(1) The defendants are the petitioners in this case. On the 25th May, 1964, a suit was filed by the Board of Religious Trusts for a declaration that the Thakurbari. Trustees whereof are the defendants, and all the properties attached thereto are Hindu public trust properties, and not private one. After the plaint was admitted on the 18th June, 1964, an order was passed on that very date for the plaintiff to file process-fees and written processes by the 4th July, 1964. Thereafter, several adjournments were given in the case for the purpose of filing process-fees and written processes; but the plaintiff did not comply with the order, and, ultimately, on the 14th November, 1964, the suit was dismissed for default of the plaintiff to file process-fees and processes. On the 18th February, 1965, an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff for setting aside the dismissal of the suit. In that application, the plaintiff alleged that it came to know of the order of the dismissal of the suit on the 26th December, 1964. The Court below held that the application for restoration of the suit was barred by time, and, therefore, it could not be allowed. But, it took the view that the Court was wrong in dismissing the suit on the 14th November, 1964; inasmuch as it had not fixed a date of hearing before passing the order for filing of process-fees and written processes, the Court had committed a mistake, and it could correct that mistake under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for which there was no period of limitation. The Court below, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal of the suit for default. Being thus aggrieved, the defendants have filed this revision application.

(2) The Court below has relied on a single Judge decision of this Court in Sripati Saran Parasad Singh v. Indrajit Mahton, AIR 1939 Pat 160 [LQ/PatHC/1938/209] . In that case, the Munsif of Bihai had declined to restore three rent suits under Order 9, Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the plaintiff, having been called upon to file process-fees and copies of plaint, had failed to comply with the Courts order, and the suits were dismissed for default. The learned Single Judge of this Court held that the order of the Munsif was illegal, because he had no power to require a plaintiff to file process-fees before fixing a date for the appearance of the defendant. No. authority for this proposition of law was cited for taking that view; nor any cogent reason was given for supporting the view taken by his Lordship. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to the fixing of a date before calling upon the plaintiff to file process-fees and processes. In absence of any such provision, it could be open to the Court either to fix a date for the appearance of the defendant and then demand process-fees, etc., or to require the plaintiff to file the process-fees, etc., and thereafter fix a date for the appearance of the defendant for hearing. Rule 1 (1) of Order 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Rule 5 of Order 5 lays down that the Court shall determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit; and the summons shall contain a direction accordingly: Provided that, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. Under this provision, the Court has to determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether the date to be specified in the summons will be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit. In other words, the Court, at the time of issuing summons, could determine the date on which the issues may have to be settled or the suit may have to be finally disposed of. Therefore, it is evident that the process-fees, etc., must be put in before the date to be specified in the summons is to be fixed. If that be so, the order of the Court requiring a plaintiff to file process-fees, etc., cannot be said to be unjust or illegal and can never be said to be without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, there does not appear to be any reason for holding that the order of the Court requiring the plaintiff to file process-fees and written processes before fixing a date for the appearance of the defendant was in any way illegal. The Court below, in the instant case, did not commit any error in directing the plaintiff to file process-fees and written processes.

(3) In the case in hand, in spite of several adjournments, the plaintiff did not comply with the order of the Court requiring it to file process-fees and written processes. In other words, the plaintiff did not take the necessary steps for the prosecution of the suit. The suit had, therefore, to be dismissed for default. It is true that no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure has been pointed out to us as to the power of the Court to dismiss a suit in the circumstances as in the present case. The Court thus may be held to have inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a suit for want of prosecution by the plaintiff; and an application to restore the suit may be filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, not necessary in the present case to decide definitely as to whether the restoration application could be made under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure only. The law, however, remains that, for whatever reason the suit may have been dismissed, an application for restoration of the suit has to be filed, under Article 122 of the Limitation Act, within thirty days from the date of the dismissal of the suit. Even if the suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution, as in the present case, the law of limitation is the same; and if the application is filed beyond thirty days of the date of the dismissal of the suit, the application has to be dismissed as being barred by time. In such a case, a Court cannot circumvent the law of limitation by exercising its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As pointed out in the case of Kameshwar Singh v. Ram Prasad Sharma, ILR 31 Pat 737 = (AIR 1952 Pat 478 [LQ/PatHC/1952/83] ), a Court cannot override the express provisions of law by a resort to inherent powers under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, nor can a Court ignore the specific provisions for dealing with a case by a resort to inherent jurisdiction either under Section 151 or Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the suit was dismissed on the 14th November, 1964. Even on the own case of the plaintiff, it got knowledge of the dismissal of the suit on the 26th December, 1964. The application for restoration, having been filed on the 18th February, 1965, was much beyond thirty days from the date of dismissal, or even from the date of knowledge of the dismissal of the suit. This application was obviously barred by limitation under Article 122 of the Limitation Act. The Court below also has taken this view with respect to this matter. But, after having taken that view, the Court below attempted to circumvent the law of limitation by exercising its inherent jurisdiction. The Court below was obviously wrong in invoking its inherent jurisdiction in a matter like the present one. True it is that if a Court, under its own mistake, had passed an order, it could set aside that order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in appropriate cases. In the present case, however, there was no mistake committed by the Court in passing an order calling upon the plaintiff to file process-fees etc. before fixing a date; and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction, after the remedy of the plaintiff of filing an application for restoration of the suit had become barred by time. It is, therefore, apparent that the order of the Court below setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit and restoring the suit is bad in law and the Court has committed an illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction in passing such an order. For file reasons stated above, it is clear that the ease of Sripati Saran Prasad Singh, AIR 1939 Pat 160 [LQ/PatHC/1938/209] , was not correctly decided.

(4) The application is, accordingly allow ed, the impugned order of the Court below is set aside and the application of the plaintiff for restoration of the suit is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.