Dilip Gupta, J.

1. This petition seeks the quashing of the order dated 7th September, 2009 passed by the District Magistrate, Azamgarh by which the firearm licence of the petitioner has been suspended pending enquiry for its cancellation under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. The petitioner was granted the firearm licence in 2005. The impugned order recites that Crime Case No. 296 of 2004 (according to the petitioner it is 296 of 2005) under Sections 325 323 and 504 Indian Penal Code and Crime Case No. 408 of 2006 under Section 160 Indian Penal Code are pending against the petitioner and as the possession of the firearm with the petitioner will be detrimental for the security of the public peace and public safety, it was necessary to revoke the licence. The petitioner has, therefore, been asked to submit a reply within 15 days as to why his licence may not be revoked but in the meantime the licence of the petitioner has been suspended pending enquiry and he has been asked to deposit the firearm in the police station.

3. The sole contention advanced by Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the firearm licence cannot be suspended by the District Magistrate pending enquiry and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1996 (Supp.) AWC 92.

4. Learned Standing Counsel has, however, contended that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity and has submitted that the firearm licence can be suspended pending enquiry for cancellation of the licence.

5. In order to appreciate the contentions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties, it is necessary to quote Section 17(3) of the Act, which is as follows:

17 (3). The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence-

(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or

(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or

(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it.; or

(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under Sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence.

6. A Full Bench of this Court consisting of five Honble Judges in the case of Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1985 (11) ALR 451 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ">1985 (11) ALR 451 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] had the occasion to examine the orders by which the firearms licence was cancelled and a direction had been given to deposit the firearm forthwith. These orders were sought to be challenged on the ground that they were passed without any notice to the petitioners or opportunity of hearing having been given to them prior to the cancellation of the licence. The Full Bench while observing that the licence for acquisition and possession of firearms is merely a personal privilege and the grant of privilege does not involve the adjudication of the rights of an individual and nor does it entail civil consequences, held that the or the Rules made thereunder do not contemplate a notice being given to the licence holder before cancelling or varying or suspending the licence but nevertheless, the act of cancelling or refusing to renew the licence leads to grave consequences. In this context it observed:

In the instant case the gun licences of the petitioners were cancelled without any prior notice to them and in Writ Petition No. 9379 of 1984 the operation of the impugned order which directed the petitioners to surrender their guns was stayed by this Court. In Writ Petition No. 9394 which was directed against a similar order the sole petitioner was directed to deposit his firearm with the dealer who would keep the same in safe custody during the pendency of the writ petition. The impugned order expressly recited that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace from the petitioners if they were allowed to retain their firearms. Hence, cancellation of their firearms licences without any prior notice to them might be justified but the ingredients of natural justice would not be satisfied until the petitioners were subsequently afforded an opportunity of hearing and making representations against the impugned order. This being the legal aspect of the case I am of the opinion that the law laid down in paragraph 16 in Chhanga Prasad Sahus case (supra) extracted in the earlier part of this judgment must be supplemented by the further observations that after making the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file objections against the preliminary order and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. In other words, it is incumbent upon the licensing authority to refrain from attaching finality to the order of cancellation until the aggrieved petitioner has been heard by such authority and his objections adjudicated. The licensing authority can also for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until the objections have been decided. It follows that in the event of the objections being allowed the licence as well as the firearm must be restored to the licence holder.

7. It would, therefore, be seen that the cancellation of the firearms licences without any prior notice was held to be valid but in order to ensure that the ingredients of natural justice were satisfied, the petitioners were afforded subsequent opportunity of hearing and making representations against the impugned orders. The Court was of the opinion that the law laid down by the earlier Full Bench of three Honble Judges in the case of C.P. Sahu v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1984 AWC 145 must be supplemented by the further observations that after making provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence, the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him opportunity to file objections against the preliminary order and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. However, the licensing authority could also, for furtherance of the immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until the objections were decided.

8. In the case of C.P. Sahu (supra) the question that had been referred to Full Bench was whether there was power to suspend a firearm licence pending enquiry into its cancellation or suspension and in this context it was observed:

...As already explained, if there already is material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent to it that possession of arms by the licensee is going to endanger public peace and safety, it can straightaway and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke/suspend the arms licence after recording reasons therefore and if the licensee is aggrieved by such orders, he will have a right to ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority. However, if there is no such material before the licensing authority and it is not apparent to it that there is an immediate danger to public peace and safety and it, on some information being laid before it, proceeds to find out whether there is any likelihood of public peace and safety being affected at some future date, it cannot be said that there is any such urgency so as to justify the revocation/cancellation of the licence even before the licensing authority gets so satisfied. In the circumstances, considering the nature and the object of the enquiry which a licensing authority is required to make for finding out if the facts justifying passing of an order for revocation/suspension of licence exist, it cannot be said that non-conferment of the power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry has the effect of defeating the object for which such a power has been conferred upon the licensing authority.

9. In the case of Balram Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1988 AWC 1481 [LQ/AllHC/1988/570 ;] ">1988 AWC 1481 [LQ/AllHC/1988/570 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1988/570 ;] , a Full Bench of this Court consisting of three Honble Judges was called upon to examine the validity of the order whereby the firearm licence had been suspended pending proceedings for revocation and a further direction had been issued to the Station Officer to ensure the deposit of the firearms at the police station. The two questions formulated by the Full Bench were:

(1) The power to suspend an arms licence is not included in the power to cancel the licence.

(2) The power to suspend an arms licence cannot be exercised during the proceedings for its cancellation.

10. The Full Bench, after considering the various provisions of Section 17(3) of the Act, observed as follows:

...Therefore, we have not a minutes hesitation in holding that the effect of a combined reading of Sub-section (3) and Clause (b) thereof is that whenever a proceeding under Sub-section (3) is initiated for suspending or revoking a licence and the licensing authority deems it necessary for security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence, the said authority can in exercise of that power suspend the licence during pendency of these proceedings, without any hindrance from other provisions in the....

11. It was also observed:

This takes us to the practical effect of Kailash Naths case. Let us suppose that an order of revoking the licence is passed by the licensing authority because he feels that security of public peace or public safety is at stake. The consequences of this order are to be found in Sub-section (10) which says that on the suspension or revocation of a licence the holder of the licence shall immediately surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked. A similar provision exists in Section 21 which notices some other contingencies also. It follows that the order revoking the licence necessarily divests the licence holder of his right to possess the fire-arm. It has been held in Kailash Naths case that after having revoked the licence, a post decisional hearing may be afforded to the licence-holder which again follows that if his objections are accepted, the licensing authority may withdraw his order and if rejects it, the revocation order becomes absolute. From a practical point of view finality to the revocation order can be attached only after the said objection has been decided. During this interim period, the licence remains inoperative and the arm remains deposited with the authority or with the officer as directed by the authority. From any point of view, this is nothing but suspending the licence during pendency of the revocation proceedings. Moreover in Kailash Naths case, the legal position is accepted that an order of suspending/revoking the arms licence without notice to the persons aggrieved, can be assailed in an appeal and further that proceedings for cancellation of the licence should be proceeded by notice to the licence holder. Thus, if and when an order revoking/suspending the licence is made separately from an order directing the licence holder to show cause why his licence be not revoked, both the orders will be valid orders. We do not find any reason to take the view that the orders would become invalid just because they have been combined into one or that one composite order has been passed.

In view of the discussions aforesaid, it has to be held that the licensing authority is vested with the powers to suspend the licence during proceedings for its suspension or revocation under Section 17 of the.

12. The matter was again considered by a Full Bench of this Court consisting of five Honble Judges in the case of Rana Pratap Singh (supra). The Full Bench observed as follows:

...We are, with respect, constrained to hold that the extent to which it runs counter to the decisions of the Full Bench in C.P. Sahu and Kailash Naths case, it does not lay down correct law and we consequently overrule it.

Further, we also cannot but hold that the Bench fell in error in observing The radio in C.P. Sahus case that there is no power to suspend pending enquiry stands completely demolished by Kailash Naths case.

...As regards suspension of an arms licence, by the licensing authority during the enquiry, this, it may be clarified, may be done only in the manner as explained in the judgment in C.P. Sahus case (supra) and not without application of mind and recording of reasons by the licensing authority with such reasons and circumstances being in consonance with the provisions of the Arms Act.

13. Thus, the Full Bench in Rana Pratap Singh (supra) clearly observed that arms licence could be suspended during the enquiry but only in the manner explained in the judgment in C.P. Sahus case (supra).

14. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 34348 of 2003 (Shafat Khan v. State of U.P. and Ors.), while answering the reference made by a learned Judge of this Court doubting the correctness of a judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in Satish Chandra v. State of U.P. and Anr. 2003 (1) JIC 33 (All.), wherein it had been held that while passing the order of suspension of the licence of arms under the Arms Act, 1959, the authority cannot direct the licence holder to deposit the arm with the police station or arms dealer, has also observed that the Full Bench of this Court in Rana Pratap Singh (supra) held that the firearm licence could be suspended during enquiry but only in the manner explained in the judgment in C.P. Sahus case (supra).

15. The issue as to whether the firearm licence can be suspended pending enquiry for cancellation also came up for consideration before a learned Judge of this Court in Ramesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 2007 (3) ALJ 300 in which the aforesaid Full Bench decisions were considered and the Court observed as follows:

The above pronouncement by five Judge Full Bench clears the mist created by effect and consequence of earlier three Full Bench judgments. Paragraph 32 of the judgment specifically shows that the suspension can be done during the enquiry but it immediately gives a caution that it can be done only in manner as explained in the judgment of Chhanga Prasad Sahu and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) as quoted above.

Five Judge Bench in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) is the Full Bench which had considered all the earlier three Full Benches and has clarified the law in paragraph 32 of the judgment. Thus from the above pronouncement it is clear that suspension of arm licence pending enquiry is not a phenomena which is unknown under Section 17 but suspension of arm licence during enquiry is hedged by certain conditions as laid down in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and clarified in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) i.e. to again extract Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra):

...If there is already material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent to it that the possession of arm by the licensee is going to endanger the public peace and safety, it can in straight away and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke/ suspend the arm licence after recording reasons therefor....

16. Thus the condition precedent for suspension of arm licence pending enquiry as deducible from the above judgment is:

1. there is already material before the licensing authority to be satisfied that the possession of arm by the licensee is going to endanger the public peace and safety;

2. after recording reasons therefor; thus the suspension can be ordered pending enquiry of revocation only when there is already material before the licensing authority and on the said materials the licensing authority is satisfied that it is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend the licence.

17. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments in Shafat Khan (supra) and Ramesh Singh (supra), it has to be held that the firearm licence can be suspended pending enquiry but in the manner provided for in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Ramesh Singh (supra).

18. The contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner that under no circumstances the firearm licence can be suspended during proceedings for its revocation cannot, therefore, be accepted.

19. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also contended that the firearm licence had been cancelled in view of the pendency of the criminal case. This contention cannot also be accepted because a finding has also been recorded by the District Magistrate, after satisfying himself from the materials on record, that it was necessary for the security of the public peace and public safety to suspend the licence.

20. The impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity calling for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

21. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.