AMARESWARI, J.

(1) THE appeal and the c. R. P. arise out of Arbitration proceedings. The State of Andhra pradesh and the concerned Executive engineer are the appellants. C. M. A. No. 1152 of 1986 is filed against the decree in 0. P. No. 312 of 1985 on the file of the second Additional Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad making the award a rule of the Court under Section 14 of the Arbitration act. C. R. P. No. 2728 of 1986 is filed against the order in o. S. No. 915 of 1985 dismissing the petition to set aside the award under Section 30 of the arbitration Act.

(2) THE brief facts are one sri Rayanam entered into a contract on 24-1-1981 with the state of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Superintending Engineer and others for formation of earth-dam in gorge portion from chainage 3360 to 3380 M of Raiwada reservoir Project near devarapalli Village, Chodavaram taluk, Visakhapatnam District. Some disputes arose between the parties. The matter was referred to arbitration as per the Clause in the agreement. The Contractor made as many as 11 claims claiming various amounts. The arbitrator passed a consolidated award granting a sum of Rs. 19. 39 lakhs towards claims 1 and 3 to 11. Claim No. 2 was withdrawn and the same was not taken into account by the Arbitrator.

(3) THE Contractor filed O. S. No. 915 of 1985 to make the award a rule of the Court and the department filed 0. P. No. 312 of 1985 to set aside the award. The learned Second Additional Judge, city Civil Court. Hyderabad decreed the suit and dismissed the o. P. against which the above c. M. A. and C. R. P. are filed by. the department.

(4) THE submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-department is that the decree of the civil Court confirming the award discloses an error apparent on the face of the record and hence is liable to be set aside.

(5) ON the other hand, it is contended for the respondent-contractor that the scope of the civil Court under the Arbitration act is very limited and since the arbitrator has not given any reasons it is not open to this Court to go behind the award and look for the reasons. It is further urged that there is no error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law.

(6) TO decide this controversy, it is necessary to refer to Section 30 of the Arbitration act which is as follows:-"30. Grounds for setting aside award: An award shall not "be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds namely; (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. "the language of Section 30 is couched in negative terms and unless the grounds metnioned in sub-sections (a) (b) or (c)thereof, exists, no award can be set aside. Clause (a) refers to misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. Clause (b) deals with a case where an award is made after the arbitration proceedings are superseded or have become invalid under Section 35. The most important and relevant for our purpose is Clause (c)which says that the award can be set aside, if it is improperly procured or otherwise invalid. The words "otherwise invalid" occurring in clause (c) had been the subject matter of judicial scrutiny on several occasions and it was held that the award can be set aside only if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The scope of jurisdiction of the civil Court under Section 30 is therefore limited. The law is well settled on this aspect.

(7) IN Union of India Vs. Bungo Steel Furniture (1) A. I. R. 1967, Supreme Court, Page 1032 the Supreme Court held that the award can be set aside on the ground of error of law on the face of the award only when in the award or in a document incorporated in it, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of award and which is erroneous.

(8) IN another case in Bungo steel Furniture Vs. Union of india (2) A. I. R. 1967, Supreme court, Page 378 reported in the same Volume, the Supreme Court held that if an arbitrator does not record his reasons and does not indicate the principles of law on which he has proceeded with, the award is not vitiated on that account and that it is only when the arbitrator proceeds to give his reasons or to lay down principles on which he has arrived at his conclusions, the Court is competent to examine whether he has proceeded contrary to law and if such error of law is apparent on the face of the award itself.

(9) IN Coimbatore Dist. P. T. Sangam Vs. Bala Subramania Foundry (3)a. I. R. 1987, Supreme court, Page 2045 the same view is reiterated. Justice Mukharji, who spoke for the Court observed that an award can only be set aside where there is an error on its face and the error must be of law and not of fact.

(10) IN Hindustan Steel works construction Ltd. Vs. Rajasekhar Rao (4) (1987) 4 Supreme court Cases, page 93 the Supreme court held that it is only in a speaking award that the court can look into the reasoning of the award. It is not open to the court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion and in the absence of any legal proposition which was unsustainable or improper in the award, the award was not open to interference by the Court.

(11) THUS the law is very clear on the scope of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in interfering with the awards passed by the arbitrators. The principles that emerge from the above decision is that the civil court can interfere only if the award is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the award. The error must be one of law and not one of fact. The award is not vitiated if no reasons are given. If no proposition of law is stated in the award or if the award is not based on any legal provision which can be said to be incorrect, the courts cannot interfere. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to reappreciate evidence and interfere with the award on the ground that its conclusions are erroneous.

(12) WITH these principles in mind, we will now examine the validity of the contentions raised by the parties. The contractor has made as many as 11 claims for different amounts. Claim No. 2 was withdrawn and the arbitrator took note of that fact and awarded a lumpsum amount of Rs. 19. 39 lakhs towards claims 1 and 3 to 11. Though different amounts are claimed under different heads, it is open to the arbitrator to give a lumpsum award. It is not necessary that he should award amounts under each of the heads or items claimed. The award is therefore, not illegal on that account. The award does not contain any reasons. It is a non-speaking award. Having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned cases, the award cannot said to be bad in law on that score. Since no proposition of law is stated in the award, it cannot be said that the award is vitiated by any error of law.

(13) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance in the decision reported in Executive Engineer (Irrigation) Vs. Abhaduta Jena (5) (1988) 1 Supreme Court cases, Page 418 and contended that the Court can go behind the award to see whether the award was made in accordance with law. This is a case relating to grant of interest by the arbitrator appointed without the intervention of the Court and the question was whether the arbitrator is competent to award interest. The Supreme Court held that the award of interest by the arbitrator is contrary to law. The reasons given by the Court are that the agreement between the parties does not entitle the arbitrator to award interest. The Interest Act of 1839 which applies to the facts of the case does not provide for interest for the period prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings and that in regard to interest pendente lite as the arbitrator was not a person appointed by the Court, Section 34 C. P. C. has no application. Hence the award of interest was held to be illegal on the face of the award. The contention that the award not being a speaking award, it was not permissible to speculate the reasons for the award of interest and the Court was not entitled to go behind the award and disallow interest was repelled holding that the arbitrator is bound to make the award in accordance with law and if the arbitrator could not possibly have awarded interest on any permissible ground because such ground did not exist, it is open to the court to set aside the award relating to interest on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. The court further observed that "if there was the slightest possibility of the entitlement of the claimant to interest on one or other of the legally permissible grounds, it may not be open to the Court to go behind the award and decide whether the award of interest was justifiable". The learned Judges in the end observed that they do not want to express any opinion on the legality or propriety of a non-speaking award as the question was before a larger Bench. This decision does not indicate a different stand from the cases already decided. Grant of interest by the arbitrator was found to be not supported by any law or statutory provisions. The award was set aside on the ground that the Arbitrator can act only in accordance with law and not contrary to law. On the question of legality or properiety of a non-speaking award, the learned judges did not express any opinion as the matter was pending before a Seven judges Bench.

(14) IT is argued on behalf of the applicant that the Contracted is not entitled to most of the claims as per the terms of the agreement and the claims are unsustainable on the face of it. Claim No. l relates to payment for forming cross bund and refund of the amount recovered. This according to the appellant cannot be granted as per Clause 30 of the agreement which says that a cross bund as indicated in the plan has to be formed upto plus 101. 00 metres at the cost of the Contractor. But the claim made by the Contractor was for formation of cross bunds across the three arms of the river and according to him this is an additional work not covered by the contract. This is a pure question of fact and it cannot also be said that Claim no. l is prohibited by Clause 30 of the agreement which relate only to the cross bund which has to be formed upto 101. 00 metres. On the face of it, it cannot be said that the claim is contrary to Clause 30 of the agreement.

(15) CLAIM No. 2 is given up. Claim No. 3 relates to escalation. The case of the Contractor is that there was a statutory increase in the minimum wages and other categories of labour and therefore, he is entitled to the amount claimed on that account. The answer of the department is that under clause 31 of the agreement, the rates quoted by the tenderer will be valid till the completion of work including extension of time granted. But this does not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record since the petitioner had claimed escallation of prices on account of statutory provisions. In fact, one of the recommendations of the committee appointed by the Government suggested that for works costing 50 lakhs each and taking more than 18 months for completion, a price escalation clause may be incorporated in the tender schedule and a provisions be made in the agreements for both increases and decreases in the price of materials and labour. The Government accepted the recommendation. No doubt the said decision was not incorporated as an amendment to the relevant codes and no G. O. was issued pursuant to the above decision. But whether Clause 31 would apply even to a case of statutory escalation is a matter for interpretation and it cannot be said that it constitutes such error apparent on the face of the record warranting inteference.

(16) IN this connection, the learned Counsel relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Chief Engineer Panchayat raj Dept. Vs. B. Balaiah (6) 1985 (1) A. P. L. J. Page 224. But we are told that leave has been granted by the Supreme Court and an appeal is pending. In the division Bench case it does not appear that the claim was the result of a statutory escalation of prices.

(17) CLAIM No. 4 related to pay of extra lead for sand. The answer of the department is that such a claim is prohibited by clause 21 of the agreement. Clause 21 says that the Contractor will have to verify the site conditions and work out the leads and satisfy himself about the adequacy and quantity of material available before tendering. The claim of the Contractor is that after the contract was entered into the bund was formed on the upstream and the sand was therefore not available and he conveyed the sand from alternative source with the consent of the respondents. This is not an error apparent on the face of the record. Even otherwise it is a question of fact. Whether there was consent by the department or not and even in such a case whether the Contractor would not be entitled to the amount under Clause 21 is a matter for interpretation. In the absence of any reasons given by the Arbitrator, it is not possible to know on what grounds and to what extent this claim was accepted and therefore it does not constitute an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

(18) SIMILARLY other claims are also claims based on facts which necessarily involve investigation. There is no error of law apparent on the face of the record.

(19) CLAIM No. 8 relates to refund of excess hire charges recovered from the Bills. The answer of the department is that there was a subsequent agreement and the hire charges were recovered as per the rates quoted in the subsequent agreement. It is argued on behalf of the contractor that the subsequent agreement is void and the subsequent agreement was entered into at the stage of final bill and does not bind him.

(20) ALL the errors pointed out by the appellant are only errors of fact and not errors of law. It is only an error of law apparent on the face of the record that entitles this Court to interfere. Even if there is an error, if it is one of fact, this Curt has no jurisdiction.

(21) WE are also not impressed with the argument that the claims do not arise under the Contract. All claims made are in relation to the contract. Whether they are tenable or untenable is a different question. Since the Arbitrator has not spoken his mind, it is not possible to say that the claims are untenable. As per the law existing today, the arbitrator need not give reasons and where the arbitrator does not disclose his mind it is not possible to postulate what the reasons could be. We find it difficult to interfere with the impugned order.

(22) HOWEVER, before parting with the case, we would like to make the following observations: all the decisions proceeded on the basis that since the arbitrator is appointed as per the choice of the parties and it is a domestic tribunal, the Courts should not normally interfere and the approach should be to support the award as far as possible. Here itself there is something to be said as in most of the cases the arbitrators are not the choice of the parties, but they are appointed by courts. Be that as it may, the arbitration proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature. There is a lis between the parties, the Contractor making several claims and the department opposing them. Usually the claims are for huge amounts, sometimes running into crores of rupees. The results have far-reaching consequences on the exchequares of the State and the Country which indirectly affects every tax payer. Therefore, the proceedings must be subject to judicial review and it is imperative that reasons should be given in support of their conclusions. It is one of the essential features of adjudication of disputes and in cases where huge stakes are involved, it is necessary that every Tribunal, be it a domestic tribunal or otherwise should give reasons for its conclusions. A fresh look is necessary in this regard. In the present case, the award being a non-speaking award, we are unable to probe into the reasons. The errors pointed out are not errors of law apparent on the face of the award, but only errors of fact which have to be discovered with reference to the claims and the various clauses in the agreement. That we are unable to do in the light of the legal princples enunciated in the various decisions referred to supra.

(23) IN the result, we find no error of law on the face of the award. We therefore, dismiss the appeal and the C. R. P. but in the circumstances without costs.