TEJ SHANKER, J.

(1.) This reference has been made by Brother Shacheendra Dwivedi, J., relating to the interpretation of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter called "the Act").

(2.) Facts of the case are not of much significance. However, briefly narrated facts are that a complaint was filed under Ss. 323 and 347 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 3(iv) and (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 before the Special Judge (Sessions Judge, Guna). The question that arose before the learned Sessions Judge was as to whether he had jurisdiction to take cognizance or not. By its order dated 14-3-1992, the learned Sessions Judge (Special Judge) held that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance in view of S. 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the complaint was dismissed. Against this order, an appeal was preferred under S. 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter called the Code). Thus, the learned single Judge was faced with the problem as to whether the Sessions Court, which was designated as Special Court under the said Act, was empowered to try the offence under the Act without its committal by the Court of Magistrate under S. 193 of the Code. There is a single Judge decision of this Court in Sukhlal Jatav v. State of M.P. and others (Cri. Revision No. 149/92, dated 14-7-1993) decided by Brother K.M. Pandey, J. in which a view was taken that Special Court under S. 14 of the Act becomes a Court of original jurisdiction in terms of the provisions of the Code, i.e. Criminal Procedure Code; and it could take cognizance of the offences under the said Act for the trial as provided in the Act. Section 193 of the Code did not apply to the said Act. Special Court was not required to wait till the case was committed to it. Brother Dwivedi, J., in his detailed order of reference found himself unable to contribute to the view taken by Brother Pandey, J., hence this reference was made.

(3.) We have heard at great length the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri A. K. Shrivastava, Advocate. Shri P. L. Dubey, Advocate, also intervened to support the contention of the applicant and the view taken by Brother Pandey, J. on the other hand, Shri K. K. Lahoti, Advocate supported the contrary view. We have also heard Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Government Advocate, who assisted us on our request, as the question was of great importance.

(4.) The controversy which has to be resolved relates to the procedure to be followed by a Special Court, while acting under the provisions of the said Act. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes to provide for Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, as is evident from the preamble. Chapter IV of the Act deals with Special Courts. Section 14 provides :

"14. Special Court.- For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act."

The State of Madhya Pradesh, vide Notification No. F-No. 1-2-90-21A(1), dated 30-1-1990, of the Law and Legislative Department, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, created Special Court and all the Sessions Judges have been specified as Special Courts under the provisions of this Act. The said Act, except for providing of creation of Special Courts under Section 14, does not specifically provide for the procedure which has to be followed by the Special Courts. The difficulty which has arisen is as to what procedure has to be followed by a Special Court created under S. 14 of the Act, while trying the offences under the Act. Shri A. K. Shrivastava, Advocate, argued that the Act is a Special Act and it has created a Special Court to try the offences under the Act. Special Court has original jurisdiction and as such is competent to take cognizance of all the offences under the Act. He laid much emphasis upon the word, try and contended that it is wide enough to embrace within its folds taking of cognizance as well. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon a Division Bench case of the Kerala High Court in In Re : Director General of Prosecution 1993 Cri LJ 760, wherein it was specifically laid down that the word, try used in S. 14 of the Act means that the Special Court had not only the power to try the offence but it had the power to make every kind of inquiry as Criminal Court of original jurisdiction in terms of the provisions contained in the Code. Learned counsel pointed out that the learned single Judge of this Court also took the same view, relying upon this authority in Sukhlals case (supra). He also urged that the provisions of S. 193 of the Code relating to cognizance of offence by the Court of Session is inapplicable in cases covered by the said Act. Learned counsel also argued that reading of S. 20 of the Act shows that it has overriding effect and as such it overrides the provisions of the Code.

(5.) Learned counsel Shri K. K. Lahoti, Advocate, on the other hand, contended that the Code is a general law and on combined reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Code, it transpires that all offences under the Penal Code and any other law have to be investigated, inquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Code unless there is any enactment regulating the manner of investigation, inquiry or trial and if it is so, the offences under those enactments have to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of special or local enactments. His contention is that as the Act does not provide any special procedure and merely provides of a creation of a Special Court, it cannot be said that the procedure provided under the Code is dispensed with. According to the learned counsel procedure provided under the Code has to be followed, as there is no procedure provided under the Act. The provisions of S. 20 of the Act specifically provide that the provisions of the Act will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. If, therefore, means that in order to have an overriding effect, it must be shown that the other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and unless it is shown that the provisions of the Code are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, general law is applicable.

(6.) Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, Government Advocate, who assisted us referred to various provisions of the Act as well as the Code and supported the contentions raised by Shri K. K. Lahoti, Advocate, mentioned above.

(7.) In order to resolve the controversy, we have to keep in mind that the Code provides procedure for the investigation, inquiry and trial of the offences. Ss. 4 and 5 are important. Under S. 4 of the Code, provision has been made for trial of the offences under the Penal Code and other laws. If we go through the provisions, we find that under Clause (1) it has been provided that all offences under the Penal Code have to be investigated, inquired into and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code. Clause (2) provides that the offences under any other law, have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. S. 5 of the Code provides that in absence of specific provisions to the contrary, not contained in the Code not affecting any special or local law, any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. Thus, when both the Sections are taken together, it becomes clear that unless there is a special provision in the special enactment, general provisions contained in the Code have to be followed.

(8.) The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities), 1989, is a special law and as said above, it creates a Special Court under S. 14. Under S. 14 of the Act Special Court has been created and the Sessions Judges have been designated as the Special Court under a Notification issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh. A perusal of the entire Act goes to show that no procedure whatsoever has been provided under the Act, which has to be followed by the Special Court. At this stage it is relevant to mention that S. 2(1)(d) of the Act defines a Special Court as follows : "(d) "Special Court" means a Court of Session specified as a Special Court in S. 14;" Thus, under this definition irrespective of the fact that a Special Court is created under S. 14, it is a Court of Session. In other words, it can safely be said that a Court of Session has been called a Special Court within the meaning of S. 14. As no special provision has been made under the Act, providing for any procedure to be followed by the Special Court by virtue of provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Code, general procedure provided under the Code has to be followed.

(9.) The Apex Court in Khatri v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 1068 [LQ/SC/1981/141] : 1981 Cri LJ 597 also ruled that, it is apparent from S. 4 that the provisions of Code are applicable, where an offence under the Penal Code, or under any other law is being investigated, inquired into or otherwise dealt with. More or less, similar question had arisen in an Allahabad case reported in case of State v. Awatar Krishna, AIR 1957 All 88 [LQ/AllHC/1956/255] : (1957 Cri LJ 767). In that case, Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was considering the provisions of S. 14(b) of the U.P. Sate Tax Act, which constituted offence, but did not prescribe the procedure for the trial of the offence. The Court took the view that to the trial of offence under S. 14(b) of the U.P. Sale Tax Act, Code is applicable and all its provisions have, therefore, to be given effect to. This view was taken because there was no special procedure laid down for the trial of the said offence under the Act.

(10.) The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Re : Director General of Prosecution (1993 Cri LJ 760) (supra) which has been relied upon by the learned single Judge of this Court in Sukhlal Jatavs case (supra) must now be seen. The learned single Judge also observed :

"The combined effect of the provisions of the Code referred to above is that all offences under the Indian Penal Code are to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code. In so far as offences under laws other than IPC are concerned, the provisions of the Code apply in their full force, subject to the specific or contrary provision made by the law, under which those offences are to be investigated, or tried. Where an enactment provides special procedure only for some matters and in regard to other matters on which that enactment is silent, the provisions of the Code must be applied."

This observation is also in consonance with what we have observed above. Learned Judge, thereafter, proceeded to discuss the case of A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 [LQ/SC/1984/42] : (1984 Cri LJ 647). Considering those authorities, as well as AIR 1957 SC 389 [LQ/SC/1957/9] : (1957 Cri LJ 567) (State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh), it was held that the Special Court can take cognizance of the offences on circumstances, excluding one out of the four recognised modes ender S. 190 of the Code. The learned Judges interpreted the word, try occurring in S. 14 of the aforesaid Act. We have carefully gone through the two authorities of the Apex Court, referred to above, as well as the view of the learned Judges of the Kerala High Court. After giving our anxious consideration, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view taken in the said Authority, i.e. In Re : Director General of Prosecution (supra).

(11.) The case of A. R. Antule (1984 Cri LJ 647) (SC) (supra) specifically dealt with provisions of the Code (Amendment Act). There was an occasion to consider offence committed by a public servant under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption At. If we go deep into this authority, it clearly goes to show that it was alleged therein that in the absence of specific provisions made in the statute indicating that offences will have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to that statute, the same will have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Code. In other words, Code is the parent statute which provides for investigation, inquiring into and trial of cases by Criminal Courts of various designations. There was a specific provision under S. 8(1) of the Criminal Amendment Act, which made a provision that Special Judge can take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to him for trial. The Court, therefore, observed that it necessarily implies that the Court of Special Judge is armed with power to take cognizance of offences and in this context, it was held shorn of all embellishment, that a Court of Special Court is a Court of original jurisdiction. With great respect to the learned Judges, we find ourselves unable to contribute to the view taken by the learned Judges on the basis of these observations of the Apex Court that in the context of the provisions of S. 14 of the Act under consideration, the Special Court was neither a Court of Session nor a Court of Magistrate, but was a Court of original jurisdiction. The learned Judges observed in para 7 of the judgment :

"The power as a Special Court is conferred on a Court of Session which is one in the hierarchy of Courts invisaged by the Code. When such a Court is seized of the dispute in so far as actual trial is concerned, it should be governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable to it as provided in the Code. The procedure for trial to be followed can only be that prescribed in the Code since no special provision to that effect is made in the Act. In other words, so long as the Act does not make provision for the procedure to be followed by the Special Court, which is Court of Session, its procedure regarding trial should be governed by the provisions contained in the Code. In the instant case, a Court of Session is constituted to be the Special Court. Court of Session is one established as per the provisions contained in the Code. That Court when constituted as a Special Court and Act constituting it is s silent regarding the procedure to be followed by it, the ordinary incidents of procedure for that Court for the trial are to be followed."

The above observations of the learned Judge is in consonance with the view we are taking in the present case, and which has been mentioned above. Once it is found that the Special law does not provide any procedure for the trial of the offence created under the said Act, the general procedure provided under the Code has to be followed. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that provisions of S.193 of the Code do not apply to the Special Court. 11A. In view of the above principles of law, we fail to understand as to how the learned Judges concluded : "The Special Court is thus to take cognizance of the offence under the Act and proceed with the trial, as provided under the Code. I hasten to add that S. 193 of the Code will not apply to the Special Court."

(12.) There is yet another authority of Patna High Court reported in Jhagru Mahto v. State of Bihar (199) 1 Crimes 643 [LQ/MPHC/2011/114] . In that case also a Division Bench of the Patna High Court was faced with the similar situation. It was held that it cannot be said in view of the express provision contained in S. 193 of the Code that power to try a case includes power to take cognizance inasmuch as S. 2(g) of the Code defines "enquiry" to mean an enquiry other than a trial conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or a Court. The learned Judges observed after taking into consideration the provisions of the aforesaid Act that there appears to be a serious lacuna in the Act (Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes Act). Section 193 of the Code prohibits a Court of Session to take cognizance of offences unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the said Code. No provision exists in the Act whereby power to take cognizance of the offences has specifically been conferred in the Special Courts by reason of the provision of the said Act. The learned Judges, therefore, took the view that the Special Court has to follow the procedure provided under the Code, and the power to take cognizance was to be exercised by the Magistrate First Class. We entirely agree with the view taken by the learned Judges in this case.

(13.) We may also mention that it is the settled principle of interpretation that while interpreting any provision of any Act, nothing can be added or subtracted from it. The intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the words used in it. The Legislature deliberately did not make any provision prescribing any special procedure for trial of the offences under the Act. We cannot, while interpreting the provisions introduce what the Legislature never intended. Had the Legislature intended to arm the Special Court under the Act with all powers conferred under the Code or any of those powers, it would have made a specific provision in the Act itself. Where the Legislature thought that a specific provision was required with respect to the provisions of the Code, it has made a provision, for example, S. 15 makes a special provision for special public prosecutors. The Act provides for the preventive action to be taken by the law and order machinery under S. 17. S. 18 makes a special provision with respect to exclusion of applicability of S. 438 of the Code. (This provision has now been declared ultra vires by this Court). S. 19 makes a provision for excluding the provision of S. 360 of the Code. Thus, wherever the Legislature intended to exclude any provision of the Code, it has made a specific provision and in this view of the matter, if we accept the view of the Kerala High Court interpreting the word try that it takes within its ambit proceedings before the actual trial as well, i.e. to take cognizance of the offence. It will mean that we are adding something which the Legislature never intended.

(14.) xxx xxx xxx

(15.) The other case of the Apex Court is State of Bihar v. Ramneresh (1957 Cri LJ 567) (supra) referred to in the aforesaid judgment of the Kerala High Court. The Apex Court clearly held that the word, try or trying appear to have no universal meaning and that word is used in the sense to mean all stages after enquiry.

(16.) Learned counsel Shri A.K. Shrivastava, in order to interprete the word, try referred to the meaning of the word, try given in various dictionaries i.e. Oxford Dictionary, Blacks Law Dictionary, Websters and Law of Laxicon. We do not propose to go into the meaning of the word, try as given in the dictionaries, as in our view, it is not necessary for the simple reason that while interpreting the word, we have to gather the intention of the Legislature as said above from the whole of the statute.

(17.) Learned counsel referred to the provisions of S. 20 of the Act and contended that it is an overriding provision and it makes a provision that the Act has an overriding effect. There cannot be any dispute about the co contention of the learned counsel because the words of the Section are very clear. It runs as follows :

"20. Act to override other laws.- Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."

A perusal of the words used in this Section goes to show that if overrides the provisions in other Act which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. In other words, the provisions of the Act override the provisions of any other Act which are inconsistent. If the other Act makes any provision which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, provision of this Act shall prevail. As there is no provision prescribed in the Act for the procedure for the trial of the offence under the Act, it cannot be said that the general rules of procedure provided in the Code are inconsistent with this Act.

(18.) Learned single Judge of this Court, in the aforesaid case (Sukhalals case) observed :

"When there is no provision in any other Act on any point then such provision becomes inconsistent with this Act for want of any provision and the provisions of this special Act shall and the provisions of any other Act having special provisions not provided in this Act will not be applicable for the purposes of this Act."

It has further been observed : in para 16 : "If the Legislature has not made any provision for the commitment of the cases under this Act to the Special Court then this in itself will not affect the jurisdiction of the Special Courts in taking cognizance of the cases under this Act." With great respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to subscribe to this view. To us, it appears that to say that as there is no provision in any other Act on any point, it is inconsistent with the Act, is nothing but a misconception. Rather the position is otherwise. We are of definite opinion that if the Special Act does not provide any special procedure, there is no question of anything being inconsistent with the general law. The above observation of the learned Judge, pre-supposes that Special Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance and that is why it has been observed that if Legislature has not made any provision for the commitment of the cases under this Act to the Special Court then this itself will not affect the jurisdiction of the Special Court in taking cognizance of the cases under this Act. To us, it appears that unless there is a special provision under the Act, enabling the Special Court to take cognizance of the offences prescribed under the Act, the general law has to be applied and it cannot be said that the provisions of the general law are inconsistent.

(19.) If we peruse the provisions of other Special Act, under which Special Courts have been created, we find that the Legislature has made specific provisions with respect to the procedure to be followed for the trial of the offences prescribed therein. A peep in the provisions of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, may be made. This Act provides under S. 36 for creation of the Special Court reads as under :

"36. Constitution of Special Courts.- (1) The Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy trial of the offences under this Act, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute as many Courts as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the notification. (2) A Special Court shall consist of a single Judge who shall be appointed by the Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. Explanation.-In this Sub-Section "High Court" means the High Court of the State in which the Sessions Judge or the Additional Sessions Judge of a Special Court was working immediately before his appointment as such Judge. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a Special Court unless he is, immediately before such appointment, a Sessions Judge, or an Additional Sessions Judge."

Thus, under this provision also provision has been made for the creation of the Special Courts for speedy trial of the offences under the Act. S. 36-A makes a specific provision with respect to the procedure and it begins with the words, "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973...." This Section specifically clothes the Special Court with the power to take cognizance. If runs as follows :-

"36-A. Offences triable by Special Courts.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (1 of 1974).- (a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Government; (b) Where a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a Magistrate under Sub-Sec. (2), or Sub-Section (2-A) of S. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days in the whole where such is an Executive Magistrate : Provided that where such Magistrate considers - (i) When such person is forwarded to him as aforesaid; or (ii) upon or at any, time before the expiry of the period of detention authorised by him, that the detention of that person is unnecessary, he shall order such person to be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction; (c) the Special Court may exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under clause (b), the same power which the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under S. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that Section; (d) a Special Court may, upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf, take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. (2) When trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court may also try an offence other than an offence under this Act, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) be charged at the same trial. (3) Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1972 (2 of 1974), and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of Sub-Sec. (1) of that Section as if the reference to "Magistrate" in that Section included also a reference to a "Special Court" constituted under S. 36." Reference may also be made to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. In this Act also S. 6 makes a provision empowering the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary for trying the offences mentioned therein. S. 8 of the Act provides for procedure and if we peruse S. 8(1) we find that it has specifically provided that the accused without being committed for trial, a Special Judge may take cognizance of offences. Section 8 runs as follows :- 8. Procedure and Powers of Special Judges. (1) A Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. (2) A Special Judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned, in or privy to, an offence, tender pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to offence and every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in a commission thereof and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purpose of Ss. 339 and 339-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be deemed to have been tendered under S. 338 of that Code. (3) Save as provided in Sub-Sec. (1) or Sub-Sec. (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provisions the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessor and the person conducting a prosecution before Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. (3-A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Sub-Sec. (3), the provisions of S. 350 and S. 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purpose of the said provisions, a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. (4) A Special Judge may pass upon any person convicted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence of which such person is convicted."

The Legislature, thus, wherever intended to make a special provision for the trial of the offences it has made specific provisions. The fact that the Legislature has not made any provision prescribing any special procedure for the trial of the offence under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, though it has made a specific provision in other Acts go to suggest that it never intended to prescribe any special procedure for the trial of the offences under the Act. Indeed, again we may reiterate that if we interprete the word try as interpreted in the aforesaid authority of the Kerala High Court as also by the learned single Judge in Sukhalals case (supra), it will go against the intention of the Legislature. Thus, we are of the definite opinion that the view taken by the learned referring Judge that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989), are applicable and the procedure provided therein has to be followed, is correct.

(20.) We, therefore, hold that the procedure provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has to be followed, while trying the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and consequently we hold that the Special Courts constituted under the Act has no jurisdiction to try the offences directly provided under the Act without the case being committed to it under S. 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The reference is, therefore, answered accordingly.

(21.) Let record be sent to the referring Judge. Order accordingly.