PANDURANGA RAO, J.

( 1 ) IN C. R. P. No. 1056 of 1986, by an order dated 14-7-1987 (reported in 1987-2

APLJ (HC) 447), I have appointed Shri Justice Challa Kondaiah, retired Chief Justice

of High Court of Andhra Pradesh as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the

disputes between the petitioner and the first respondent in respect of the words

"special Repairs to the existing W. B. M. Road and providing B. T. Surface to

Atmakur-Somasila Road Kms. 15/0 to 21/0". In pursuance of that order, the

arbitrator has entered upon reference and after considering the oral and

documentary evidence adduced before him, passed an award dated 12-11-1988

allowing the claim of the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 1056 of 1986 (hereinafter referred

to as the Contractor) for a total sum of Rs. 91,606/with simple interest at 12% per

annum from 4-8-1981.

( 2 ) THE Government filed C. M. P. No. 4428 of 1989 under Section 30 of the

Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to set aside the award on the

ground of misconduct. The contractor on the other hand filed C. M. P. No. 1134 of

1989 under Ss. 14 and 17 of the Act to make the award, a rule of the court. As

common questions of fact and law arise in both the petitions, they were heard and

are being disposed of together.

( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader attacked the award on three grounds viz. ,

(1) the finding regarding the delay in execution of work is not based upon any

evidence and as such the enhanced rate awarded by the arbitrator is not warranted.

(2) the arbitrator has not passed the award within four months as provided in

Schedule I of the Act and hence the award passed beyond the period of four months

is a nullity. (3) the awarding of interest from 4-8-1981 is not permissible as the

contractor is not entitled to interest during the period covered by the arbitration

proceedings.

( 4 ) I shall deal with these objections seriatim.

( 5 ) THE arbitrator in the award has allowed some of the claims and disallowed

some of the claims put forth by the contractor. The arbitrator relying upon the

statement given by the contractor on oath before him that he mentioned in the

applications seeking extension of time that he would not make any claim for the

increase in the price at the instance of the officers as they threatened him that

otherwise he would not be given extension of time (which fact was not contradicted

by any positive evidence), upheld the claim of the contractor to claim the increase in

the value of the cost of the work. The arbitrator however held that the amount of

Rs. 1,10,000/- claimed by the contractor is excessive and exorbitant and fixed the

same at Rs. 25,000/- on that account.

( 6 ) THE learned Government Pleader submitted that the site was handed over to

the contractor on 16-6-1977; that he has not completed the work within the

stipulated period of four months; that the time was extended from time to time till

30-4-1979; that the contractor made an endorsement that he has no further claims;

that all the claims made by the contractor pertain to the extended period; that as

per the agreement, the contractor has to work out at the agreed rates and that the

delay in execution of the work is due to the laches of the contractor and hence he is

not entitled to claim any amount towards the increase in the value of the cost of the

work..

( 7 ) IT is necessary at this stage to consider the scope of the application filed under

S. 30 of the Act. A Division Bench of this court of which I happened to be a party,

held in State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. V. Rajaram, (1988) 1 APLJ (HC) 536, [LQ/TelHC/1988/65] that an

award passed by the arbitrator can be interfered with by the Civil Court only if the

award is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. It is further held

that the error must be one of law and not one of fact and that the Civil Court has no

jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the award on the

ground that its conclusions are erroneous. The learned counsel for the contractor

submitted that the decision of the Division Bench referred to above in case, (1988-1

APLJ (HC) 536) (supra) has been confirmed by the Supreme Court by not granting

the special leave. To support that, he filed Judgments Today, (1990) 1 JT 57 ,

wherein the Supreme Court held that from the reading of the award it is clear that

the arbitrator has considered the claim made on the basis of "escalation and

damages" but he has awarded a total sum of Rs. 19. 39 lakhs in so far as he finds

admissible in respect of the claims which the arbitrator has adjudged and in such a

situation it is not possible to contend that there was any exercise of jurisdiction by

the arbitrator beyond his competence. Their Lordships observed that the award of

the arbitrator can be challenged only on two distinct and different grounds viz. , that

there is an error apparent on the face of the record or that the arbitrator has

exceeded his jurisdiction. In this case, the arbitrator after considering the entire

evidence adduced before him and taking into consideration the human conduct,

observed that no reasonable and prudent contractor would, of his own free will and

volition would mention in the application seeking extension of time that he will not

make any claim for the extra cost incurred by him during the extended period of the

contract, if he is granted extension of time. Under those circumstances, the

arbitrator was inclined to agree with the version of the claimant that he was asked

by the Officers before whom he wrote the petitions to make a specific mention of

the same and that otherwise, he would not be given extension of time. The

arbitrator has given a reasoned award and it cannot be said that the arbitrator has

exceeded his jurisdiction.

( 8 ) THE Supreme Court held in U. P. Hotels v. U. P. State Electricity Board, (1989)

1 SCC 359 [LQ/SC/1975/487] , that where a question of law regarding statutory interpretation in the

light of a decision of Supreme Court involved or arose during course of the

arbitration proceedings and arbitrator/umpire in compliance with principles of

natural justice arrives at a possible view, the award is not open to courts

interference on ground of the view being wrong. The scope of S. 30 of the Act is

considered in another decision of the Supreme Court in Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. v.

Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 411 [LQ/SC/1989/44] , wherein it is observed that the court deciding

objections against the award cannot examine the correctness of the award on merits

by re-appreciating evidence. Their Lordships held on facts that the award was fair,

supported by evidence and also correct on merit and hence the award is not open to

challenge. It is observed that the court cannot sit in appeal over the views of the

arbitrator by re-examining and re-assessing the materials and that none of the

grounds for setting aside the award as provided in the Act was available in that

case. In another decision in Food Corporation of India v. Joginderpal Mohinderpal,

(1989) 2 SCC 347 [LQ/SC/1989/137] , the Supreme Court held that an award of the arbitrator can only

be interfered with or set aside or modified within the four corners of the procedure

provided by the Act; that it is necessary to find whether the arbitrator has

misconducted himself or the proceedings are legal in the sense whether the

arbitrator has gone contrary to the terms of reference between the parties or

whether the arbitrator has committed any error of law apparent on the face of the

award and that these are the separate and distinct grounds for setting aside the

award. The Supreme Court further clarified that it is not misconduct on the part of

an arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision, whether his error is one of fact or

law, and whether or not his findings of fact are supported by evidence. The

Supreme Court further held that if the award is a speaking award, then unless it is

demonstrated to the court that such reasons are erroneous as propositions of law or

that the arbitrator has taken a view which could not possibly be sustained on any

view of the matter, the challenge to the award of the arbitrator cannot be sustained.

( 9 ) FOLLOWING the above catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, I hold that,

even assuming that the conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator on the question of

fact is erroneous, it does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record

so as to result in misconduct on the part of the arbitrator or misconduct of the

proceedings. I, therefore, hold that the decision of the arbitrator on the question of

awarding compensation during the extended period of the contract even assuming

to be erroneous, cannot be interfered with by this court under S. 30 of the Act.

( 10 ) THE next ground urged by the learned Government Pleader is that the

arbitrator not having passed the award within four months, the award is a nullity.

Relying upon clause (3) of Schedule I of the Act, the learned Government Pleader

argued that the arbitrator shall pass the award within four months after entering on

the reference or within such extended time as the court may allow and inasmuch as

the court has not extended the period, in this case, the award passed by the

arbitrator is a nullity and cannot be looked into. In support of his contention he

relied upon a decision in State of Punjab v. Hardyal, AIR 1985 SC 920 [LQ/SC/1985/122] .

( 11 ) BUT Section 28 (2) of the Act provides that any provision in an arbitration

agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may, except with the consent of all

the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making the award shall be void

and of no effect. The learned counsel for the contractor argued that with the

consent of both the parties and basing on the requests made in joint memoranda,

filed by the contractor as well as the Government through their respective counsel,

the arbitrator has extended the period from time to time; that the time was so

extended till 31-12-1988 and that the award was passed by the arbitrator on 12-11-

1988 well within the extended period. He therefore, argued that the award passed

by the arbitrator is within the extended time. The submission made by the learned

counsel for the contractor that time was extended from time to time by the

arbitrator with the consent of both the parties and on the joint memoranda filed by

both the counsel is borne out by the proceedings of the arbitrator dated 11-6-1988

and 11-9-1988. That is obviously the reason why in the grounds mentioned in C. M.

P. No. 4428 of 1989, no ground was taken that the award is rendered illegal by

reason of the fact that it was filed beyond the time granted by the court. It is with

the consent of both the learned counsel that the arbitrator has extended the time

for filing the award till 31-12-1988 and as such the award filed by him on 12-11-

1988 does not become illegal. I, therefore, hold that this objection also has no legs

to stand.

( 12 ) THE third objection raised by the learned Government Pleader is that the

awarding of interest by the arbitrator from 4-8-1981 is not permissible and that the

contractor is not entitled to interest during the period covered by the arbitration

proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme

Court in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala v. Abnaduta Jena, AIR 1988 SC

1520.

( 13 ) TO meet that contention of the learned Government pleader, the learned

counsel for the contractor has placed reliance upon the provisions of the Interest Act

(No. 14 of 1978) which came into force in our State on 19-8-1981. Section 2 (a) of

the said Act defines court as including a Tribunal and an arbitrator. Section 2 (c)

defines debt as any liability for an ascertained sum of money and includes a debt

payable in kind. Thus, the arbitrator is in the nature of a court under the Interest

Act of 1978, and the debt includes any liability for an ascertained sum of money.

The decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case, (AIR 1988 SC 1520 [LQ/SC/1987/667] ) (supra)

lays down that in cases which arose before the commencement of the Interest Act,

1978, the claimants are not entitled to claim interest either before the

commencement of the proceedings or during the pendency of the arbitration. In a

subsequent decision in Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique

Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. , AIR 1989 SC 973 [LQ/SC/1989/47] , the Supreme Court has laid down that

in a reference made after the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978, interest for

the period prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings can be granted by

the arbitrator and that interest from the date of the award to the date of the decree

can also be granted. What all the arbitrator is prohibited from granting is the

interest pendente lite. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the date of commencement

of the proceedings is mentioned as the date when the parties appeared before the

arbitrator after filing the claims and counter-claims. The period pendente lite is

mentioned as the period commencing from that date and till the date of the award.

Applying the decision of the Supreme Court in case, (AIR 1989 SC 973 [LQ/SC/1989/47] ) (supra) to

the facts of this case, it is seen that after the arbitrator has entered on the

reference, the claim petition was filed on 18-11-1987, the Government filed the

counter on 9-12-1987, the contractor filed the reply objections on 19-12-1987 and

rejoinder was filed by the Government on 18-4-1988. So, it can be said that both

the parties have appeared before the arbitrator after filing their claims and counterclaims only on 18-4-1988. Till that stage, the parties were in the process of putting forth their claims and counter-claims. Hence the direction of the arbitrator for

payment of interest cannot cover the period from 19-4-1988 to 12-11-1988. The

decision of the Supreme Court in case, (AIR 1989 SC 973 [LQ/SC/1989/47] ) (supra) clearly lays down

that the contractor is entitled to interest for both the anterior and subsequent

periods. I, therefore, hold that the objection of the learned Government pleader with

regard to the awarding of interest is upheld only for the period from 19-4-1988 and

12-11-1988.

( 14 ) FROM the above discussion, it follows that C. M. P. No. 4428 of 1989 should

be dismissed except to the extent of the award of the arbitrator awarding interest

for the period from 19-4-1988 to 12-11-1988. C. M. P. No. 4428 of 1989 is

accordingly dismissed. Consequently, C. M. P. No. 1134 of 1989 is allowed making

the award of the arbitrator the rule of the court awarding Rs. 91,606/- with simple

interest at 12% per annum for the period from 4-8-1981 to 18-4-1988 and from 13-

11-1988 till the date of payment. No costs. The Government shall pay their share of

the arbitrators fee. Advocates fee Rs. 500/- in each case. Order accordingly.