Oriental Insurance Co L.t.d v. Pritamlal

(1.) THE present revision has been placed before the division Bench on the reference by the learned single Judge Honble Awasthy, J. The legal question referred for decision of the Division Bench is, whether an order awarding compensation under section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on the principle of "no fault liability" is appealable under section 110-D of the said Act or only revision under section 115 Civil Procedure Court is tonable against the order granting such compensation.

(2.) THE learned single Judge noticed that no consistent procedure was being followed in this court and in some cases (e. g. M. A. No. 50/85, decided on 24-2-1986, by Hon. Gulab Gupta, J.) the appeals were entertained against the order of compensation under section 92-A of theand in some cases (e. g. C. R. No. 625/83, decided on 9-7-1985 by Hon. S. Awasthy, J.) revisions were tertained and decided. He has, therefore, referred the matter for decision of the Larger Bench. We have heard arguments advanced by Shri Prakash Naik, advocate for the petitioner and Shri Umesh Trivedi, Advocate, for the respondents. Both of them have contended that an appeal is tenable under section 110-D against the order of compensation granted under section 92-A of the.

(3.) AFTER hearing the parties and looking into the relevant provisions we are also of the opinion that an appeal under section 110-D of thewould lie against the order of compensation granted by the Claims Tribunal under section 92-A of the act and the question referred is liable to be answered accordingly. We may now state the reasons in support of our conclusion. Section 92-A of theis contained in Chapter VII-A of the, which may be reproduced as under

"92-A Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault- (1) Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicle shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees. "

(4.) THE whole chapter containing sections 92- A to 92-E was introduced by Act No. 47 of 1982 with effect from 1-10-1982. The object of providing compensation, on the principle of no fault, obviously, appears to be to make available quickly a minimum compensation to the victims of fatal accidents or serious accidents, irrespective of the tort committed or not and the compensation so determined should be made payable as an interim award before the trial of the case and passing of afinalaward by the Claims Tribunal in accordance with the procedure contained in section 110-B of the. Reading the provisions contained in sections 92- A to 92-E show that in a claim case where there is compensation claimed both on the principle of no fault and also on the basis of tort or negligence, the fixed sum of compensation granted on the principle of no fault liability under section 92- A is adjustable in the final award made after full trial of the claim case in accordance with section 110-B of the. The provision of payment of compensation on principle of no fault liability is thus an interim relief or interim award in a claim case in which compensation is claimed both on principle of no fault liability and on the basis of allegations of commission of negligence or tort.

(5.) IT was pointed out to us by the counsel appearing for the parties that there may be cases where compensation is claimed from the Claims Tribunal only on the basis of no fault liability under section 92- A and in such cases the Claims Tribunal may be required to pass a final order of compensation under section 92- A in accordance with the procedure contained in Chapter VII-A. It is true that the provisions contained in Chapter VII-A do not speak of passing of any award and only envisage passing of an order of compensation to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- in case of death and to the extent of Rs. 7,500/- in case of permanent disability. It would, however, be reasonable to construe the order of compensation granted under section 92- A as an award passed by the Claims Tribunal because any order of compensation or award passed by the Claims Tribunal under the provisions of the act can be enforced only in accordance with the procedure contained in section 110-E, section 110-E reads as under:

"110-E Recovery of money from insurer as arrear of land revenue - Where any money is due from (any person) under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to money, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. "

(6.) AN order of compensation under section 92-A of thehas to be construed as an award as it has to be made enforceable in accordance with the provisions contained in section 110- A. It is a settled principle of interpretation of statute that a construction which makes it workable has to be preferred to one which makes it unworkable. If the order of compensation on principle of no fault liability under section 92- A is not construed to be an award, it would make its recovery impossible in the absence of any provision of mode of recovery. The learned author former Chief Justice G. P. Singh in his book Principles of Statutory Interpretation, fourth Edition, at page 25, has referred to cases of the Supreme Court M. Pentiah vs. Veeramallappa Muddala; AIR 1961 SC 1107 [LQ/SC/1960/260] and the decision of Lord Denning j. in Eawcett Properties vs. Buckingham Country Council, 1960 (3) All ER 503 and has stated as under:

"the courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat. . . . . . "

Lord Denning approving Farwell J. , stated the principle thus:

"but when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity". And it was said by Lord Dunedin: "it is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be operative, and not inept, and nothing short of impossibility should in my judgment allow a judge to declare a statute unworkable. " The principle was reiterated by him in a later case where he observed: "a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that unattainable. "

(7.) APPLYING the above principle of statutory interpretation, the compensation granted on no fault liability under section 92- A has to be both recoverable as well as. appealable, otherwise the grant of such compensation would only be a paper order and would defeat the very object of legislation in introducing Chapter VII-A of the act to provide speedy relief to the victims of motor accidents. The compensation, therefore, granted on no fault liability under section 92- A is also therefore an award within the meaning of section 110-B of the. The proviso added to section 110-B by Act No. 47 of 1982 w. e. f. 1-10-1982 also indicates that compensation granted on no fault liability under section 92- A is also in the nature of an award by the Claims tribunal, although the Claims Tribunal has to follow a summary procedure in granting the same as contemplated in Chapter VII-A. Section 110-B read with the proviso is reproduced hereunder for reference:

"110-B, Award of the Claims Tribunal: On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 109-B, may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the Claims tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: provided that where such applications makes a claim for compensation under section 92- A in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII-A. "

(8.) AFTER introduction of Chapter VII-A in the, the Claims Tribunal is empowered to pass two awards, one on the basis of no fault liability and the other on proof of negligence or tort.

(9.) ON the construction placed by us on the provisions of sections 92- A read with section 110-B and 110-E, we are of the opinion that the order of compensation passed by the Claims Tribunal under section 92- A is in the nature of passing of an award and the same is appealable under section 110-D of the. We find support for our conclusion from the decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Sant ram vs. Surya Pal, 1986 ACJ 202. [LQ/AllHC/1985/355] The reference made by the learned single Judge is, therefore, answered accordingly and the case may now be placed before the single judge for decision on merits and for disposal of the same by registering it as an appeal under section 110-D of the. Order accordingly.