K. Ramamoorthy, J.

1. The petitioner joined the Delhi Development Authority (for short DDA) as Junior Engineer. He was promoted as Asistant Engineer with effect from February, 1977. He was further promoted to the post of Executive Engineer on current duty charge with effect from 4.7.1983. With effect from February, 1986 he was regularised in the post of Executive Engineer.

2. The next higher post is Superintending Engineer. For the purpose of being considered for the post of Superintending Engineer, the Executive Engineer should have served in that capacity for a period of seven years. The Departmental Promotion Committee was to be held on 26.7.1996. The petitioner was issued with the charge-sheet on 25.7.1996. On 2.8.1996 the petitioner had filed the writ petition challenging the issue of charge-sheet on the ground of delay.

3. According to the petitioner the DDA with a view to promoting Mr. Sajjan, this method had been adopted. It was only Mr. Sajjan who was instrumental in charge-sheet being issued against the petitioner.

4. The (Central Technical Examiner) C.T.E. had made inspection of the works in November, 1984. In the charge-sheet irregularities were mentioned with reference to the payment made to the Contractor resulting in some temporary benefits to the contractor. A Memorandum was issued on 21.3.1994, after 10 years of the date of inspection which was in November, 1984 to the petitioner. The petitioner asked for inspection of certain relevant documents vide letter dated 4.4.1994. The petitioner filed a reply on 14.6.1994 explaining that no action could be taken against him. Nothing was done by the respondents after receiving the said reply from the petitioner and all of sudden a charge-sheet dated 25.7.1996 was issued to the petitioner.

5. According to the DDA the charges involved technical aspect of the construction and reports from the technical personnel were required. The matter was under preliminary investigation by the Director of Vigilance, Technical Examiner (Vigilance) and also Central Vigilance Commission. It is stated that the works was inspected by C.T.E in November, 1984 and the matter was referred to Vigilance in December, 1984 after obtaining comments/clarification from C.T.E., preliminary investigation was completed in April, 1993 and the Memo was issued to the petitioner in 1994. The Articles of charges given in the charge-sheet are as follows:

ARTICLE-I

That the said Shri D.P. Bambah while working as E.E./H.D.-30 was the-incharge of the works of c/o 96-3 bedrooms (type-III) 96 -2 bedrooms (type-II) and 144 scooter garages at Janakpuri, Block-B i/c internal development of land, executed vide agreement No. 41/EE/HD-7/81-82. That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah had allowed the rate for payment of secured advance on bricks and brick tiles higher than the rate payable which resulted into temporary over payment to the tune of about Rs. 1,68,643.

ARTICLE-II

That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah in the capacity as stated in Article-I above had made the payment against agreement items Nos. 5.1, 11.1 and 11.2 at part rates instead of making payment as secured advance for the material brought at site. This act resulted into temporary over payment to the tune of about Rs. 1,89,727.

ARTICLE-III

That the said Shri D.P. Bambah while working in the capacity as stated in Article-I above had made the payment against agreement item No. 6.7 for providing and fixing steel windows but the windows (fixed or not fixed) were not brought at site by the agency. This resulted into overpayment to the tune of about Rs. 50,987.

ARTICLE-IV

That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah while working in the capacity as stated in Article-I above had made the payment against agreement item No. 6.7 for providing and fixing steel windows at part rate. The part rate released was mere because glass panes were not brought at site by the agency. This resulted into overpayment to the tune of about Rs. 34543.

ARTICLE-V

That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah while working in the capacity as stated in Article-I above had made the payment against agreement items Nos. 11.3 and 11.15 at part rates instead of making the payment as secured advance for the material brought at site. This resulted into temporary overpayment to the tune of about Rs. 34,262.

ARTICLE-VI

That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah while working in the capacity as stated in Article-1 above had made less recovery to the tune of about Rs. 3 lacs vide 34th R/A bill for the departmental material issued to the agency and no certificate regarding availability of balance departmental material at store/site has been recorded in the bill. That the said Sh. D.P. Bambah neither made the recovery of outstanding about Rs. 4,14,000 on account of secured advance paid for the material brought at site by the agency nor did record the certificate regarding availability of balance material at site and did not get indenture of secured advance signed from the agency.

Sh. D.P. Bambah, EE by his above acts exhibited mala fides, dereliction of duty and behaved in manner unbecoming of an employee of DDA thereby violating Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 as made applicable to the employees of D.D.A.

Sd/-

6. The authority made investigation in 1984 and prima facie the charges appeared to be not of any technical nature and the investigation report made in 1984 should have been considered seriously by the DDA and if so advised action should have been taken against the concerned officer immediately. The department cannot take its own time referring the matter to the Vigilance Department and later on issue charge-sheet against the concerned officer. In the counter affidavit except stating that the matter was referred to the Vigilance Department, no explanation has been given by the DDA as to why action could not be taken on the basis of the report given by the C.T.E. in December, 1984. It is not the case of the DDA that on the basis of the report given in December, 1984, no action could have been taken against the petitioner. In C.W. 3145/94, the Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the question of delay in initiating disciplinary action under similar circumstances, on the similar question and came to the conclusion that the charge-sheet was issued belatedly and the charge-sheet was liable to be quashed. The question was again considered by me in C.W. No. 2648/96 (Sh. C.P. Kapoor v. Delhi Development Authority) following the decision of the Division Bench and the writ petition was allowed on 22.1.1998.

7. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal, learned Counsel for the DDA submitted that the DDA had to wait for the reports from the various agencies, that DDA had not been keeping quiet that the petitioner was also asked to explain a few things to which the petitioner had responded, that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner if inquiry is held pursuant to the charge-sheet. issued in 25.7.1996 and that the charges are of such a nature that it requires invesitation by Vigilance Department.

8. The learned Counsel Mr. Vinay Sabharwal submitted that the Court has to ask itself whether in such cases employee would be prejudiced in the inquiry. According to the learned Counsel, on the facts and circumstances of this case the answer is emphaitic because the petitioner knows all the facts and the enquiry is to be conducted only on the basis of the records and, therefore, there is no room for anybody coming out on the basis of memory.

9. The learned Counsel Mr. Vinay Sabharwal relied upon a number of authorities. The learned Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Another v. R. Rajan, etc., 1996 (72) Indian Factories and Labour Reports 294 which is=JT 1995 (8) SC 447 [LQ/SC/1995/1210] . The learned Counsel also submitted that the Courts cannot interfere at the stage of enquiry and the petitioner could always challenge the final order if it goes against him.

10. The learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in The Managing Director, Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Another v. R. Rajan etc., JT 1995(8) SC 447 [LQ/SC/1995/1210] . There the Secretary and President respectively of the Association of the Assistant Engineers in the service of the Madras Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board were subject to disciplinary action. The Board ultimately issued notices along with copy of Inquiry Officers report, depositions of witnesses were enclosed. At that stage the Secretary and the President approached Madras High Court challenging the in action of the Board dismissing them from service and they are being victimised for their Union activities.

11. The Board contended that the Court cannot interfere at the stage of inquiry. A statement was made on behalf of the Board before the learned Single Judge that the Board did not propose to impose the punishment of dismissal on the respondents (writ petitioners) even if the charges against them were established. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that no interference was called for at that stage but observed that even if the charges are held proved against the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service was not to be imposed on the petitioners in the light of the statement made on behalf of the respondents.

12. The two officers carried the matter in appeal. The Division Bench after examining the relevant regulations came to the conclusion that the Managing Director was not competent to impose the penalty of dismissal. The appeals were disposed of. Against that decision of the Division Bench the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court was invited to decide the question whether the Managing Director had the power to impose the punishment of dismissal. The Supreme Court did not go into that question. I failed to see how this decision would be of any help to the respondents.

13. The learned Counsel Mr. Vinay Sabharwal referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rt. rev. B.P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. D. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser, 1996(4) SCC 406. The Diocese of Medak is running a Technical Institute at Secunderabad A.P. The Socio-economic Board who was concerned with the administration of the institutions resolved to appoint Inquiry Commission to enquire into the acts of commission and omission on the part of Principal of the Technical Institute. The Commission of Enquiry was constituted. The Commission of Inquiry submitted its report holding that there was sufficient material in support of charges made against the Principal. Thereupon the Diocesan Executive Committee issued a notice calling upon the Principal to show cause why she should not be dismissed from service. Challenging the show-cause notice and also the action of the Diocese of Medak in constituting the inquiry officer the Principal filed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed the writ petition as pre-mature. There was an appeal to the Division Bench. The Division Bench by order dated 1.2.1996. allowed the appeal on the view that the terms of reference made to the Inquiry Commission were vague and general and that there was an "element of mala fides" on the part of the Diocese of Medak in initiating the said proceedings and that the order of suspension dated 12.6.1995 having come to an end on 12.10.1995 the Principal was entitled to be restored to the position Principal. This order of Division Bench was challenged by the Diocese of Medak in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held in para 6:

It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in view of the two decisions of the same High Court in M. Chandrasekhara Rao v. Secy. & Correspondent, Sri Sarvodaya College and Y. Philomena (Dr.) v. Govt. of A.P., the Division Bench should not have directed the appellant, by issuing a writ of mandamus, "to arrange for the petitioner to assume charge as Principal", in view of the serious irregularities found to have been committed by her. In M. Chandrasekhara Rao case the High Court after considering the effect of Section 79(3) of the A.P. Education Act, 1982 (1 of 1982) has held that in a case where there are grave charges of misconduct, whatever may be the reason for not completing the inquiry within the prescribed time, the interest of the institution and the employee would be best served if a direction is given to the management to continue to pay to the employee the salary and allowances of the post held by him instead of directing reinstatement/restoration of the employee into the service. The said view was reiterated by a Division Bench of the High Court in Dr. Philomens case and it has been observed therein that though Section 79(3) is mandatory and on the expiry of the specified period the employee would be entitled to be restored to the same position and status as he or she occupied as on the date of the order of suspension, but such restoration cannot be automatic in all circumstances and the Court may in restoration or reinstatement, strike an equibalance between the right of the employee vis-a-vis the right of the institution/society and the discipline among the co-employees. Unfortunately, the High Court did not consider this aspect and has ordered restoration of respondent-l on the post of the Principal. From the material on record we find that the charges levelled against respondent-l are quite serious. They pertain not only to administrative irregularities but also to financial irregularities and disobedience. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we think it just and proper to set aside the direction for restoration of respondent-1 on the post of Principal and instead direct the appellant to go on paying full salary and allowances to her till the inquiry is over. We also direct the appellant to conclude the inquiry within four months from today. Respondent-l shall also co-operate with the inquiry in order to see that it is completed within the time fixed by us. This appeal is allowed accordingly.

14. The argument of Mr. Vinay Sabharwal is that when there are grave charges of misconduct and whatever may the reason for not completing the inquiry, and however prolong the delay, he will be entitled only to subsistence allowance and the charges cannot be quashed.

15. The DDA has not mentioned in the counter affidavit as I had referred to above as to why no action could be taken against the petitioner while C.T.E. had given the report in December, 1984. The persons who had committed misconduct should not go unpunished but at the same time the D.D.A. cannot act like Rip Van Winkle when the charges which had already referred to, could be investigated and enquired into by a competent Engineer and assistance of Vigilance Department is not at all necessary. It is not explained as to why the superior officer who is an Engineer could not apply his mind and hold the inquiry against the petitioner in 1985 or 1986. The DDA had been indulging in unnecessary correspondence. If ultimately the petitioner is exonerated and by the time the inquiry is completed, if he retires the petitioner would have been deprived of his legitimate progress in the profession in the ladder of service. That is the reason why the Courts had always insisted that there should not be undue delay in departmental action against employees. The assertation by the learned Counsel that the charges are very grave is not of any moment because the charges are not of such gravity that it should have been taken 12 years for the DDA to issue charge-sheet to the petitioner and that is the crux of the matter.

16. The learned Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995(1) Vol.103 SLR 700. In the case before the Supreme Court the High Court of Punjab quashed the memo of charges and issued a direction to the State of Punjab to consider the case of the employee for promotion according to law. The respondent before the Supreme Court was the Superintendent of Nabha High Security Jail in the year 1986. A few terrorists who were held in the jail made an attempt to escape. It was alleged against the employee that he yielded to illegal demand from the extremists and as a result thereof one of the detenus assumed the leadership of the prison population and dictated terms to the administration. The employee accepted a farewell party from a terrorist on the receipt of a promotion order. The terrorists who were trying to escape were apprehended and they had confessed that they had been planning this escape for about a month. The Inspector General of Prisons who was asked to give a report held the employee responsible for the situation. On 25.3.1992, he was asked to appear before the Secretary, Home Department and he was issued with a memo of charges on 19.7.1992. The employee submitted his explanation on 4.1.1993 denying the charges mentioned in the memo. On 20.7.1993, the Government appointed an Inquiry Officer. The employee (respondent before the Supreme Court) approached the High Court seeking the quashing of the charges and the orders appointing the Inquiry Officer. The writ petition was entertained but there was no interim order passed.

17. The evidence on behalf of the Government was completed during the pendency of the petition. The employee had examined his advance witnesses. At that state the High Court allowed the writ petition on 25.8.1994. One of the points raised before the Supreme Court was the delay in issuing the charges. The Supreme Court observed:

Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after laspe of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the Delinquent Officer in defending himself, the inquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the Court has to indulge in a process of balancing.

18. The learned Counsel relied upon para 12 of the judgment wherein the Supreme Court had observed:

The principles to be borne in mind in this behalf have been set out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayakand Another, (1992)(1) SCC 225). Though the said case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case". It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the Court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.

19. The Supreme Court held: "applying the balancing process, we are of the opinion that the quashing of charges and of the order Appointing Inquiry Officer was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In para 14 the Supreme Court observed:

The High Court had relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr., 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 738 on the question of delay. That was a case where the charges were served and disciplinary inquiry sought to be initiated after a lapse of twelve years from the alleged irregularities. From the report of the judgment, the nature of the charges concerned therein also does not appear. We do not know whether the charges there were grave as in this case. Probably, they were not. There is another distinguishing feature in the case before us by the date of the judgment of High Court, the major part of the inquiry was over. This is also a circumstance going into the scales while weighing the factors for and against. As stated hereinabove, whereever delay is put forward as a ground for quashing the charges, the Court has to weigh all the factors, both for and against the Delinquent Officer and come to a conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances. In the circumstances, the principle of the said decision cannot help the respondent.

20. In the case before the Supreme Court, charges were grave and the national security was involved. Therefore, the ratio laid down in that case would not apply to the present case. The learned Counsel for the DDA referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and Another v. F.X. Fenlando, (1994)(1) SLR 820. In the case before the Supreme Court the respondent employee joined the Co-operative Department as Deputy Registrar in the year 1969. He was promoted as Joint Registrar in 1981. He became the Joint Registrar/Special Officer of the Park Town Co-operative Whole sale Stores Ltd. in 1984. Complaints were received by the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. The Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department was requested to complete the inquiry on or before 31.12.1987 but nothing was done.

21. On 17.3.1988, the Government of Tamil Nadu amended Rule 12 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. On the basis of this amendment. A submission was made that action could be taken only by the Government and not by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The charge memo was issued on 20.3. 1989.The inquiry was conducted. The employee had participated in the inquiry and cross-examined one witness. Having participated in the inquiry proceedings the employee made a complaint against the inquiry officer stating that he was biased against him and that complaint was rejected. The employee filed OA No. 1294 of 1990 before the Tamil Nandu Administrative Tribunal to quash the order dated 8.5.1990. By an order dated 19.3.1991 the Tribunal set aside the proceedings on the ground that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was not empowered to impose even minor penalty and it was open to the Government as Disciplinary Authority to initiate fresh action by issuing a charge memo and conclude the proceeding within a period of six months. It was this order of the Administrative Tribunal that was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. While doing so, the Supreme Court observed:

Then again the finding that there is long delay in initiating of departmental proceedings cannot be supported because in this case the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption had not been promoted. Therefore, the appellant cannot be faulted.

22. The facts are distinguishable and the charges against the Joint Registrar were such that they were to be enquired into by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. Therefore, the facts of this case do not resemble the facts of the Supreme Court. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal tried to rely upon the above observation of the Supreme Court about the delay and in my view, that does not help the DDA. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in The Deputy Registrar, Co-Operative Societies, Faridabad v. Sachindra Nath Pandey & Ors., JT 1995 (2) SC 407 [LQ/SC/1995/255] . In the case before the Supreme Court the first respondent was appointed as a Co-operative Supervisor in 1961. In August, 1976, he was working as Seed Store Incharge-cum-Secretary, Sahkari Sangh, Raniwan. On the 19th of August, 1976 he was transferred to Gonda, but he did not hand over the charge and he was absconded. A police complaint was lodged against him for criminal breach of trust in November, 1976. On 13.12.1976 he was placed under suspension pending inquiry. Memo of charges were issued to him but that could not be served according to the department because the first respondent was avoiding service, he did not also co-operate to conduct the inquiry. By an order dated 20th of April, 1978, the first respondent was dismissed from service. The first respondent filed an appeal but while the appeal was pending he filed a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad and he sought to withdraw the appeal but the Appellate Authority dissmised the appeal on merits.

23. On 15.1.1992 the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition on the only ground that a copy of the Inquiry Officers Report was not furnished to the first respondent before dismissing him and that was a grave violation of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court observed "though he was apprised of the inquiry, he did not care to attend in-spite of repeated opportunities. In such a situation he cannot complain of not recording the evidence of witnesses and other evidence."

24. The argument on behalf of the first respondent was that there was delay. The Supreme Court dealt with this aspect, observing:

On a perusal of charges, we find that the charges are very serious. We are, therefore, not inclined to close the matter only on the ground that about 16 years have elapsed since the date of commencement of disciplinary proceedings, more particularly when the appellant alone cannot be held responsible for this delay. So far as the merits are concerned, we regret to say that the High Court has not dealt with the submissions and facts in support of the submission of the appellant that in spite of being given a number of opportunities the first respondent has failed to avail of them. If the appellants allegations are true then the appellant cannot be faulted for not holding a regular inquiry (recording the evidence of witnesses and so on). The High Court has assumed, even without referring to Regulation 68. On facts, the first respondent has his own version. In the circumstances, the writ petition could not have been allowed unless it was held that the appellants version of events is not true and that the first respondents version is true. In the circumstances, we have no alternative but to set aside the order under appeal and remit the matter to the High Court once again for disposal of the writ petition afresh in the light of the observations made herein. Since the matter is very old one it is but appropriate that the matter is dealt with expeditiously. Perhaps, it would be appropriate if the Court looks into the records relating to the disciplinary proceedings also.

25. It may be noticed that the first respondent was absconding and he did not co-operate in the conduct of the inquiry and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that the department alone was not responsible for the delay. Therefore, in my view, the Supreme Court has not laid down any ratio which could be made applicable to the facts of the present case.

26. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal, learned Counsel for the DDA referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Secretary to Government and Another v. K. Munniappan, 1997(4) SCC 255. In this case before the Supreme Court a embazzlement of the fund of the Government to the tune of Rs. 7.82 crores was complained and the point taken before the Supreme Court was that the authority who had issued the suspension order was not competent to issue the same. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal referred to this case only to show when grave charges are pending against the employee he could not be shown any indulgence by the Court:

27. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal submitted that while considering the delay in issuing the charge it should not considered as if the delay coming under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and assuming it to be so the Supreme Court had held some latitude should be shown to the Government authorities and he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Others, 1996 (3) SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] ">1996 (3) SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] . He relied upon para 11 of the judgment. Para 11 reads as under:

It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the Stateare barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cuase to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delayintentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.

28. I fail to see how this approach would advance the case of the D.D.A. Mr. Vinay Sabharwal submitted that the Investigating Agency takes its own time and, therefore, once there is no prejudice caused to the employee who can participate in the inquiry and defend his case he cannot seek to quash the charges, however, the long delay might have been in issuing charge-sheet. I am not able to agree. The law imposes an obligation on the employer and the public authorities whenever there are complaints against the employee to take action with utmost dispatch unless there are valid reasons for the delay. The DDA cannot call in aid the facts of the other cases where Courts had not taken the delay to be of any consequence on the facts and circumstances of those cases and say that there is no delay in issuing the charge-sheet warranting the annulling of the same. The Division Bench in C.W. No. 3145 of 1994 by its judgment dated 1.5.1995 had allowed the writ petition after considering all the relevant aspects. I respectfully follow the same. On the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not find any justification for the DDA in issuing the charge memo, on 25.7.1996 when CTE had given the report in December, 1984.

29. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed and the charge-sheet dated 25.7,1996 stands set aside and the DDA is directed to open the sealed cover placed before the DPC on 26.7.1996 and issue order as per the recommendations of the DPC. The DDA shall pass the order on or before 30.6.1998 and shall grant the petitioner all the consequential benefits. There shall be no order as to costs.