B.P. Jha, J.

1. I shall dispose of these two civil revision petitions by a common judgment as a common point of law arises for consideration in both these civil revision petitions.

2. The point for consideration is:

Whether the valuation given by the plaintiffs under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) is to be accepted, or, whether the Court has jurisdiction to interfere with this valuation on the ground that it is not a reasonable one

3. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following decisions, namely, (1) in the case of Gauri Shankar Mahansaria v. Union of India (: AIR 1980 Pat 217 [LQ/PatHC/1979/154] ) : (1980 BUR 455) , (2) in the case of Smt. Prem Kishori Devi v. The State of Bihar (: AIR 1982 Pat 47 [LQ/PatHC/1981/89] ) :(1981 BBCJ 531) , (3) in the case of Secretary, Managing Committee, Dwarkanath High School, Muzaffarpur v. Gaurishankar Jha (Civil Revision No. 388 of 1979) disposed of on 20th Sept., 1979, (4) in the case of Shree Thakur Durga Narainjee Asthapit Mandir v. Surendra Prasad Sah (Civil Revision No. 1141 of 1980) disposed of on 24th March, 1982, (5) in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Arunachalam Chetty v. Rangasamy Pillai (: AIR 1915 Mad 948 [LQ/MadHC/1914/414] ), (6) in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Cheiasami Ramiah v. Chelasami Ramasami 1913 Ind Cas 363 and (7) in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar (: AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] ).

4. It is also necessary to quote the bottom portion of Section 7(iv) of the Act which runs as follows:

"according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal;

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought"; On a perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that in the cases covered under Section 7(iv) (b) and (c), the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. In other words, the option has been given to the plaintiff to value the relief in the plaint. Such a valuation cannot be interfered with either by the Court or by the defendant. In such cases, the plaintiff is entitled to amend the valuation also. The Court has no authority in law to say that the valuation is low or arbitrary or is not a reasonable one. Such a power has not been vested in the Court under Section 7(iv) (b) and (c) of the Act. The authority to state the valuation lies with the plaintiff, and, once he exercised such a right, the Court has no authority to interfere with such a valuation.

5. In my opinion, the valuation given by the plaintiff in a suit under Section 7(iv)(b) or 7(iv)(c) of the Act is final and conclusive. The Court has no jurisdiction to challenge the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff in view of the provision of Section 7(iv) of the Act. This proposition has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar (: AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] ) as well as in all the decisions, mentioned above. This Court has followed the decision of the Supreme Court.

6. The facts of the Supreme Court decision (supra) are as follows. The plaintiff filed a suit for setting aside a decree in a previous partition suit, and, he valued the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction as well as for payment of court-fees at Rs. 15,00,000/-. In the memorandum of appeal, the plaintiff amended the valuation of the suit and fixed it at Rs. 50,000/-. The Supreme Court upheld the valuation given by the plaintiff at Rs. 50,000/- on the basis of the provision of Section 7(iv) of the Act. It is relevant to quote paras 14 and 15 of the decision of the Supreme Court which runs as follows :

"14. The question which still remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000/-. In our opin ion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Section 7, Sub-section (iv) (b) deals with suits to en force the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property and the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits is according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. Section 7 fur ther provides that in all suits falling under Section 7(iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under Sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes or court-fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the Court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiffs alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court-fees. It really means that in suits falling under Section 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the Court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief.

15. What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading Section 7(iv) of the Act along with Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Court-fees Act, Section 7, paras 5, 6 and 9 and para 10, Clause (d), court, fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. . In other words, so far as suits falling under Section 7, Sub-section (iv) of the Act are concerned, Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of Section 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court-fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases, but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. Incidentally we may point out that according to the appellant it was really not necessary in the present ease to mention Rupees 15,00,000/- as the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953 there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation."

7. The Supreme Court has held that in a case falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act, the option has been given to the plaintiff to state the valuation in the plaint. It has further been held that once a plaintiff exercised such an option under Section 7(iv) of the Act, that determines the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction as well as for court-fees.

8. It has been held in the case of Smt. Prem Kishori Devi v. The State of Bihar through the Collector, Katihar : (: AIR 1982 Pat 47 [LQ/PatHC/1981/89] para 5) : (1981 BBCJ 531) in para No. 5 as follows :

"On the basis of the observations made above, I hold that in cases falling under Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act, liberty has been given to the plaintiff to state the valuation in the plaint. If such option is exercised by the plaintiff then In that case the Court has no business to interfere with such valuation given in the plaint."

In view of the principle held in the above case. I hold that in cases falling under Section 7(iv) (b) and (c), an option has been given to the plaintiff to state the valuation in the plaint. The Court has no jurisdiction to come to a contrary conclusion on the ground of the valuation being unreasonable or arbitrary or on any other ground.

9. Learned counsel for the opposite party has not challenged the correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar (: AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] ). Learned counsel for the opposite party has, however, relied on one sentence in the decision of the Supreme Court occurring in para No. 14 which is as follows:

"It really means that in suits falling under Section 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the Court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief."

Learned counsel for the opposite party has laid stress on the word ordinarily. In other words, learned counsel for the opposite party contends that the Supreme Court has not used the word generally.

10. The Supreme Court has clearly held that ordinarily the valuation stated by the plaintiff should be accepted in cases falling under Section 7(iv)(b) of the Act. If it is read along with the other sentences in the judgment, then it is clear that the valuation given by the plaintiff in a case falling under Section 7(iv) (b) or (c) shall have to be accepted by the Court. In this connection, learned counsel for the opposite party failed to look into the following observation of the Supreme Court in para No. 14 of the decision :

"If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under Sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees."

If the aforesaid two sentences are read together, then even if the word ordinarily occurs in one of the sentences, the irresistible conclusion win be that the valuation given by the plaintiff shall be conclusive and final and the Court has no authority in law to interfere with such a valuation.

11. Learned counsel for the opposite party has also relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton (: AIR 1944 Pat 17 [LQ/PatHC/1943/83] ). This very question arose for consideration before the Full Bench. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Chelasami Ramiahs case 1913 Ind Cas 363 was also referred to by the Honble Judges. The Honble Judges did not accept the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court as correct without assigning any valid reason. It appears to me that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Mt. Rupias case (: AIR 1944 Pat 17 [LQ/PatHC/1943/83] ) does not lay down a correct law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiars case (: AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] ). The decision of the Supreme Court, as laid down in Article 141 of the Constitution, is, in my opinion, the correct law, and the law laid down in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Mt. Rupias case (: AIR 1944 Pat 17 [LQ/PatHC/1943/83] ) is not correct as it is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court (supra). As such, I do not accept the decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Mt. Rupias case (supra) as correct. For the same reasons, I do not accept the decisions of this Court in Samarendra Kumar Motilal v. Jitendra Kumar Motilal (: AIR 1970 Pat 317 [LQ/PatHC/1969/137] ) as well as in Ramcharitar Pandey v. Basgit Rai (: AIR 1932 Pat 9 [LQ/PatHC/1931/69] ) and in Jadunandan Gope v. Syed Naimuzzaman (: AIR 1957 Pat 560 [LQ/PatHC/1956/160] ) as correct. With due respect to the Lordships of the Patna High Court, I must say that none of these Honble Judges considered the bottom portion of Section 7(iv) of the Act. On the other hand, the Supreme Court and the Full Benches of the Madras High Court considered the bottom portion of the provision of Section 7(iv) of the Act and they correctly held that the valuation given by the plaintiff in a suit falling under Section 7(iv) (b) and (c) of the Act was final and conclusive. 1 also adopt the same reasonings of the Supreme Court and the Madras High Court. 1 hold that in cases falling under Section 7(iv) (b) and (c) of the Act, the valuation given by the plaintiff shall be final and conclusive and the plaintiff has the right to amend the valuation.

12. IN these circumstances, I hold that in both the cases the Courts below acted without jurisdiction in raising the valuation given in the plaint for which the Courts were not authorised to do so in law. Hence, 1 set aside the order dated 4th Aug., 1973 in Civil Revision No. 1130 of 1973 and the order dated 23rd July, 1981 in Civil Revision No. 1338 of 1981.

13. In the result, both the petitions are allowed and the orders dated 4th Aug., 1973 and 23rd July, 1981 are set aside. The Courts below are directed to proceed with the suits in accordance with law on the basis of the valuation given in the plaint. The parties shall bear their own costs.