B.P. Jha, J.

1. The civil revision petition has been filed by the plaintiff against an order dated 5-4-1980 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Katihar.

2. The plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is the kaiyami raiyat of the suit land. The plaintiff also prayed to pass an order of permanent injunction restraining the State of Bihar from interfering with the khas possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. The plaintiff valued the suit at Rs. 5,350/-, as stated in paragraph No. 17 of the plaint, for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fees. The defendant raised objection to the valuation. The court below held by the order dated 5-4-1980 that the valuation of the suit amounted to Rs. 2,40,000/-.

3. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the State that the suit will come within the purview of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. It is relevant to quote Section 7(iv)(c), which is as follows:--

"7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows :--

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(iv) In suits:--

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(c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed

XX XX XX

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought."

If the case comes within the purview of Section 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act then the court will accept the valuation given by the plaintiff in the plaint. In my opinion, liberty has been given to the plaintiff to state the valuation and such valuation shall be accepted by the court. The court has no authority to interfere with the valuation in cases falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act on the ground that it is arbitrary or it is below the market value. No such power has been given to the court under the.

4. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (: AIR 1958 SC 245 [LQ/SC/1957/131] ). It is relevant to quote a few portions of paragraphs Nos. 14 and 15 of that decision :

"14......Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under Section 7(iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several Sub-sections of Section 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under Sub-section (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fee. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in case in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. 15. "...The computation of court-fees in suits falling under Section 7(iv) of thedepends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction."

5. On the basis of the observations made above I hold that in cases falling under Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act liberty has been given to the plaintiff to state the valuation in the plaint. If such option is exercised by the plaintiff then in that case the court has no business to interfere with such valuation given in the plaint.

6. Learned counsel for the opposite party contends that the plaintiff has not been given an absolute right to place any valuation on her relief. I am unable to accept his argument in view of the Provisions of Sec. 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act, (as quoted above), as well as on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court. Hence, I direct the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court-fee on Rs. 5,350/-. I, therefore, set aside the order dated 5th April, 1980 by which the valuation was raised to Rupees 2,40,000/-.

7. In the result, the petition is allowed and the order dated 5th April, 1980 is set aside and the court below is directed to abide by the directions given in this judgment. Parties shall bear their own costs.