S.B. SINHA, C.J.

( 1 ) ALL these matters involving common question of law are being disposed of by this common judgment. However, the fact is being noticed from Writ Appeal No. 1189 of 2000.

( 2 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated July 18, 2000 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Writ petition No. 5802 of 2000 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent herein was allowed. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is a short one. The respondent was serving as a Conductor under the appellant-Corporation. He was removed from service in relation whereto he filed an application before the Labour Court. An award was passed by the Labour Court directing his reinstatement without backwages. Although he was reinstated in service his pay was not fixed taking into consideration the notional increments whereafter the writ petition was filed.

( 3 ) THE learned single Judge having (regard to the various decisions of the Court in n. Raja Reddy v. Vice Chairman and Managing director, APSRTC Hyderabad, 1998 (2) ALD 317 [LQ/TelHC/1995/622] , T. Narayana v. Managing Director, apsrtc, Hyderabad, 1998 (3) ALD 304 [LQ/TelHC/1998/271] , The vice-Chairman and Managing Director, apsrtc, Hyderabad v. N. Raja Reddy, 1997 (2) An. WR 69, directed: following the said decisions, writ petition is to be allowed. However, the learned standing counsel for the Corporation submitted that the petitioner is not entitled for arrears and he is entitled for arrears only from the date of filing the writ petition. This issue was also considered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 28596 of 1997 dated June 20, 2000 and it was held that he is entitled for arrears from the date of award. Writ petition is therefore allowed and consequently there shall be a direction to the respondents to fix the pay of the petitioner taking into account the notional increments from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement without reference to the proceedings passed by the Depot Manager of siddipet dated April 13, 2000. This exercise shall be done within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.

( 4 ) MR. K. Harinath, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned single Judge was wrong in passing the impugned judgment inasmuch as it has not been directed specifically in the award of the Labour Court that such notional increments should be counted. In support of the aforementioned contentions strong reliance has been placed on Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu university AIR 1998 SC 3261 [LQ/SC/1998/962] : 1998 (8) SCC 194 [LQ/SC/1998/962] : 1999-I-LLJ-200, State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey 2001-II-LLJ- 1660 (SC), mr. Harinath would contend that having regard to the delay and laches on the part of the respondent, the learned single Judge ought not to have exercised his discretionary jurisdiction. Reliance in this connection has been placed on m. R. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 669 [LQ/SC/1995/818] : 1995 (5) SCC 628 [LQ/SC/1995/818] and Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways, 2000-I-LLJ-476.

( 5 ) MS. Nanda R. Rao the learned counsel appearing in some of the writ appeals inter alia submitted that different orders have been passed in different cases and thus each case has to be considered on its own merit. The learned counsel pointed out that on the ground of delay and laches alone several Courts have not granted the relief. Reliance in this connection has been made on APSRTC, Khammam District v. S. Satyanarayana Rao, 2000 (2) ALD 627 [LQ/APHC/1999/170] , apsrtc, Mushirabad, Hyderabad and another v. Chandramouli, 2000 (4) ALD 584. [LQ/TelHC/1999/979] According to the learned counsel the principles of limitation under the Limitation Act should be made applicable and in support of the said contention reliance has been placed on 1997 (11) SCC 394 [LQ/SC/1996/201] , the Municipal Council, ahmednagar and another v. Shah Hyder Beig and others, AIR 2000 SC 671 [LQ/SC/1999/1193] : 2000 (2) SCC 48 [LQ/SC/1999/1193] ; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar AIR 1995 SC 1991 [LQ/SC/1995/674] : 1995 (4) SCC 683 [LQ/SC/1995/674] . The learned counsel has also placed strong reliance upon regulation 2 (iv) of the Andhra Pradesh State road Transport Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the petitioner-employees have no alternative remedy under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the ).

( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent would, on the other hand, submit that the impugned order was passed having regard to a circular issued by the management of the appellant-Corporation directing not to grant notional increment. According to the learned counsel, such circular instructions being itself illegal, the impugned order has rightly been set aside. The learned counsel would contend that this Court in various decisions had interpreted similar awards where against a special leave petition filed by the appellant herein had been dismissed.

( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted as the question raised herein is no longer res integra. In Writ Petition No. 1060 of 1998 U. C. BANERJEE,. , Chief Justice (as his Lordship then was) held: it has been contended, therefore, in support of the appeal that since the Tribunal has specifically directed continuity of service without any backwages and other monetary benefits, question of giving him notional increments during the period he was out of employment does not and cannot arise and as such the learned single Judge was clearly in error in directing to take into account the notional increments that the writ petitioner would have earned when he was out of employment. We are however, not inclined to lend our concurrence to the submission of the learned advocate since the other monetary benefits refer to backwages only. The learned Tribunal ordered continuity of service with the benefit of seniority and by reason, thereof, the learned single Judge has also taken into account the notional increments that the writ petitioner would have earned during the period he was out of employment. We do feel it expedient to record that no exception can be taken to the interpretation given by the learned single judge and as such this appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

( 9 ) A special leave petition was relied there against which was marked as Civil Appeal no. 16095 of 1998. By an order dated October 27, 1998 the said application was dismissed. Yet again in Managing Director, APSRTC v, hanumanlu, QUadri,. , (as his Lordship then was) by a judgment dated November 26, 1997 in Writ Appeal No. 1321 of 1997 held: the question raised in the writ petition relates to fixation of pay of the respondent writ petitioner. By award No. 202 of 1992 dated May 5, 1993 the respondent was reinstated into service with continuity of service but without back wages and stoppage of three annual increments after reinstatement with cumulative effect. The petitioner submits that the fixation of pay should take note of the increment earned by him as a result of continuity of service from the date of removal May 13, 1987, till the date of reinstatement on August 23, 1997. The method of fixation prescribed was notified by the respondents in proceedings no. E2/785/ (Genl/i/97/-BDN, dated august 2, 1987. These proceedings were also questioned in the writ petition. The learned single Judge who dealt with the writ petition having taken note of the fact that when similar relief was claimed in Writ petition No. 11186 of 1992 the principle of fixation was decided by him on October 17, 1995, followed the same judgment and allowed the writ petition on September 24, 1997. It is the correctness of that order that is assailed in this writ appeal. Smt. A. Vyjayanthi, the learned Standing counsel for the appellant Corporation submits that as the petitioner has accepted the fixation of pay, he cannot be permitted to raise that issue in the writ petition. The principle of fixation of pay as referred to by the learned single Judge is that the pay of the petitioner should be fixed notionally from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement and if any amount is payable to the respondent- petitioner, the same shall be paid. Obviously that respondent- petitioner will not be entitled to so much of arrears as would relate to the period from the date of removal till the date of reinstatement. He will only be entitled to the benefit of the fixation of pay from the date of reinstatement. We find no illegality in the order of the learned single Judge subject to the above clarification, the writ appeal is dismissed.

( 10 ) IN N. Raja Reddys case (supra) a learned single Judge of this Court observed: i find that the Corporation has not properly construed the moaning given to the word reinstatement while treating the period as continuous for the purpose of seniority and terminal benefits, there is no reason why the same period should not be treated for the purpose of pay fixation notionally. But for the words reinstatement without backwages, the petitioner could have got all the benefits of fixation arrears of wages and other benefits. Therefore, the impugned proceedings are arbitrary and illegal.

( 11 ) THE learned Judge considered the circular issued by the Corporation on december 18, 1991 which is in the following terms:1. In case where an employee is directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and attendant benefits but without backwages the salary of the employee shall be refixed by giving notional increments. He shall not be paid backwages for the period when he was not on duty. 2. Attendant benefits does not include giving uniform or chappal allowance for the period the employee was not in service (was not on duty ). 3. Leave is earned by duty only. Continuity of service given for some limited purpose in the award cannot be construed as if the employee performed duties attached to the post. The period during which the employee was out of service does not earn any leave. As such, this not on duty period shall not be considered for computing earned leave. 4. The employee is not entitled to payment of ex-gratia during the period he was out of service (unless the conditions laid down in the circular governing the eligibility and payment of ex-gratia are complied with.)5. House rent allowance and city compensatory allowance shall not be paid as they are included in the definition of wages as defined in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, do not come under the purview of attendant benefits. 6. In regard to promotion to higher post purely on the basis of seniority, notional promotion can be given to the employee, if he is not otherwise found unsuitable. 7. In case of promotion to selection post, he can be considered by Selection Committee in future vacancy also.

( 12 ) IT was held: a perusal of the said guidelines would clearly reveal that proper interpretation has been given to the word reinstatement. That moreover, the phrase reinstatement with continuity of service would not go whether as reinstatement itself implies continuity of service. Therefore, as per Guideline No. 1 the salary of the employee is directed to be refixed without backwages, by giving notional increments. Even promotion was directed to be given to the employee notionally. This circular shall have overriding effect on the communication No. LCl/402 (16)of l990 dated January 6, 1990 issued by the Managing Director of the corporation.

( 13 ) IN N. Raja Reddys case (supra) Chief justice P. S. Misra speaking for the Division bench again held the circular to be bad in law stating:". . . . . . . . . . Learned single Judge, has taken notice of the grave injustice such circular has caused to the writ petitioner-respondent who has been ordered to be reinstated. Learned single Judge has rightly taken notice of the consequence of an order of reinstatement. In all circumstances when a certain person is reinstated with backwages or without back wages, he has to be above his next junior and placed in the time scale of pay with all admissible emoluments including allowances at the level of fitment after reinstatement. Corporations circular is such that it appears not only to interfere with the directions of the Courts but also attempts to give some sort of administrative review of the directions issued by the court. . . . . . "

( 14 ) A special leave petition taken there against being Civil Appeal No. 20096 of 1996 was dismissed by an order dated October 25, 1996.

( 15 ) IN M. D. , APSRTC v. M. Sankaraiah 1999-III-LLJ (Suppl)-1516 (AP-DB) P. V. REDDI,. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held at p. 1517: we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that backwages having been denied to the respondent, the benefit of notional increments cannot also be given. It is not as if the learned single Judge directed any arrears for the past period to be paid. It is only a question of fixation of the salary at the appropriate scale after reinstatement and unless the Labour Courts order is clear, benefit of continuity of service cannot be restricted only to the computation of seniority or for pensionary benefits. The view taken by the learned single Judge is supported by the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 1060 of 1998, 1321 of 1997, 395 of 1996 and Writ petition No. 11585 of 1988 and against the judgment in Writ Appeal No. 395 of 1996, slp No. 20096 of 1996 preferred by the corporation was dismissed. Hence, we are not inclined to admit the writ appeal. The writ appeal is dismissed at admission stage.

( 16 ) YET again in P. Srinivas v. Industrial tribunal, 2000 (2) ALT 415, it is held that notional increments cannot be denied on the ground of delay on the part of the workman approaching the Court. The said judgment was upheld by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal no. 771 of 2000 disposed of on August 15, 2000 holding: since the pay of the employee was fixed only in 1995, which fact was brought to our notice by the learned standing counsel for the Corporation on instructions from the corporation, we are of the view that the writ petition cannot be dismissed on grounds of laches. Now, the only question that remains to be considered is, whether the respondent-employee is entitled to have his pay fixed on the basis of the notional increments that would have been earned by him during the period from July 8, 1978. e. , the date on which he was removed from service to december 1, 1987 the date on which he was reinstated into service and for the consequential arrears of salary. As rightly held by the learned single Judge, this question is well settled by the decision of this Court in T. Narayana v. APSRTC, 1998 (3) ALD 304 [LQ/TelHC/1998/271] , which was affirmed by a division Bench of this Court as also by the honble Supreme Court.

( 17 ) YET recently a Division Bench of this court in D. M. APSRTC, Kurnool Depot v. S. S. Reddy Jamal Reddy, 2001 (2) ALD 92 [LQ/APHC/2000/178] , of which one of us (SATYA BRATA SINHA, CJ) was a member held:". . . . . . . Thus the direction for reinstatement of the workman must be read in the aforementioned context that except the backwages and attendant benefits, he was entitled to all other benefits to which he became entitled to by way of his reinstatement without break in service. Having regard to the fact that all the attendant benefits have been clubbed with backwages, we have no doubt in our mind that the learned single Judge while disposing of the writ application meant that not only the notional increments shall not be paid but other allowances to which the concerned workman is entitled to, had he worked during the said period, could not be allowed. But the same does not and cannot mean that the workman would not be entitled to the benefit of notional increments for the purpose of computation of his retiral and other terminal benefits, as also payment of his salary from the date of his reinstatement. If any other meaning is attributed, the same, in our opinion, would amount to double punishment, meaning thereby not only he becomes disentitled from receiving backwages and attendant benefits but also reduction in his salary, which is not contemplated under the statute. "

( 18 ) ADMITTEDLY, the appellant herein had been denying such lawful claim of the writ petitioners, purported to be relying on the basis of clause 2 (iv) of the regulations. Any circular or regulation cannot take away the plain meaning of a word used in judgment. The interpretation clause itself provides that meaning of the word as defined in Regulation 2 would be attributed as mentioned therein unless the context otherwise requires. The said regulation does not define reinstatement. Clause 2 (iv) of the regulations defines duty as: a person is said to be on duty as member of a service:- (A) When he is performing the duties of a post borne on the cadre of such service; or (b) When he is on joining time; or (c) When he is absent from duty on authorised holidays or on casual leave taken in accordance with the instructions regulating such leave issued by the corporation having been on duty immediately before and immediately after such absence; or (d) When he is deputed by a competent authority to attend an authorised course of instruction or training. Explanation:-If an employee is deputed by a competent authority to attend a course of instruction or training in the interest of the corporation, and he is required to execute an undertaking to serve the Corporation, on return, for a minimum period, the period spent on the journey to and from the place of training or instructions as the case may be, be treated as duty. On the other hand, if an employee on his own attends a course of training or instruction in order to acquire a special qualifications then the period of absence shall not be treated as duty; if the qualifications which he proposes to acquire are likely to be of use in connection with his work in the Corporation it may be treated as leave due to him or as study leave, if such leave is admissible. The said definition has got nothing to do with any application in relation to an award passed by a competent Court. In any event, by reason of such definition of duty, the effect of reinstatement cannot be given a go by.

( 19 ) THE decision of the Apex Court in basudeo Tiwary s case (supra) is not apposite. Therein the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the employee died during pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court. The legal representative of the deceased employee was substituted in his place. It was held that the termination of service without notice was invalid in law and violative of Article 14 of the constitution. The Apex Court therefore directed that the employee would be deemed to have died in harness and thus would become entitled to the payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination of service upto the date of death. The question which arises for consideration in this writ petition did not arise therein. The Court merely granted certain reliefs. The said decision is not, therefore, an authority for the proposition that grant of notional increment is bad in law. In the said case no order of reinstatement could have been passed as the employee died and as such only a monetary benefit was granted. In that case the question of grant of notional increment in the case did not arise nor could arise having regard to the fact that the employee died, and as such question of his getting a higher salary did not arise.

( 20 ) IN Ram Chandra Dubey s case (supra) the Apex Court was considering the question as to whether in a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act the existence of a pre-exising benefit or one flowing from a pre- existing right was a condition precedent. The Apex Court observed:". . . . . To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages".

( 21 ) THE Apex Court in that case was concerned with the jurisdiction of the Labour court under Section 33-C (2 ). The observations had been made therein keeping in view the controversy obtaining therein viz. , whether the right to get backwages although is denied and disputed and was dependent on the interpretation of the award and, thus, the same may not be held to be flowing from a pre-existing right.

( 22 ) SO far as the question of delay in concerned, it may be noticed that such a question does not appear to have been raised before the learned single Judge. In any event, the decision of the Apex Court in M. R. Guptas case (supra) on which Mr. Harinath himself relied upon it was held that non-fixation of initial pay would be a continuous wrong. In the instant case also the respondent herein had been denied fixation of his pay pursuant to an award of the Labour Court on a wrong notion. If on the above situation the learned single Judge has entertained the writ petition despite some delay or laches, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should interfere therewith. We may, however, notice that the respondent had filed two representations on july 20, 1994 and November 10, 1998. Both the representations did not receive any response. Only when an advocates notice dated December 8, 1994, reply thereto was issued on April 30, 2000 and by that time the writ petition had already been filed. In the instant case, although the legal position was settled by a large number of cases of this Court, the appellant deliberately and intentionally did not pay the just and lawful dues to the respondent herein for a long time. In a situation of this nature mere physical running of the time may not be taken aid of for depriving an employee from his legitimate right.

( 23 ) IN APSRTC, Musheerabads case (supra) it was held:". . . . . . . Here the respondents have approached the Court almost within a reasonable period even within the standards of limitation provided by the Limitation act. Limitation cannot be strictly applied and laches have to be considered by taking into consideration various factors literacy, being a member of an unorganised labour. When a worker has suffered for eight years from 1988 to 1996 without a job in a hunger stricken country, we find no ground to decline the relief to the respondents. Seeking dismissal of writ petition on the ground of laches is not a legal right of the appellant. It is a judicial discretion to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each. Laches bars the remedy but not the right. The learned single Judge has rightly invoked the discretionary writ jurisdiction in grating the relief to the respondents".

( 24 ) IN APSRTC, Khammam Districts case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court was considering a case relating to refixation of scales of pay and arrears of salary. Basing on a decision of this Court on a question of continuous service it was held that the respondent cannot take advantage of his own lapse in approaching the Court after expiry of three years provided by the Limitation Act by setting aside the order of fixation of pay which was fixed as far back as in 1989. In the said case, the writ petition itself was filed after 11 years; but despite the same the Court granted the relief upon giving notional fixation of pay without payment of arrears of salary from 1989 till the filing of the writ petition and further directed that thereafter he will be entitled to the arrears on the pay fixed considering him to be in continuous service as interpreted by the judgment.

( 25 ) IN that case the learned counsel for respondent himself prayed for fixation of pay without arrears. In N. Raja Reddy v. Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, apsrtc, Hyderabad (supra ). The said decision, therefore, runs counter to the submission of the learned counsel.

( 26 ) IN 1997 (11) SCC 394 [LQ/SC/1996/201] a two Judge bench was considering a matter under the Code of Civil Procedure and held that for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation for arrears of salary in execution proceedings, article 113 of the Limitation Act shall apply. The said decision has no application in this case. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagars case (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with a land acquisition matter. A question arose therein as to whether the cause of action was a continuing one. The answer to the said question was rendered in negative and it was held that the discretionary relief cannot be provided to one who by his own act or conduct had given a go by to his rights. Having regard to the fact that the Court was deciding a case under the limitation Act, it was held that when no limitation is provided for, the principles governing under the Limitation Act shall be a guiding factor. In State of Maharashtras case (supra) a delay of 20 years had taken place. In filing an application under Article 226 of the constitution for grant of compensation in taking over of land by the State and from the conduct of the parties it was held that such land had been taken over without his consent and in any event he had acquiesced in such taking over.

( 27 ) IN the instant case, a right of the concerned workmen flows from the award. The award becomes enforceable in terms of 17 (2) of the within one month from the date of its publication in the official gazette.

( 28 ) WE may notice that in Deep Chandra v. State of U. P. and another, 2000-I-LLJ-742 (SC), the Apex Court, in a case where requirement of Section 25-F of thehad not been complied with held at p. 743 :"if there has been violation thereof such an employee will have to be reinstated in his original service on the same terms and conditions in which he was working earlier. If this is the position in law, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could have interfered with the award made by the labour Court. "

( 29 ) SO far as the availability of the alternative remedy is concerned, such a plea had not been taken before the learned single judge. An action of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution can be questioned in writ if by reason thereof the right of a citizen under Article 14 is infringed. The action of the appellant being wholly arbitrary, a writ petition would be maintainable despite existence of an alternative remedy. In any event the very fact that the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks refuge under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, we may note that in relation to such a proceeding the principles of Limitation Act have no application. See (1998) 8 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1998/1044] .

( 30 ) HOWEVER, in Writ Appeal No. 3 of 2001 it was specifically stated that neither any back wages have been awarded nor any increment had been granted. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the learned single Judge erred in directing grant of back wages.

( 31 ) IN Writ Appeal No. 46 of 2001 it appears that the writ petitioner-respondent has filed an execution petition under Section 11-B of the. In that view of the matter, the respondent could not have maintained the writ petition as it is well known that a citizen cannot pursue two parallel and simultaneous remedies. Reference in this connection may be made to state of Punjab v. Kulbir Singh 1977 (1) SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1976/445] .

( 32 ) FOR the reasons afore-mentioned we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeals except W. A. No. 3 of 2001 and WA No. 46 of 2001 are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsels fee assessed at rs. 1;000/- (Rupees one thousand only ). The writ petitions are also allowed in terms of this judgment.