1. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside the summoning order dated 6.1.2022, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala. It has been asserted that the son of the petitioners got married to the respondent on 11.11.2011. He filed a petition for divorce against the respondent. Respondent filed a false complaint against the petitioners. The petitioners were not present at their residence on 1.5.2013 and returned from Delhi on 8.5.2013. Petitioners were summoned on 5.1.2017. The petitioners filed a revision petition against the summoning order dated 5.1.2017 but the petition was dismissed on 6.1.2022. The order passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dharamshala is against law and justice, hence the same is unsustainable in law. The respondent filed a complaint under Section 406 of Cr.P.C. by abusing the rights provided to women. She suppressed the material facts from the Court that she had left her matrimonial home on 8.5.2013 on her own by saying that she was going to school where she was working as a teacher. The father-in-law lodged an FIR on 21.5.2013 under Section 366 of IPC; however, the petitioners came to know that the respondent had left the home and she was recovered from the house of Vijay Kumar at Delhi. Her statement was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., in which she expressed her desire to join the company of Vijay Kumar instead of her husband. A divorce petition is pending between the respondent and her husband in the Court of Learned Additional District Judge-II, Dharamshala at Kangra. Respondent filed a reply that she was kidnapped and her ornaments were stolen. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dharamshala also held in Criminal Case No. 297/1/13 that no case for the commission of offence punishable under Section 366 of IPC was made out against the respondent. These circumstances cast strong suspicion on the veracity of the complainant. She has not stated anything about the criminal breach of trust. The witnesses are related to the respondent and no case for the commission of offences punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 of IPC is made out. All the family members have been roped in by the respondent. The petitioners were ready to settle the matter and return the marital articles of the respondent. The marriage has already been dissolved; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the orders passed by learned JMFC and learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala be set aside.

2. I have heard Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the documents placed on record clearly show that the respondent is unworthy of credit. There is no truthfulness in the complaint filed by her. Learned JMFC, Dharamshala erred in passing the summoning order and learned Sessions Judge, Dharamshala erred in dismissing the revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the orders passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

4. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is not permissible to rely upon the material placed by the petitioner before the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Aryan Singh 2023:INSC:338 in support of his submissions. He submitted that the complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and the same should not be quashed. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

6. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana,2023:INSC:595 : (2023) 7 SCC 711 [LQ/SC/2023/711 ;] wherein it was observed at page 716:-

17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LQ/SC/2012/789] : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] [LQ/SC/2012/789] , this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)

"27. ...27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."

7. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023:INSC:511 wherein it was observed:-

26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

(Emphasis supplied)

8. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023:INSC:338, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed:

"10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider "whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not".

11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried."

9. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023:INSC:779 wherein it was observed:

"12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [2018:INSC:1205 : (2019) 14 SCC 568] [LQ/SC/2018/1616] , this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 [LQ/SC/1960/96] ) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint."

10. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the documents annexed to the petition as Annexure P-2 to P-5 to show that the complainant-victim is in litigation with her husband. She had made a statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. that she wanted to divorce her husband and wanted to reside in Delhi. However, it is not permissible to look into the documents filed along with the petition while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1982/187] : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115, [LQ/SC/1982/187] that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."

12. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."

13. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

14. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, 2021:INSC:700 : (2022) 2 SCC 129 [] : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:

"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial."

15. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023:INSC:595 : (2023) 7 SCC 711 [LQ/SC/2023/711 ;] wherein it was held:

"13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents."

16. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya wherein it was observed:

"55. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand."

(Emphasis supplied).

17. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the documents filed by the petitioner along with the petition and the Court has to confine itself to the complaint along with the material placed before the Magistrate.

18. The complainant-victim made a statement on oath that articles gifted to her at the time of the marriage were retained by the present petitioners. The respondent had left her matrimonial home and present petitioners are using the articles handed over to her at the time of the marriage. They have no right to retain those articles. The truthfulness of otherwise of this statement is not to be seen at this stage. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, 2022:INSC:1152 : (2023) 4 SCC 298 [LQ/SC/2022/1386 ;] that the High Court exercising the power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

"21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, 2023) 12 SCC 821: JT (2002) 3 SC 89 [LQ/SC/2002/225] ], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab,2020:INSC:168 : (2020) 3 SCC 317 [LQ/SC/2020/212 ;] : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC."

19. The complainant has made the statement on oath and it has to be accepted as correct. Further, the statement is corroborated by the ground taken in the present petition that the petitioners were ready to return the articles kept with them which clearly shows that the articles were handed over to the petitioners and have not been returned.

20. Therefore, it cannot be said at this stage that the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence punishable under Section 406 of IPC. Hence, there is no error on the part of the learned JMFC, Dharamshala in issuing the summons or on the part of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dharamshala in dismissing the revision.

21. The first revision preferred by the petitioners was dismissed and there is a specific bar to filing the second revision. It was laid down by the Madras High Court in Ramgopal v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 924, that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised when the petition has been filed in the nature of the second revision. It was observed:

"9. In this regard in the case of Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 [LQ/SC/1997/112] in para 10 has held as under:-

"10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person accused/complainant-cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of the criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously."

10. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in above cited case, it is found that the Court may not exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. when the said petition is preferred before the Court is of the nature of second revision petition."

22. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Kapoor Chand Gupta v. State, wherein it was held:

"13. In Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka, 1990 Supp SCC 132, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"2. ...A second Revision did not lie at the instance of the State to the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of Cr. P.C. Obviously, to avoid this bar, the application moved by the State before the High Court was stated to be under Section 482 Cr. P.C. asking for the exercise of inherent powers. In the exercise of that power, the High Court has reversed the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The question for consideration is as to whether the bar under Section 397(3) Cr. P.C. should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. It is not disputed by the counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really an application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3) Cr. P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for the exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled as one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed and we set aside the order of the High Court. The Order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Session Judge is upheld."

14. In Surender Kumar Jain v. State, 2012:DHC:611, a learned Single Judge of this Court, held as under:

"5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 482 Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But, that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly, when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved of the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but as on whether the impugned order brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, [LQ/SC/1977/299] State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal,AIR SC 87, Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571 [LQ/SC/2005/70] ."

15. In Varinder Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2017:DHC:5706, a learned Single Judge of this Court, has observed as under:

21. It is worth mentioning that in the garb of a petition under Section 482 CrPC, the petitioner has filed a second revision petition which is not maintainable. In the case Wajid Mirza v. Mohammed Ali Ahmed, : 1982 Cri LJ 890, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has observed as under:-

'23. This Court in Re Puritipati Jagga Reddy, (1979) 1 AP LJ 1: AIR 1979 AP 146 [LQ/TelHC/1978/244] at p. 149 (FB) held:

The language of sub-section (3) of Section 397 contains no ambiguity. If any person had already chosen to file a revision before the High Court or to the Sessions Court under subsection (1), the same person cannot prefer a further application to the other Court. To put it in other words, sub-sec. (1) and (3) make it clear that a person aggrieved by any order or proceeding can seek remedy by way of revision either before the High Court or the Sessions Court. Once, he has availed himself of the remedy, he is precluded from approaching the other forum. It is equally manifest from the provisions of sub-section (3) that this bar is limited to the same person who has already chosen to go either to the High Court or to the Sessions court seeking a remedy and that it does not apply to the other parties or persons."

22. The Bombay High Court has taken the same view in the case Inayatullah Rizwi v. Rahimatuallah,1981 Cri LJ 1398 and observed that:

"We are, therefore, of the view that a revision to the High Court would be tenable at the instance of a party who is unsuccessful before the Sessions Judge, or who is aggrieved by his order. In other words, a concurrent finding of the Sessions Judge and the Courts below becomes final, but when the Sessions Judge reverses the order of the Court below in revision the defeated party is not precluded from moving to the High Court. The consensus of judicial opinion as can be seen supports only this view.'

16. In Pooja Walia v. State, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2462, a learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under:

"8. At the very outset, I must state that the present petition is in essence a second revision filed by the petitioner raising the same set of grievances which were raised by her before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Although Section 482 Cr. P.C. starts with a non-obstante clause that would mean merely on account of the fact that a person has preferred a revision in the Sessions Court, he need not be necessarily debarred from assailing the order in the High Court in the exercise of its power in Section 482 Cr. P.C. in order to prevent abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice, but ordinarily in the absence of this, the Court would discourage a party to have a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C."

17. In Ritu Sethi v. State, this Court has observed as under:

"10. The grounds taken in the present petition as well as during the course of the arguments are the same which were taken by the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court. The grounds raised before the learned Appellate Court were dealt with by a detailed threadbare analysis of the prosecution evidence on record and the finding of the learned trial Court. It was for the petitioner to demonstrate the perverseness in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court in order to cause interference by this Court with two concurrent findings of acquittal qua the present respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330, [LQ/SC/2009/1361] while dealing with the scope of reappreciation of evidence by a higher court in criminal revision observed in para 9 as under:

"9. ...It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of reappreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse..."

Following the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022:INSC:656 : (2022) 8 SCC 204, [LQ/SC/2022/793 ;] has held as under:

"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contention, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction alike to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings."

23. Therefore, it is not permissible to exercise the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as a second revision and the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground as well.

24. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

25. The parties, through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 11.01.2024.