PALOK BASU, J.
(1.) This Full Bench has been constituted to resolve the conflict in the two decisions, one in writ petition No. 9475 of 1986 Kripa Shankar v. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur and others, and the other in Awadhesh Kumar Misra v. District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, 1988 0 AllWC 42 : (1988 All LJ 363). It appears that when this writ petition was filed before Hon. V.K. Mehrotra and Hon. Ravi S. Dhavan, JJ. the decision of Hon. K.C. Aggarwal and Hon. M.P. Singh, JJ. in Kripa Shankar's case (supra) was cited for the petitioner while the Standing Counsel relied upon Awadhesh's case (supra). Noticing a conflict in those decisions, a reference for constituting a larger Bench was made.
(2.) Balram Singh has filed this petition against the order dated 11-4-1988 passed by the A.D.M.(F.), Banda, thereby suspending the petitioner's licence for possessing, a revolver and a rifle issued under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) pending proceedings for revocation thereof, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-1. From the two reports dated 15-3-88 forwarded by the Tehsildar and the S.D.M., Banda, on the complaint of Ram Naresh, Lekhpal, the Licensing Authority was satisfied that the petitioner along with his three accomplices had reached the Tehsil premises, being armed with his licensed revolver and rifle; beat the Lekhpal in order to get an application of the petitioner for grant of pension forcibly forwarded through the Lekhpal, retreated after severely admonishing the Lekhpal; a report under Section 332, I.P.C. had been registered against him as case No. 284 of 1988 at Kotwali Banda. The A.D.M. thus suspended the arms licence on the ground that the petitioner was having 'criminal instant' and directed the petitioner to show cause why the Arms License be not cancelled and further directed the Station Officer, Pailani, to get deposited the arms of the petitioner at the Police Station and submit compliance report immediately.
(3.) We have heard Sri Gopal Swarup Chaturvedi on behalf of the petitioner as regards the legal questions. Though Sri R.C. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to go into the factual aspects but we did not permit because the writ petition has to go back to the appropriate Bench after we resolve the supposed conflict. We have also heard Sri M.C. Dwivedi, learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
(4.) In fact, Sri Chaturvedi argued the same old questions which have been the subject matter of discussion in the two Full Bench decisions of this Court reported in 1984 All WC 145 : (1986 All LJ 328) (Sahu's case) and 1985 All WC 493 : (AIR 1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ">1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ) (Kailash Nath's case) which may be formulated as under :
(1) The power to suspend an arms licence is not included in the power to cancel the licence. (2) The power to suspend an arms licence cannot be exercised during proceedings for its cancellation.
(5.) The learned counsel for the petitioner is right when he says that in Sahu's case (which is relied upon by him) it was held that 'the Licensing Authority' has no power to suspend the arms licence pending proceedings for revocation of the arms licence. Hon. Mr. Justice H.N. Seth (as he then was) delivered the judgement on behalf of the three Hon. Judges. But, in Kailash Nath's case, which has been relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel, Hon. M.N. Shukla, C.J. delivering the leading judgement (with which Hon. M. Wahajuddin, J., Hon. R.P. Shukla, J. and Hon. A.N. Dikshita, J. agreed) held that finality to the order of revocation can be attached only after the said authority hears the licence-holder and adjudicates upon his objections. Hon'ble H.N. Seth, J. expressed his own views in paragraph 27 explaining what are the implications of Sahu's case. However, the effect of the concluding portion of the judgement of Hon'ble M.N. Shukla C.J. as well as Hon'ble H.N. Seth, J. were one and the same i.e. the objections of the license holder were directed to be decided within three weeks. Thus there was complete unanimity in the ultimate conclusion of the said F.B., namely, that for securing public peace or safety, the licensing authority can suspend or revoke the license straightway, but, till the principles of natural justice were satisfied by giving to the license-holder an opportunity to represent, finality will not be attached to that order. Such a provisional or preliminary order (as described in Kailash Nath's case itself) is obviously suspension pending enquiry in its basic content, irrespective of the nomenclature by which it is characterised. The ratio in Sahu's case that there is no power to suspend pending enquiry stands completely demolished by Kailash Nath's case.
(6.) This being the background and the tenor of the case law, not much opening is left for this full-bench to attempt an interpretation over and above Kailash Nath's case (AIR 1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ">1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ). The said five Judge decision in Kailash Nath's case is binding on us. It may be noted that neither side has challenged the correctness of the said decision. Therefore, in trying to resolve the conflict, we will look to the provisions contained in the Act as also the ratio decidendi in Kailash Nath's case. However, for the following added reasons, we are of the view that the power of the licensing authority to suspend the licence for the entire period during which the proceedings for its revocation are going on before him, appears implicit.
(7.) Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act confer power upon licensing authority to grant different types of licences as detailed in Chapter II of the Act. Chapter III deals with the provisions relating to licences. This Chapter is applicable to all licenses issued under Section 3 or 4 or 5 of the Act. Similarly, Chapter IV indicates powers and procedures in certain given cases. Again, this chapter too applies to all licences. Therefore while referring to Section 17 of the Act contained in Chapter III, we must remember that the said section is applicable not only to a licence issued under Section 3 but it applies to licences issued under Sections 4 and 5 also. We may add that licences issued under Sections 4 and 5 may have much larger rumifications than one issued under Section 3 of the Act.
(8.) Now for our purposes, it does appear necessary to examine Section 17 of the Act. It may be noted that in the decisions referred to above it is only Section 17(3)(b) of the Act which has primarily received attention. Clause (b) alone refers to the conferment of a power which may have to be used by the licencing authority "for the security of public peace or for public safety". We have to keep in mind the objects sought to be achieved and then try to fathom the extent of the power. The provisions are :-
"17. (1) and (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) The licencing authority may, by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,- (a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . or, (b) If the licencing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence, or (c) to (e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) to (8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (9) The Central Government may, by order in the official gazette, suspend or revoke or direct any Licensing authority to suspend or revoke all or any licences granted under this Act throughout India or any part thereof. (10) On the suspension or revocation of a licence under this section the holder thereof shall without delay surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked or to such authority as may be specified in this behalf in the order of suspension or revocation."
(9.) It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the word 'or' between the words 'suspend' and 'revoke' as found in S.17(3)(b) of the Act, has to be read disjunctively and that being so, suspension cannot be used as a substantive power during proceedings for cancellation of the Arms Licence, that there is no provision in the Act or the Rules indicating as to what will be the life of an order of suspension, if passed by the licencing authority; that the Act and the Rules do not provide for any remedy by way of appeal against an interim suspension order.
(10.) Sub-Section (3) was read by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and rightly so, as conferring the powers on the licencing authority to 'suspend a licence or revoke a licence'. While referring to clause (b) the learned counsel argued that the words 'to suspend' or revoke the licence were redundant and superfluous because the parent clause already contained reference to the said two powers of suspending a licence or revoking a licence, as the case may be. On the strength of the said reading of Sub-Section (3) along with clause (b), it was argued that right to suspend was not available so long as proceedings for revoking the licence was going on.
(11.) After giving our anxious consideration to this (argument ) and having a close look at the provisions of the Act we must repel it.
(12.) The words 'suspend a licence' ..... or 'revoke a licence' exist in Sub-Section (3) which governs its five clauses. Neither clause (a) nor clause (c) nor clause (d) nor clause (e) have those words repeated, which has been done specifically in clause (b). Thus, to us it appears plain and obvious that while sub Section (3) confers the general power 'to suspend a licence' .... or 'revoke a licence', a mere specific power stands conferred by clause (b) concerning the licence. It may be noted that while preposition 'a' is found before the word 'licence' (used twice) in Sub-Section (3), the legislature has used the preposition 'the' before the word licence in sub-clause (b). Further, 'deems it necessary' is the special qualifying precondition only in clause (b). Therefore, the intention of the legislature appears clear that the licencing authority shall have the power of suspending or revoking 'the licence' concerning which the said authority has initiated proceedings under Sub-Section (3) against a licence holder because the authority 'deems it necessary'. These words indicate a case of extreme urgency. Such words are conspicuously absent in clause (a), (c), (d) or (e). Therefore, we have not a minute's hesitation in holding that the effect of a combined reading of Sub-Section (3) and clause (b) thereof is that whenever a proceeding under Sub-Section (3) is initiated for suspending or revoking 'a licence' and the licencing authority deems it necessary for security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke 'the licence', the said authority can in exercise of that power suspend the licence during pendency of the proceedings, without any hindrance from other provisions in the Act.
(13.) In this connection, another aspect of the matter cannot be lost sight of. Obtaining of a licence for possessing a fire-arm has to be held a privilege only. No civil consequences follow. Even if we were to hold that civil consequences do follow as it may in proceedings concerning licences issued under Section 4 or 5 of the Act, the security of public peace or public safety would be of paramount importance and if, to protect and preserve the same it appears "necessary", the licencing authority has that power to use, for the power to suspend such a licence is inherent in the power to cancel it. Moreover, a right of objection or representation is available to the licence-holder. Thus his individual rights are fully safeguarded. The licence-holder will have a right of appeal also as provided in Section 18 of the Act. Thus there are enough checks against a wrong order or action.
(14.) This takes us to the practical effect of Kailash Nath's case (AIR 1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ">1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ) (FB). Let us suppose that an order of revoking the licence is passed by the licencing authority because he feels that security of public peace or public safety is at stake. The consequences of this order are to be found in Sub-Section (10) which says that on the suspension or revocation of a licence the holder of the licence shall immediately surrender the licence to the authority by whom it has been suspended or revoked. A similar provision exists in Section 21 which notices some other contingencies also. It follows that the order revoking the licence necessarily divests the license holder of his right to possessing firearm. It has been held in Kailash Nath's case that after having revoked the licence, a post decisional hearing may be afforded to the licence-holder from which again it follows that if his objections are accepted, the licencing authority may withdraw his order and if it rejects it, the revocation order becomes absolute. From a practical point of view finality to the revocation order can be attached only after the said objection has been decided. During this interim period, the licence remains inoperative and the arm remains deposited with the authority or with the officer as directed by the authority. From any point of view, this is nothing but suspending the licence during pendency of the revocation proceedings. Moreover in Kailash Nath's case, the legal position is accepted that an order of suspending/revoking the arms licence without notice to the persons aggrieved, can be assailed in an appeal and further that proceedings for cancellation of the licence should be preceded by notice to the licence-holder. Thus, if and when an order revoking/ suspending the licence is made separately from an order directing the licence holder to show cause why his licence be not revoked, both the orders will be valid orders. We do not find any reason to take the view that the orders would become invalid just because they have been combined into one or that one composite order has been passed.
(15.) In view of the discussions aforesaid it has to be held that the licencing authority is vested with the powers to suspend the licence during proceedings for its suspension or revocation under Section 17 of the Act.
(16.) Incidentally, we might refer to two other decisions. The first one is reported in 1986 All WC 1074 : (1986 All LJ 1442), Raghubir Sahai v. Distt. Magistrate Jhansi. In that case, since no finding was recorded by the District Magistrate that suspension of licence was necessary for securing public peace and safety, a Division Bench, which included one of us, interfered with the order upholding the right of the District Magistrate to decide the matter after granting time to petitioner to file objections. The decision was thus applicable on the facts of that case alone. It however, appears that somehow the correct legal position emerging out of Sahu's and Kailash Nath's cases went unnoticed in the said decision, as it may well have been held that the ratio in Sahu's case (1986 All LJ 328) (FB) that there was no power to suspend the license pending enquiry has lost ground after Kailash Nath's case (AIR 1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ">1985 All 291 [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1985/288 ;] ) (FB). The second decision is another Division Bench pronouncement in C.M. Writ Petition No. 4675/1987 (Lucknow Bench) consisting of Hon'ble K.N. Mishra and Hon'ble Virendera Kumar, JJ., made on 9-3-1988. The said Division Bench has quoted extensively from Awdhesh Kumar's case and has agreed with the said case law.
(17.) After going through the decisions mentioned above along with the relevant provisions of the Act, we are of the considered view that the power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of power of revocation for effective control and regulation as also for security of public peace or public safety.
(18.) In view of the aforesaid reasons, we uphold the decision in Awdhesh Kumar's case (1988 All LJ 363) as laying down the correct law. The contrary observations made in Kripa Shanker's case, as also in Raghubir Sahai's case, (1986 All LJ 1442), are not approved.
(19.) Let the writ petition now be listed for admission before the bench concerned with this opinion. Order accordingly.
