Authored By : L.C. Adami, Das
L.C. Adami, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order of the District Judge dismissing an application for revocation of Letters of Administration granted to one Jogendra Rout on the 7th April, 1919. The widow of the deceased testator had applied for revocation on the 26th April, 1919, but her application was dismissed and now the present appellants have come forward alleging that they had no knowledge of Jagendra's application of the 7th April 1919, and that, therefore, the grant should have been revoked.
2. The learned District Judge has found that both the appellants had as a fact notice of the application by Jogendra, they being summoned by Rajan Dei the caveatrix in the first application of Jogendra and again on the 21st October, 1918.
3. The point taken by the learned vakil for the appellants is that Jogendra in his application stated in paragraph 2, that the testator had left behind him only his married widow, Rajan Dei, and his sister, Banki Dei, and that the deceased had no relations except them. One appellant is uncle of the testator and the other is a cousin and it is urged that as reversioners they were entitled to have a special citation issued upon them at the time when Jogendra made his application.
4. The learned vakil has relied on the case of Shyama Charan Baisya V. Prafulla Sundari Gupta (1915) 21 C. L. J. 557 = 30 I.C. 161 = 19 C.W.N. 882 to the effect that where an incorrect statement as to the relations of the deceased is made, and, misled thereby, the Court does sot direct the issue of special citation on a person who is entitled to intervene, the proceeding to obtain the grant is defective in substance. But the same case lays down that a person is bound by proceeding to which be is no party but of which he has received know ledge and whereto he has had a capacity to make himself a party.
5. The learned Judge in that case cited the judgment of Sir John Nicholl in Newell v. Weeks (1814) 2 Phillim. 224 to the effect that "the process of citing parties is a convenient one for all suitors, because when that is done you need got prove actual privity-the law presumes privity after the legal process-the lis pendens is sufficient notice that persons should appear and protect their own interests but if you can prove actual privity, the legal process, in point of solid justice and sound reason, is superfluous; though enabundanti caulela, it may still be convenient to resort to it and have it upon record"
6. In the present case the District Judge has found as a fact that at the time of the application of Jogendra for probate, Rajan Dei the widow issued summonses on the two appellants and those summonses were duly served upon them. They thus had full notice that an application was being made and they had an opportunity of intervening. The notice was served upon them a full month before a compromise was arrived at between Jogendra and the widow, but they took no steps.
7. Under the circumstances it was unnecessary that special citations should have been served upon them and the failure to serve those citations cannot give a good ground for revocation of the grant of probate.
8. Under the circumstances, I do not consider that the appellants are entitled to the relief and I would dismiss this appeal.
9. Das, J.
10. I agree.