of Cr. PC. The petitioners appeared before the learned SDM for one year and the learned SDM discharged the accused. The continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to double jeopardy. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom be quashed.
6. The police filed a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken by it during the investigation.
7. I have heard Mr Imran Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent Nos. 1 to 3-State and Ms. Kusum, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 to 8.
8. Mr. Imran Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the informant party had made a complaint to the police in which only ten names were mentioned which were increased to seventeen. The increase shows the falsity of the claim of the informants. The petitioners had to face criminal proceedings before learned SDM for one year and they were discharged after one year. Continuation of the proceedings before the criminal court amounts to double jeopardy which is not permissible. The FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the civil suit filed by the accused party. He has relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Asif Khan Pathan Vs. State, Criminal Writ Petition No. 593 of 2023, decided on 16.10.2023 and Saleem alias Shalu alias Saleem versus State of H.P. 2023 INSC 687 [LQ/SC/2023/810 ;] in support of his submission.
9. Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No. 1 to 3 submitted that Section 300 of Cr.PC cannot be applied to the security proceedings as there is no acquittal or conviction in these proceedings. The allegations in the FIR and the investigation conducted by the police show the commission of a cognizable offence. Learned Trial Court had rightly ordered the framing of the charges. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
11. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 : (2023) 7 SCC 711 [LQ/SC/2023/711 ;] wherein it was observed at page 716:-
"17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LQ/SC/2012/789] : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] [LQ/SC/2012/789] , this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)
“27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.
27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.”
12. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:-
"26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”(emphasis supplied)
13. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed:
"10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”.
11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried."
14. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed:
"12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [(2019) 14 SCC 568] [LQ/SC/2018/1616] , this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866 [LQ/SC/1960/96] ) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint."
15. It was submitted that the petitioners had to face the security proceedings and the continuation of the present proceedings is barred in view of Section 300 of Cr.PC. This submission cannot be accepted. There is force in the submission of Ms. Avni Kochhar, learned Deputy Advocate General that the security proceedings cannot be equated to the criminal proceedings in which a person is acquitted or convicted rather they are preventive proceedings, to which the provision of Section 300 of Cr.PC does not apply. It was laid down more than 100 years ago in Muthia Moopan and Ors. (09.09.1911- MADHC): MANU/TN/0278/1911 that the security proceedings contemplate the discharge as opposed to acquittal. No charge is to be framed. Hence the provision of Section 495 of Cr.P.C. 1888 (corresponding to Section 300 of 1973) does not apply to security proceedings. It was observed:-
“Section 495 has no application to the case. It applies only where the proceedings could end in an acquittal or discharge of the accused. A proceeding under Section 107 of, the Criminal Procedure Code, does not terminate in either of these ways. No doubt Section 117 enacts that the enquiry in such cases shall be made as nearly as may be practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons cases. But the final order to be passed is expressly provided for in Section 119, Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down that "If, on an enquiry under Section 117, it is not proved that it is necessary for keeping the peace... that the person in respect of whom the enquiry is made, should execute a bond, the Magistrate shall make an entry on the record to that effect, and, if such person is in custody only for the purposes of the enquiry, shall release him or if such person is not in custody, shall discharge him." Section 118, Criminal Procedure Code, shows that if the finding is against the accused no order is to be passed convicting him. The order should be one directing him to execute a bond. If on the other hand, the finding is in his favour, Section 119 shows an entry is to be made on the record that it is not necessary that he should execute a bond and if he is in custody he should be released; if he is not in custody he should be discharged. In Velu Tayi Ammal v. Chidambaravelu Pillai I.L.R., (1910) Mad., 85, Miller, J., points out that the expression discharged in Section 119, Criminal Procedure Code, means merely discharged from custody and is not used in the technical sense of discharged (as opposed to acquitted) from an offence as used in Section 253, Criminal Procedure Code. No charge has to be framed against the accused in security proceedings which commence with the making of an order under Section 112, Criminal Procedure Code, by the Magistrate "setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required." We have not here therefore a case where the framing of a charge is contemplated at all or as the result of the proceedings an order either of discharge or acquittal is to be passed against anyone. It may be noted that even the word "accused" is not used by the legislature with reference to security proceedings though the word is a convenient one and may not inappropriately be made use of for some purposes, but as pointed out by Miller, J., the use of the word requires caution. That learned Judge held in Velu Tayi Ammal v. Chidambaravelu Pillai I.L.R., (1910) Mad., 85 that Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers the High Court or a Sessions Judge to direct a further enquiry to be made where an accused person has been discharged does not apply to orders passed under the security sections. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Queen-Empress v. Iman Mondal I.L.R., (1900) Calc., 662.”
16. This question was also considered by Emperor vs. Bhagwat Singh, AIR 1926 All 403 [LQ/AllHC/1926/68] and it was held that a person bound over under Section 107 is not convicted of any offence and may be retried. It was observed:-
“The question is whether the appellate court has the power under section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to order a re-trial. The authority given to an appellate court is contained in clauses (c) and (d). In an appeal from an order the appellate court may alter or reverse such order and may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. Under clause (b) in an appeal from a conviction, the appellate court is specifically given the power of ordering a retrial. The distinction exists for a very obvious reason. Under section 403 a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence and in an appeal from a conviction, if the conviction is reversed, the appellant may claim that he has been acquitted and he would not be liable to re- trial for the same offence. To obviate this difficulty power has to be given to the appellate court specifically to order a re-trial. This difficulty will not arise in proceedings taken under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A person bound over under the terms of that section is not convicted of any offence and may be re-tried in pursuance of the same order passed under section 107. The order for re-trial is, in our opinion, an incidental order. All that the Sessions Judge has done is to reverse the order binding over the applicants and then to direct that proceedings subsequent to the stage of the issue of a notice under section 107 be all cancelled and that the Magistrate do proceed from the stage of the issue of notice.”
17. Therefore, the plea taken by the petitioners that they had to face trial before the learned SDM and continuation of the proceedings before the Court will be violative of Section 300 of Cr.PC is not acceptable.
18. In Asif Khan Pathan (supra), the Bombay High Court held that it is not permissible for the police to register the FIR when a non-cognizable case has been alleged, even if additional information is placed without the leave of the Magistrate. Without saying anything about this proposition of law, it is to be noticed that in the present case, there was an express order of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr. PC. Therefore, this judgment will not apply to the present case.
19. A heavy reliance was placed upon report No. 34, dated 27.1.2017 lodged at the instance of Jeet Kumar in which the names of only 10 persons were mentioned. It was submitted that the addition of seven persons before the Court shows the falsity of the complaint. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saleem alias Shalu (supra). In Saleem (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the allegations in the FIR were inherently improbable. The ingredients of the commission of offence were not satisfied. Multiple FIRs were registered for wreaking vengeance. Hence, the FIR was quashed. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of cognizable offences. It was specifically stated that the accused had given beatings to the informants. It was also mentioned that they caused damage to the under- construction building and took away the articles of the informant party. Therefore, the judgment in Saleem (supra) does not apply to the present case.
20. It was also submitted that the Medical Officer had changed the medical opinion by converting the nature of injuries from simple to dangerous to life which shows that the medical opinion is false and manipulated. This submission and the submission that the number of the accused were changed from 10 to 17 assume that the Court has the jurisdiction while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the contents of the FIR. This assumption is not correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 [LQ/SC/2022/1386 ;] : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:
"21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2) CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.
22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89 [LQ/SC/2002/225] ], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.
23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 [LQ/SC/2020/212 ;] : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC."
21. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik B. Vs. Kadapala Sreyes Reddy and another 2023 LiveLaw(SC) 642, wherein it was observed:
“6. Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of such trial.
7. Such an exercise, in our considered view, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
8. The scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is very limited. The Court would exercise its power to quash the proceedings only if it finds that taking the case at its face value, no case is made out at all.
9. At the stage of deciding an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. it is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the charge sheet. The High Court by the impugned order has done exactly the same.”
22. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734 [LQ/SC/2023/819 ;] : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge- sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.”
23. Therefore, it is not permissible for this Court to determine whether the names of the persons were correctly added or not or whether the opinion of the Medical Officer is true or false. This exercise is to be carried out by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending and FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that the contents of the same are false.
24. Taking the allegations of the FIR to be correct the same discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and it cannot be quashed in the exercise of the inherent power of the Court. Therefore, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.
25. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
