U.L. BHAT, C. J.
(1.) Civil Revision 602 of 1992 has been filed by the insurer against a decision under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Acts directing the Insurance Company to pay compensation on account of no fault liability. Civil Revisions Nos. 589/92 and 454/93 have been filed by claimants in different cases against rejection of the claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act. Civil Revision No. 70/93 has been filed by an owner of the vehicle alleged to have been involved in an accident who has been directed under Section 140 to pay compensation on account of no fault liability. Civil Revision No. 590/92 has been filed by an owner of the vehicle similarly placed. M. P. No.2351/92 has been filed by a claimant under Article 227 of the Constitution whose claim for compensation under Sec. 140 of the Act has been rejected.
(2.) The civil revision petitions have been referred to a Full Bench by a learned single Judge. The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been referred to a Full Bench by a Division Bench. Thus the cases came up before a Full Bench of three Judges who in the course of hearing were of the opinion that an earlier decision of a Full Bench in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar, 1992 MPLJ 485 [LQ/MPHC/1991/554] , may require reconsideration. Accordingly, the Full Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench. That is how this larger Bench has been constituted.
(3.) The cases involve grant or refusal, as the case may be, of compensation by M.A.C. Tribunal under Section 140 of the Act, the unsuccessful parties having invoked either jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 115, C.P.C. or the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. They have done so in view of the decision in Gaya Prasad's case, 1992 MPLJ 485 [LQ/MPHC/1991/554] to the effect that no appeal lies against a decision of the Tribunal under Section 140 of the Act. Two Judges of the Full Bench took that view while the third Judge took a contrary view. The Full Bench overruled an earlier decision of the Division Bench in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pritamlal, 1989 MPLJ 580 [LQ/MPHC/1989/143] where it has been held that an appeal lies against such an award.
(4.) It is necessary to look into the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act in order to appreciate and adjudicate the controversy before us. Chapter X of the Act deals with no fault liability in certain cases. Broadly speaking, the provisions in Chapter X replaced the corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 with minor changes. The no fault liability and the quantum of such liability are declared in Section 140. Section 141 lays down, inter alia, that the right under Sec. 140 of the claimant is in addition to any other right on the principle of fault to claim compensation under any other provision of the Act or any other law for the time being in force. Sub-section (3) of Section 141 ensures that if the compensation under Section 140 is less than the amount of compensation fixed for no fault liability. The person concerned is liable to pay in addition to the no fault liability only so much of the compensation awarded as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the no fault liability compensation. The provision also makes it clear that if the amount of the no fault liability compensation is, equal to or more the amount of the compensation finally awarded, he shall not be liable to pay the latter. Section 144 declares that the provisions of Chapter X shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
(5.) Chapter XII of the Act deals with Claims Tribunals. The provisions of this Chapter are parimateria with the corresponding provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 165 states, inter alia, that the State Government may constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals "for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both". Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 165 reads thus :-
"For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression 'claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles includes claims for compensation under Section 140."
The Explanation makes it crystal clear that a claim for compensation referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 165 for adjudicating which Tribunals shall be constituted, would include claims for compensation under Section 140.
(6.) Section 166 deals with the application for compensation and prescribes the details which are to be mentioned in an application. Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 166 reads thus :
"Provided that where any claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant."
The proviso makes it clear that a claim for compensation under Section 140 could be made in the application contemplated under Sec. 166. The purpose of the proviso is to make it clear that no separate application is necessary.
(7.) Section 168, deals with the award of the Claims Tribunal and reads as follows :
"168. Award of the Claims Tribunal - (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which.appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. (3) When an award is made under this Section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct."
(8.) A reading of Section 168, brings forth the following aspects (a) The Tribunal should receive an application under Section 166 and follow the incorporated principles of natural justice. (b) The Tribunal may make an award subject to the provisions of Section 162. (c) The award shall (1) determine the amount of compensation which appears to be just, (2) specify the person or persons to whom payment should be made, (3) specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. (d) Where the application under Sec. 166 makes a claim for compensation under Section 140, the claim shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (e) Copies of the award shall be delivered to the parties within the period limited. (f) When an award is made, the person liable to pay the amount under the award shall deposit the entire amount within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Tribunal.
(9.) Section 173 which deals with appeals against awards reads as follows :
"173. Appeals.- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, which ever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court. Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the sa id period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees."
The important aspects of this provision are- (a) - an appeal lies against the award passed by the Tribunal (b) no appeal by the aggrieved person shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount awarded, which ever is less, and (c) no appeal shall lie against an award if the amount awarded is less than ten thousand rupees.
(10.) According to Section 174, if any amount is due from any person under an award, the Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
(11.) The decision in Gaya Prasad's case, (1992 MPLJ 485 [LQ/MPHC/1991/554] ) (FB) proceeded on the basis that the determination of compensation under Section 140 of the Act is not an award and, therefore, appeal under Section 173 would not lie against such determination. The provisions of Chapter X only declared the rights and liabilities of the parties and the details of such rights and liabilities. The provisions in Chapter X do not provide the procedure for determination of the claim under Section 140 and do not indicate whether the determination should be by way of an order or a judgment or an award. The irresistible conclusion is that Chapter X is not a self-contained Code. To effectuate the provisions of Chapter X, the Tribunal must necessarily follow the relevant provisions of Chapter XII. Chapter XII has an impact on the claim under Section 140 which is clear from the Explanations to sub-section (1) of Section 165, proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 166 and the Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 168. By these provisions, some of the provisions of Chapter XII are attracted in the matter of determination of the compensation payable under Sec. 140 of the Act. The Tribunal is constituted also for the purpose of determining the claim for compensation under Section 140. The claim for compensation under Section 140 may be made in the application in which the compensation for fault liability is also claimed. Section 168 contemplates an award being passed on the application made under Section 166. In the generality of cases, claims under Section 140 are projected in the application filed under Section 166 of the Act. The determination of the right and liability under Sec. 140 is made following the procedure prescribed in Section 168. The provision in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec. 168 that the claim under Section 140 has to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X makes abundantly clear that such determination is only under sub-section (1) of Section 168. This provision is made since the liability under Section 140 is no fault liability and the quantum of compensation is pre-determined by the statute so that in making the determination, the quantification cannot be gone into and the fault of the respondents is not relevant. These circumstances made it amply clear that the determination of right or liability under Section 140 of the Act amounts to an award as contemplated in Section 168. The provisions of Chapter X are beneficial in character. The parallel provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were incorporated only in response to the suggestions repeatedly made by Courts of this Country. Those suggestions were made in order to help persons who are injured in such accidents or the legal representatives of persons who sustained fatal injuries in such accidents and to secure them minimum amount of compensation without being compelled to prove the fault of the persons whose fault done would give rise to compensation according to principles of Law of Torts. If the determination of the compensation payable under Section 140 of the Act is not to be regarded as an award, certain beneficial aspects of Sections 168 and 173 would be denied to the claimants who may be dragged to the superior Courts by challenges against such determination. The benefit of Section 168(2) requiring the Tribunal to deliver copies of the award to the parties expeditiously, of sub-section (3) of Section 168 requiring the.person liable, to deposit the amount awarded by the Tribunal within 30 days, and of the requirement in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173 to deposit Rs. 25,000/- or fifty per cent of the award, which ever is less, in the High Court as pre-condition for entertainment of the appeal, will not be available to the claimants. It is no t possible to accept that the legislature which introduces no fault liability in the 1939 Act and the 1988 Act intended to deprive such claimants of the beneficial provisions referred to above. If the party against whom a claim is made for compensation under Section 140 desires to challenge the determination of the liability before the superior Court either by way of revision or under Article 227 of the Constitution, the claimants will not secure the benefit that he would have otherwise secured under Section 173(1) of the Act. It is not possible to accept that such was the legislative intention.
(12.) 'Award' is explained in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, at Page 174 as meaning- "to grant, concede, of adjudge to; to give or assign by sentence or judicial determiantion . . . . . .the decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extra judicial deciders, upon a controversy submitted to them; also the writing or document embodying such decision." As award, as generally understood, is a document incorporating the adjudication or determination of a matter in dispute by a person competent to adjudicate or determine the dispute. There is nothing in Chapter X or XII of the Act to indicate that any different meaning has been attributed to the expression in 173 of the Act. The decision of liability under Section 140 is an award which can be challenged under Section 173.
(13.) We are also fortified in our view by the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1992 SC 522 [LQ/SC/1991/628] . Section 5 of the Inter-State Water Dispute Act, 1956 deals with the adjudication of water disputes. Sub-section (2) of the said section states that "the Tribunal shall investigate the matters referred to it and forward to the Central Government a report setting out the facts as found by it and giving its decision on the matters referred to it." (emphasis supplied). The Tribunal made an interim order. A question arose as to whether the order granting interim relief as a report and a decision as contemplated in Section 5(2) of that Act. The Supreme Court observed :
"The contention that since the order does not say that it is a report and decision and, therefore, it is not so under Section 5(2) of the Act is to say the least factious. Either the order is such a report and decision because of its contents or not so at all. If the contents do not show that it is such a report, it will not become one because of the order states so. As is pointed out a little later, the contents of the Order clearly show that it is a report and a decision within the meaning of Sec. 5(2)."
The Motor Vehicles Act 1988 does not define an award. It must, therefore follow that the expression 'award' contained in the provisions referred to above carries its general meaning and content. A decision under Sec. 140 is a decision on a claim for compensation thereunder. It must be passed after following the procedure contemplated in Section 166(2) of the Act. It must indicate the findings and the reasons, atleast briefly. These attributes of "determination" of a claim under Section 140 would certainly make the "determination" an award for the purpose of Section 166 as well as 173 of the Act. With great respect, we are of the opinion that the decision in Gaya Prasad's case (1992 MPLJ 485 [LQ/MPHC/1991/554] ) (FB) does not lay down good law, to the extent it holds that an appeal does not lie under Section 173 of the Act against determination of a claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act. We hold that determination of a claim under Section 140 of the Act is an award and an appeal lies against such an award under Section 173 of the Act.
(14.) There cannot be any doubt that where an appeal lies revision cannot lie (See S. S. Khanna v. F. J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 [LQ/SC/1963/188] and Sunderlal v. Paramsukhadas, AIR 1968 SC 366 [LQ/SC/1967/246] . This principle has been introduced in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by means of sub-section (2) incorporated by Amendment Act No. 110 of 1976. Sub-section (2) states that the High Court shall not under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeallies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Since we have held that an appeal lies, it follows that a revision does not lie. Since the appeal lies, it will also follow that the impugned award is not liable to be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
(15.) If the petitioners in these cases are willing to have the revision petitions or the petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution to be converted as appeals under Sec. 173 of the Act, they may amend the petitions in an appropriate manner after which they will be registered and dealt with as appeals. Order accordingly.
