M.S. Liberhan, C.J.In this writ appeal the undisputed facts are that the respondent herein was appointed in 1976 with the appellants-Corporation and was removed from service in 1978. The respondent raised an industrial dispute in 1987 after a lapse of nine years and he was directed to be reinstated by the Industrial Tribunal without backwages but with continuity of service in 1989 vide award dated 10-4-1989. The respondent joined the service of the appellants. Consequently, his pay was refixed. The fixation of pay was never challenged. In view of a later pronouncement of this Court in Writ Petition No.l 1182 of 1992, dated 17-10-1995, in the case of some other workman defining continuity of service the respondent woke up from a slumber sleep and started making representations to gain time. The first representation was made in 1996. Inspire of no reply having been received with respect to the representation the respondent has not raised even a little finger. Then all of a sudden on 13-4-1999 a writ petition was filed praying for the writ of mandamus directing the appellants to give notional increment and also revision of pay-scales from time to time and consequently direct the appellants to pay the arrears of salary with interest by fixing some time limit, holding that inaction on the part of the appellants is arbitrary and illegal. It is a case where crow calling quail black. The respondent has not been vigilant enough from 1989 to 1999 much less even prior thereto. Similar was the appellants-Corporation, which was extraordinarily sympathetic to the respondent. When the respondent raised industrial dispute after a lapse of nine years no question of laches was raised by the appellants. The learned single Judge after relying on the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.l 1 f82 of 1992, dated 17-10-1995 defining continuity of service directed the appellants to refix the pay and pay the arrears from 1989 on wards till date with 12% interest; thus, penalised the State exchequer and the public money for the inaction of the respondent. The respondent cannot take advantage of his own lapse in approaching the Court after expiry of three years provided by the Limitation Act for setting aside the order of fixation of pay which was fixed as far back as in 1989. Thus, in our considered view, the respondent is not entitled to any arrears of pay much less with interest till he approached this Court in 1999.

2. The learned Counsel for the appellants has not seriously contested refixation of pay in view of the later precedent of this Court having come into being defining continuity of service. The learned Counsel for the respondent limits his prayer to fixation of pay.

3. Thus, the order of the learned single Judge is modified to the extent that the pay of the respondent shall be fixed in terms of the judgment of this Court giving him notional fixation of pay with no payment of arrears of salary from 1989 till the filing of the writ petition in April, 1999. From April, 1999 the respondent will be entitled to the arrears on the pay fixed considering him to be in continuous service as interpreted by the judgment of this Court. The order of the learned single Judge to the extent of ordering payment of interest is set aside.

4. With the above modification in the order of the learned single Judge the writ appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs.