Das, J.This is an appeal from a decision of the learned-District Judge of Saran, dated 1-2-1944, by which he has refused the appellants application for revocation of the grant of letters of administration made in favour of some of the respondents on 30-4-1900, in respect of the estate of one Harihar Dikshit. The main question which arises for decision, is if there is just cause for revoking the grant of letters of administration as contemplated by Section 263, Succession Act.

2. It is necessary to state, briefly, the facts out of which the appeal has arisen. The appellant is the daughter of Pandit Harihar Dikshit by his wife Mt. Rajbansi Kuer. It appears that Harihar Dikshit first made a will on 9-9-1898, in favour of his wife, Mt. Rajbansi Kuer, and his daughter-in-law Mt. Dhanrajo Kuer, who was the widow of a pre-deceased son of Harihar Dikshit. Harihar Dikshit subsequently revoked this will, and executed another will on 20-9-1898, at Benares, where he had gone at the time of his last illness. This will was in favour of his own brother Ram Sewak Dikshit, father of some of the respondents. This second will was registered at Benares on 21-9-1898, the same day on which Harihar Dikshit died. Mt. Rajbansi Kuer first filed an application for probate which was numbered as case No. 80 of 1898. Ram Sewak Dikshit also applied for probate of the second will, and his case was numbered 177 of 1898. Mt. Rajbansi Kuer, mother of the present appellant, contested the application of Ram Sewak Dikshit. The two cases were amalgamated and tried together. The Court rejected the application of Rajbansi Kuer and granted letters of administration with the copy of the will annexed to some of the respondents on 30-4-1900, Ramsewak having died during the pendency of the probate proceedings. There were two appeals to the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, the High Court which had jurisdiction at the time, and the appeals were dismissed. The grant in favour of some of the respondents was upheld.

3. It is not in dispute that the appellant is the daughter of Harihar Dikshit. The main grounds on which the appellant founded her application for revocation are mentioned in paras. 12(vi) and 12 (vii) of her application which read as follows:

(vi) That in the petition for probate Ram Sewak Dikshit did not mention the existence of the petitioner, then a mere minor, and no general or special citations were issued or served on the petitioner or anybody in the locality.

(vii) That no guardian of the petitioner was appointed in that proceeding and it was illegal and defective in substance from the beginning to the end.

It was also alleged by the appellant that both wills dated 9-9-1898 and 209-1898, were forged and fabricated.

4. The respondents denied the allegations made by the appellant and they alleged that citations were issued and served on all persons which were required by law to be served, and they further alleged that Musammat Rajbansi Kuer, mother and natural guardian of the appellant, keenly contested the application for probate right up to the High Court, and there was no fraud, illegality or irregularity at any stage of the proceeding. They also alleged that both. Musammat Rajbansi Kuer and the appellant had acquiesced in the grant and had derived benefit in accordance with the directions given in the will, and the appellant knew of the grant long before 1938, and that the application has been filed after long delay at the instance of the enemies of the respondents.

5. The learned District Judge framed several issues of which issues 4 and 5 were only pressed and decided by the learned District Judge. Issue No. 4 raised the question if the grant of probate (the grant was really one of letters of administration) in case No. 177 of 1898 was illegal; in other words, this issue raised the question if the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, which would be a just cause for revoking the grant. Issue 5 was a general issue raising the question as to what relief, if any, the appellant was entitled to. On a consideration of the evidence given in the case, the learned District Judge came to the following finding:

I would come to the conclusion that all the formalities of the law had been complied with and that there was no concealment of the existence of the applicant from the Court during the probate proceedings which cannot be held to have been defective in any manner.

The witness, Ramakant Dikshit, for the objectors deposed that notices had in fact been issued and served upon the applicant through her mother guardian, and I see no reason to doubt this evidence. The case was much contested and fought up to the Calcutta High Court and I do not think that there is any room for holding that fraud of any kind had been committed.

The learned District Judge further found that the appellant knew of the will long before 1938, and that she had failed to give any satisfactory explanation of the long delay in filing the application for revocation. There is no finding on the question of acquiescence, though the learned District Judge has stated that the appellants mother Raj Bansi Kuer had instituted a suit for maintenance against some of the respondents in the year 1929 for recovery of possession of certain lands on the allegation that the lands had been given to her for maintenance, on the basis of the will and that the sons of the appellant did pairvi for Rajbansi Kuer in that suit. The learned District Judge has relied on this circumstance for his finding that the appellant knew of the grant before 1938. The learned District Judge has refused the application for revocation on his main finding that there was no defect of substance in the proceedings which resulted in the grant of letters of administration.

6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has addressed us on questions of fact as well as of law. I shall deal with the question of fact first, and then consider the questions of law which would arise on the facts found. The foremost question of fact in this case is if citation was issued and had been served on the appellant in the proceeding which resulted in the grant of letters of administration to the respondents. It is admitted that at the time of the proceedings in 1900 the appellant was an infant of about 12 or 13 years of age or even less. Her mother, therefore, was her natural guardian. If any citation had been issued and served on the appellant, it must have been through her natural guardian. The learned District Judge appears to have relied on the evidence of Ramakant Dikshit, one of the respondents, who said as follows:

Notice has been issued and served on Sheopati Kuer in the probate case. Sheopati was then 12 or 13 years of age. Her guardian was her mother, Rajbansi Kuer. The notice had been served through her guardian. Rajabansi Kuer had given the name of Sheopati Kuer in her application for probate.

It is to be noted that the papers of the probate case have been destroyed according to the rules of destruction, and service reports etc. are not available now. Learned Counsel for the appellant has, however, drawn our attention to the copy of the judgment of the High Court (Ex. B), which shows that the appellant was not made a party to the proceeding. We have looked into the paper-books of the appeals which were heard in the Calcutta High Court, the paper-books of all Calcutta cases relating to this Court having been sent here. The petitions for probate, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, the decree and the memoranda of appeals as printed in the paper-books all show that the appellant was not made a party to the proceedings, though the name of the petitioner is mentioned in the body of the petition filed by Musammat Rajbansi Kuer. In these circumstances, I do not think that reliance can be placed on the evidence of Ramakant Dikshit. It is more than probable that no citation was issued or served on the present-appellant separately from her mother. The mother no doubt had appeared and contested the application filed by Ram Sewak Dikshit. Therefore, on the question of fact if citation had issued and had been served on the appellant, the finding should be in favour of the appellant, namely, that no special citation had issued or had been served on the appellant through her natural guardian, though her natural guardian, namely, the mother, had appeared and contested the application.

7. I now take up the questions of law which arise on the aforesaid finding of fact. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance on illus. 2 of Section 263, Succession Act, 1925 which corresponds to Section 50 of Act 5 of 1881. The substantive part of the section says that the grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause. There is an explanation to the section which says that just cause shall be deemed to exist where, among other things, the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance. There is no doubt, in my mind, that once it is found that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, it must be held that just cause exists and the grant of letters of administration may be revoked. The words of the explanation are imperative in character and say that just cause shall be deemed to exist where the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance. Illustration 2 is merely an instance of the practical application of the explanation: the real point for decision is if the proceedings to obtain the grant were, in the particular case in question, defective in substance. It is necessary, however, to clear the ground for a decision of this main point by disposing of certain other subsidiary points connected with it. A question has been raised before us if the appellant was entitled to citation in the life-time of her mother, who was the person entitled to succeed under Hindu law on the death of the testator Harihar Dikshit. Learned Counsel for the respondents has invited our attention to Section 283, Succession Act (corresponding to Section 69 of Act 5 of 1881), and has contended that it was merely discretionary with the District Judge to issue citations calling upon all persons claiming an interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of letters of administration. It is, however, well established now that any interest, however slight and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. It has been held in several decisions that although a reversioner under the Hindu law has no present alienable interest in the property left by the deceased, still he has substantial interest in the protection or devolution of the estate, and as such, is entitled to appeal and be heard in a probate proceeding: see Brindaban Chunder v. Sureswar Shaha (09) 10 CLT 263, Shyama Charan v. Prafulla Sundari AIR 1916 Cal. 623 and Ram Balak Singh v. Ambika Singh AIR 1929 Pat. 365 . There can, there fore, be no doubt that the appellant, who was the daughter of the testator, was entitled to citation, and she was a person "who ought to have been cited as contemplated by illustration 2 of Section 263.

8. Learned Counsel for the respondents has then contended that there is a distinction between compulsory citation and discretionary citation. He has relied on the well known Bombay decision in Digambar Keshav v. Narayan Vithal (11) 9 I.C. 354 in which it has been held that where the compulsory citation has been omitted, the grant of letters of administration would be defective on the face of it; but where the citation is discretionary, the Court cannot say that mere absence of the citation invalidates the grant. But Illus. 2 of Section 263 refers not only to cases where it is imperative on the Court to issue a special citation, but it refers to all cases where the grant is made without citing the parties who ought, in the opinion of the Court, to have been cited. This is the view which has been expressed in Walter Rebells v. Maria Rebells 2 CWN 100. The position has been very clearly explained in Ranmaya Gaorangini Vs. Betty Mahbert and Others, and I can do no letter than quote the observations made there:

On behalf of the respondents it has been urged that Section 250, Succession Act gives a discretion to the Judge in the matter of issuing citation, and the only case where such omission amounts to a just cause for revocation u/s 234 of the Act is a case of an omission to issue a citation such as is mentioned in Section 193 or Section 199 of the Act and is compulsory, and in support of this contention reliance has been placed upon the case in Digambar Keshav v. Narayan Vithal (11) 9 I.C. 354. This last-mentioned case, which related to a will and was under the Probate and Administration Act, it is true, lays down a distinction between compulsory citations and discretionary citations on reference to Section 16 and Section 69 of the Act; but I doubt very much whether the learned Judges intended to lay it down that it is only compulsory citations which would come within Illust. (b) to Section 50 of the Act as has been contended for before us. The judgment in that case to my mind is not inconsistent with the view that they held that both classes of citations come within the illustration, but that the question whether the grant should be revoked or not would depend upon the circumstances, that is to say, in the case of compulsory citations nothing else need be considered, while in the case of discretionary citations other considerations have to be taken into account.This precise contention which the respondent has now put forward was urged in this Court in Walter Rebells v. Maria Rebells 2 C.W.N. 100 and was not accepted as well-founded (see the judgment of Banerjee J., in that case) and I agree with what was said by the learned Judge in his judgment in that case.

I am, therefore, of the view that illustration (ii) of Section 263 is not confined to cases of compulsory citation only. The position, therefore, comes to this that the appellant, as a daughter of the testator, ought to have been cited, but no special citation was issued or served on her, though the natural guardian, viz; her mother appeared and contested the case.

9. Now, comes the main question whether in the circumstances mentioned above, there is just cause for revoking the grant, It has been very strenuously contended on behalf of the appellant that absence of citation on her at once brings her case within illustration (ii) of the section and it must be held that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, once that is held, the grant must be revoked. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed very great reliance on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2 and also on Haimabati Mitra Vs. Kunja Mohan Das, . I shall presently consider these decisions in detail. On behalf of the respondents, it has been contended with equal vehemence that the mother was the natural guardian of the appellant at the time; she appeared in the case and contested the grant right up to the High Court; there is nothing in the record to show that she acted injuriously to the appellant or that her interest was adverse to that of the minor; therefore, she effectively represented the appellant in the probate proceedings, and it cannot be said that the defect arising out of the absence of citation was a defect of substance, which alone can be a ground for revocation. Apart from authority, which I shall presently discuss and which also (in my opinion) is in favour of the view I am about to express, I fail to see how a proceeding can be said to be defective in substance, when the natural guardian of the minor has appeared and has contested the grant right up to the High Court. The position, no doubt, will be different if the natural guardian is under the influence of the propounder of the will or puts up a nominal contest or does not appear at all or her interest is adverse to that of the minor. In those and other like circumstances, the absence of citation on a person, who ought to have been cited, will no doubt be a defect of substance which shall be deemed to be a just cause as is mentioned in the explanation to Section 268. In a case, however, where the person, who could under the law appear on behalf of the minor, did appear and contest the grant as hard as she could, right "up to this Court, it cannot be said that the proceedings were defective in substance, and the grant should be revoked.

10. As to authority, there are two lines of decisions: one in which the absence of citation has been considered to be a defect of substance and the grant has been revoked, and the other where the absence of citation by itself has not been considered to be a defect of substance and the grant has not been revoked. I take up first the decisions which have held that absence of citation is a defect of substance. The earliest decision is Walter Rebells v. Maria Rebells 2 C.W.N. 100. This was a case in which no citation was issued on two minor sons of the testator. The finding was that no one was served except the co-executors and the grant of probate wag not contested, which would be regarded in England as a grant of probate in common form only. The judgment of Bannerjee J. one of the Judges who decided the case, makes the position clear. He says as follows:

It appears clear on the evidence that the petitioners, the minor sons of the alleged testator, had been living under the guardianship of Mr. Dias, one of the executors who was the applicant for probate, and so it was clearly necessary that the minors should have been represented in the probate proceedings by some one appointed as guardian ad litem whose interests were not adverse, as those of the applicant for probate were, to the interests of the minors.

That decision, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that mere absence of citation must in all cases be held to be a defect of substance.

11. The next decision, which has been brought to our notice, is Akhileswari Dasi and Another Vs. Hari Charan Mirdha and Another, . This was a case in which no notice was served on the infant daughters of the testator. It was observed in that case that notices, directed to the infants, were taken to the house of their father and as the girls could not be found, the notices were affixed to the thatch: no appearance was entered on their behalf, and the letters of administration were granted ex parte. This case also is no authority for the view that absence of citation is a defect of substance, even when the natural guardian has appeared and contested the case on behalf of the minor.

12. The earlier decision in Shoroshibala Debi v. Anandamayee Debi 12 C.W.N. 6 is also similar in nature. In this case an application for probate was made by two widows of the testator and citation was issued upon the infant daughter of one of them as represented by her mother (one of the applicants for probate) and in those circumstances it was held that the proper course for the applicant for probate was to have somebody appointed by the Court to act as guardian of the infant daughter, or to take out citation against her represented by her next friend, or by an officer of the Court who could have no interest adverse to the infant daughter. The reason for the decision was that the mother (one of the applicants for probate) could not represent both her interest and the interest of her daughter.

13. The case in Dwijendra Nath v. Golok Nath Sarma AIR 1915 Cal. 393 was a case in which both the daughter and the mother were minors. It was, therefore, useless to serve the notice on the minors mother, because the latter was also a minor and could not protect the interest of her minor daughters. It was observed there that the object of the issue of the citation is that all persons, whose interests are or may be adversely affected by the decree of the Probate Court, shall have notice of the proceedings and an opportunity, should they choose to avail themselves of it, of intervening for the protection of their interests. It was held in that case that this purpose was not achieved merely by issue of citations to two infants.

14. In Banga Chandra De and Others Vs. Sm. Menaka Sundari De, , the application for probate was made by a brother. The testator had left a widow, a widowed sister and three infant daughters. Citation was issued on the widow and the widowed sister. There was no contest, and, on the other hand, there was a petition purporting to have been made by the widow and the widowed sister consenting to the grant. It was found that the three infant daughters of the testator were residing with their mother in the house of Ramgobind. In these circumstances, it was held that the failure to mention the existence of the daughters and to have them represented and cited was a defect sufficient to revoke the probate.

15. In Priya Nath v. Saila Bala Debi AIR 1929 Pat. 385 , which is a decision of this Court, the son of a sister of the testator applied for revocation. It was held that he was entitled to citation. But as he was aware of the probate proceedings and stood by, he was not entitled to apply for revocation. This case is of no help to the appellant.

16. I now take up the two decisions on which learned Counsel for the appellant has placed the greatest reliance. In Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2, their Lordships came to the finding that even if some kind of formality was gone through on the occasion when service of notice is said to have been effected, it was not such as would give to the person alleged to have been served an opportunity either to oppose the grant of probate or to require the will to be proved in her presence, in the peculiar circumstances of the case the service, if any, was of no greater effect in law than personal service on an infant of tender years. It was a case where Ramanandi Kuer, the minor daughter of the testator, applied for revocation, and, as stated above, the finding was that the service of notice on her mother was defective and that the person alleged to have been served with notice had no opportunity either to oppose the grant or require the will to be proved in her presence. The mother Thakurani Kuer did not appear, and the order for grant of probate was made in her absence. It was further found that Thakurani was living as a dependent female member of the family, of which the actual head was the propounder of the will. In those circumstances, it was observed that if all the, circumstances were fully placed before the Court, Thakurani would not have been appointed guardian ad litem of her daughter. Their Lordships then observed:

If citations were not served, i.e. properly and effectively served, on Thakurani, the daughter is entitled to ask that the probate which was obtained in her absence should be recalled and the executor or his representative called upon to prove the will in the present proceeding.

It would be seen from what I have stated above that their Lordships were dealing with a case which is essentially different from the case under our consideration, and the principles laid down therein are not applicable to a case where the natural guardian, whose interest is not adverse to that of the minor and who was not in any way under the influence of the propounder of the will, appears and contests the application before the grant is made. Learned Counsel for the appellant has characterised the will as an in officious and unnatural testament in that it does not mention the daughter and makes no provision for her. The will states why the properties were given to the brother and what provision was made for the maintenance of the widow. The fact that there was a daughter was known to the Probate Court, having been mentioned in the mothers application. These are matters which were for consideration of the Court of Probate in which the contest was made. The present question for consideration is if there was a defect of substance in the proceeding which resulted in the grant.

17. The decision in Haimabati Mitra Vs. Kunja Mohan Das, follows the decision mentioned above on very similar facts. The daughter applied for revocation 32 years after her fathers death. At the time of her fathers death, she was a minor living with her mother who again lived in the same mess with and under the protection of the propounder of the will. The mother either:for self or as guardian of her infant daughter did not enter any caveat, and the matter was treated as a non-contentious proceeding. These facts are sufficient to distinguish this decision from the case before us.

18. I now turn to those decisions where absence of citation, in certain circumstances, has not been held to be a defect of substance. The earliest decision is Nistariny Debya v. Brahmamoyi Debya (91)18 Cal. 45. This was a case where the testator died leaving a minor widow and his mother. The mother applied for probate: the usual citations were issued, and the paternal uncle of the minor widow entered a caveat representing that the minor was living under his care and was the heiress-at-law and that the will was a forgery. It was contended on behalf of the minor widow that as she had not appeared nor had she been specially cited to appear in the probate proceeding, there was just cause for revocation of probate within the meaning of Section 50, Probate Act. Dealing with this contention their Lordships observed as follows:

Let us examine what the facts are. Kali Prasad Tripati, paternal uncle of the minor, clearly had notice of the proceedings. It is admitted by the minors mother, who now represents her as her guardian, that he is not on bad terms with the minor, and that the minor has been living in the same house with him. Kali Prasad had no interest whatever in opposing the grant of probate otherwise than as representing the minor. He did oppose the grant of probate, expressly representing that the minor was living under his care and wag the heiress-at-law of the alleged testator, and his opposition was successful in the first Court, though the Appellate Court took a different view of the case. And both the Courts regarded him as acting on behalf of the minor. These being the facts of the case and the allegation of fraud and collusion between Kali Prasad and the opposite side being now given up, the only conclusion that we can come to is that the persons under whose care the minor has been living, and who are interested on her behalf, were fully aware of the previous proceedings, and that the party who entered appearance and opposed the grant, though nominally appearing on his own behalf, did really appear on behalf of the minor.

We do not, therefore, think that any just ground has been made out for reopening the proceedings.

19. The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision was approved in Sadafal Kanu v. Sodari Hajam AIR 1981 Cal. 497 and in Bibhuti Prasad v. Mt. Pan Kuer AIR 1930 Pat. 488 , though in the latter case the decision rested on the question if the applicant had interest in the estate left by the testator. In Kanhai Raut v. Jogendra Raut AIR 1922 Pat. 406 it has been held that where special Citation is not issued upon a person entitled to it, a grant of letters of administration is nevertheless binding on him if he had knowledge of the application for the grant and had an opportunity of intervening.

20. In Ranmaya Gaorangini Vs. Betty Mahbert and Others, the sister of the testatrix applied for revocation on the ground, inter alia, that two minor sons of a deceased brother of the testatrix had not received separate citation and that their mother was not competent to represent them, as she was not a properly constituted guardian. Regarding this ground it was observed as follows:

She (the mother) appears to have taken part in the proceedings and put in a petition stating the shares which her sons would, according to her, be entitled to. She does not appear to have done anything injurious to the interest of her sons and nothing has been shown to us which may suggest that their interest was not properly looked after. It must, under the circumstances, be held, despite the absence of a formal order appointing her guardian ad litem, on behalf of the infants that the infants were effectively represented by her in the proceedings.

21. There are other decisions where the question of delay and acquiescence or subsequent ratification has been considered: see, for example, Kunja Lal v. Kailash Chandra 14 C.W.N. 1068, Nalini Sundari v. Bejoy Kumar Roy AIR 1915 Cal. 706, Srimati Manorama Chowdhurani Vs. Soshi Mohan Das Majumdar and Others, and Aswini Kumar Chakravarty and Another Vs. Sukhaharan Chakravarty and Others, . The last decision is of some importance as it lays down that delay in applying for revocation of probate is fatal only when from circumstances attendant upon the delay an inference of waiver can reasonably be made; mere delay, without more is no bar to revocation. I do not wish to examine this question of delay at any greater length, because there is no finding on the question of acquiescence of waiver against the appellant. As has been observed in Shyama Charan v. Prafulla Sundari AIR 1916 Cal. 623, there may be a distinction between a case where the acquiescence alleged occurs while the act acquiesced in is in progress, and another where the acquiescence takes place after the act has been completed. In the former case the acquiescence is quiescence under such circumstances as that assent may be reasonably inferred from it; in the latter case, when the act is completed without any knowledge or without any assent on the part of the person whose right is infringed, the matter must be determined obviously on very different legal considerations. It has also been observed in certain cases that a person can be barred of his remedy on the ground of waiver, only when at the time of the alleged waiver he has been shown to have been fully cognizant of his right on the facts of the case, In the case before us all that has been found is that the appellant knew of the probate proceedings long before 1938. I do not, therefore, think that this is a case in which mere delay would bar the remedy of the appellant, in the absence of any finding of acquiescence or waiver.

22. As a result of a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, I have come to the conclusion that though the appellant did not receive special citation in the probate proceeding which resulted in the grant of letters of administration to the respondents, there is no just cause for revocation in the present case, inasmuch as there was no defect of substance in the said proceeding. The mother of the appellant was her natural guardian. She appeared and contested the grant right up to the High Court. She did not act injuriously to the interest of the appellant, and she was not under the influence of the propounder of the will or any one connected with him. For all practical purposes, she represented her minor daughter as effectively as she represented herself. The existence of the daughter was not concealed from the probate Court, inasmuch as her existence was mentioned in the very petition which the mother had filed. In coming to the conclusion at which I have arrived, I have not been unmindful of the fact that the mother herself had propounded a will; the genuineness of that will was not, however, accepted by the Court of Probate. As far as the will propounded by Ramsewak Dikshit is concerned, she contested the grant as best as she could, right up to this Court, and all possible objections were taken to it. The contest was not a mere nominal contest, and there is no proof that the mother of the appellant was colluding with the propounder of the will or was under the latters influence. The paper-books of the appeals heard in the Calcutta High Court show that a large number of witnesses were examined on behalf of both parties, including the mother of the appellant and the doctor who treated Harihar Dikshit before his death. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the contest was a formal contest or that Rajbansi Kuer was in any way influenced by the propounder of the will. There was, therefore, no defect of substance in the proceedings which resulted in the grant.

23. For the reasons given above, I would hold that there is no just cause for revocation in the present case. I must add that if we had found that there was just cause for revocation, we would have revoked the grant and sent the case back to the District Judge for giving the respondents an opportunity of proving the will in solemn form in presence of the appellant, There would undoubtedly be great difficulty in proving the will after the lapse of about 48 years, but as observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2, much of the difficulty could have been avoided by prudent action on the part of the propounder. That difficulty would not have stood in the way of revoking the grant.

24. In view of my finding, however, that there is no just cause for revocation in the present case, the appeal fails and must be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order for costs.

Manohar Lall, Ag. C.J.

25. I have perused the elaborate judgment prepared by my learned brother. I only wish to add a few observations to show why I agree with his conclusions, I do not propose to discuss the numerous cases which have been exhaustively reviewed by my learned brother as I am of the opinion that the same conclusion can be reached by examining the general principle which has been illustrated in the leading Privy Council case in Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2.

26. It is unnecessary for me to state the facts over again. I entirely agree with the conclusions of fact of my learned brother that in this case it must be held that no special citation had been issued to or had been served on Sheopati Kuer separately from her mother Rajbansi Kuer. Rajbansi Kuer contested that application bona fide not only in the Court of the District Judge but also before the High Court.

27. The critical question to be determined is whether any just cause has been established to revoke the grant of the letters of administration within the meaning of Section 263, Succession Act. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that since it is found that no citation had been issued on the appellant (and she was a person entitled to a special citation) the original proceeding to obtain grant of letters of administration became defective in substance and this must be deemed to be a just cause as provided by the Explanation to Section 263. On the other hand it is argued on behalf of the respondent that the minor was not entitled to a special citation and attention was invited to Section 283, Sub-clause 1(c), Succession Act in support of the argument that the District Judge had a discretion to issue citation on the appellant and it must be presumed that he was satisfied that the interest of the appellant will be properly looked after by her mother and there was no need to have the appellant formally on the record as an opposite party when she would certainly be represented by her mother in those proceedings.

28. I do not agree with the contention of the respondent that the District Judge had a discretion in the matter. He must, if he comes to know of the existence of persons who claim to have any interest in the estate of the deceased, issue citation upon all those persons to come and see the proceedings. The proceedings of the letters of administration case which have been placed before us in the form of the paper-book of the Calcutta High Court do not show that the District Judge ever considered the question whether the appellant should or should not be served with special citation. It must, therefore, be held that special citations required to be issued to the appellant have not been issued.

29. Does this fact alone make the proceeding defective in substance It will be observed that the words are defective in substance and not merely defective. I am of opinion that in the special circumstances of this case it must beheld that the proceedings were not defective in substance. It has been found, as stated in the judgment of my learned brother, that the mother of the appellant opposed the application for grant of letters of administration by urging that the will propounded was a forgery and in any case was executed by him when he had no Bound disposing power. The appellant could not have urged forward anything more than what was done by her mother, her natural guardian. An examination of the record of those proceedings also discloses that the case was well investigated. A doctor was examined to prove the testamentary capacity of the testator, and the will was a registered one. Moreover, if a special citation had been issued to the appellant, who was a minor at that time, the Court would certainly have appointed the mother as the guardian of the appellant in those proceedings, as the mother had no adverse interest to the appellant--indeed she was vitally interested in inducing the Court to hold that the will propounded was neither genuine nor executed voluntarily or with a sound disposing power.

30. A similar situation arose in Ramanandi Kuer v. Mt. Kalawati Kuer AIR 1928 P.C. 2 but their Lordships came to a contrary conclusion because of the finding that Thakurani Kuer, the mother, would not have been appointed the guardian of Ramanandi Kuer if a special citation had been issued to Ramanandi Kuer. Their Lordships disagreed with the view taken by Das J. that if a guardian ad litem had been assigned for her, Thakurani Kuer would have been so appointed if all the circumstances were fully placed before the Court: see page 26 of the judgment. Further at page 27, their Lordships held at the bottom of the page that if citations were not served, i.e., properly and effectively served, on Thakurani, the daughter was entitled to ask that probate which was obtained in her absence should be recalled. It will be observed that their Lordships are not saying that if citations were not served on Ramanandi, the daughter would be entitled to ask that probate should be recalled; they are emphasising that if citations had not been properly served on Thakurani, the daughter would be entitled to ask for that relief. In the present case special citations were served, as I have stated already, on the mother of the appellant and they were properly and effectively served on her.

31. In the numerous cases decided under the provisions of Order 32, Civil P.C. it has been held following the leading Privy Council case in Mt. Bibi Walian v. Bankey Behari Persad (03) 30 I.A. 182 that the mere fact that no formal order appointing a guardian is found to be recorded in the order-sheet is not sufficient to invalidate the entire proceedings provided that the interest of the minor has not been sacrificed or has been well represented. Adopting the same principle, I must hold that in this case although the proceedings were defective, but they were not defective in substance because the interests of the appellant were fully protected and indeed were identical with the interests of her mother who opposed the grant of letters of administration.

32. For these additional reasons I agree with my learned brother that in this case it is impossible to give any relief to the appellant. The appeal fails and must be dismissed but without costs.