Anil Kumar, J.Head Sri B.K. Shukla, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri K.K. Shukla, learned State counsel and perused the record. Petitioner/Sri Hridaya Narain Tiwari, has been granted an arms licence No. 805 by the Licensing Authority/O.P. No. 2 against the same he holds N.P. Bore Revolver. By an order dated 12.12.2006 passed by Licensing Authority/District Magistrate, Ambedker Nagar, the licence of the petitioner has been suspended and he was asked to submit his reply that why his licence should not cancelled keeping in view the report dated 25.11.2006 and 21.11.2006 submitted by Superintendent of Police and Prabhari Nirikshat Kotwali, Akbarpur, District Ambedker Nagar on the ground that the petitioner had misused his arm in an incident took place on 20.11.2006, as a result of which he has been implicated in Crime Case No. 134/2007 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 I.P.C. and in Case No. 107/116 Cr.P.C. as such a recommendation has been made by the police authorities of the district to the licensing authority that the petitioner should not be allowed to keep his arms with him in order to maintain public peace and safety (Lok Hit and Lok Parishanti), after receiving the same the petitioner submitted his reply.

2. After considering the reply submitted by the petitioner as well as taking into consideration the material facts/report on record, the report submitted by the Prabhari Nirikshat Kotwali, Akbarpur dated 4.2.2013 that the petitioner has used his arm in a public place, thus keeping the public peace and safety as well as a criminal case initiated against him in which he has been enlarged only bail, the licensing authority/O.P. No. 2 by an order dated 9.4.2010 had cancelled the petitioners arms licence with a finding that the petitioner has misused his arms by firing in the incidence taken place on 20.11.2006 which is against the public peace and safety, so not entitled to retain the arms licence.

3. Aggrieved by the said fact, the petitioner filed an appeal, dismissed by the appellate authority by an order dated 8.11.2010.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner while assailing the impugned order submits that the action on the part of official respondent thereby cancelling the petitioners arms licence and dismissing the appeal only on the mere involvement in a criminal case is not a ground for cancellation, hence the impugned orders are liable to be set aside and writ petition may be allowed.

5. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the following judgment:

1. Mewa Lal @ Kunnu v. Commissioner Allahabad Division Allahabad and another, Writ Petition No. 165(MS) of 2012, judgment and order dated 13.1.2014

2. Hond. Haroon v. The District Magistrate, Siddharth Nagar, 2003 (21) CLD 548

3. Mulayam Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2013 (80) ACC 786

6. Learned State counsel while supporting the impugned orders under challenge in the present case submits that the same is in accordance with law as the licensing authority after considering the material facts on record has given a categorical finding of fact that the petitioner has misused his arms which is against the public peace and safely, so there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders under challenge in the present case, accordingly, writ petition liable to be dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through the record.

7. In our Constitution and jurisprudence there is no fundamental right to bear arms unlike the Second Amendment to the American Constitution which at least suggests such a right in the following terms:

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

8. In construing the aforesaid provision the Supreme Court of the United States in Presser v. Illinois, (1884-85) 116 US 252, has observed as under:

It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the Federal Government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the General Government. But....... we think it clear that the sections under consideration do not have this effect.

9. By judgment and order dated 11.3.2014 passed in Writ Petition No. 1605 of 2014 (Shiv Narayan v. Additional Commissioner of Police (Licensing), Delhi High Court held as under:

In fact, the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Kapildeo Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Others, has held that "In our Constitution and jurisprudence there is no fundamental right to bear arms unlike the Second Amendment to the American Constitution. It further held that "the registration and pendency of a criminal case for a major or capital offence may for adequate reasons justify the suspension or revocation of a licence under Cl. (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act." This Court is also of the opinion that the precautionary principle must be followed and public safety cannot be put in jeopardy by granting an arms licence to the petitioner at this stage."

10. However, it is apt to notice that in modern times even in the United States any constitutional right to possess and bear arms has now come under carping criticism in view of the raising of the ugly heads of gun-running, gangsterism and the mafia. In sharp contrast therewith there is no such analogous provision in other jurisprudential system and indeed under the Indian law the right to carry arms is privilege conferred by the Act and other similar statutes which primarily leave the grant thereof in the discretion of the licensing authority. Reference in this connection may instructively be made to the relevant parts of Sections 3, 13, and 14 of the Act:

3. Licence for acquisition and possession of fire-arms and ammunition.

(1) No person shall acquire, have in his possession, or carry any firearm or ammunition unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder:

13. Grant of licences.--(1) An application for the grant of a licence under Chapter II shall be made to the licensing authority and shall be in such form contain such particulars and be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed.

(2) On receipt of an application, the licensing authority shall call for the report of the officer-incharge of the nearest police station on that application, and such officer shall send his report within the prescribed time.

(2A) The licensing authority, after such inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, and after considering the report received under sub-section (2), shall, subject to the other provisions of this chapter, by order in writing either grant the licence or refuse to grant the same:

14. Refusal of licences.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 13, the licensing authority shall refuse to grant--

(a) a licence u/s 3, Section 4 or Section 5 where such licence is required in respect of any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition;

(b) a licence in any other case under Chapter II,

(i) where such licence is required by a person whom the licensing authority has reason to believe--

(1) to be prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition; or

(2) to be of unsound mind; or

(3) to be for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or

(ii) where the licensing, authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to refuse to grant such licence.

11. It would be manifest from the aforesaid provisions that under the Act there is first a legal bar for having in possession or carrying a fire-arm unless a valid licence is first secured in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Secondly, even the original grant u/s 13(2A) is vested entirely in the licensing authority and it seems that the widest discretion has been given to it. Even after conforming to the procedural requirements, the licensing authority may, as regards the general category of arms, either grant the licence or refuse to grant the same. This discretion in this context has perhaps been deliberately kept untrammelled. Further, u/s 14 the law mandates a refusal to grant licence even where the licensing authority has reason to believe that the applicant is for any reason unfit for licence under the Act. The larger tilt of the law in this context is thus somewhat too plain to call for further elaboration.

12. Inevitably one may now advert to the relevant parts of Section 17 and sub-sections (3), (4) and (7) thereof may be noticed in extenso:

(3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence,--

(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or

(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or

(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or

(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or

(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver up the licence.

(4) The licensing authority may also revoke a licence on the application of the holder thereof,

(7) A Court convicting the holder of a licence of any offence under this Act or the rules made thereunder may also suspend or revoke the licence:

Provided that if the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the suspension or revocation shall become void.

13. In the afore-quoted Section 17 there is no provision or mandate that the pendency of a serious criminal case would warrant the revocation of a licence. Counsel, therefore, submitted that the mere registration of a criminal case or its continued pendency was no ground for the extreme step of revoking the licence.

14. Now it is true that sub-section (3) does not in terms provide that the pendency of a criminal charge is a ground for the revocation of licence. However, it is equally true that it is not possible for the legislature to conceive every situation in the future which may render the suspension of revocation of a licence granted earlier necessary. It is, therefore, that the residuary discretion is left in the licensing authority. On this score, the language employed is again of the widest amplitude. Clause (a) warrants revocation if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence "is for any reason unfit for the licence under the Act".

15. Now, the employment of such phraseology in the statute by the framers can leave no manner of doubt that a wide residuary discretion has been vested in the licensing; authority to revoke provided it is satisfied that the holder is unfit for the licence under the Act. The issue, thus, is whether the pendency of a major or capital crime case may not, in the opinion of the District Magistrate, satisfy him that such a person is unfit for holding the licence further. Plainly enough such discretion given by the statute cannot be put in a strait-jacket. It cannot possibly be said that in a particular case the implication of the holder in serious or horrendous capital crime may not furnish an adequate ground for the licensing authority for being satisfied that the former holder of the weapon is now unfit for the privilege of the licence granted under the Act.

16. This is more so in the light of the fact that sub-section (1) requires the licensing authority to give notice in writing to deliver up the licence to it within such time as may be specified in the notice in the event of variation, suspension and the revocation of licences. That would invariably give an opportunity to the licensee, as in the present case to show some cause against such action. It is after consideration of this explanation that the licensing authority may, on the overall circumstances, be satisfied from the nature of the case that the person is now unfit for continuing as a licensee for arms.

17. A further safeguard is provided by sub-section (5) of Section 17. The licensing authority must record in writing reasons therefore and also furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in exceptional cases he is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement.

18. Nevertheless the requirement of recording reasons in writing is inflexibly mandatory. Therefore, it cannot be easily said that the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority hedged in by the statutory requirement cannot be exercised on the basis of the pendency of the serious or capital criminal charge. If such subjective satisfaction has been broadly and reasonably exercised, to my mind, it would come within the parameters of the statute under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 17.

19. A strong note of caution, however, must be sounded in this context. It is not the pendency of any and every criminal case which would inflexibly warrant the suspension or revocation of a licence validly granted. A criminal case may range from a paltry traffic offence to the most horrendous capital crime. Whilst the pendency of the former may hardly provide an adequate basis u/s 17(3), in the case of the latter after notice and hearing of the explanation such action may well become necessary.

20. Equally, the use or employment of the licensed weapon in the alleged crime might well be a relevant and added factor for consideration in the exercise of the discretion by the licensing authority. There is no gainsaying that licensed weapons are not to be allowed to degenerate into crime weapons. It bears repetition that sub-section (3) puts the matter in the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority and inevitably the issue cannot be put in the procrustean bed of a precise definition or an exhaustive enumeration of situations in which such discretion may be exercised.

21. If the actual use or misuse of the licensed weapon in the alleged murder and even the petitioners participation therein is as yet sub judice before the any Court. Therefore, the licensing authority could draw no sustenance from what as yet are only allegations in a pending case, for revoking the licence. This argument loses sight of the fact that under sub-section (3)(a) it is the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate that for some reason the holder has become unfit for the licence. It is not the requirement of Clause (a) aforesaid that there must be a formal conviction on a criminal charge only for holding a person as unfit. There is a wide gap betwixt the two, namely, a reasonable subjective satisfaction and an objective conviction on a criminal charge resting on the basis of acceptable evidence. One cannot go to the length of holding that because the matter is as yet pending trial the licensing authority could not be subjectively satisfied about the unfitness of the holder.

22. In the context of even a most horrendous crime committed with licensed weapons, the licensing authority would be denuded of all powers of suspending or revoking the licence till the completion of the trial and a conviction therein. Perhaps, the matter can even be elongated so long as an appeal against such conviction may be pending. Indeed, it appears to me that under, sub-section (3) the actual conviction or acquittal on the criminal charge does not have an inflexible or conclusive impact on the exercise of the discretion by the licensing authority thereunder.

23. Even if the holder of this licence may be acquitted by narrowly giving the benefit of doubt, the licensing authority could, perhaps, still take the view that alongwith other factors such a person may not be fit for holding an arms licence. Equally, conviction on any and every criminal charge would not provide an inflexible rule that the licensing authority must revoke the same and it may well be justified in allowing the continuance of the said licence. As is noticed hereafter, conviction and acquittal are issues of relevance under sub-section (7) for the criminal Court and not conclusive for the licensing authority who is governed by the provisions of sub-section (3).

24. Reference may now be instructively made to sub-section (7) of Section 17. This empowers the Court convicting the holder of a licence of any offence under the Act, to suspend or revoke the same. However, the proviso to the sub-section equally mandates that if the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the suspension or revocation would also become void.

25. It is manifest therefrom that the statute has vested a different power in a different authority in the event of a conviction narrowly for offences under the Act or the rules framed thereunder. This is thus a separate power in the event of an objective conviction for a criminal offence under the Act. It is rightly rested on the substantiation of such a charge and on acquittal therefrom automatically renders the suspension or revocation void in itself.

26. What has to be kept in mind is that the requirement or position under sub-section (7) is distinct and different. Whilst the discretion under sub-section (3) is based on the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, the other is rested on the objective fact of a conviction under the Arms Act and the power of the criminal Court to do so. The two things are distinct and apart.

27. It has to be kept in mind that the prescribed statutory conditions for suspension and revocation of a licence are identical. The provisions of Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (3) are with absolute uniformity applicable to the grounds for suspension as well as for revocation of a licence. No finical distinction can thus be drawn betwixt the two.

28. Therefore, if the pendency of a criminal case can be an adequate ground for the suspension of the licence, the same would be equally adequate for its revocation as well. No logical distinction can be drawn to hold that what is adequate for suspension would not be adequate for revocation. Herein the discretion as to which of the two would be more appropriate is vested in the licensing authority and ordinarily it would not be easy for the Court to intrude into that arena.

29. Thus, it can be said that the registration and pendency of a criminal case for a major or capital offence may for adequate reasons justify the suspension or revocation of a licence under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act.

30. Further, on the policy issue, there are broadly two categories of the cases:

(A) The recent trend of the judgments of the learned Single Judges are that pendency of the criminal case cannot be a ground for the District Magistrate/Licensing Authority to invoke his power u/s 17(3) of the Act. In the first category of cases, reference may be made to the following cases:

Ram Sanehi Vs. Commissioner and Another, ; Firasat Ali @ Munna Vs. State of U.P. and Others, ; Jagdish Prasad and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, and Jageshwar Vs. State of U.P. and Others, .

(B) The second category of the case are those cases where this Court has taken the view that if the District Magistrate is satisfied that the licensee is involved in a criminal case the nature of which directly or indirectly affect the public peace or safety of the community/society and the gravity of his action is likely to endanger the public tranquility the District Magistrate will be well within his power to cancel suspend or revoke the license. Reference may be made to the following cases:

Ramesh Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Station Officer, ; Tale Singh Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, ; Sunil Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (6) ADJ 326; Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2009 (9) ADJ 657. [LQ/AllHC/2009/2008]

31. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, a citizen has no fundamental right to hold the arms license, it is only a privilege. In this regard a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and Others Vs. Jaswant Singh Sarna, , has held that a citizen has fundamental right to hold acquire and dispose of fire-arms and ammunition and the provision of sub clauses (f) and (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution are attracted. The Division comprising of V.G. Oak, CJ and R.S. Pathak, J. (as he then was) held as follows:

The aforesaid conclusion is fortified by the nature of the legislation. The Act is plainly a regulatory measure intended to regulate the rights of a citizen to hold acquire and dispose of fire-arms and ammunition and to carry on the occupation, trade or business of dealing in them. The provisions of sub clauses (f) and (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution are immediately attracted, and an enquiry into the question whether the provision, of the Act constitute a reasonable restriction upon the exercise of those fundamental rights becomes relevant. In that enquiry, it is pertinent to consider whether a right of hearing is afforded, expressly or by necessary intendment, before the fundamental right is prejudicially affected.

32. However, a full bench of this Court took a contrary view in the matter of Kailash Nath and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another, .

Para. 3 "In my opinion the obtaining of a licence for acquisition and possession of fire-arms and ammunition under the Arms Act is nothing more than a privilege and the grant of such privilege does not involve the adjudication of the right of an individual nor does it entail civil consequences. I may, however, hasten to add that even an order rejecting the application for grant of licence may become legally vulnerable if it is passed arbitrarily or capriciously or without application of mind. No doubt, a citizen may apply for grant of a licence of fire-arms mostly with the object of protecting his person or property but that is mainly the function of the State. Even remotely this cannot be comprehended within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution which postulates the fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty."

33. Similar view was taken in another full bench in Balram Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , the relevant part of the judgment is extracted below:

13. In this connection, another aspect of the matter cannot be lost sight of. Obtaining of a licence for possession a fire-arm has to be held a privilege only. No civil consequences follow. Even if we were to hold that civil consequences do follow as it may in proceedings concerning licences issued u/s 4 or 5 of the Act, the security of public peace or public safety would be of paramount importance and if, to protect and preserve the same it appears "necessary", the licensing authority has that power to use, for the power to suspend such a licence is inherent in the power to cancel it. Moreover, a right of objection or representation is available to the licence holder.

34. The same question was considered by another full bench in Rana Pratap Singh, 1995 (I) All CJ 200, wherein it was held that grant of license is a privilege and not right. The relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder below:

The consistent trend of judicial decisions has been that the official granting of the licence involves the exercise of discretionary licensing powers which are concerned with privileges and not rights.

35. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down in the above case that the involvement in criminal case or pendency of criminal case cannot be ground for revocation of licence. The suspension or revocation can be ordered when the conditions as mentioned in Section 17(3) is fulfilled. Thus without recording a finding that the security of the public peace or public safety is endangered the suspension cannot be ordered only on the ground that a criminal case is pending against a person.

36. The same view has been taken in the case of Tale Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra):

14. In view of the Full Bench decisions of this Court the reference of which has been mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs which are binding upon this Court, this Court cannot delve into the question that no order suspending the Arms Licence can be passed for the period pending enquiry inasmuch as the Full Bench in Kailash Naths case (supra) and Rana Pratap Singhs case (supra) has clearly laid down the law that the Arms Licence can be cancelled/revoked even without giving an opportunity to show-cause but a post decisional hearing must be provided. The words "for such period as it thinks fit" do not mean that only for a specific period an Arms Licence can be suspended. Section 17(3) of the Arms Act does not provide that the licensing authority may suspend the licence for a specific period only, hence it cannot be said that for a non-specific period or indefinite period licence cannot be suspended or revoked. What is incumbent upon the District Magistrate is that after suspension/revocation of the Arms licence, the licensing authority must give an opportunity to the licensee to show-cause against such suspension or revocation.

37. The Supreme Court in case of National Capital Territory of Delhi and Another Vs. Umesh Kumar, , has considered similar facts. A gun license was cancelled on the ground of involvement in criminal case. However, the licensee was acquitted in criminal case and State filed appeal against acquittal. The said appeal was pending. In the meantime licensee filed Writ Petition challenging the cancellation on the ground that he has been acquitted. The High Court allowed his Writ Petition on the ground that licensee was already acquitted and pendency of appeal will not make any difference. The matter was carried to Supreme Court by Delhi administration.

38. The Supreme Court held that licensees license shall remain cancelled till disposal of State appeal against his acquittal.

39. Principle of Law emanates from the judgments are that the District Magistrate has the power to suspend/revoke the fire-arm license on the ground of pendency of a single criminal case but he shall record the reason for the same and he is further required to record the finding that the nature of criminal case was of such type that it can endanger the peace and tranquility of the society, if the licensee is allowed to keep his weapon. For recording such finding the District Magistrate can call the report from the Police and from other source such as local vigilance etc. The District Magistrate may also call the material with regard to the family background, past antecedent of the licensee, his criminal record, if any, and general reputation of the licensee in the society.

40. The provisions of the Arms Act cast obligation on the District Magistrate to apply his mind and consider the material before him objectively at both stages viz. while granting the license u/s 13 of the arms Act exercising his power u/s 17 of the Arms Act. While exercising his power u/s 17 of the Arms Act he may not only rely on the Police Report of the local Police Station sent by the Junior Officer/Sub Inspector of the Police. In large number of cases arising out of the Arms Act, Court finds that orders of the District Magistrate are perfunctory and inchoate and are based on report of Police Station concerned sometime only short conclusion are recorded by the District Magistrate in support of his order without disclosing any reason or application of mind.

41. In this State, political interference is common in grant and cancellation of the arms license. These unwarranted interference are fraught with the serious consequences on the law and order situation and the safety of the citizen. A gun in a wrong hand can play havoc with the life of the citizen and happiness of the victims family. In United States most of the States have very liberal law relating to purchase of a weapon, there are no requirement of license or even permission for purchase of a lethal weapon.

42. A citizen can walk in arms shop and can purchase a gun of his preference just like any other grocery item. But in recent years several incident occurred whereby on indiscriminate firing students and other innocent persons were killed. Now there is a rethinking in the United States on this issue and some States are thinking to control the abuse of gun by putting restriction permissible under their local law.

43. In the case of Ramesh Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Station Officer, , this Court has held as under:

30. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down in the above case that the involvement in criminal case or pendency of criminal case cannot be ground for revocation of licence. The suspension or revocation can be ordered when the conditions as mentioned in Section 17(3) is fulfilled. Thus without recording a finding that the security of the public peace or public safety is endangered the suspension cannot be ordered only on the ground that a criminal case is pending against a person. Present is not a case of passing of suspension order merely on the ground of pendency of the criminal case. The, incident which took place on 20.11.2006 has been taken into consideration and it is the happening on that particular day which has formed the basis of suspension of arm licence. Unless registration or pendency of criminal case can be said to have nexus with endangering the public peace or public safety, the mere pendency or registration of a criminal case cannot be a ground for suspension. Thus on the second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the order of suspension of arm licence cannot be held to be illegal.

44. In the instant matter, District Magistrate/Licensing Authority while canceling the licence of the petitioner to hold arms on the basis of material facts on record/report had given a finding that it is necessary to cancel the arms licence of the petitioner for security of the public peace and safely (Lokhit and Lok Parishukh) and while doing so, he has also taken into consideration that a criminal case is pending against the petitioner in which he has been granted bail which has been applied by the appellant and also is as per the law as laid down by this Court in the case of Masi Uddin v. Commissioner, Allahabad, 1972 ALJ 573, relevant portion wherein it has been held:

A licence may be cancelled, inter alia, on the ground that it is "necessary" for the security of public peace or for public safety, to do so. The District Magistrate has not recorded a finding that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to revoke the licence. The mere existence of enmity between a licencee and another person would not establish the "necessary" connection with security of the public peace or public safety.

In the case before us also the District Magistrate has not recorded any finding that it was necessary to cancel the licence for the security of public peace or for public safety. All that he has done is to have referred to some applications and reports lodged against the petitioner. The mere fact that some reports had been lodged against the petitioner could not form basis for cancelling the licence. The order passed by the District Magistrate and that passed by the Commissioner cannot, therefore, be upheld on the basis of anything contained in Section 17(3)(b) of the Act.

45. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders under challenge in the present case. In the result, writ petition, lacks merit and is dismissed.