Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. It is the plea of the petitioner that since the inquiry has been delayed for a considerable period, because of the slovenly manner in which it had been started and conducted by the DDA, his valuable and infrangible rights for a speedy trial have been thrown to the winds. It is his contention that on this short ground the charges levelled against him should be quashed. This question has been considered not only by various High Courts but also by the Honble Supreme Court in a number of cases. By way of preface, the preponderance of opinion is that delay defeats justice and unless the accused is himself the cause of the delay, or the charges are of heinous nature, the inquiry should be brought to an abrupt end.

2. In Unionof India & Anr. v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 180, the petitioner had impugned the charge-sheet without even replying to it. It was clearly in these circumstances that the Honble Supreme Court held that the challenge before the Tribunal was premature. The case is thus of little relevance.

3. In Rajinder Kumar Chopra v. Food Corporation of India & Ors., 1998 Lab. I.C. 2508 and in O.P. Sachdeva & Ors. v. Food Corporation of India, New Delhi & Ors., 2000 Lab. I.C. 2040, two Division Benches of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (both judgments authored by G.S. Singhvi, J.) applied the observations of the Full Bench of that Court in Dr. Ishar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 Lab. I.C. 1256, that delay by itself is no ground to quash the proceedings. Speedy trial is no doubt a part of the right to be treated reasonably, fairly and justly, but at the same time mere delay by itself does not entitle the delinquent officer to escape the trial. The Bench thereafter observed that prima facie the charges were serious and it was impossible for the Court to nullify the proceedings of enquiry by assuming that the defence of the petitioner will necessarily be prejudiced due to the time-gap between the date of the incident and the initiation of the enquiry. However, the Full Bench had in Ishar Singhs case (supra) itself observed that there must be a bona fide and reasonable explanation for delay, absence of which would entitle the Court to intervene and examine the case. The Full Bench did not favour the view that the burden of proving prejudice to the defence lay entirely on the delinquent officer. The gravamen of the assault of the petitioner in that case appears to be that the enquiry was initiated only on his retirement and after 100% pension had been sanctioned. This is evident from the ultimate paragraph of the judgment. The conclusions of the Full Bench were :

(i) The Government has no right to withhold or postpone pension or the payment on account of commutation of pension. The State is bound to release 100 per cent pension at the time of superannuation, may be provisionally.

(ii) The Government can withhold the gratuity or other retiral benefits except pension or postpone payment of the same during pendency of an enquiry.

(iii) Pension cannot be adversely affected before a finding of guilt is returned.

(iv) The Government can initiate departmental enquiry after long lapse before retirement, rather there is no limitation for initiating the departmental enquiry from the date of incident before retirement. The delay and the explanation for the same may reasonably be taken note of keeping in view its likelihood to cause prejudice to the delinquent if the enquiry is challenged in appropriate proceedings.

(v) The enquiry proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the ground of long pendency.

(vi) There is no effect of superannuation on the pendency of the enquiry proceedings.

(vii) The recovery of the Government dues can be made from gratuity or other retiral benefits only.

4. In S.K. Sharma v. State Bank of Patiala, 1996 (3) SCC 364 [LQ/SC/1996/698] , the decision of the Trial Court was in favour of the delinquent officer on the ground that he had not been supplied with the list of witnesses and list of documents along with the charge sheet and these were also not supplied by the presenting officer during the course of enquiry. It was in this context that the Apex Court opined that while the principles of natural justice should be followed but it would not be correct to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice the order passed is altogether void. Such order can be set aside only where such a violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. The question in controversy was not one of delay in the commencement and conclusion of an enquiry. In the case of the present petitioner the controversy is whether the delay in the enquiry has caused and effected the denial of a fair hearing.

5. State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., III (1996) CLT 62 (SC)=(1996) 3 SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] ">(1996) 3 SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] , sets down that in interpreting the words sufficient cause for the purposes of delay under the Limitation Act, 1963 a pragmatic and justice oriented approach is to be preferred; since latitude within reasonable limits is permissible having regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set up involving red tapism. These observations were sought to be pressed into support for the proposition that there are bound to be delays also in the conclusion of enquiries by State bodies/authorities, but these delays should be viewed with a liberality that would sustain the enquiry rather than defeat it. In my opinion it would be inappropriate to equate appellate proceedings with those of first instance since in the former the evidence had already come on record. The challenge of inordinate delay in the enquiry proceeding is quintessentially predicated on the platform that with the passage of time evidence is lost or has become difficult to obtain and present. In Rt. Rev. B.P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. D. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser, (1996) 4 SCC 406 [LQ/SC/1996/784] , the annals of the litigation were that a learned Single Judge of the High Court had dismissed the writ petition filed against the holding of a preliminary enquiry but the Division Bench of the High Court quashed it, apparently on the grounds that the person was not called upon to participate in the Enquiry. The Honble Supreme Court restored the judgment of the Single Judge observing that the Court had no role to play since the preliminary enquiry was intended only to arrive at a conclusion as to whether a formal Enquiry was necessary. This decision has no bearing on the case in hand.

6. The ratio of Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad v. Sachindra Nath Pandey & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 134 [LQ/SC/1995/255] , can be found in the following paragraph :

On a perusal of charges, we find that the charges are very serious. We are, therefore, not inclined to close the matter only on the ground that about 16 years have elapsed since the date of commencement of disciplinary proceedings, more particularly when the appellant alone cannot be held responsible for this delay. So far as the merits are concerned, we regret to say that the High Court has not dealt with the submissions and facts in support of the submission of the appellant that in spite of being given a number of opportunities the first respondent has failed to avail of them. If the appellants allegations are true then the appellant cannot be faulted for not holding a regular inquiry (recording) the evidence of witnesses and so on). The High Court has assumed, even without referring to Regulation 68 aforesaid that holding of an oral enquiry was obligatory. Indeed, one of the questions in the writ petition may be the interpretation of Regulation 68. On facts, the first respondent has his own version. In the circumstances, the writ petition could not have been allowed unless it was held that the appellants version of events is not true and that the first respondents version is true. In the circumstances, we have no alternative but to set aside the order under appeal and remit the matter to the High Court once again for disposal of the writ petition afresh in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matter is a very old one it is but appropriate that the matter is dealt with expeditiously. Perhaps, it would be appropriate if the Court looks into the records relating to the disciplinary proceedings also.

7. Learned Counsel for the DDA has also relied on the following observations in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., JT 1995 (8) SC 65 [LQ/SC/1995/1057] , on the aspect of delay defeating the enquiry outright :

The next question is whether the delay in initiating disciplinary proceeding is an unfair procedure depriving the livelihood of a public servant offending Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution. Each case depends upon its own facts. In a case of the type on hand, it is difficult to have evidence of disproportionate pecuniary resources or assets or property. The public servant, during his tenure, may not be known to be in possession of disproportionate assets or pecuniary resources. He may hold either himself or through somebody on his behalf, property or pecuniary resources. To connect the officer with the resources or assets is a tardious journey, as the Government has to do a lot to collect necessary material in this regard. In normal circumstances, an investigation would be undertaken by the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to collect and collate the entire evidence establishing the essential links between the public servant and the property or pecuniary resources. Snap of any link may prove fatal to the whole exercise. Care and dexterity are necessary. Delay thereby necessarily entails. Therefore, delay by itself is not fatal in this type of cases. It is seen that the C.B.I. had investigated and recommended that the evidence was not strong enough for successful prosecution of the appellant under Section 5(1)(e) of the. It had, however, recommended to take disciplinary action. No doubt, much time elapsed in taking necessary decisions at different levels. So, the delay by itself cannot be regarded to have violated Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution.

8. In Food Corporation of India & Anr. v. V.P. Bhatia, (1998) 9 SCC 131 [LQ/SC/1996/1649] , the Supreme Court concluded that the delay of slightly more than one year in serving the charge-sheet after the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission did not vitiate the departmental enquiry. In Secretary to Government & Anr. v. K. Munniappan, (1997) 4 SCC 255 [LQ/SC/1997/546] , the question for resolution was whether it was proper to disallow the officer to retire for the reason that charges of embezzlement had been levelled against him. The Court upheld the decision to disallow retirement and only directed an expeditious investigation.

9. Reliance was also placed on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in D.P. Lalwani v. DDA, CWP 1596/1997 decided on March 28, 2001, a careful reading of which discloses that Dr. M.K. Sharma, J. was influenced by the fact that the charge memo was issued in August, 1992 and the writ petition was filed in 1997 and throughout this period the departmental enquiry continued but the petitioner did not face any difficulty in conducting his defence. My learned Brother Dr. Sharma specifically noticed that it had not even been pleaded that prejudice to the defence had occasioned due to the delay. However, in H.C. Khura v. DDA, C.W.P. 747/98, Dr. M.K. Sharma considered it fatal that the Inspection had been carried out in 1987, but no plausible and compelling reasons had been given to explain the delay in seeking an examination in the case by the C.V.C. till February, 1995 and the issuance of the charge-sheet three days prior to the petitioners retirement on 30.11.1997. In CWP 4748/1997 Madan B. Lokur, J. followed the decision of S.K. Nagpal v. Delhi Development Authority, CWP 2810/1996 to dismiss the petition because it was proposed to impose a major penalty. In Hari Singh v. D.D.A., C.W.P. 4748/97, reliance was placed on S.K. Nagpals case (supra) by learned Counsel for the DDA who had also appeared for the D.D.A. in those proceedings, but my learned Brother Lokur, J. accepted the challenge for the reason of the absence of any explanation whatsoever for the inaction between 1986 and 1992. He was greatly influenced by the ratio of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, IV (1998) SLT 273=(1998) 4 SCC 154 [LQ/SC/1998/448] , to the effect that delay defeats justice.

10. On the other side of the watershed of the controversy of the effect of delay in departmental proceedings a number of decisions of the Apex Court can be found. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308 [LQ/SC/1990/210] , disciplinary proceedings initiated after more than 12 years were quashed. The ratio can be found in the following paragraph :

The appeal against the order dated 16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunals orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.

11. All the precedents cited before me had also been relied upon by learned Counsel for the D.D.A. before K. Ramamoorthy, J. in D.P. Bambah v. U.O.I., 74 (1998) DLT 437 [LQ/DelHC/1998/506] =1998 IV A.D. (Delhi) 240. While setting aside the charge-sheet it was observed that law imposes an obligation on the employer and the public authorities whenever there are complaints against the employee to take action with utmost dispatch unless there are valid reasons for the delay. I am in respectful agreement with my learned Brothers understanding of the various pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court as also his quoted digestion of the principle of law. Vijender Jain, J. in C.W.P. 4572/95 entitled J.S. Setia v. D.D.A. also quashed the charge-sheet dated 1.6.1994, after noticing that the Report of the C.V.C. was obtained in 1984. My learned Brother had considered the previous decisions of this Court in V.P. Bhat v. F.C.I., C.W.P. 64/92; T.C. Suri v. F.C.I., C.W.P. 63/1992; Ashok Kumar v. D.D.A., C.W.P. 3145/1995, D.P. Bambahs case (supra) as also the rejection of the Special Leave Petition in D.D.A. v. C.P. Kapoor. On similar lines, A.K. Sikri, J. in Jasbir Singh v. DDA, CWP 983/1998) quashed the charge-sheet, following the decisions of this Court in Mangat Ram v. DDA, CWP 2471/97, D.P. Bambah (supra); Chanchal Kumar Dhari v. DDA, CWP 2779/96; C.P. Kapoor (supra) and Ashok Kumar (supra). Division Benches of this Court have consistently declined to interfere in the appeals against the orders of the Single Judges.

12. State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, IV (1998) SLT 273=AIR 1998 SC 1833 [LQ/SC/1998/448] , was decided without any direct reference to Bani Singhs case, although the verdicts of both cases are similar. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had directed the State to promote the petitioner ignoring the charge-sheet, and this was sustained by the Honble Supreme Court. The Apex Court also explained its earlier decision, which has been heavily relied upon by the learned Counsel for the DDA, namely State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, in following words :

In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 [LQ/SC/1995/165] , State of Punjab was aggrieved by the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo of charges against Goyal and also the order appointing Inquiry Officer to inquire into those charges. In this case the incident, which was the subject matter of charge, happened in December, 1986 and in early January, 1987, when Goyal was working as Supdt. of Nabha High Security Jail. It was only on July 9, 1992 that memo of charges was issued to Goyal. He submitted his explanation on January 4, 1993 denying the charges. Inquiry Officer was appointed on July 20, 1993 and soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in the High Court on August 24, 1993. The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for which there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the factual position as to how the delay occurred and if Goyal had been prejudiced in any way on account of delay. This Court relied on the principles laid down in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 [LQ/SC/1991/691] : (1992 AIR SCW 1872) and said that though that case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. Referring to decision in A.R. Antulay case this Court said :

In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the Court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.

In that case this Court said that it was more appropriate and in interest of justice as well as in the interest of administration that inquiry which had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time the Court directed that Goyal should be considered forthwith for promotion without reference to and without taking into consideration the charges or the pendency of the inquiry, if he is found fit for promotion.

It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not make to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much Disciplinary Authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this parth he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations.

13. A Division Bench of this Court has relied on the pronouncement of the Apex Court in a Radhakishans case (supra) to quash the imposition of a 10% reduction of pension for a period of five years in N.S. Bhatnagar v. U.O.I., 92 (2001) Delhi Law Times 301 (DB). This penal order having been passed after six years of the retirement of the petitioner was viewed as seriously prejudicing his rights. This decision is specially significant since the Division Bench had not merely set aside an inchoate inquiry, but had gone to the extent of overruling the final decision of the inquiry because of the fact that it was rendered after inordinate and unjustified delay.

14. The DDA has referred almost several cases to the CVC for its opinion. Learned Counsel appearing for the DDA is unable to indicate any provision or regulation which mandates such a referral. It was in fact, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner who had hazarded the opinion that it is in the case of officers of the rank of Executive Engineer and above officer an inquiry, that the opinion of the CVC was required to be solicited. The similar question arose before the Division Bench of this Court in K.P. Bhatt v. FCI, CWP 64/1992. In that case the Agency was the CBI but that should not make any appreciable difference. The Honble Division Bench opined as follows :

Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Corporation submits that the enquiry was not initiated by the respondent till the year 1990 because the petitioners case was referred to CBI in the year 1987 and it was only in the year 1988 that the CBI recommended that action be initiated against the petitioner under major penalty. It is not disputed that as of today there is no enquiry officer appointed and enquiry has not proceeded between the period 14.9.1990 till date.

We find that even after the CBI had given its report for initiating action against the petitioner, the respondent Corporation did not take any action for proceeding against the petitioner till September, 1990. We also fail to understand why the respondent Corporation should have waited for any report from the CBI against the petitioner for misconduct if the misconduct was detected in the year 1987 itself. Enquiry should have started straightaway under the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1971. The respondent have failed to do that.

Under the circumstances, since no explanation is forthcoming for the inordinate delay, in initiating departmental proceedings action at this late stage cannot be sustained.

15. A distillation of the plethora of precedents would yield the results that the Court must balance public interests against the rights of the individual. Neither should be sacrified at the alter of the other. While public servants ought to be enduringly answerable for the manner in which they discharge their duties, they are not disentitled from claiming the protection of the tenants of natural justice. However this longer period of accountability attached to public office should not become a test of their endurance. The normal rule is that the initiation and the culmination of an enquiry should be diligently expeditious, since unexplained and/or unjustified delay would invalidate the exercise at its every stage. While zero tolerance would apply to trivial/minor misconducts, latitude would increase with the gravity of the offence. Protraction of proceedings, deliberate or derelictional, must be abjured. It is needless to explain that where the delay is caused by the delinquent, the Enquiry must be allowed to continue to its end. Once the alleged misconduct is detected the process must proceed with all reasonable dispatch. A late detection should not render the Enquiry irregular. Public interests would be served by a quick and speedy end to the Enquiry; it is not cynical to profess the view that Enquiries are deliberately stretched in order to protect the accused or to ensure that a pandoras box is not opened, revealing a larger conspiracy and accountability. Permitting inordinate delay runs counter to the common weal. Most often it is deliberately planned so that the truth does not surface. Enquiries usually commence with a defalcation becoming a public scandal, and delay directly results in its hushing up, since public memory is infamously short. If Courts stringently quash delayed enquiries the result would be their expeditious conclusion since otherwise the Department, which is already embarrased by the scandal, would be rocked by failure to prove or disprove the charges. That the protraction of proceedings may be a concerted effort of all concerned can be gathered from the needless reference of moot of the cases to the Central Vigilance Commisson (CVC) even though the DDA has its own vigilance machinery. In condoning delay, the Court tends to allow uncomfortable truths to be swept under the carpet into obscurity. Where enquiries coincide with the promotional rights/chances of the officer charged with misconduct, the Judge must be alive to the likelihood of it being intentional and motivated, rather than coincidental and truthful. While deciding a writ petition challenging the legal propriety of continuance of Enquiry proceedings on the grounds of inordinate delay, the Court is not expected to assess the relative strengths of the prosecutions case and/or of the defence. That is essentially the function of the Enquiry. However, once substantial delay has transpired, what the Court must carefully examine is whether, even on a cursory perusal of the charges, the case is worthy of continuance. This is primarily for the reason that where the departmental proceedings have become inordinately protracted the requirement of conducting a speedy trial has been violated but also that it would be fair to infer from the delay that the Enquiry was initiated and continued for some oblique motive. Charge-sheet and Enquiry can never be permitted to be misused as tools for a witch-hunt or an inquisition, or a means to steal a march in promotions. Where progress to the next higher post is impeded because of the initiation of a charge-sheet or Enquiry, innocence must be zealously presumed until guilt stands established. This approach is definitely conducive for proper administration, including that of justice.

16. These principles must now be applied to the facts of the present petition. The petitioner joined the DDA in the post of Assistant Engineer in October, 1969 and was promoted to the post of an Executive Engineer on 1.12.1978. In CWP 4145/98 it is alleged that he was Incharge of the Housing Division XII, which was for the internal development at Avantika. The estimate cost of the works was Rs. 1,56,660/- and it was to be completed between 17.5.1983 and 16.7.1983. The work was, however, abandoned/rescinded and was subsequently executed at the risk and costs of the original Contractor. The counter claim for Rs. 86,194/- was filed against the original Contractor but was rejected by the Arbitrator. The petitioners case is that the bitumen was to be procured by his junior officer from the Store Department of the DDA. Since the bitumen was not supplied the work could not be completed by the original Contractor and for this very reason the DDAs claim was rejected. The memorandum of charges was issued on 25.11.1985, to which the petitioner replied on 30th January, 1986, i.e. within two months. No progress was made by the DDA for one full decade, but strangely another memorandum was issued on 9.4.1996. This was again replied to by the petitioner on 30.8.1996 and was followed by Reminders dated 17.12.1996 and 8.9.1997. The impugned charge-sheet was issued on 22.10.1997, i.e. just four days prior to the petitioners retirement. Beyond stating that the matter was being investigated, no explanation is forthcoming as to why it took the DDA eighteen long months to prepare a charge-sheet in a matter which had been lingering for ten long years. The only possible conclusion is that the inordinate delay in the inquiry deserves that it be quashed. In the first place the amount is relatively insignificant. Secondly, since it was timed with the retirement of the official, there is every possibility that the action was not bona fide. In CW 6081/1998 this very petitioner had been charge-sheeted one day prior to his retirement for alleged irregularities committed five years earlier, and that too for a loss of approximately Rs. 15,000/-. In CW 6048/98, this very person is accused of causing a loss of Rs. 60,000/- during his posting in 1991-1992. The alleged misconduct was discovered in 1993 but no action was taken till virtually the eve of his retirement in October, 1997. The coincidence in these charges of trivial nature, cannot be viewed in any manner other than manifesting a witch-hunt. The petitioners rights to a speedy trial have been violated. The petition is, accordingly, allowed and the charge-sheet bearing No. E.26(421)86/VIG/11835 dated 22.10.1997 is quashed.

C.M. 8620/98 :

17. In view of the above judgment no further orders are called for.

18. The application is disposed of accordingly.