ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) ESTATES (ABOLITION AND CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948

Preamble 1 - ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) ESTATES (ABOLITION AND CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948

THE ANDHRA PRADESH (ANDHRA AREA) ESTATES (ABOLITION AND CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948

(Act XXVI of 1948)

An Act to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisitions of the rights of landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the [1][Andhra area of the State of Andhra Pradesh] and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates.

Whereas it is expedient to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the rights of landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the [2][Andhra area of the State of Andhra Pradesh] and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates; It is hereby enacted as follows;

Section 1 - Short title, extent, application and commencement

(1)     This Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.

 

(2)     It extends to the whole of the [3][Andhra Area of the State of Andhra Pradesh].

 

(3)     It applies to all estates as defined in Section 3, clause (2) of the Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Estates Land Act, 1908 (Act I of 1908).

 

(4)     This section and Sections 2,4,5,7,8,9, [4][58-A], 62, 67 and 68 shall come into force at once; and the rest of this Act shall come into force in regard to any zamindari, undertenure or inam estate, on such date as Government may, by notification appoint.

[5][(5) The Government may, by notification, cancel or modify any notification issued under sub-section (4) in respect of any estate, but the cancellation shall not be deemed to affect the power of the Government under sub-section (4) again to extend the rest of this Act to that estate, [6][and the notification issued under sub-section (4) may be issued so as to have retrospective effect].

(6)??  [7][Save as otherwise provided in this Act where a notification is cancelled under sub-section (5),] the rest of that Act shall be deemed never to have applied to the estate concerned, and every proceeding taken thereunder and pending in respect of such estate shall abate.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--This Act is one of the Acts included in the Ninth Schedule and is protected by Article 31-B. The Court must interpret the Act as it finds it by giving the ordinary and natural meaning to the words used, uninfluenced by any pre-conceived notion as to its validity.[8]

 

2.        Object :--The Act introduced a revolutionary reform in the land tenures of the State. On the date of notification, all the estates governed by the Act have been transferred to the Government and vested in them free of all encumbrances. All rights and interests created in or over the estate by the land-holders ceased and determined as against the government. Thereafter the persons, whose rights are terminated, are entitled only to be paid from and out of the compensation deposited by the Government with the Tribunal.[9]

 

3.        Self Contained Act :--The Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act is a self-contained code in which provision is also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified, by specially constitute tribunals. On general principles, the special Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide dispute entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication.[10]

Section 2 - Definitions

In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,--

(1)     all expressions defined in the Estate Land Act shall have the same respective meanings as in that Act with the modifications, if any, made by this Act.

 

(2)     "Director" means the Director of Settlement appointed under Section 4;

 

(3)     "Estate" means a zamindari or an under-tenure or an inam estate;

 

(4)     "Estates Land Act" means the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908;

 

(5)     "Government" means the State Government;

 

(6)     "Upartiable estate" means the estate governed immediately before the notified date, by the Madras Impartible Estates Act, 1904;

[11][(7) "inam estate" means an estate within the meaning of section 3, clause 2(b), of the A.P. (A.A.) Estates Land Act, 1908 (A.P. Act 1 of 1908).]

(8) ??"landholder" includes (i) a joint Hindu family, where the right to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate vests in such family; and (ii) a darmila inamdar;

(9)? ?"notification" means a notification published in the Andhra Pradesh.

(10) ?"Notified date" in relation to an estate, means the date appointed by a notification issued under Section 1, sub-section (4), as the date on which the provisions of this Act (other than Sections 1, 2,4,5,7,8, 9, [12]58[-A], 62, 67 and 68) shall come into force in the estate, and the word "notified" shall be construed accordingly;

(11) ?"Prescribed" means prescribed by rules made by the Government under this Act;

(12) ?"Principal landholder" means the person who held the estate immediately before the notified date; and

(a)      in the case of an estate held by a joint family immediately before that date, means such joint family; and

 

(b)      in the case of an impartiable estate, means the person entitled to the possession of such estate immediately before that date;

(13) ?" Settlement Officer" in relation to any estate or part of an estate, means the officer appointed therefor under Section 5, sub-section (1);

(14) ?"Tribunal" means a Tribunal constituted under Section 8 and having jurisdiction;

(15) ?"under-tenure estate" means an estate within the meaning of Section 3, clause (2)(e), of the Estates Land Act;

(16) ?"zamindari estate" means--

(i)       an estate within the meaning of Section 3, clause (2)(a), of the Estates Land Act, after excluding therefrom every portion which is itself an estate under Section 3, clause (2)(b) or (2)(e), of that Act; or

 

(ii)      an estate within the meaning of Section 3, clause (2)(b) or (2)(c) of the Estates Land Act, after excluding therefrom every portion which it itself an estate under Section 3, clause (2)(e) of that Act.

Synopsis

1.        Inam Estates :--When the Madras Estates Abolition Act XXVI of 1948 was passed, whole inam village which were estates before 1936 only were intended to be affected by it. The other villages which were brought in, in the year 1936, were defined by the Act as inam estates and were excluded for the time being from its operation. But Under Section 9 (1) of Act XXVI of 1948, an officer appointed under section 5 of the Act known as the Settlement Officer was empowered either suo motu or on an application, to inquire and determine whether any inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not.[13]

At the time of passing of Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948 only pre-1936 inam estates were included within the definition of section 2 (7) and were liable to be notified. Subsequently, by the Act XVIII of 1957 post 1936 estates also were included in the definition of inam estates for the purpose of abolition.[14]

2.        . Zamindari Estate :--In State of A.P. vs. Raja Velugoti Navaneetha Krishna,[15] held that reading the definitions given in Section 2 (15) and (16), it cannot be said that what is not under tenure estate is a zamindari estate. It is necessary to show that the former tenure ceased to exist by resumption or otherwise before those grants could be zamindari estate.[16] See also.[17]

 

3.        Permanent under-tenure :--Where a village is held under a permanent under-tenure, it falls squarely under the definition of Section 3(2)(e) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 and is therefore, an estate thereunder and hence it an under-tenure estate. As the under-estate is excluded from the definition of "zamin estate", the notification issued by the Government on the basis that it is a zamin estate is void and the High Court rightly declared it as void.[18]

Section 3 - Consequences of Notification of Estate

With effect on and from the notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act--

(a)      the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, the Estates Land Act, and all enactments applicable to the estate as such except the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Regulation of Rent) Act, 1947, shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the estate;

 

(b)      the entire estate (including [19] [minor inams (post-settlement or pre-settlement) included in the assets of the zamindari estate at the permanent settlement of that estate; all communal lands and porambokes]; other non-ryoti lands; waste lands; pasture lands; lanka lands; forests; mines and minerals; quarries; rivers and streams; tanks and irrigation works, fisheries'; and ferries), shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, free of all encumbrances; and the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Irrigation Cess Act, 1865 and all other enactments applicable to ryotwari areas shall apply to the estate;

 

(c)      all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the Government cease and determine;

 

(d)      the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the estate, and all accounts, registers, pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to that estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof :

Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta--

(i)       if such person is a ryot, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;

 

(ii)      if such person is a landholder pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it, as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;

 

(e)      the principal or any other landholder and any other person whose rights stand transferred under clause (b) or cease and determine under clause (c), shall be entitled only to compensation from the Government as provided in this Act;

 

(f)       the relationship of landholder and ryot shall as between them, be extinguished;

 

(g)      ryots in the estate and persons holding under them shall, as against the Government, be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognized or conferred on them by or under this Act, and any other rights and privileges which may have accrued to them in the estate before the notified date against the principal or any other landholder thereof shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such landholder.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Section 3 (b) of the Estates Abolition Act provides, save as expressive provided otherwise, for the vesting of the entire estate in the Government, free of all encumbrances, with effect on and from the notified date. An express provision otherwise is found in Section 3(d) itself. The proviso to Section 3(d) of the Act prohibits the Government from dispossessing any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. If such person is a landholder he cannot be dispossessed pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta. If such a person is a ryot he cannot be dispossessed pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is entitled to a patta.[20]

In Venkaiah vs. Subbarama Sastry,[21] the principal point for consideration was whether section 4 of the Madras Tenants and Ryots Protection Act (XXIV of 1949) is attracted to a tenant of a estate which has been notified by the Government under section 3 of the M'adras Estates (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948). It was held as under :

The language of this section makes it abundantly clear that when once the notification envisaged in clause (a) issues, the totality of interests in that estate vest in the Government and no one has any right except those which are specifically recognized by the provisions of the Act. Therefore, section 20 cannot come to the rescue of either an erstwhile landholder or a ryot, to claim such rights as existed prior to the notification of the estate.

This is the view that found favour with the Supreme Court in State of Madras vs. Srinivasa Ayyangar.[22] Their Lordships decided that section 20 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act had no application to transactions by which a person becomes a landholder by reason of ownership of even a part of the estate being transferred to him, and that a darmilla minor inam was not protected by section 20. In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court, Sreeramulu Chetty vs. Venkatanarayana,[23] could no longer hold the field.

Under proviso (ii) to Section 3 (d), the government shall not dispossess a landholder of any land in any estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta pending the decision of the settlement officer and the tribunal on appeal, if any, to it as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta.[24]

2.        Object :--Under Section 3 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act the estate along with all communal lands and porambokes vests in the government. All rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder cease and determined as against the government. Any person having rights recognised by the Act had to work them out under the said Act.[25]

Under section 3, the entire estate, i.e., the totality of all interests in the estate is transferred to the Government and no one can assert any right or interest as against the Government after the estate is notified except to claim compensation in the manner prescribed by the Act. The rights and privileges which the ryots in the State or persons holding under them can claim are those that are recognised or conferred on them by the Act. so, the point for consideration is whether other rights or privileges, which might have been valid against the landholder, are available against the Government, especially having regard to the specific provision in clause (g) of the section. In this situation, the defendants, who were ryots of the State have to rely upon one or other of the sections of the Act.[26]

Under Section 3(b) of the Act, the entire estate, including forest, minerals, quarries, vest in the government, with effect on and from the notified date.[27]

By virtue of Section 3, once an estate is notified and taken over, it in the entirety vests in the government. Clause (d) thereof empowers the Government to take possession of the estate after removing any obstruction that may be offered. The proviso thereto, however, precludes the government from dispossessing any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider he is prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta.[28]

3.        Right for possession :--Under Section 3 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, the person in possession has a right to continue in possession until his rights are determined and terminated either under Section 11 or section 12 of the Act by the non-issue of patta in his favour. Only when their right is so declared and possession is denied to them, they can resort to a civil court. Until then their right for possession does not ripen.[29]

 

4.        Procedure for eviction :--The procedure adopted for evicting a person who is not prima facie entitled for ryotwari patta under the Madras Estates Abolition is kept distinct and separate from the eviction procedure that is taken under the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905. The two should not be confused with each other. In so far as the persons who were in possession of some land in the estate as on the notified date are concerned, they had to be dispossessed, if dispossession is ultimately decided upon, only in accordance with the provisions of Section 3(d) and the Rule made in G.O.Ms.No.1634 (Revenue) Dated 20th July, 1955, under section 67 of the Act.[30]

 

5.        Section 3 (b) and Section 4 of Permanent Settlement Regulation (XXV of 1802) :--Section 4 of the Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, exempts from the scope of permanent settlement only lakhiraj lands and all other lands paying only favourable quit rents. When an inam formed part of the settlement in the year 1802, it falls within the sweep of Section 3 (b) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.[31]

 

6.        Estate :--The compensation amount invested in the treasury certificate can in no sense be regarded as part of the Estate within the meaning of Madras Act XXVI of 1948.[32]

 

7.        Tresspasser :--The proceedings under the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905 can only be taken against the landholder on the footing that they are trespasser in respect of the land in question. So long as the claim for ryotwari patta is pending before the settlement officer and an appeal before the Tribunal, it is not possible to say that the landholders are trespasser. The proceedings under the Land Encroachment Act on the assumption that the landholder were trespasser should not have been taken.[33]

 

8.        Arrears of Income :--It is plain from clause (b) of Section 3 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948 that the right to collect arrears of income due to the zamindar is not vested in the government. It still inheres in the zamindar and is left untouched by this section. There is nothing in the Act which extends the disability of the zamindar created by section 55 to collect arrears of income.[34]

 

9.        Transfer of interest :-A Division Bench of the A.P. High Court in Karaka Samulu vs. Reddi Appalanaidu,[35] expressed themselves thus : --

"The Statutory transfer of interests under the provisions of the Act XXVI of 1948, is an assignment or devolution of interest, within the meaning of that provision (Order 22, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code). The plaintiffs, therefore, could continue the suit despite the fact that their interest devolved on the government under the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. In Vellanki Siva Kutumba Rao vs. Vellanki Sarvalakshamma and Ors., 1963 (2) An.W.R. 90, referring to the above judgment [1958 (1) An.W.R. 410] it was held :

"a person entitled to possession immediately before the notified date shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to be in possession if his right of ownership or possession has not been lost. If his right to possession continues until he is dispossessed by the Government, in accordance with law, there is no reason why he cannot successfully defined this right of his against all others. If he had a right to recover the possession from the intruder, that right will not be lost by reason of mere vesting under notification. In fact, that right by the express provision of section 64 of Act XXVI of 1948 has been left unaffected. At any rate, when the action has been already taken, subsequent vesting will not affect the right of the plaintiffs to continue the action unless the Government comes on record to continue the same.

Section 4 - Appointment and functions of the Director of Settlement

As soon as may be after the passing of this Act, the Government shall appoint a Director of Settlements to carry out survey and settlement operations in estates and introduce ryotwari settlement therein. The Director shall be subordinate to the Board of Revenue.

Section 5 - Appointment and functions of the Settlement Officers

(1)     As soon as may be after the passing of this Act, the Government shall appoint one or more Settlement-Officers to carry out the functions and duties assigned to them under this Act.

 

(2)     Every Settlement Officer shall be subordinate to the Director and shall be guided by such lawful instructions as he may issue from time to time; and the Director shall also have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :-The Director of settlement can conduct suo motu enquiry after dismissing a petition to condone the delay in preferring a revision petition.[36] Principal of estoppel do not apply to such exercise of power.[37]

The Act is a welfare legislation. It is intended to acquire the rights of landholders in estates and other settlements, to divest them with all rights and vest all rights in cultivable lands in ryots in accordance with the principles laid down therein. Any violation of the provisions of the Act in granting of patta would amount to fraud on the statutes. So as to dispel any such criticism that in the case of implementation of the Act unscrupulous persons were given patta, the legislature has reserved the power to revise any orders, acts or proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer in the Directorate. Such exercise of revisional power under Section 5 (2) of the Act is not subject to law of limitation. It is well settled that in the absence of any provision prescribing limitation, the authorities have to exercise power within a reasonable time.[38]

2.        Grant of Pattas :--In Suthappal Lakshmana Rao and Ors. vs. Director of Settlements,[39] it is held that the order of settlement officer is subject to revision before the Director of Settlement or Commissioner and upon revision it gets merged in the order of revisional authority.

 

3.        Suo Motu revisional powers :--In Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Kalleti Chengaiah,[40] the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under :

It is settled law that the power of suo motu revision can be exercised within reasonable time. When it is held that the power may be exercised from time to time, what would be the reasonable time depends upon facts of each case. It is seen that in this case the orders were issued by the Settlement Officer contrary to the provisions and it was not known till an enquiry was held and until it came to light that the exercise of power by the Settlement Officer under Section 11(a) of the Act was clearly in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Under those circumstances, the Director was constrained to exercise the power. It is also seen that when the record was called for it came to light that the record was destroyed. It would be obvious that the persons behind the scheme had managed to see that the records were destroyed. Considered from this perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was clearly in error in interfering with the order of the Director of Settlement.

4.        Power to Cancel or Revise :--Section 5 (2) of the Act makes it clear that the Director has power to cancel or revise any order of the Settlement Officer, of course excluding those against which an appeal lies to the Tribunal. The words "Cancel or revise" occurring in the above section are wide enough to take in, the incidental power of remand to the lower authority by the Director while exercising his powers under section 5 (2) of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether the revision is preferred one or taken up suo motu.[41]

The exercise of revisional jurisdiction suo motu must be exercised to advance the cause of injustice and not to upset settled rights.[42]

The High Court of A.P. in Kalleti Chengaiah vs. Director of Settlements,[43] interpreting Section 5 (2) of the Act, 1948 held :

Section 5 (2) makes it clear that the Director has power to cancel or revise any order of the Settlement Officer, of course excluding those against which an appeal lies to the Tribunal. The words "cancel or revise" occurring in Section are wide enough to take in, the incidental power of remand to the lower authority by the Director while exercising his powers under Section 5(2) of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether the revision is a preferred one or taken up suo motu.

In this case, at the time of issuing the show-cause notice, the Director was not having even the order of granting patta so that he could peruse and find a ground to take up the revision suo motu. This is a case where the patta was granted as long back as in the year 1983 and the present revision taken up suo motu is disposed of in October, 1990 upsetting the settled rights conferred through the patta in favour of the petitioner to the land in question. Therefore, on the ground of non-application of mind before initiation of the proceedings, and the resultant upsetting of the settled rights, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

In Koyya Veeraju vs. M.R.O.,[44] it is held, "the powers to revise are quasi-judicial in nature. The same shall be exercised within a reasonable period and while exercising so shall give valid and acceptable reasons.

5.        Period of limitation :--Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the authority vested with jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers suo motu should exercise that power within a reasonable time.[45]

The High Court of A.P. in Kodanda Rao vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh,[46] held that "the judgment of the Supreme Court is undoubted by an authority for the proposition that even though no period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the Statute, that power must be exercised within a reasonable time. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court which is binding on us under Article 41, we must necessarily hold the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, suo motu beyond the reasonable time cannot be sustained."

It is fairly settled that though no period of limitation is prescribed the initiation or taking action particularly under special enactments is expected to be done within a reasonable time and such reasonable period depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.[47]

In Mirza Muzamdar Hussain vs. D. Bhaskara Reddy,[48] a Division Bench of the A.P. High Court held that. Section 5 (2) merely confers the powers of revision upon the Director without saying further whether it should be exercised at the instance of a private party. It has been further observed in the said judgment that it is well settled that even though no period of limitation is prescribed for exercising the power of revision suo motu, it has to be exercised within a reasonable time.

What is the reasonable time is a question of fact to be answered in the given set of facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be enunciated in that behalf.

Relying on the judgment given in M.M. Hussain's case,[49] the A.P. High Court in S.B. Dharma Reddy vs. The Director of Settlements,[50] held that in matters of this nature an inflexible rule cannot be laid down and it will have to be left to the discretion of the authorities concerned to determine whether a particular case is a fit case for the exercise of suo motu powers of revision under section 5 (2) of the Act.

6.        Revisional Jurisdiction :--In Kodanda Rao vs. Govt. of A.P.,[51] the provisions of Section 5(2) of the A.P. (A.A.) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 were considered. It was held that exercise of revisional jurisdiction suo motu beyond the reasonable time cannot be sustained. The reasoning given in the judgment is that such a power is to be exercised only to advance the cause of justice and not to upset settled rights and if it is found that on the facts of any case that the time lag intervening in the matter between the grant of pattas and the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is unduly long, then it cannot be said to be a valid exercise of power under section 5 (2) of the said Act.

Section 6 - Managers of estates

With effect on and from the notified date, the Government shall appoint one or more persons to manage the estate.

(2)?? ?Every manager shall be subordinate to the District Collector and shall be guided by such lawful instructions as he may issue from time to time; and the District Collector shall also have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceeding of the manager.

Section 7 - Powers of control of the Board of Revenue

The Board of Revenue shall have power--

(a)      to give effect to the provisions of this Act and in particular to superinted the taking over of estates and to make due arrangements for the interim administration thereof;

 

(b)      to issue instructions for the guidance of the Director, District Collectors, Settlement Officers and managers of estates;

 

(c)      to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of any Settlement Officer other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal or of any manager; and

 

(d)      to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the director or of any District Collector, including those passed, done or taken in the exercise of revisional powers.

Section 8 - Constitution of Tribunals for certain purposes

(1)     The Government shall constitute as many Tribunals as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act.

[52][(2) Each Tribunal shall consist of a single member who shall be either a District Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge.]

(3) Each Tribunal shall have such jurisdiction, and over such estates or parts thereof, as the Government may, by notification from time to time, determine.

(4) ???Every Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Section 8(1) Tribunal has the power to remand the matter back to settlement officer for fresh consideration.[53]

The Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1948 originally provided under section 8 for the constitution of only a Court as a Tribunal. After amendment of that section, it has in sub-section (2) of that section stated that the Tribunal will consist of a single member who shall be either a District Judge or an Officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge. There is therefore a distinction to be drawn as to the constitution of the Tribunal with reference to the language of the said-section as it existed at each relevant time. The Act seeks to make a person of the status of a District Judge or an Officer eligible to be appointed as a District Judge as a Tribunal. The language of the section does not say that it is the District Judge of a Court alone that could be appointed as the Tribunal; but provides persons who could be appointed as a District Judge as the Tribunal.[54]

2.        Tribunals Constituted under the Act :--In Tirupathirayudu vs. Venkatacharyulu,[55] it was pointed that the Tribunal constituted under the Madras Estates Abolition Act, are subject not only to the administrative but also the judicial control of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and they are bound by the decisions of the High Court. There it was further pointed out that Tribunals acting under the provisions of the Madras Estates Abolition Act should, and are bound to follow, the decisions of the High Court, especially when those decisions determine the tenure of very village which the Tribunal has to deal with. To say that the Tribunals Constituted under the Estate Abolition Act can ignore the decisions of the High Court, especially when those decisions concerned the tenure of the very land which is the subject matter of the enquiry by them and which are in fact inter partes is to ignore the items of Article 227 of the Constitution.

The view given in Tirupathirayudu's case,[56] was fortified by a judgment of Bhimasankaram J., in K.K. Rameswaraswami Varu vs. Ramalinga Raju,[57] where the learned Judge pointed out that prior judgments of civil courts not inter partes are not binding as res judicata under section 64 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, but they are entitled to great weight upon the issues raised before the tribunal and the Tribunal cannot brush them aside on the ground that they do not embody the decisions inter partes.

In Chada Venkatanarayanavadhani vs. Assistant Settlement Officer,[58] it was held that the decisions of High Court have not only a persuasive effect but also have a binding force an all the courts subordinate to the High Court as well Tribunals situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

Section 9 - Determination of Inam Estates

(1)     As soon as may be after the passing of this Act [59][and subject to the provisions of Section 9-A], the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall on application, inquire and determine whether any inam village 3[or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam] in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not.

 

(2)     Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall cause to be published in the village [60][or hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam] in the prescribed manner, a notice requiring all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village 3[or hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam' to file before him statements bearing on the question whether the village 3[or hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam] is an inam estate or not.

 

(3)     The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire, to examine all such documents as he has been reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give the decision in writing.

 

(4)     [61] [(a)      (i) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (3), the Government may, within one year from the date of the decision or if such decision was given before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (amendment) Act, 1957, within one year from such commencement, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal.

(ii) ???If, before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1957, any order has been passed by the Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the Government against a decision of the Settlement Officer on the ground that the Government were not competent to file an appeal under this clause or that such appeal was time-barred, the Tribunal shall, on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act aforesaid, vacate the order already passed by it and pass a fresh order on merits.

(b) ??Where any such appeal is preferred [62][by an aggrieved person, the Tribunal shall give notice thereof to the Government and in the case of all appeals, whether by the Government or by an aggrieved person], the Tribunal shall cause to be published in the village [63][or hamlet or Khandriga granted as inam] in the prescribed manner, a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) or filed before him statements under sub-section (2) to appear before it, and after giving them [64][and the Government] a reasonable opportunity of being heard, give its decision.

(c)? ?The decision of the Tribunal under this sub-section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

(5)     No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (3) or of the Tribunal under sub-section (4) shall be invalid by reason of any defect in the form of the notice referred to in subsection (2) or sub-section (4), as the case may be, or the manner of its publication.

 

(6)     Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision, every decision of the settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village, [65][or hamlets or khandriga granted as inam] notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer the Tribunal as the case may be.

 

(7)     In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal may presume that an inam village [66][or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam] is an inam estate.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--In State of Madras (now Andhra) vs. V. Srinivasulu,[67] the High Court of A.P. relying on the observations made in Venkatanarasayya vs. State of Madras,[68] held as under :

It follows from these observations that the opinion of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal given in a proceeding under section 9 that an inam grant is of less than a village and therefore outside the ambit of Madras Act XXVI of 1948, will not be binding on the parties or the State in proceedings under Madras Act XXX of 1947. Moreover, section 64-A of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 does not make the decision of a Tribunal on any matter falling within its jurisdiction binding on the Special Officer or the Board of Revenue functioning under Madras Act XXX of 1947 and determining the rent payable by ryots though such decision is binding on the parties and persons claiming under them in any suit or proceedings in a civil court, if the same matter is in issue. There is also the further fact in this case the Government was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal under section 9 of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and is not bound by its decision and is not precluded from proceeding under Madras Act XXX of 1947. The party aggrieved by such proceedings will have a right of suit because, as observed by the learned Judges in the case already cited, "he would have a good cause of action when proceedings are taken under colour of an Act which does not apply to the facts of the case."

Section 9 empowers Settlement Officer to determine suo motu also whether any inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not. When the decision of the Settlement Officer that it is not an inam estate has become final, the Government cannot have jurisdiction or power to issue notification.[69]

In Bolla Perayya vs. State of A.P.,[70] the High Court of A.P. relying on the judgment delivered in Kancherla Audinarayana vs. The Branch Settlement Officer,[71] wherein the scope of Section 9 had come up for consideration, held :

Under Section 9 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, as it stood prior to the Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment Act (XVIII of 1957) the enquiry by the Settlement officer was to be confined to the question whether the grant constituted the whole village or not; whether it constituted a hamlet or khandriga was extraneous to that enquiry. The Settlement Officer had to consider the material form the stand point whether it constituted a whole village or not. The enquiry as contemplated by Section 9 after the amendment is more comprehensive, namely, whether what was granted was a whole village or a hamlet or khandriga. Therefore, the prior decision of the Tribunal that the inam in question was a part of the village does not preclude the Settlement Officer from further investigating into the question as to whether what was granted would constitute a hamlet or khandriga. However, the Settlement Officer cannot review the order of the Tribunal that the grant was only a part of the village, since it is not competent for him to go behind it by reason of section 9 (4)(c) of the Act. It is not open to the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to come to a different conclusion on the issue as to whether the inam consisted of a whole village or a part of it. The enquiry will be confined to the problem whether the area covered by the grant would constitute a hamlet or khandriga within the purview of Section 9 as amended in 1957.

2.        Fresh Enquiry :--The Assistant Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to hold a fresh enquiry into the question whether the village is an "inam estate" or not when the order passed by the Estates Abolition Tribunal had become final and binding on the parties.[72]

 

3.        Principles of Constructive res judicata :-In Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sri A. Padamanabha Swamy Varu,[73] dealing with the question whether any decision given by the Tribunal can operate as constructive res judicata, the High Court of A.P. held as under :

It is true that the word "decision" is used in the said sub-section and not "Judgment". The defendant of "judgment" given in section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. The word "decision" is not defined in the Act. At one time a distinction was sought to be made between the word "decision" appearing in section 64-A of the Estates Abolition Act and the word "judgment" as is used in the Civil Procedure Code. It was said that while the word "judgment" includes the reasons or grounds therefore, the "decision" may not include the reasons or grounds given therefor. Even in a case of judgment, it is now settled that "the previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata; the reasons for the decision are not res judicata". See Mathura Prasad vs. Dossibai.[74] In view of that decision, therefore, any distinction sought to be made between the two terms "decision" and "judgment" on the ground of reasons would not now be correct. The Legislature had never intended that the reasons or grounds on which a decision proceeds should be binding. It is the issues decided that would be binding upon the parties. We do not, therefore, after the said Supreme Court decision, feel any difficulty in attributing almost the same meaning to the word "decision" as is given to the term "judgment."

Having got out of way the so called distinction between the two terms, what we have to examine is whether a point which might and ought to have been raised before the Tribunal but has not been raised would operate as res judicata in regard to such matters. We have already stated that section 9 does not contain any provision on the lines of Explanation 4 to section II, Civil Procedure Code. That, however, in our judgment does not come in the way. We are of the opinion that even a decision of the Tribunal before whom a ground of attack or defence might and ought to have been raised in an enquiry under section 9 of the Act is not raised, even then it would be deemed that it was a matter which would be directly and substantially in issue and the decision would operate even in regard to such matters as constructive res judicata and it will not be open to the Tribunal to consider such matter again in a separate enquiry under section 9.

In W.P. No.656 of 1966 dated 2nd July, 1968, one of us Hon'ble the Chief Justice) had the occasion to consider this very question. It was held.

"There is no warrant for the arguments that under Section 9 (6) it is only the decision which is expressly given that is binding. Any judgment given under section 9(1) read with section 9 (4) is binding upon the parties and in one case the parties and in one case the parties will not be permitted to dispute its correctness before a Court of law and in the other case, it is binding upon the parties even in a subsequent proceeding before the Tribunal or the Assistant Settlement Officer."

The said decision was carried in appeal, W.A.No.48 of 1970. The judgment was affirmed by a Bench of this Court by an order dated 30th August, 1971.

Thus the principles of constructive res judicata can be invoked under section 9 (6) in so far as this Court is concerned is now well settled.

4.        Whether Section 9 (4)(c) of the Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court :--In Gosukonda Venkatanarasayya and Ors. vs. The State of Madras,[75] it was held that as there was no provision in the Act to decide whether a particular grant comprises less than a village or not, the civil court has jurisdiction to decide that question.

Where a dispute arose as to whether an estate was a zamindari estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2)(a) of the Madras Estates Land Act or an under-tenure within the meaning of Section 3 (2)(e), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held in Srinivasulu Chetty vs. State of Madras, 65 L. W. (SN) 36, that as there was no provision in the Act to decide such a dispute, the petitioner was entitled to field a suit to establish his rights.

In Pattamani Devi vs. State of A.P., 1962 (2) ALT 9 = 1962 (1) An.W.R. 320, the dispute which arose between the parties was as to whether the grant was of a Zamindari estate or an inam estate. It was held that there is no specific provision made in the Act to decide the whether Merangi Estate was a zamindari estate or not.

5.        Whether Act XVII of 1957, repugnant to Article 19 of the Constitution :--In Bhanoji Rao vs. State of A.P., 1961 (2) An.W.R. 258 = 1961 ALT 711 = AIR 1962 (A.P.) 157, the High Court of A.P. dealing with petitions filed by some of the landholders in Visakhapatnam and West Godavari Districts, raising an issue regarding the vires of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act, 1957 (XVII of 1957) which amended the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (XXVI of 1948), held as under :

It is manifest that the right of appeal is specifically created in the Government by the amended sections while there was no such specific provision under the old law. We are told that the amended provision was necessitated by the decisions of some of the Tribunals to the effect that the Government did not have any right of appeal, the right being confined only to a private individual aggrieved by the decision of the Settlement Officer. The Legislature, therefore, though that it was advisable to insert this clause conferring specifically the right of appeal on the Government, which, in the nature of things, is very much interested in the adjudication of the Settlement Officer. It should be borne in mind that under section 3 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, the entire estate (including all communal lands and porambokes etc) vested in the Government and as such the Government is vitally interested in any decision that might be rendered by the Settlement Officer. It is for this reason that the Legislature had introduced this clause giving the right of appeal to Government.

The amendment is contained in two limbs : (i) creating a right of appeal with retrospective effect; and (ii) prescribing a period of one year for enforcing this right. It is thus plain that this clause has created a right of appeal in the Government with retrospective effect.

The argument presented by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that this clause has destroyed the protection given to the landholders by Article 19 (I)(f) of the Constitution. It is urged that this provision has the effect of abridging the right of the petitioners to hold property. It is argued that by reason of the decision of the Settlement Officers that the properties in question were not estates within the purview of section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act having become final, the petitioners had acquired a vested interest and this was sought to be taken away by this clause.

It is convenient here to extract Article 19 (I)(f) of the Constitution which is as under

"All citizens shall have the right--

to acquire, hold and dispose of property."

Now, what is the impact of this Article on section 9 (4) (a) (i) of the Estates Abolition Act? How does the impugned section affect the rights of the petitioners to acquire, hold and dispose of property? Admittedly, there is nothing in the impugned Act which in any way abridges the rights guaranteed either to acquire or to dispose of property. We are left with the question whether it touches the right to hold property. It should be remembered that the expression "to hold" means only to "enjoy or to possess". In other words, the protection afforded to a citizen of India is to enable him to possess and enjoy the property belonging to him. Does the clause in question materially interfere with the right of the petitioners either to possess or enjoy the property? As we have already observed, this clause has merely vested a right of appeal in Government with retrospective effect, the consequence of which is the finality that attached to the decision of the Settlement Officer is nullified. As a result of this clause, the question whether a particular village was an inam within any of the clauses of section 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act was left open. It merely exposes the landholders to the risk of an adverse decision being rendered by the Tribunal at the instance of the Government. There is no inviolable or absolute right to allow the determination in favour of a party unquestioned in appeal or revision. There is no fundamental right in the Chapter guaranteed to a citizen that any adjudication in his favour should have an attribute of finality. It was, therefore, competent for the Legislature to give a right of appeal to any party--be it Government or a private individual.

The powers of the Legislature are plenary within the constitutional limitations. Entry 21 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, has clothed the Provincial Legislature with power to make laws concerning land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land-tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. The main Act, i.e., the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, provides for the abolition of a certain kind of tenures prevailing in the then State of Madras. It provided a machinery for working out the rights and obligations of the landholders and tenants. Therefore, the legislature has not overstepped the limits set on its power by the Constitution in making this legislation. So, the validity of this legislation cannot be attacked, unless it offends against any provision contained in Chapter III of the Constitution. We have already stated that this does not in any way cut down the right of the petitioners to possess and to enjoy the properties belonging to them. The only consequence of this legislation is that it reopens the question whether a particular village is an estate or not.

The next point to be considered is whether it was open to the Legislature to create this right with retrospective operation. In our judgment, the Legislature has ample jurisdiction to make laws either prospectively or retrospectively. There is no restriction on the legislative competence in this behalf. There is ample authority for this position.

In The United Provinces vs. Atiqa Begum,[76] the Federal Court ruled that a law which modified the pre-existing law relating to payment of rents by tenants to landlords and give it retrospective operation was valid notwithstanding section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which enacted that the pre-existing law was to continue to be in force until it was altered. The same principle is contained in Sundararmier & Co., vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,[77]. In this case, the Supreme Court decided inter alia that the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (VII of 1956) which rendered the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bengal Immunity Company Case,[78] ineffective was constitutional and could not be successfully impeached. It was held in the Bengal Immunity Company Case,[79] that the Explanation sales were not divested of their character as inter-State sales, as the Explanation to Article 286 (I)(a) of the Constitution did not govern Article 286 (2) and that in the absence of Parliamentary legislation as envisaged by Article 286 (2), taxation of sales falling within its range would be unconstitutional. The effect of this decision was that taxes on sales that occurred within a particular period were illegally levied and that the assesses were entitled to get back taxes illegally collected from them. It is to nullify this decision that the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (VII of 1956) was enacted by the Parliament. This legislation was given retrospective operation in that it validated the levy of taxes on sales that took place before the law was passed. Notwithstanding this, it was laid down by the Supreme Court in Sundararamier & Co., vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,[80] that the Validation Act was free from challenge, since the power vested in a sovereign State carried with it the authority to enact laws either prospectively or retrospectively unless there was a limitation contained in the Constitution itself on this power. It, therefore, cannot be maintained that any law which has retrospective operation should be struck down as unconstitutional. The legislative measure now attacked does not transgress any constitutional provision. On the other hand, as we have already stated, it is within the right of the Legislature derived under Entry 21, of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. We are not persuaded that Act XVII of 1957 is in any way repugnant to Article 19 of the Constitution.

In this view of ours, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether, if this enactment infringes Article 19 (I)(f) of the Constitution, it is saved by Article 31-A. It is only a legislative measure that takes away or abridges the right enshrined either in Article 19 or Article 14 of the Constitution that is immune from challenge under Article 31-A. We are, therefore relieved of the necessity to consider whether Act XVII of 1957 imposes restrictions on the rights guaranteed under Article 19, and, if so, whether they amount to reasonable restrictions. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners deal only with reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by particular pieces of legislation. They do not throw any light on the controversy whether the Act, if at all, offends against Article 19 (I) (f) of the Constitution.

For these reasons, we hold that the impugned Act must be held to have been validly passed and cannot be invalidated as being repugnant to Article 19 (I)(f).

6.        Enquiry by Settlement Officer :-Where a Miscellaneous Settlement Officer held an enquiry under section 9 of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and declared a particular village as not being on inam estate, the High Court of A.P. in B. Venkasami Rao vs. State of Madras,[81] held that the order passed by the Settlement Officer is final subject to the result of the appeal that might be filed under sub-section (4). It was further held that it is therefore not open to the government to go behind the decision already arrived at by the Settlement Officer.

 

7.        Power of Settlement Officer :--Under Section 9, of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, as it stood prior to the A.P. Second Amendment Act, 1957 (XVIII of 1957), the enquiry was to be confined to the question whether the great consisted of the whole village or not. Whether it constituted a hamlet or khandriga was extraneous to that enquiry. The Settlement Officer had to consider the material from the standpoint whether it constituted a whole village or not. The enquiry as contemplated by section 9 after the amendment is a more comprehensive are, namely, whether what was granted was a whole village or a hamlet or khandriga.[82]

 

8.        Section 2 (7) and 9(1) and (7) of the Act :--It is clear from sections 2 (7) and 9 (1) and (7) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 that the Settlement Officer either suo motu or on an application by persons claiming an interest in it has to start an inquiry to determine whether an inam village is an inam estate. In the determination of that question, he may presume that it is an inam estate. It must be noted that the presumption enacted in Section 9 (7) is a rebuttable one. It is also plain that the section does not involve the presumption that every inam constitutes an inam village. The pre-requisite to the applicability of Section 9 (7) is the existence of an inam village. So as a necessary condition for the application of this section, it should be established that the grant was of an inam village. It is for the person who sets up such a contention to make it out. It is only then that the presumption can be called in aid.[83]

 

9.        Jurisdiction of Civil Court :--In Sreeman Srimath Addanki Tim Venkata Tata Desikacharyulu vs. The State of A.P.,[84] the High Court of A.P. dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of the civil court held that it is open to the persons interested to question before the ordinary courts a notification relating to a village on the ground that it did not relate to an inam village.[85] The question as to whether a particular property constitutes an inam village within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948 is properly within the cognizance of the Civil Court.

 

10.    Decision of the Tribunal :--While Section 9(4)(c) of the Act enjoins that the decision of the Tribunal given under section 9 shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law, sub-section (6) of that section declares that every decision of the Tribunal given under section 9 shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village or Khandriga notwithstanding that any such persons has not preferred any application filed any statement or adduced any evidence or even appeared or participated in the proceedings before either the settlement officer or the Tribunal.[86]

Section 9A - Inquiry under Section 9 not necessary in certain cases

[87]If before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Second Amendment) Act, 1957 any decision was given under Section 9 in respect of any village that it was not an inam estate as it stood defined before such commencement, and that decision was based on the finding the inam village became an estate by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 then,--

(a)      if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Tribunal under sub-section (4) of Section 9, no fresh inquiry under that section shall be necessary for taking any proceeding under this Act on the basis of that finding; and

 

(b)      if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Settlement Officer, and no appeal was filed to the Tribunal, the Government or any person aggrieved, may appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding within two months from the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1960, and if no such appeal is filed, the finding of the Settlement Officer shall be final and no fresh inquiry shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under this Act on the basis of that finding.]

Section 10 - Determination of date on which under-tenure estate was created

(1)     The landholder of an under-tenure estate or any other person interested may, within three months from the notified date, or such further time a the appropriate Settlement Officer may in his discretion allow, apply to him for a decision as to whether such estate was created before or after the date on which the principal estate was permanently settled.

 

(2)     The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire to, examine all such documents, as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the claims before him and give his decision in writing.

 

(3)     The Government or any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under subsection (2) may, within two months from the date of the decision, or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

 

(4)     Unless the Settlement Officer, or where there is an appeal, the Tribunal, decides that an under-tenure estate was created before the date on which the principal estate was permanently settled, it shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as having been created after that date.

 

(5)     Where the principal estate is a temporarily settled zamindari or an unsettled palaiyam or jagir, all references to the date of the permanent settlement of the principal estate in the foregoing provisions shall be construed as references ?

 

(a)      in the case of a temporarily settled zamindari, to the date of its temporary settlement; and

 

(b)      in the case of an unsettled palaiyam or Jagir, to the 13th day of July, 1802.

Section 11 - Lands in which ryot is entitled to ryotwari patta

Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of--

(a)      all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act; and

 

(b)      all lanka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified date, such lands having been in his occupation or in that of his predecessors-in-title continuously from the 1st day of July, 1939;

Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the first day of July, 1945 shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land.

Explanation :--No lessee of any lanka and no person to whom a right to collect the rent of any land has been leased before the notified date, including an jaradar or a farmer of rent, shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this section.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The Act does not allow the government to acquire the ryoti lands and then allow it to grant the same to or assign the land thus acquired to anyone the Government chooses.[88]

The settlement officer is not under an obligation to consider the nature or character of the land under Section 15 of the Act, when an application under Section 11 of the Act is filed seeking to issue ryotwari patta.[89]

In Venkata Subba Rao vs State of A.P.,[90] it is held : Section 11 envisages the issue of a ryotwari patta to a ryot in regard to lands which were included in his holding or ought to have been included. But the section does not mention as to who should grant the patta.

It is well-settled law that enquiry under Section 11 of the Act is only a summary enquiry and the authorities discharging the duties under the Act have no jurisdiction to declare the title to the property. In other words, no finality can be attached to any order passed by the authorities concerned under the Act and at best the said order has to be confined for the purposes of the Act and it cannot be stated that the judgment is in Rem. When a dispute arises between the contesting parties, the civil Court alone is competent to adjudicate the dispute irrespective of the decision of the authorities under Section 11 of the Act.[91]

2.        Any Land :--In Anyam Satti Raju vs. Sri Raghu Venkata Mahipathi Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur,[92] the Division Bench of A.P. High Court held that the expression "any land" is of a wide import and applies to both kinds of lands ryoti as well as non-ryoti.

 

3.        "Lankas" :--In Dokka Ramabhadrudu vs. State of A.P.,[93] it was held; "The term "lankas" is comprehensive enough to include lateral accretions and not confined to vertical accretions. This view of ours is vouched by the observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sri Balusu Ramalakshmama vs. The Collector of the Godavari District.[94] Their Lordships at the beginning of the judgment observed :

"The formation is called a lanka, which term as their Lordships understand, not only includes islands more generally known as chure, but also accretions of the banks of rivers. The lanka in dispute is one formed in contact with an island called the Tatapudi lanka". To a like effect are the remarks in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Secretary of State vs. Maharajah of Pithapur, AIR 1938 Mad. 470. The passage which lands support to this view occurs at page 472 :--

We think that as the lanka presents every appearance now of being a lateral accretion and not an island, the onus is upon Government to show that it once was an island. No positive evidence of this fact exists, and a study of previous plans of the river cannot possibly establish the continued existence of any stream along the western bank which has now shrunk not the present depression. It is obvious that the course of the deep channels in the river must be subject to frequent changes. We are of opinion accordingly that there were no sufficient reasons for dissenting from the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that the suit lanka is a lateral and not a vertical accretion.

It is clear from this pronouncement that in order to be lanka it should be an island and that either vertical accretions or even lateral accretions can form a lanka.

4.        Assignment of land :--When once ryotwari patta is granted under section 11(a) of the Act by the Settlement Officer after conducting enquiry, the right of the government to assign the land would automatically cease.[95]

It is within the purview of settlement officer to consider rival claims for grant of ryotwari patta, even though the patta is already granted to one party under Section 11(a).[96]

5.        Proviso to Section 11 :--The proviso to Section 11 of the Madras Estate Abolition Act does not seem to justify the conclusion that it is for the government to decide ultimately as to when the person was admitted into possession. The Government would come into the picture only if it is decided by these tribunals, including the Board of Revenue that he was admitted into possession after the 1st of July, 1945. The Government is vested with discretion and jurisdiction to direct the issue of patta even if admission is after the 1st of July 1945. It is for the Board of Revenue as the final authority to find out as to when exactly he was admitted in possession. If, in exercise of this power, the Board of Revenue comes to the conclusion, in agreement with the Settlement Officer that it is a ryot land and that the person was admitted into possession before the 1st of July 1945, the Government cannot interfere with it.[97]

In Srinadhu Mallappa vs. Board of Revenue,[98] the grant was under a statutory power, viz., proviso to section 11 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948. The grant has to be made by the Government. No doubt the settlement officer has to make the enquiry; but the power of granting it is vested in the government under the said section. This power has been delegated to the Board of Revenue, under the rules. As against any order passed by the Board of Revenue, a revision has been provided to the Government by the Rules made in G.O.Ms.No. 1044, Rev., dated 17th June, 1961. This being a statutory provision, the Board of Revenue once it has passed an order granting patta, it had become functus officio, and no power of revision is vested in it and unless it be an grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or other similar grounds, if could not review its own orders.

6.        Suo motu enquiry :--In Penatamma vs. Lakshmanna,[99] the proceedings in so far as they related to the enquiry into the claim of the respondents and the grant of patta to them in effect amounted to one under Section 11 (a). In view of that enquiry being dove-tailed into the suo motu enquiry which the Assistant Settlement Officer made under section 15, r/w rule 2 (c), the appeal, Tribunal Appeal No. 87 of 1960, was in fact filed before the Tribunal against the order which had in effect granted a patta to the respondent (under section 11(a)).

Agreeing with the view expressed in pentammas case (1963 (2) An.W.R. 19) the High Court of A.P. in Maddala Subba Rao vs. Estate Abolition Tribunal,[100] held that in holding enquiry in the present case the Assistant Settlement Officer was in error in converting an enquiry under Section 15(1) into an enquiry under section 11 and therefore the entire enquiry and the order passed therein by him are vitiated and illegal and that the order of the Tribunal in T.A. No.87 of 1960 is also vitiated and illegal.

Following the rulings of Maddala Subba Rao's case,[101] the High Court of A.P. in Gopajosyula Suryakanthamma vs. Lokavarapu Sanyasi and Ors.,[102] held that as in that case, the Assistant Settlement Officer here mixed up both the enquiries and directed pattas to issue under section 11(a) in the enquiry instituted suo motu under section 15(1). An appeal entertained under Section 15(2) would therefore be bad in law.

Suo motu power to be exercised within a reasonable time and not after such long lapse of 28 years in this case and also acceptable reasons are to be given while doing so.[103]

In Neerupaka Rama Krishna vs. Director of Settlements,[104] the High Court of A.P. dealing with a writ petition questioning the show cause notice dated 28-2-1998 issued by the Director of Settlements in purported exercise of suo motu powers of revision proposing to cancel the order dated 27-5-1962 passed by the Additional Settlement Officer granting ryotwari patta under section 11 of the Act on the ground that the said order is irregular held as under :--

On an earlier occasion when the revenue authorities refused to implement the said order dated 27-5-1962, the petitioner herein filed WP No. 10773 of 1996 for a direction to implement the said order. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on merits by an order dated 16-8-1996 upholding the validity of the order dated 27-5-1962 and the District Collector was directed to implement the same Pursuant to the said directions of this Court on instructions from the District Collector, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Venkatagiri implemented the order dated 27-5-1962 on 26-9-1996 by making the necessary changes in the revenue records. The order passed in WP No. 10773 of 1996 had become final as no writ appeal was filed against the same. Despite the said order passed by this Court, the first respondent has issued the impugned show-cause notice dated 28-2-1998.

In the face of the categorical findings recorded by this Court in WP No. 10773 of 1996 upholding the validity of the order dated 27-5-1962, it does not admit of any doubt that the first respondent has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in issuing the impugned show-cause notice dated 28-2-1998. The order passed in WP No. 10773 of 1996 clearly operates as res judicata. The learned Government Pleader for Revenue however contends that WP No. 10773 of 1996 was concerned with the issue of Pattadar Pass Book to the petitioner and the same has no bearing on the validity of the order dated 27-5-1962. I am unable to agree with this submission. In the order dated 16-8-1996 passed in WP No. 10773 of 1996 this Court has elaborately considered the self-same objections with regard to the truth and validity of the order dated 27-5-1962 and negatived the same and upheld the validity of the order dated 27-5-1962. It was therefore not open to the first respondent to reagitate the same question once again. That apart, there is absolutely no justification for the exercise of suo motu powers of revision by the first respondent after the lapse of more than 36 years. The writ petition is therefore allowed and the impugned show-cause notice is quashed. No costs.

7.        Jurisdiction of Civil Court :--The civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue of title, notwithstanding the earlier decision of the Settlement Officer granting patta under Section 11 of the Act.[105]

Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into the correctness of determination of nature of land under Section 11 by settlement officer.[106]

In Nallipattu Ramakrishna Reddy vs. Kasala Balaiah and anr.[107] the point that arose for consideration was whether the civil court has jurisdiction to go into the questions existing under section 13 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948, it was held by Hon'ble Justice Jagannadha Rao of A.P. High Court as under :

A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Raghuvir and K. Ramaswamy, JJ held in Jaya Syamala Rao vs. Sri Radhakantha Swami,[108] that though there is no express provision under the Act the jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 9, C.P.C. is ousted for agitating the matter covered by Section 11 of the Act. They held that the decision arrived at under the Act under Section 11 by the authorities are conclusive and not liable to be questioned in a civil suit and that the Act is intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement authorities and the Tribunals constituted under that Act including the one covered by Section 11 in K. Ranga vs. M. Venkatarami Reddy,[109] rendered by Jeevan Reddy, J. In my opinion the above decision of the Division Bench must be deemed to have been impliedly overruled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamilnadu vs. Ramalingaswamigul.[110] The Supreme Court there held that the order passed by the settlement authority either granting or refusing to grant ryotwari patta to a ryot under Section 11 of the Act must be regarded as having been passed to achieve the purposes of the Act as mentioned in Section 64-C and that must have reference only to the purpose of revenue collection and therefore any decision rendered by the Settlement Officer while taking a decision for the aforesaid purpose is not final and is subject to the decision of the civil Court. It was pointed out that there was distinction between proceedings under Section 11 of the Act on the one hand and proceedings under Section 12, 13 and 14 of the Act. In respect of Section 11, there is no express provision for any enquiry into the nature of character of the land before granting or refusing to grant such patta to the applicant whereas the specific provision for such enquiry is made in Sections 12 to 14 of the Act. The decision arrived at under Section 11 of the Act is arrived at in a summary manner for the purpose of granting or refusing patta while considering the question of payment of assessment. A summary decision of this type in an enquiry conducted for revenue purposes cannot be regarded as final or conclusive so as to constitute a bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court in adjudicating upon the same issue arising in a suit field by a ryot on the basis of his title and long and uninterrupted possession. Further the Supreme Court held that the Tribunals constituted under the Act do not have the powers to grant the various relief which can be granted by the Civil Court.

In my view the decision of the Supreme Court impliedly overrules the decision of the above Decision Bench of this Court in Jaya Syamalarao's case (1 supra). I therefore hold that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under Section 11 of the Act notwithstanding any earlier decision of the Settlement authority as to the persons entitled to the grant of patta under Section 11 of the Act.

The Division Bench of the A.P. High Court in the case of Sajana Granites, Madras and another vs. Manduva Srinivas Rao & Ors.,[111] held that Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the issue of title in spite of the earlier decision of Settlement Officer granting patta under Section 11 of the Act. In State of A.P. vs. B, Venkatamma & Ors.,[112] following Sajana Granites case,[113] it is held :

If that be so, there is no patta granted in the instant case to any other person and there is no evidence to show that it is a Government land. Even in respect of the Government lands, whoever was in continuous possession from 1940 onwards, they are entitled for grant of ryotwari patta. Insofar as the non-khalsa villages i.e., Jagir Villages is concerned, there is no dispute that the cultivators are entitled for the pattedari rights and therefore, I am of the opinion that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is maintainable.

8.        Show Cause notice :--The requirement of show cause notice is conceived by way of affording opportunity to the person whose interest, be they personal or proprietorial are sought to be affected. He is expected to know the nature of the case he has to meet. The nature of the case he has to meet he must be appraised of only in the show cause notice.[114]

 

9.        Principle of Merger :--When once the order granting patta confirmed by the Government in exercise of its revisional powers, the order of Board gets merged in the order of the government.[115]

 

10.    Period of Limitation :--In the absence of any provision being enacted or any, rule being made under the rule making power, prescribing the period of limitation, it would not be open to the Settlement Officer to reject applications filed under Section 11 (a) of the Act, an the ground of limitation.[116]

There cannot be two applications for the same relief at two different places to cover earlier laches.[117]

Section 12 - Lands in Zamindari estate in which landholder is entitled to Ryotwari Patta

In the case of the zamindari estate, the landholder shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of--

(a)      all lands (including lanka lands) which, immediately before the notified date, (i) belonged to him as private land within the meaning of Section 3, clause 10(a), of the Estates land Act, or (ii) stood recorded as his private land in a record prepared under the provisions of Chapter XI or Chapter XII of the said Act, not having been subsequently converted into ryoti land;

 

(b)      (i) all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included, in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder, by inheritance or succession under a will, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry from the date of such acquisition or the 1st day of July, 1939, whichever is later and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from such later date;

(ii)? ?all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder by purchase, exchange or gift, but not including purchase at a sale for arrears of rent, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandary from the 1st day of July 1945 and has been in direct and continues possession of such lands from that date;

(iii) ??all lands (not being (i) lanka lands, (ii) lands of the description specified in Section 3, clause (16), sub-clauses (a),(b) and (c) of the Estates Land Act, of (iii) forest lands) which have been abandoned or relinquished by a ryot, or which have never been in the occupation of a ryot, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, or by his own servants or hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandary, from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date.

Explanation :--"Cultivate" in this clause includes the planting and rearing of topes, gardens and orchards, but does not include the rearing of topes of spontaneous growth.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Section 12 (a) of the Madras Estate Abolition Act talks only of the grant of patta in regard to private land falling within the purview of Section 3 (10)(a) of the Madras Estates Land Act and does not take in those covered by Section 3 (16) of that Act. Before a Patta could be issued under section 12(a), it should be established at least that the land is capable of cultivation, whether directly or indirectly apart from the question whether it was cultivated or not. A landholder could not claim a ryotwari patta in regard to a tank.[118]

 

2.        Object :--The Legislature has chosen certain types of land for the conferment of ryotwari pattas on the landholders, i.e., those envisaged in section 3 (10) of the Madras Estates, 1908. If any class of land falls outside its purview, despite the fact that the tenants did not put forward any rights of occupancy, section 12 (a) of the Madras Estate Abolition Act, 1948 would not come into play.[119]

 

3.        Intention of Legislature :--Section 12 (b) (ii) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 enables a land-holder who acquires lands from a ryot by purchase, exchange or gift, to claim ryotwari patta provided he was in possession from 1st July, 1945. When a right is subject to a condition, the person claiming the right cannot ignore the condition.

Under Section 12 (b)(i), a land-holder, who acquires land from a ryot by inheritance or succession under a will, is entitled to a patta provided he has cultivated the land from the date of the acquisition or from the 1st day of July, 1939, whichever is later and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from such later date. It is said that the difference in the phraseology used in the two clauses indicates that where the Legislature intended that the proviso should govern all acquisitions irrespective of the date of the acquisition, they have clearly stated so. On the other hand, the different phraseology used in the two clauses clearly indicates that in the case of clause (i), the Legislature insisted on direct and continuous possession of the land-holder from the date of the acquisition whereas in the case of clause (ii) they insisted on direct and continuous possession from 1st July, 1945. If the Legislature also intended to impose the condition of direct possession only from the date of purchase, even though that date is subsequent to 1st July, 1945, they would have used similar language in clause (i). The conscious departure in the framing of the proviso in clause (ii) from that in clause (i) is indicative of the fact that the condition of direct possession under a purchase from 1st July, 1945 is a necessary condition of the right claimable by a land-lord under that clause. We, therefore, hold that the appellant, who purchased lands only in 1947, is not entitled to claim ryotwari patta under section 12 of the Act.[120]

4.        Applicability :--In H.V.S. Sivarama Sastry vs. The Estates Abolition Tribunal,[121] it was held that "one of the rights recognised under the Act is the one contemplated by section 12. Unless the requirements of that section are complied with, the landholder upon whom the right to claim patta has been conferred by the section cannot successfully ask for patta. Viewed thus, there can be little doubt that what the section requires is actual cultivation from 1st July, 1939.

 

5.        Oral Exchange :--In Rajah Sivarama Prasad vs. State of A.P.,[122] a petition, was filed under section 12 (b) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948 by a landholder for grant of a ryotwari patta on the ground that the land was given to him on an oral exchange. It was held by the Assistant Settlement Officer that as there is no registered instrument evidencing the transaction, it could not be said that the landholder had acquired the land by purchase or exchange and rejected the claim.

On appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, it was considered by the Tribunal that the claim was an after-thought and rejected it Dismissing the writ petition the High Court of A.P. held that the claim was rightly rejected by the Tribunal.

Section 13 - Lands in inam estate in which landholder is entitled to ryotwari patta

In the case of an inam estate, the landholder shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of--

(a)      all lands (including lanka lands) which, immediately before the notified date, (i) belonged to him as private land within the meaning of Section 3, clause 10 (b) of the Estates Land Act, or (ii) stood recorded as private land in a record prepared under the provisions of Chapter XI or Chapter XII of the said Act, not having been subsequent converted into ryoti land; and

 

(b)      (i) all lands which were properly included, or which ought to have been properly included, in the holding landholder, by inheritance or succession under a will, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, from the date of such acquisition or the 1st day of July, 1945 whichever is later and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from such later date;

(ii) ??all lands which were properly included, or which ougth to have been properly included in the holding of a ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder by purchase, exchange or gift, including purchase at a sale for arrears of rent; provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry from the 1st day of July 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date;

(iii) ??all lands (not being (i) lanka lands, (ii) lands of the description specified in Section 3, clause (16), sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Estates Land Act, or (iii) forest lands) which have been abandoned or relinquished by a ryot, or which have never been in the occupation of a ryot, provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, or by his own servants or hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date.

Explanation :--"Cultivate" in this clause includes the planting and rearing of topes, gardens and orchards, but does not include the rearing of topes of spontaneous growth.

Synopsis

1.        Character of land :--In order to be excluded from the applicability of Section 13(b) (iii) the lands must be shown to beds on bunds of tanks etc, either on 1st July, 1945 or on the date when the Estates Abolition Act come into force. The question of the character of land either at the inception of the Estates Land Act, 1908 or during the period when that Act was in force would be irrelevant.[123]

 

2.        Application for grant of patta :-In Muppirala Jagannadham vs. The Chairman, Estates Abolition Tribunal,[124] the question for consideration is whether section 13 should yield to section 64 and should be read as being controlled by the latter. It is held :

In our opinion, an application for the grant of a patta should be determined with reference to section 13 of the Act and this section is not in any way sub-servant to section 64. It is section 13 that makes provision for the grant of patta to a landholder while section 64 deals with the preservation of the rights of a person who has been temporarily dispossessed or of a transferee from such a person. That has no relevancy in considering whether a person has acquired a right to the grant of a patta under section 13 (b)(iii) of the Act. Section 64 cannot be regarded as an exception to section 13 (b)(iii). In order to enable a landholder to the benefits of that section, it must be established that the ryoti land in regard to which he seeks a patta was abandoned or relinquished by a ryot, that subsequently it was never put in the occupation of a ryot and that further.

"the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or hired labour with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandary, from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous possession of such lands from that date.

3.        Character of a land :--In order to prove the character of a land that it is a private and adducing direct evidence with regard to self-cultivation is not the only method available to a party for indirect evidence can also be taken into account in order to reach the inference warranted by Section 13 (b) (iii).[125]

Section 14 - Lands in an under-tenure estate in which landholder is entitled to ryotwari patta

The grant of a ryotwari patta to landholder in respect of lands in an under-tenure, estate shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of--

(a)      Section 13, if it has been decided under Section 10 that such estate was created before the date of the permanent or temporary settlement of the principal estate or the 13th day of July, 1802, as the case may be; and

 

(b)      Section 12, in other cases.

Section 15 - Determination of lands in which the landholder is entitled to ryotwari patta under foregoing provisions

(1)     The Settlement Officer shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta under Section 12, 13, or 14, as the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed.

[126][(2)   (a) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Government may, within one year from the date of the decision or if su'ch decision was given before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1957, within one year from such commencement, and any person aggrieved by such decision may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.]

(b)?? If, before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1957, any order has been passed by the Tribunal dismissing an appeal filed by the Government against a decision of the Settlement Officer on the ground that the Government were not competent to file an appeal under this sub-section or that such appeal was time-barred, the Tribunal shall, on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act aforesaid, vacate such order, and pass a fresh order on merits.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The Tribunal while deciding an appeal against a decision of the settlement officer is entitled to pass such order in its discretion and such decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court law.[127]

Section 15 of the Act deals with the determination of lands in which the land holder is entitled to ryotwari patta. Section 15 (2) (a) provides appeal against the order passed by the Settlement Officer.[128]

2.        Object :--The determination under section 15 by the Settlement Officer under the Estate Abolition Act is appealable under that section to the tribunal established under the Act, while the decisions given by such an officer on the applications of the tenant or the ryots are revisable under sections 5 or 7 of the Act, in the first instance, by the Director of Settlements, and then by the Board of Revenue.[129]

It is well settled that if the Legislature confers certain rights upon an individual and provides a machinery for the determination of such rights, it is that machinery that should be utilised by the person concerned. The machinery created by the Estates Abolition Act to deal with claims is the one within the contemplation of Section 15.[130]

3.        Scope of enquiry under Section 15 :-In an enquiry under section 15 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, any decision given with regard to the ryotwari patta under section 11 or with regard to a dispute falling under section 56 would be clearly outside the scope of enquiry under section 15 and such a determination or finding on such question would not have a binding effect so as to preclude an enquiry into the said dispute when it is properly raised under the appropriate section.[131]

 

4.        Purpose of enquiry :--It is clear that unless a case for patta is made out, nobody would be entitled to the patta of the land to which he sets up a claim. The so called tenants right has been negatived and also the so-called landholders. It does not follow that the land ceases to vest in the government. It is not competent for the Assistant Settlement Officer to determine the character of the land as assessed waste when the purpose of his enquiry was to determine who was entitled to patta.[132]

 

5.        Power of Tribunals :--In Aderam Chenchu Reddy & Ors., vs. Estates Abolition Tribunal,[133] the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. held that the words in clause (a) of Section 15 (2) "such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow" as conferring power on the Tribunal to grant further time not only to private persons but also to the government.

 

6.        Scope of the Tribunal's power in extending the time :--Clause (a) of Section 15 (2) of the Act clearly mentions that the Tribunal may grant further time in its discretion. The Appellate Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body and it goes without saying that it will have to exercise its discretion judiciously. It cannot arbitrarily extend the time or refuse to extend the time. Either to grant further time or refuse further time in preferring appeals it must give valid reasons.[134]

 

7.        Suo-motu enquiry :--Section 15 (1) of the Madras Estate Abolition Act, 1948, does not contemplate an enquiry as to whether anyone other than the landholder is entitled to a patta.[135]

 

8.        Jurisdiction of Assistant Settlement Officer:-- Under Section 15 the Assistant Settlement Officer while making an enquiry either suo motu or otherwise has the jurisdiction to enquire into the nature and character of the land and history thereof.[136]

 

9.        Orders by Settlement Officer :--The Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Estates Land Abolition Act, is a self contained Act under the scheme of the Act, the orders passed by the Settlement Officer are final subject only to the appellate provisions.[137]

 

10.    Principle of res-judicata :--The proceedings under the Act concluded by the judgment of the Tribunal under section 15 of the Act cannot be questioned in a court of law and it is fairly settled that judgment is binding on the civil court. The proceedings under section 15 of the Act has the effect of conferring a fresh right on the landlord and it is a fresh root of title and the findings arrived at by the Tribunal under Section 15(2) of the Act clearly operates as res-judicata as envisaged in Section 64-A of the Act.[138]

 

11.    From the date of the Order :--In Pendyala Venkateswarlu vs. Estate Additional Tribunal,[139] the Hon'ble High Court of A.P., dealing with a question that when the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was not communicated in full as required by rule 6 (b) of the Rules made under section 15 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, did the limitation start from the date of the order or if the petitioner after obtaining the certified copies of the order prefers an appeal within prescribed time from the date of obtain in such copy, will that appeal be considered as time barred if it is filed in spite of a non-communication of a full order, it was held :

It is now fairly established that although section 15 of the Act mentions that the limitation will start from the date of the order, the limitation will commence only from the date when the orders are communicated to the party. In Raja Harish Chandra vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer,[140] their Lordships of the Supreme Court have decided that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. It was considered unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the order" in a literal or mechanical law. In the light of those observations of the Supreme Court, a similar interpretation will have to be put on the words "from the date of the decision" occurring in section 15 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act. In this case, what is communicated on 13th December, 1958, is an incomplete order and not a full order. Looked at from that point of view, I have only to consider whether the limitation started from the date when the incomplete order was communicated to the appellant or to declare that the appeal, which was filed after obtaining copies within the prescribed time from the date when such copies of full order were received, was filed within time and ought to have been heard on merits. In order to find correct answer to these questions, I must look into Rule 6. Rule 6 is in the following terms :--

"6.      (a) Every decision of the Settlement Officer under section 15(1) shall be published in the village in Form No. II appended hereto (Appendix V) in the manner prescribed in Rule 3 (2).

(b) A copy of the decision in full shall be delivered to the landholder if he is present or sent to him free of cost by registered post acknowledgement due and a copy shall be sent to the Manager of the Estates. Copies of the orders passed by an Assistant Settlement Officer should be submitted to the Settlement Officer and those passed by the Settlement Officer shall be submitted to the Director of Settlements."

The language of this rule leaves me in no doubt that, what is required to be communicated is the full order, and as the full order is not communicated in the instant case, that does not amount to compliance with the requirements of Rule 6.

Section 16 - Liability to pay assessment, etc., to Government

(1)     Every person, whether a landholder or a ryot, who becomes entitled to a ryotwari patta under this Act, in respect of any land shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be liable to pay to the Government such assessment, as may be lawfully imposed on the land.

 

(2)     If in respect of any such land, the ryot was liable immediately before the notified date to make any payment to the landholder otherwise than by way of rent, whether periodically or not, the ryot shall continue to make such payments as accrue on or after that date to the Government.

Section 17 - Ryotwari patta in service-tenure lands

(1)     Where any land [141][not consisting of an entire village) granted on service-tenure, whether to an individual or institution falls under Section 3, clause 16(c) of Estates Land Act, then [142][xxx].

 

(a)      if the service to be rendered is personal or private service to the landholder, not being a religious, educational or charitable institution, the land shall be discharged from the condition of such service and the holder of such land shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the land with effect on and from the notified date;

 

(b)      in all other cases, the holder of such land shall have the same rights in the land, and be subject to the same liabilities, as the inamdar of a minor service inam in a ryotwari village has in respect of his land.

Provided that [143][xxx] no ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of any land [144][xxx] which is forest or which falls under Section 3, clause (16), sub-clause (a) or (b), of the Estates Land Act.

(2)     The provisions of sub-section (1), clause (b), shall apply also a dasabandam inam lands in estates.

Section 18 - Vesting of buildings situated in estates

(1)     Every building situated within the limits of an estate, which immediately before the notified date, belonged to any landholder thereof and was then being used by him as an office in connection with its administration and for no other purpose, shall vest in the Government, free of all encumbrances, with effect on and from the notified date.

 

(2)     Every building so situated which, immediately before the notified date, belonged to any such landholder and the whole or principal part thereof was then in the occupation of any religious, educational or charitable institution, shall also vest in the Government, free of all encumbrances, with effect on and from the notified date;

Provided that when such institution ceases to exist, the building shall revert to such landholder, or if he is dead, to his heirs or legal representatives.

(3)     Where any building so situated ?

 

(a)      which belonged to any such landholder on the 1st day of July, 1947; and

 

(b)      (i) which on that date was being used by him as an office in connection with the administration of the estate, and for no other purpose; or

(ii) ??the whole or principal part whereof was on that date in the occupation of any religious, educational or charitable institution has after the 1st day of July 1947 and before the notified date, been sold or made a gift of, by the landholder, or ceased to be used by him as an office as aforesaid, or ceased to be in the occupation of such institution, the value of the building shall be assessed by the Tribunal in such manner as may be prescribed; and the Tribunal shall pay to the Government such value from out of the compensation deposited in its office under Section 41, sub-section (1).

(4)     Every building other than a building referred in subsection (1),(2) and (3) shall, with effect on and from the notified date, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date; but the Government shall be entitled?

 

(i)       in every case, to levy the appropriate assessment thereon; and

 

(ii)      in the case of a building which vests in a person other than a landholder, also to the payments which such person was liable immediately before the notified date to make to any landholder in respect thereof, whether periodically or not and whether by way of rent or otherwise, in so far as such payments, may accrue the on or after the notified date.

 

(5)     In this section, "building" includes the site on which it stands and any adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto.

 

(6)     If any question arises whether any building or land falls or does not fall within the scope of sub-section (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), it shall be referred to the Government whose decision shall be final, and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

 

(7)     Any person holding a mortgage or charge on any building referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, for the purpose of Section 42, be a secured creditor and be entitled to priority over any person holding a mortgage or charge subsequently created by the landholder over any part of the estate.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--In Board of Revenue vs. L.N. Sanyasi Raju,[145] held. It is significant to note that only the expression "building" is used is sub-section (1) and not "every building or any portion thereof. As in the case of Rent Control Act, the expression "building" is not defined in this Act. So we will have to appreciate the intention of the Legislature in regard to "buildings" only from the language of section 18 of the Estates Abolition Act. If it wanted to say that portions of buildings also would come within the ambit of sub-section (1) it would have clearly said so. The omission to include portions of buildings is, in our view, very significant in that it shows that the Legislature did not intend to bring portions of buildings within its scope. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature to take over portions of buildings while leaving the rest in the possession and enjoyment of former landholder. Had it been the intention of the Legislature, it would have led to great inconvenience and confusion because a part of the building would be in the possession and control of the Government while the rest would be under the former landholder. In any case, if the Legislature intended to bring portions of buildings also within the ambit of sub-section (1), the Legislature would have clearly said "every building or portion thereof to avoid any confusion.

This understanding of the scope of sub-section (1) and other provisions is strengthened by the provision in sub-section (5) which reads :

"In this section, "Building", includes the site on which it stands and any adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto."

This reinforces the conclusion that section 18 is dealing only with the entirety of a building and not any portions thereof. Further, sub-section (2) throws some light on this question. According to it, every building which belongs to a landholder and the whole or principal part thereof was in the occupation of any religious, educational or charitable institution, shall also vest in the Government. It is significant that in sub-section (2) alone the whole or principal part of a building are referred to and nowhere else. This clearly shows that the Legislature was fully aware of the question whether the whole of a building or a part of a building should be brought within the ambit of section 18 of the Estates Abolition Act. The use of the word part is limited only to subsection (2). It is reasonable to conclude that section 18 as a whole refers only to buildings as a whole.

2.        Delegation of Power :--In P.V.G. Raju vs. State of A.P.,[146] the contention urged before the High Court of A. P., that the rule authorising the Government to delegate the powers to decide the question whether any building or land falls within any of the sub-sections (1) to (5) of the Section 18 of the Madras (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, is unconstitutional in that it is repugnant to section 18 (6) of the Act which requires the government itself to decide this question, held as under :

The answer therefore depends upon whether the function to be performed by the Government in this behalf is a quasi-judicial or an administrative one. Rajagopalan J., in Padian vs. Board of Revenue,[147] expressed the opinion that because section 18 (6) of the Act provides for determination of disputed questions, that determination should be at least quasi-judicial in its scope and that being the real position, it could not be delegated in the absence of an express provision in the statute or at least any provision from which could be gathered the necessary intendment to provide for delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. If what section 18(6) contemplates is a quasi-judicial function, it could not be delegated to any other authority without any express provision in that behalf in the statute or any provision leading to the necessary inference that it provided for delegation.

We feel that the duty to be discharged by the Government is not a quasi-judicial one but merely an administrative one. It must be remembered in this connection that neither section 18 nor any of the rules framed under the Act by the Government envisages any enquiry or notice to the party affected before the Government could determine the question falling within the ambit of any of the sub-sections. It is significant that when a doubt arises in the mind of a subordinate authority as to the nature of the property in question, the matter is referred to the Government. Obviously, a decision has to be taken by the Government on the material placed before it by the referring authority. Hence, the Government does not either issue a notice to the concerned parties before deciding the question or hold an enquiry. Merely because the Tribunal has authority to determine a question affecting the rights of a party, it could not be posited that authority is acting judicially. It is not enough that the Tribunal is called upon to adjudicate upon the rights of parties to invest that function with a judicial or a quasi-judicial character. There must be super-added to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially. As we have already stated, there is nothing either in section 18 or in the rules framed under section 67 to indicate that the Government was to act in a judicial or a quasi-judicial capacity.

In this connection, we may refer to the fact that the Settlement Officer, while acting under section 15, is required by the rules framed by the Government to issue notice to the affected parties, to hear objections and to hold an enquiry before he finally determine the rights of the parties. Similarly, under section 9, rules have been promulgated to guide the concerned officer in determining whether a particular estate is an inam estate or not. Provisions analogous to those bearing on section 15 are made for the purpose of determining the question. We have referred to these rules for the purpose of gathering the indendment of the Legislature with regard to the nature of the power that was confined to the Government. In view of these considerations, we are unable to share the view of the learned Judge in the cited case and we express our respectful dissent from it. It follows that there is nothing unconstitutional in the delegation of the power vested in the Government under section 18 (6) of the Estates Abolition Act and the Board acted validly in this behalf.

Section 19 - Right to ryoti or non-ryoti land sold for non-agricultural purpose before 1st July, 1945

Where any ryoti or non-ryoti land has been sold by any landholder for a non-agricultural purpose before the 1st day of July, 1945, the buyer shall be entitled to keep the land, subject however to the payment by him to the Government of the ryotwari or other assessment or the ground rent which may be imposed upon the land;

Provided that the sale was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time.

Section 20 - Saving of rights of certain lessees and others

(1)     In cases not governed by Sections 18 and 19, where before the notified date, a landholder has created any right in any land (whether by way of lease or otherwise) including rights in any forest, mines or minerals, quarries, fisheries or ferries, the transaction shall be deemed to be valid; and all rights and obligations arising thereunder, on or after the notified date, shall be enforceable by or against the Government.

Provided that the transaction was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time;

Provided further that any such right credited on or after the 1st day of July, 1945 shall not be enforceable against the Government, unless it was created for a period not exceeding one year;

Provided also that where such right was created for a period exceeding one year, unless it relates to the private land of the landholder within the meaning of Section 3, clause (10), of the Estates Land Act, the Government may, if, in their opinion, it is in the public interest to do so, by notice given to the person concerned, terminate the right with effect from such date as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than three months from the date thereof.

(2)     The person whose right has been terminated by the Government under the foregoing proviso, shall be entitled to compensation from the Government which shall be determined by the Board to Revenue in such manner as may be prescribed, having regard to the value of the right and the unexpired portion of the period for which the right was created. The decision of the Board of Revenue shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The provisions of Section 20 of the Abolition Act has been considered and constructed by a Bench of the Madras High Court in A.M.S.S.V.M. and Co., vs. The State of Madras.[148] It was held :

The argument of the petitioners is that the words "such rights" in the third proviso have reference to the rights created after the 1st July, 1945, mentioned in the previous proviso and on that construction, the lease in favour of the petitioners could be terminated only in accordance with that proviso by giving three month's notice. But this is to read the third proviso as a proviso not to the section, but to the second proviso and there is no warrant in law for such a construction. The words "such rights" refer in the second proviso, only to the right dealt with in the body of the section and those words, occurring in the third proviso, should also bear the same interpretation. That the third proviso does not govern the second proviso is also clear if the scope of the two provisos is examined. Under the second proviso, leases for a period exceeding one year and created after 1st July, 1945, are not enforceable against the Government. That is to say, the Government can elect to dis affirm them and they become, on such disaffirmance, void. If the third proviso also applies to such leases, as the petitioners contend, then the lease can be terminated only if the Government is satisfaction that it is in the public interest that it should be terminated and that further, in such cases, the lessee will also be entitled to compensation under section 20 (2). In other words, while under the second proviso the Government can terminate the lease at its option and unconditionally, under proviso (iii) that can be done only if it is in public interest and, in that event, on payment of compensation, and this repugnancy can be avoided only by construing them as referring to different subjects. Then again, there is in proviso (iii) an exception with reference to rights created over private lands; there is nothing corresponding to it in the second proviso and that also shows that the scope of the two provisos is different. The true effect of the section can be stated in three propositions : (i) Rights validly created prior to 1st July, 1945, will be valid; (ii) such rights, however, may be determined under the third proviso if it is in the public interest to do so and in such cases, compensation will be payable under section 20 (2); and (iii) rights created after 1st July, 1945, if they are for a period exceeding one year, are liable to be avoided under the second proviso. In this view, we are of opinion that the notice, dated 13th March, 1951, falls under the second proviso and is valid.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Kumara Rajah of Venkatagiri vs. State of A.P.,[149] held:

It is pointed out that the attention of the Madras High Court was not drawn to the rule framed by the Governor of Madras in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 67 (1) and (2) of the Abolition Act. That rule runs as follows :

Rule

In the case of any right in any land created by a landholder on or after the 1st day of July, 1945, for a period exceeding one year and falling under the second proviso to section 20 (I) of the said Act, the authority to decide whether the right should be terminated or allowed to continue shall be the Board of Revenue. Any order passed by the Board of Revenue under this rule shall be subject to revision by the Government.

We do not think that the rule in any way impairs the correctness of the Madras decision. It will be noticed that rule only indicates the authority who is to decide whether the right falling under the second proviso should be terminated or allowed to continue. It does not purport to lay down the manner in which such termination is to be brought about. In other words, that rule does not, in terms, attract the operation of the third proviso at all. Even if that rule has the effect contended for, it cannot, in our view, change the meaning of section 20 which we gather on a true construction thereof.

2.        Right in a Land :--In Shanta Bai vs. State of Bombay,[150] the right of a person to ultimately cut and take for himself timber trees which were still standing on forest land and which were not yet ripe for cutting and were taking nourishment by way of drawing sap through the soil, was decided to be that of a person having a licence with a right to profit a prendre. That right was referred to in the Judgement of Bose, J., as immovable property.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the right of Profit a prendre amounted to interest in land.

Relying on Shanta Bai's case (1958 SCJ 1078), the High Court of A.P. in Reddi Govinda Reddi vs. State of A.P.,[151] held :

It is significant that, under section 20 (I) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, the words "right in a land" are claimed as including rights in forests, mines, quarries, fisheries, etc., Consequently, the right of a person either under a tree patta or under a permanent lease to the exclusive unsufruct of a tamarind tree standing on a particular land is a right with respect to the land which is in the same category and ejusdem generis with right of fisheries, right in quarries and forests on the land. So, such right in the land comes under section 20 (I) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act. It comes under the saving provision which is contained in section 3 as follows :

"...........save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act."

Therefore, the rights of the plaintiffs under Exhibit A-I as permanent lessees of the tamarind tope are enforceable against the Government under Section 20 (I) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, unaffected by the provisions in sub-sections (b), (c) and (g) of section 3.

3.        Dispossession :--The Government is the proper authority who has got right to exercise the power under section 20 (1) read with its second proviso and consider the question of dispossession.[152]

Section 21 - Survey of estates

(1)     Any estate or part thereof may be surveyed or, if it has been surveyed before the notified date, may be resurveyed, as if it were Government land, in accordance with the provisions for the survey of such land contained in the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923;

Provided that any resurvey made under this sub-section may be limited to what is necessary for the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in the estate or part thereof.

(2)     The cost of the survey or resurvey, except so much thereof as is payable by the ryots or the landholder under the provisions of Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, shall be borne by the Government.

Section 22 - Manner of effecting ryotwari settlement of estate

(1)     The Settlement Officer shall effect a ryotwari settlement of the estate or part thereof, in the accordance with a settlement notification framed and published by the Government for the purpose.

 

(2)     The said notification shall embody the principles adopted in making ryotwari settlements in ryotwari areas, and shall adopt?

 

(a)      the rates of assessment set out in the resettlement notification in force on the date of the passing of this Act, in the district in which the estate is situated; or

 

(b)      if more than one such notification is in force in the district, or if the estate is situated in more than one district, the rates set out in that one of those notifications, which the Government consider to be most appropriate to the case.

 

(3)     All rates of assessment imposed at a ryotwari settlement shall be liable to revision from time to time as laid down in the settlement notification referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2).

 

(4)     Neither the settlement notification nor any order passed in pursuance thereof shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

Section 23 - Determination of land revenue before ryotwari settlement is brought into force

The land revenue payable to the Government with effect on and from the notified date shall, until a ryotwari settlement effected in pursuance of Section 22, has been brought into force in the estate, be calculated as follows:--

(a)      In respect of any land held for the purpose of agriculture, not being private land, the land revenue shall be?

 

(i)       where the rent payable to the landholder immediately before the notified date has been determined under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, the rent so determined; or

 

(ii)      where the rent has not been so determined, the rent which would have been payable to the landholder in respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified; or

 

(iii)     where no rent was payable the rent which would have been payable to the landholder immediately before the notified date, by a ryot holding similar land with similar advantages, in the neighbourhood;

Provided that in cases falling under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) the land revenue in respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified shall be the rent due to the landholder, less any payment made to him before the notified date and authenticated in the prescribed manner;

Provided further that in cases falling under sub-clause (ii), whereafter the rent has been determined under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estate Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, it is found that the land revenue paid exceeds the rent so determined, such excess shall be adjusted towards the land revenue payable in the subsequently fasli year or years.

(b)      In respect of other lands, the land revenue payable shall be calculated at such rate or rates as the Government may, by general or special order, determine.

[153][(c) Notwithstanding anything in clause (a), in the case of wet lands whose irrigation are improved by an irrigation scheme executed by the Government, they may levy additional wet assessment on such lands at such rate as they may, by order, determine having regard to the cost incurred by them and the additional benefit derived by the ryot in respect of such irrigation scheme.]

Determination, Apportionment and Payment of Compensation

Section 24 - Compensation how determined

The compensation payable in respect of an estate shall be determined in accordance with the following provisions.

Section 25 - Compensation to be determined for estate as a whole

The compensation shall be determined for the estate as a whole, and not separately for each of the interests therein :

Section 26 - Basic annual sum

A sum called the basic annual sum shall first be determined in respect of the estate.

Section 27 - Component parts of basic annual sum in zamindari estates

In the case of a zamindari estate, the basic annual sum shall be the aggregate of the sums specified below :--

(i)       one-third of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all lands in the estate (excluding lanka lands) in respect of which any person other than the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, as ascertained under Section 28, less the deductions specified therein;

 

(ii)      one-third of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of?

 

(a)      all lanka lands in the estate in respect of which a person other than landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, and

 

(b)      all lanka lands which in the opinion of the Government are sufficiently permanent (that is to say, similar to the permanent portions of Government lanka lands) to enable the level thereon of ryotwari assessment, as ascertained, under Section 28, in so far as it may be applicable, less the deductions specified therein;

 

(iii)     one-third of the average net annual income derived from all lanka lands in the estate other than those-

 

(a)      in respect of which a ryot or the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, and

 

(b)      which in the opinion of the Government are sufficiently permanent (that is to say, similar to the permanent portions of Government lanka lands) to enable the levy thereon of ryotwari assessment as ascertained under Section 29, less than deduction specified therein;

 

(iv)    one-third of the average net annual miscellaneous revenue derived from all other sources in the estate specified in Section 3, clause (b) [154][including water-cess not consolidated with the assessment under Section 22] but not including lands in respect of which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, as ascertained under Section 30; and

 

(v)      the whole of the jodi, kattubadi or other amount, if any (excluding local ceases and taxes) payable annually to the landholder of the estate immediately before the notified date, by the landholder of every inam village or under-tenure estate including the value, as ascertained in the prescribed manner, of whatever was deliverable in kind annually.

Section 28 - Computation of ryotwari demand and deductions therefrom

(1)     The gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of the lands referred to in Section 27, clauses (i) and (ii), shall be the total of the ryotwari assessments imposed, in pursuance of a settlement effected under Section 22, on the lands occupied by any person other than the landholder on the notified date.

[155][Explanation 1 :--For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression "ryotwari assessment' in respect of any land, classified as dry in the landholders account and irrigated solely or partly from an irrigation work constructed, maintained or controlled by or on behalf of the Government, shall be deemed to be the appropriate dry assessment on the land, together with the net amount, if any, which the landholder is entitled to retain as his share of the charge for water, paid or payable to him by the ryots for the Fasli year 1357.

Explanation II :--In the case of wet lands referred to in Section 23, clause (c), the ryotwari assessment shall be the assessment which would have been imposed on the land, if it had been settled before the execution of the irrigation scheme, and shall not include the additional wet assessment or any part thereof levied thereunder].

[156][(1-A) Explanations I and II to sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th April, 1949].

(2)     The deductions referred to in Section 27, clauses (1) and (ii), shall be ?

 

(a)      five per cent of the gross annual ryotwari demand as computed above in respect of the lands referred to in the said clause (i) or (ii), as the case may be, on account of establishment charges, deficiencies in collection and the like; and

 

(b)      three and one-third per cent of such gross demand on account of the maintenance of [157][irrigation works serving the estate] :

Provided that no deduction shall be made on account of the maintenance of irrigation works, if there is no such work serving the estate or if the landholder is under no legal obligation to maintain any such work serving the estate :

Provided further that where the obligation of the landholder to maintain every one of the irrigation works serving the estate is shared by him either with the Government or with the landholder of some other estate, the percentage of deduction on account of the maintenance of irrigation works shall be reduced by such extent as the Government may deem reasonable.

Synopsis

1.        Amending Act (XX of 1960) whether retrospective :--The Hon'ble High Court of A.P. in Manthena Venkatapathi Raju & Ors., vs. Board of Revenue,[158] dealing with the main question as to whether the Explanations added by the amending Act XX of 1960 to sections 28 (1) and 32 (1) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948, can be held to be retrospective in their effect, held that the Explanations added to Section 32 (1) and 28 of the Act are prospective in their effect.

Section 29 - Computation of income from lanka lands

(1)     (a) The average net annual income from the lanka lands referred to in Section 27, clause (iii), shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the landholder from such lands during a period of twenty complete fasli years immediately preceeding the notified date, or where such lands have been in existence for a shorter period not being less than five complete fasli year immediately preceeding the notified date, during the complete fasli years for which the lands have been in existence :

Provided that where the particulars necessary to compute such average are not available for the full period or where the particulars available appear in material respects to be incorrect, the computation may be made in such manner as may be prescribed.

(b)? ?Where such lands have not been in existence for a period of five complete fasli years as aforesaid, their average net annual income shall be computed in such manner as may be prescribed.

(2)     The deduction referred to in Section 27, clause (iii), shall be such amount as may be prescribed on account of remissions for bad seasons and the like, in the same manner as in the case of Government lanka lands.

Section 30 - Computation of net miscellaneous revenue

The average net annual miscellaneous revenue from the sources referred to in Section 27, clause (iv), shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the Government from such sources during the fasli year commencing on the notified date, if such date was the 1st day of July, or on the first day of July immediately succeeding the notified date, if such date was not the 1st day of July and the next two fasli years.

Section 31 - Component parts of basic annual sum in inam estates

In the case of an inam estate, the basic annual sum shall be the aggregate of the sums specified below, less than deductions specified in Section 35 --

(i)       the whole of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all lands in the estate (excluding lanka lands), in respect of which any person other than the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, as ascertained under Section 32, less than deduction specified therein;

 

(ii)      the whole of the gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of all?

 

(a)      lanka lands in the estate in respect of which a person other than the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, and

 

(b)      all lanka lands which, in the opinion of the Government, are sufficiently permanent (that is to say, similar to the permanent portions of Government lanka lands), to enable the levy thereon of ryotwari assessment, as ascertained under Section 32, in so far as it may be applicable, less than deduction specified therein;

 

(iii)     the whole of the average net annual income derived from all lanka lands in the estate other than those-

 

(a)      in respect of which a ryot or the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, and

 

(b)      which in the opinion of the Government are sufficiently permanent (that is to say, similar to the permanent portions of Government lanka lands), to enable the levy thereon of ryotwari assessment, as ascertained under section 33, less than deduction specified therein;

 

(iv)    the whole of the average net annual miscellaneous revenue derived from all other sources in the estate specified in Section 3, clause (b), [159][including water-cess not consolidated with the assessment under Section 22] but not including lands in respect of which the landholder is entitled to a ryotwari patta, as ascertained under Section 34.

Section 32 - Computation of ryotwari demand and deduction therefrom

(1)     The gross annual ryotwari demand in respect of the lands referred to in Section 31, clauses (i) and (ii), shall be the total of the ryotwari assessments imposed in pursuance of a settlement effected under Section 22 on the lands occupied by any person other than the landholder on the notified date.

[160][Explanation 1 :--For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression "ryotwari assessment" in respect of any land, classified as dry in the landholder's account and irrigated solely or partly from an irrigation work constructed, maintained or controlled by or on behalf of the Government, shall be deemed to be the appropriate dry assessment of the land, together with the net amount, if any, which the landholder is entitled to retain as his share of the charge for water paid or payable to him by the ryots for the Fasli year 1357.

Explanation II :--In the case of wet lands referred to in Section 23, clause (c), the ryotwari assessment shall be the assessment which would have been imposed on the land if it had been settled before the execution of the irrigation scheme, and shall not include the additional wet assessment or any part thereof levied thereunder.]

[161][(1-A) Explanations I and II to sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th April, 1949.]

(2)     From the gross annual ryotwari demand as computed above, there shall be deducted [162]1/3 per cent of such demand on account of the maintenance of 3[irrigation works serving the estate];

Provided that no such deduction shall be made, if there is no irrigation work serving the estate, or if the landholder is under no legal obligation to maintain any such work serving the estate:

Provided further that where the obligation of the landholder to maintain every one of the irrigation works serving the estate is shared by him either with the Government or with the landholder of some other estate, the percentage of such deduction shall be reduced by such extent as the Government may deem reasonable.

Section 33 - Computation of income from lanka lands

(1)     (a) The average net annual income from the lanka lands referred to in Section 31, clause (iii), shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the landholder from such lands during a period of twenty complete fasli years immediately preceeding the notified date, or where such lands have been in existence for a shorter period not being less than five complete fasli years immediately preceeding the notified date, during the complete fasli years for which the lands have been in existence :

Provided that where the particulars necessary to compute such average are not available for the full period, or where the particulars available appear in material respects to be incorrect, the computation may be made in such manner as may be prescribed,

(b)? ?Where such lands have not been in existence for a period of five complete fasli years as aforesaid, their average net annual income shall be computed in such manner as may be prescribed.

(2)     From the average net annual income as computed above, there shall be deducted such amount as may be prescribed on account of remissions for bad seasons and the like, in the same manner as in the case of a Government lanka lands.

Section 34 - Computation of net miscellaneous revenue

The average net annual miscellaneous revenue from the sources referred to in Section 31, clause (iv), shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the Government from such sources during the fasli year commencing on the notified date, if such date was 1st day of July, or on the 1st day of July immediately succeeding the notified date, if such date was not the 1st day of July and the next two fasli years.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Section 34 provides that the average net annual miscellaneous, revenue shall be the average of the net annual income derived by the Government for the succeeding three fasli years.[163]

Section 35 - Jodi, etc., to be deducted

From the aggregate of the sums referred to in Section 31, clauses (i) to (iv), ascertained as aforesaid, there shall be deducted,--

(a)      the whole of the jodi, quit-rent or other amount, if any of a like nature, payable annually by the landholder to the Government; and

 

(b)      the whole of the jodi, kattubadi or other amount, if any (excluding local ceases and texes), payable annually by the landholder immediately before the notified date, to a landholder of some other estate, in including the value, as ascertained in the prescribed manner, of whatever was deliverable in kind annually.

Provided that the amount deducted under clauses (a) and (b) shall in no case exceed one-half of the aggregate of the net amounts computed in accordance with Sections 32 and 33.

Section 36 - Basic annual sum in the case of under-tenure estates

In the case of an under-tenure estate, the basic annual sum shall, where it has been decided under Section 10 that the estate was granted before the date of the permanent or temporary settlement of the principal estate or before the 13th day of July, 1802, as the case may be, be computed, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 31 to 35, both include.

In other cases, the basic annual sum shall be the sum as computed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 27 to 30, both inclusive, less the whole of the jodi, kottubadi or other amount, if any (excluding local cesses and taxes), payable annual by the landholder of the under-tenure estate immediately before the notified date to the landholder of the principal estate, including the value, as ascertained in the prescribed manner, of whatever was deliverable in kind annually :

[164][Provided that the total amount to be deducted as aforesaid shall in no case exceed one half of the aggregate of the net amounts computed in accordance with clauses (i) to (ii) of Section 27 read with Sections 28 and 29].

Section 37 - Scale of compensation except in the case governed by Section 38

The total compensation payable in respect of any estate shall, except in the case governed by Section 38, be determined in accordance with the following scale :--

(i)       Where the basic annual sum does not exceed Rs. 1,000 - 30 times such sum.

 

(ii)      Where the basic annual sum exceeds Rs. 1,000 but does not exceed Rs.3,000-25 times such sum or Rs.30,000 whichever is greater.

 

(iii)     Where the basic annual sum exceeds Rs.3,000 but does not exceed Rs.20,000-20 times such sum or Rs.75,000 whichever is greater.

 

(iv)    Where the basic annual sum exceeds Rs.20,000 but does not exceed Rs.50,000-17 ? times sum or Rs.4,00,000, whichever is greater.

 

(v)      Where the basic annual sum exceeds Rs.50,000 but does not exceed Rs. 1,00,000-15 times such sum or Rs.8,75,000 whichever is greater.

 

(vi)    Where the basic annual sum exceeds Rs. 1,00,000 = 12? times such sum or Rs.15,00,000 whichever is greater.

Section 38 - Payment of tasdik allowance and additional compensation to institutions

[165][(1) In the following cases, namely :--

(a)      Where an inam estate or part thereof was held immediately before the notified date by any religious, educational or charitable institution, and

 

(b)      Where a zamin or under-tenure estate or part thereof was held immediately before the notified date by any such institution, such estate or part having been endowed for its maintenance, the Government shall subject to [166][the provisions of sub-sections, (3-A) and (4-A) pay to the Institution every year as a tasdik allowance :

 

(i)       in the case of an entire estate, the basic annual sum;

 

(ii)      in the case of a part as may, such portion of the basic annual sum as may, on a calculation in the prescribed manner, be ascribed to that part].

 

(2) ??Where the tasdik allowance so payable is less than the difference between :

(a)      the average net annual income derived by the institution from all sources in the estate or part as calculated in the prescribed manner during the five complete fasli years immediately preceeding the notified date or during that portion of those fasli years in which the estate or part was held by the institution, and

 

(b)      the income as calculated in the prescribed manner which the institution may be expected to receive from the lands in respect of which it is entitled to a ryotwari patta, the deficiency shall be made good to the institution by the Government every year.

(3) ??All amounts which accrued due to the institution during the period referred to in sub-section (2), clause (a) shall be taken into account, whether the amounts were actually collected or not :

Provided that the value in money of anything deliverable in kind to the institution at any time during the period aforesaid shall, where any price has been fixed by the Government for the sale of such thing at such time in the area concerned, be calculated at such price.

Provided that the value in money of anything deliverable in kind to the institution at any time during the period aforesaid shall, where any price has been fixed by the Government for the sale of such thing at such time in the area concerned, be calculated at such price.

[167][(3-A) The tasdik allowance payable under sub-section (1) shall not exceed the average net annual income derived by the institution during the five complete Fasli year immediately preceeding the notified date or during that portion of those Fasli years in which the estate or part thereof was held by the institution.]

(4) ??Payment shall be made to the institution under sub-sections (1) and (2), so long as it exists.

[168][(4-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and (2), the aggregate of the amounts payable every year under the said sub-sections to all the institutions referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall not exceed a sum of rupees one lakh and fifty thousand; and if such aggregate exceeds in any year one lakh and fifty thousand rupees, a proportionate reduction shall be made in the amount payable to each such institution so that the aggregate of the amounts payable in respect of all such institutions for that year may be limited to the said sum of rupees one lakh and fifty thousand.]

[169][(5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply where any land (not consisting of an entire village) granted on service tenure to the institution falls under Section 3, clause 16(c) of the Estates Land Act].

Section 38A - Payment of allowance by religious institutions

[170](1) Where an inam estate or part thereof was held immediately before the notified date by an individual on condition of rendering service to a religious institution, the individual shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, be bound to render such service after the notified date, if he is required to do so by a written notice sent to him by the institution within such time as may be specified by the Government in this behalf.

(2)? ?Any such individual who renders the service on being required to do so by the institution as aforesaid shall be entitled to be paid by the institution every year such sum as may be fixed by agreement between the individual and the institution, and if no such agreement can be reached, such sum as may be fixed by the Board constituted under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf.

Provided that if the individual pays to the institution the amount of compensation paid to him under this Act, the institution shall, in lieu of the sum aforesaid, pay to the individual every year a sum equal to the aggregate of the amounts which would be payable by the Government under Section 38, if the inam estate or part thereof was held immediately before the notified date by a religious institution.

Explanation :-For the purposes of this section, "individual" means the person who would have held the inam estate or part thereof, if it had not vested in the Government under this Act].

Section 39 - Determination of basic annual sum and of total compensation

(1)     The Director shall determine in accordance with such of the foregoing provisions as may be applicable to the estate-

 

(a)      the basic annual sum in respect thereof; and

 

(b)      except in the case governed by Section 38, also the total compensation payable in respect of the estate.

 

(2)     Any landholder or other person interested may, within such time as may be prescribed or such further time as the Director may in his discretion allow, apply in writing to the Director for a copy of the data on the basis of which he proposes to determine the basic annual sum.

 

(3)     On the receipt of such application, the Director shall furnish the data aforesaid to the applicant; and he shall also, before passing any under sub-section (1), give the applicant a reasonable opportunity of making his representations in regard thereto, in writing or orally.

 

(4)     A copy of every order passed under sub-section (1) shall be communicated to every landholder concerned, and also to every applicant under sub-section (2).

 

(5)     Any person deeming himself aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (1) may, within three months from the date of the order or such further time as the Board may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Board of Revenue; and the Board shall, after giving the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit.

 

(6)     The Board of Revenue may also in its discretion, at any time, either suo motu or on the application of any person call for and examine the record of any order passed, or proceeding taken, by the Director under this section, for the purpose of satisfying of itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

Provided that the basic annual sum or the total compensation payable in respect of any estate shall not be altered by the Board without giving every landholder concerned and every person who has made an application under sub-section (2), a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(7)     No order passed by the Director under sub-section (1) shall be liable to be cancelled or modified except by the Board of Revenue as aforesaid or to be questioned in any Court of Law; and no order passed by the Board of Revenue under sub-section (5) or (6) shall be liable to be cancelled or modified by the Government or any other authority or to be questioned in any Court of Law;

[171][Provided that where the notification under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of an estate is cancelled under sub-section (5) of that Section and the said estate is re-notified under sub-section (4) of that Section 5 of that section and the said estate is re-notified under sub-section (4) of that section, subsequent to the passing of an order under this section, resulting in--

(i)       the originally notified estate being split up into two more estates;

 

(ii)      some area being added, or excluded from such state; or

 

(iii)     the variation in the tenure of such estate or of any estate estates as so re-notified; it shall be lawful for the Director to determine, in accordance with such of the foregoing provisions as may be applicable to the estate or estates as so re-notified.

 

(a)      the basic annual sum in respect of such estate or estates; and

 

(b)      except in the case governed by Section 38, also the total compensation payable in respect of such estate or estates; and all the provisions of this section shall apply to every such determination made by the Director].

Synopsis

1.        Interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 39 :--In Rajah of Venkatagiri vs. Director of Settlements,[172] it was held that sub-section (3) makes it obligatory for the Director to give the data contemplated by sub-section (2). This mandatory provision must be given effect to by the Director. This Section does not say what the component parts of the basic annual sum should be.

 

2.        Order passed by the Director :--Section 39 of the Act, in particular sub-section (7) thereof categorically lays down that no order passed by the Director under sub-section (1) shall be liable to be cancelled or modified except by the Board of Revenue or to be questioned in any court of law.

A right stands vested by reason of the provisions of the statute. The concept of statutory finality, cannot possibly be whittled down or the court cannot land a deaf ear and a blend eye in regard thereto. Statute has a sanctity of its own, and if an order is said to be final in terms of the provisions of the statute, question of there being any other interpretation as regards its finality, does not and cannot arise.[173]

Section 40 - Compensation, etc., to be paid in prescribed manner

(1)     The compensation payable to any person under this Act and the sums payable to any religious, educational or charitable institution under Section 38, sub-sections (1) and (2), may be paid in such form and manner, and at such time or times, and in one or more instalments, as may be prescribed by rules made by the Government.

 

(2)     Such rules shall be subject to [174][the approval of the State Legislative Assembly].

Section 41 - Compensation to be deposited in office of Tribunal

(1)     The Government shall deposit in the Office of the Tribunal, the compensation in respect of each estate as [175][determined by the Director under Section 39] in such form and manner, and at such time or times and in one or more instalments, as may be prescribed by rules made under Section 40 :

[176][Provided that the Government shall be entitled to deduct from the amount to be deposited--

(a)      the advance compensation referred to in subsection (1) of Section 54-A.

 

(b)      all moneys, if any, still remaining due to them?

 

(i)       in respect of peshkash, jodi, quit-rent or other amounts of like nature, and cesses; and

 

(ii)      in respect of any claim which was secured immediately before the notified date by a mortgage of, or a charge on, the estate or any portion thereof;

 

(c)      the rents, if any, collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of the fasli year in which the Estate is notified and any amount collected by him from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) and outstanding to the credit of the ryots on the first day of that fasli year, which rent or amounts cannot be adjusted by deduction under Section 50; and

 

(d)      all interim payments deposited under sub-section (5) of section 50 in excess of the amounts finally found to be payable under that section, together with interest thereon as provided in sub-section (9) of the same section :

Provided further that where the total amount of the compensation payable in respect of any estate stands altered after the deposit referred to above has already been made, the Government may deposit the difference or withdraw the same from the deposit already made, or otherwise adjust the same in such manner and at such time or times as may be prescribed, and the provisions of Section 42 to 49, and

Sections 51 and 52 shall apply to the amount finally under deposit, and to this extent the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, shall be competent to revise its orders, if any, already passed]:

[177][Provided also that where the notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of an estate is cancelled under sub-section (5) of that section and the said estate is renotified under sub-section (4) of that section, the amount, if any, deposited in respect of such estate prior to its re-notification shall be deemed to be the deposit made under this section, in respect of the estate or each of the estates as so re-notified and it shall be adjusted towards the estate or each of the estates as so re-notified, either wholly or in proportion to their respective basic annual sums, as the case may be, and that all such adjustment shall be deemed to have been made on the dates on which the respective amounts were actually deposited with the Tribunals].

(2)     On the making of such deposit, the Government shall be deemed to have been completely discharged in respect of all claims to, or enforceable against, the compensation aforesaid.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Section 41(1) of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948, itself contemplates the making of rules regarding deposit. This rule is obviously intended to enable prospective claimants to obtain notice of the deposit. But for such notice, it would be extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, for them to make an application under section 42 (1) within the prescribed period of 6 months from the date of deposit.[178]

Section 42 - Claims to be made within six months

(1)     Every person claiming the compensation so deposited or any portion thereof, including the principal or any other landholder, members of his family claiming any portion of such compensation, whether by way of a share or by way of maintenance or otherwise, and creditors, whether their debts are secured or not, shall apply to the Tribunal within six months from the date on which the amount was so deposited or within such further time as the Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow.

 

(2)     Every claim against the compensation which is not made to the tribunal within the time aforesaid, shall cease to be enforceable.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Person entitled to collect rent under a permanent lease is a landholder within the meaning of the definition under section 2 (8) of the Act and is therefore, one of the persons who can apply for payment of compensation under section 42 of the Act.[179] Petition under section 42 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948 by the receiver appointed for the estate of a person claiming a certain amount with subsequent interest deposited or to be deposited on the original amount from out of the compensation amount deposited or to be deposited by the Government with the Tribunal in respect of the Estate and representing the compensation payable for a village within the estate, held that the application petitioner (appellant) in the lower court was not maintainable.[180]

 

2.        Remuneration of a Receiver :--The remuneration of a Receiver appointed by the court for the partition of estate notified by the Government under the Estate Abolition Act, cannot be on a higher footing than salvage charges and also the wages of workmen.[181]

 

3.        Creditor of a maintenance-holder :--In Sri Narasimhasur Sri Chandana Deo vs. Yerukolu alias Penta Subadramma,[182] an application was made under section 42 of the Act by a creditor of a person having a maintenance claim against the estate for which compensation money was deposited. It was held that the Act did not enable such a claim to be advanced. It was further that a creditor of a maintenance-holder is not one of the creditors mentioned in section 42 who could apply to the Tribunal for an apportionment to him of the amount of compensation in deposit. In Lakshminarayana vs. Lakshmi Venkayamma,[183] it was pointed out that except for persons mentioned in Section 42 (1) any other person can recover the amount due to him from any land-holder or a shearer by processes available to him under the Civil Procedure Code.

 

4.        Jurisdiction of Tribunal :--Exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal to determine the persons who are entitled to the compensation deposited before it and the amount to which each of them are entitled. It is not open to the tribunal to shrink that responsibility by directing the parties to seek an adjudication in a civil court on the ground that difficult questions have been raised before it. When a Tribunal is invested with jurisdiction for a special purpose it is not competent for it to refuse to exercise it merely because the controversies centering round the claims of the parties present certain difficulties.[184]

 

5.        Period of Limitation :--The Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, (XXVI of 1948) is a special enactment and the disputes thereunder are adjudicated by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal which are not courts. Article 182 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) will not therefore apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal, as that provision relates to execution of a decree or order of any civil court.[185]

Section 43 - Duty of Tribunal

The Tribunal shall, after giving notice to all persons who have applied under Section 42 and to any others whom it considers to be interested, make inquiry into the validity of the claims received by it, and determine the persons who, in its opinion, are entitled to the compensation deposited and the amount to which each of them is entitled.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--A Division Bench of the A.P. High Court in Munuswamy Pillai vs. Lakshmamma Garu,[186] held that Sections 42 and 43 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act only provide for the machinery for the realisation of valid and subsisting claims and a claim, which is time-barred, under the provisions of Limitation Act cannot be a legally subsisting claim. See also.[187]

Section 44 - Compensation to be apportioned by Tribunal

(1)     As a preliminary to such determination, the Tribunal shall apportion the compensation among the principal landholder and any other persons whose rights or interests in the estate and stand transferred to the Government under Section 3, clause (b), or cease and determine under Section 3, clause (c), including persons who are entitled to be maintained from the estate and its income, as far as possible in accordance with the value of their respective interests in the estate :

[188][Provided that where the notification issued under sub-section (4) of section 1 in respect of an estate is cancelled under sub-section (5) of that section and the said estate is re-notified under sub-section (4) of that section, it shall be competent for the Tribunal to revise the apportionment of the compensation already made under this sub-section, so as to be in conformity with the revised compensation payable under this Act in respect of the estate or estates as so renotified, and

(i)       if an additional amount becomes due to any person owing to such revised apportionment, it shall be paid to him in accordance with the provisions of this Act; or

 

(ii)      if any payment made to any person is found to be not due to him or to be in excess of the amount due to him, such payment or excess payment, as the case may be, shall be recoverable under Section 54-D],

 

(a)      in the case of the impartible estates referred to in Section 45, in accordance with the provisions contained in that section and in such rules, not inconsistent with that section, as may be made by the Government in this behalf; and

 

(b)      in the case of other estates, in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf.

 

(2)     A copy of every rule made under sub-section (2) shall, as soon as may be after it has been made, be laid on the table of the State Legislative Assembly.

Section 45 - Apportionment in the case of certain impartible estates

(1)     In the case of an impartible estate which had to be regarded as the property of a joint Hindu family for the purpose of ascertaining the succession thereto immediately before the notified date, the following provisions shall apply.

 

(2)     The Tribunal shall determine the aggregate compensation payable to all the following persons, considered as a single group :

 

(a)      the principal landholder and his legitimate sons, grandsons and great-grandsons in the male line living or in the womb on the notified date, including sons, grandson and great-grandsons adopted before such date (who are herein after called "shares"); and

 

(b)      other persons who immediately before the notified date, were entitled to maintenance out of the estate and its income either under Section 9 or 12 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Impartible Estates Act, 1904, or under any decree or order of a Court, award, or other instrument in writing or contract or family arrangement which is binding on the principal landholder (who are hereinafter called "maintainance-holders") :

Provided that no such maintenance-holder shall be entitled to any portion of the aggregate compensation aforesaid, if, before the notified date his claim for maintenance, or the claim of his branch of the family for maintenance, has been settled or discharged in full.

(3)     The Tribunal shall next determine which creditors, if any, are lawfully entitled to have their debts paid from and out of the assets of the impartible estate and the amount to which each of them is so entitled; and only the remainder of the aggregate compensation shall be divisible among the sharers and maintenance-holders as hereinafter provided.

 

(4)     The portion of the aggregate compensation aforesaid payable to the maintenance-holders shall be determined by the Tribunal and notwithstanding any arrangement already made in respect of maintenance whether by a decree or order of a Court, award or other instrument in writing or contract or family arrangement, such portion shall not exceed one-fifth of the remainder referred to in sub-section (3), except in the case referred to in the second proviso to Section 47, sub-section (2).

 

(5)     (a) The Tribunal shall, in determining the amount of the compensation payable to the maintenance-holders and apportioning the same among them, have regard, as far as possible, to the following considerations, namely :--

 

(i)       the compensation payable in respect of the estate;

 

(ii)      the number of persons to be maintained out of the estate;

 

(iii)     the nearness of relationship of the person claiming to be maintained;

 

(iv)    the other sources of income of the claimant; and

 

(v)      the circumstances of the family of the claimant;

(b)? ?For the purpose of securing (i) that the amount of compensation payable to the maintenance-holders does not exceed the limit specified in sub-section (4) and (ii) that the same is apportioned among them on an equitable basis, the Tribunal shall have power, wherever necessary, to re-open any arrangement already made in respect of maintenance, whether by a decree or order of a Court, award, or other instrument in writing, or contract or family arrangement.

(6)     The balance of the aggregate compensation shall be divided among the sharers, as if they owned such balance as a joint Hindu family and a partition thereof had been effected among them on the notified date.

Synopsis

1.        Appointment of Receiver :--Under Order 40, Rule 1 (a) of Civil Procedure Code the court is empowered to appoint a Receiver when pending adjudication of a litigation to receive and preserve the property and the object and purport of that provision is to maintain the position of the property as it is where it is and to see during the pendency of that suit property is not subjected to waste and destruction and to lease out the lands and collect the proceeds and ultimately hand over possession of the property to the successful party.[189]

 

2.        Suit against Receiver :-In Everest Coal Company Pvt. Ltd., vs. State of Bihar and Ors.,[190] the issue that came up for consideration was whether a third party can file a suit against an Receiver appointed by the Court under Order 40 (1) CPC without the leave of the court. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed.

"That when a court puts a receiver in possession of property, the property comes under court custody, the receiver being merely an officer or agent of the court. Any obstruction or interference with the courts possession sounds in contempt of that court. Any legal action in respect of that property is in a sense such an interference and invites the contempt penalty."

Section 46 - Claims of creditors

After the compensation has been apportioned among the persons referred to in Section 44, subsection (1), or where it is more convenient, so to do pending such apportionment, the Tribunal shall take into consideration the applications of the creditors other than those dealt with in Section 45, sub-section (3), and decide the amount to which each such creditor is entitled and the person or persons out of whose share or shares of the compensation such amount should be paid.

Section 47 - Grant of ryotwari patta to maintenance-holders in certain impartible estates

(1)     Every maintenance-holder entitled to a portion of the compensation under Section 45 shall also be entitled to the grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of a portion of the lands referred to in Section 12 or 14, as the case may be.

 

(2)     The Tribunal shall determine the total extent of the lands in respect of which ryotwari pastas may be granted to the maintenance-holders and divide the same among them, and in doing so, the Tribunal shall, unless for reasons recorded in writing it considers that it is inappropriate to do so, have regard to the considerations set forth in Section 45, sub-section (5) and the manner in which the compensation payable to the maintenance holders has been or may be apportioned among them under that sub-section.

Provided that the total extent of the lands granted to all such maintenance-holders shall not exceed one-fifth of the extent of the lands in respect of which a ryotwari patta may be granted under Section 12 or 14 :

Provided further that where it is found to be inconvenient or impracticable to grant any such lands, or to grant any such lands to the full extent to which the maintenance-holder may be regarded as entitled, whether on the ground that such a grant will result in the creation of an uneconomic holding or for any other reason, the share of the compensation awarded to the maintenance-holder may be increased by such amount as the Tribunal may consider reasonable.

(3)     The lands in respect of which a ryotwari patta may be granted under Section 12 or 14, after excluding any lands which may be granted to maintenance-holders under sub-section (2), shall be divided among the sharers, as if they owned such lands as a Joint Hindu family and a partition thereof had been effected among them on the notified date.

Section 48 - Certain estates to be treated as impartible estates for purposes of compensation

Where the power of the landholder to alienate any property in an estate is restricted, whether by the terms of the grant or otherwise, the provisions of this Act relating to the payment and apportionment of compensation in respect of impartible estates shall, so far as may be and subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, apply to the payment and apportionment of the compensation in respect of impartible estates shall, so far as may be and subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, apply to the payment and apportionment of the compensation payable in respect of the estate.

Section 49 - Devolution of interest in compensation

Where it is alleged that the interest of any person entitled to receive payment of any portion of the compensation has devolved on any other person or persons, whether by act of parties or by operation of law, the Tribunal shall determine whether there has been any devolution of the interest, and if so, on whom it has devolved.

Section 50 - Interim payments to principal landholder and others

(1)     The provisions of this section shall apply in every case not governed by Section 38.

 

(2)     After the notified date and before the compensation has been [191][determined by the Director under Section 39 and deposited under Section 4] interim payments shall be made by the Government every fasli year, to the principal landholder and to the other persons referred to in Section 44, sub-section (1), as follows :

[192][(3) In respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, they shall together be entitled to such amount as the Government may, on a rough calculation, determine to be the basic annual sum referred to in Section 26, if the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A has not been already made, and to an amount equal to one-half of the basic annual sum as to so calculated, if the deposit aforesaid has been already made :

Provided that, in either case, the Government shall be entitled to deduct-

(i)       the rents if any, collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of the fasli year aforesaid and any amount collected by him from the ryots in excess of the rents determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) and outstanding to the credit of the ryots on the first day of that fasli year; and

 

(ii)      the peshkash, jodi, quit-rent or other amounts of like nature and cesses due to the Government from the landholder :

Provided further that such deduction were not already made in pursuance of Section 54-A or Section 55.

Explanation :--Any amount collected by the Government on behalf of the landholders as rent from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), and paid to the landholder shall, for the purpose of this sub-section, be deemed to be an amount collected by the landholder].

(4) ??In respect of each subsequent fasli year, they shall together be entitled to the amount estimated under sub-section (3) to be the [193][one half of the basic annual sum], unless data for the better calculation thereof have since become available, in which case the amount to be paid shall be revised by the Government with reference to such data [194][and the excess or deficiency in respect of the amounts already deposited for the previous fasli or faslis shall either be adjusted towards the interim payments due for that fasli or subsequent faslis, or deposited in addition, as the case may be :

Provided that in cases where the compensation as [195][determined by the Director under Section 39] for the estate is not paid in one lumpsum, but in instalments, the amount payable, under this sub-section every year after the first instalment of compensation has been paid, shall be reduced in proportion to the compensation amount outstanding in that year:

Provided further, that if for any reason the whole or any portion of the rents, the excess collections and the cesses and other amounts referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) was not deducted in pursuance of that proviso, the amount remaining undeducted shall be deducted from the amount payable under this sub-section].

[196][(4-A) If the amount deposited under Section 54-A is, on subsequent calculation either because data for better calculation have since become available or because of mistake in the method of calculation adopted before the deposit was made under that section, found to be in excess of the amount that should properly have been deposited, such excess shall also be deducted out of the amounts to be deposited under sub-section (3) or sub-section (3)].

(5) ??The Government shall deposit all such amounts in the office of the Tribunal and the Tribunal shall, after such inquiry, if any, as it thinks fit, apportion the amounts among the principal landholder and the other persons referred to in sub-section (2), as far as possible in accordance with the value of their respective interests.

(6) ??On the making of such a deposit, the Government shall be deemed to have been completely discharged in respect of all claims to, or enforceable against the amount so deposited.

[197][(7) After the compensation has been finally determined, the Government shall ascertain, in the manner specified below, the aggregate interim payment due in respect of the estate as follows :--

(a)      In respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, the basic annual sum as finally determined under Section 39 after deducting therefrom an amount bearing to the basic annual sum the same proportion as the amount of the advance compensation referred to in Section 54-A bears to the compensation as finally determined under Section 39, in case the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made in the fasli year in which the estate is notified.

 

(b)      In respect of each of the subsequent fasli year, the basic annual sum as finally determined under Section 39, after deducting therefrom an amount bearing to the basic annual sum the same proportion as the amount of the advance compensation referred to in Section 54-A together with any further instalment or instalments of compensation deposited up to end of the fasli year concerned bears to the compensation as finally determined under Section 39.

If the aggregate interim payment thus determined less than deductions already made under sub-sections (3) and (4) exceeds, or is less than, aggregate of the amounts already deposited under sub-section (5), the balance with interest thereon at three per cent per annum shall be deposited by the Government with the Tribunal after deducting the amounts of the nature specified in the proviso to sub-section (3) and still, due to the Government, or, as the case may be, the amount of deficiency shall be intimated by the Government to the Tribunal.

Explanation :--Any amount collected by the Government on behalf of the landholders as rent from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), and paid to the landholder shall, for the purpose of this sub-section, be deemed to be an amount collected by the landholder].

(8)? ?No interim payment made under this section shall be deemed to constitute any part of the compensation which the Government are liable to deposit under Section 41, sub-section (1), or to any extent to be in lieu of such compensation.

[198][(9) The Tribunal shall revise the apportionment of the interim payments with reference to the aggregate interim payments as finally determined by the Government under subsection (7) on the basis that each of the persons entitled to receive any portion of the interim payments shall be entitled separately to the same share of the said aggregate interim payments as the share of the compensation to which he is finally held to be entitled under Section 44. Any excess payment disclosed by such revision which has not already been deducted [199][under the first proviso] to sub-section (1) of Section 41 shall be deducted by the Tribunal, with interest thereon at three per cent per annum, from the compensation payable to the person concerned].

[200][(10) Where the notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of an estate is cancelled under sub-section (5) of that section and the said estate is re-notified under subsection (4) of that section, the amount of interim payments for the estate or each of the estates as re-notified shall be calculated afresh and the amount, if any, deposited in respect of the estate as originally notified prior to its re-notification shall be adjusted towards the estate or each of the estates as so re-notified, either wholly or in proportion to their respective basic annual sums, as the case may be, and all such adjustments shall be deemed to have been made on the dates on which the respective amounts were actually deposited with the Tribunal and the additional amount, if any, that becomes payable to any person towards interim payments owing to such fresh calculation shall be paid to him in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(11) Notwithstanding the fact that subsequent to the determination of the compensation by the Director under Section 39 or the expiry of the period, in which the compensation is payable in instalments, the basic annual sum or the total compensation or both, have been altered owning to re-calculation thereof in pursuance of an order, decree or judgment of any authority or Court or owing to re-determination thereof as a consequence of the re-notification of the estate under sub-section (4) of section 1, after the original notification issued in respect thereof under that sub-section has been cancelled under sub-section (5) of section 1, and notwithstanding anything in this section, it shall not be necessary to make interim payments under this section--

(i)       in the case of an estate where compensation is payable in one lumpsum from the fasli year in which the Director would have determined the compensation under Section 39 but for the re-calculation or re-determination as aforesaid; and

 

(ii)      in any other case, from the fasli year in which the last instalment of the compensation would have been due but for the re-calculation or re-determination as aforesaid].

[201][(12) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) to (11), where, after the Government have deposited the compensation, as originally determined by the Director under Section 39, the basic, annual sum, or the total compensation, or both, have been altered owing to determination thereof by the Director in pursuance of--

(a)      an order or decision passed or given by the Board in appeal or in revision, or

 

(b)      an order passed by a court in any proceedings, after setting aside or modifying the order of determination passed under Section 39 and remanding the case to him with a direction to determine afresh the basic annual sum or compensation, it shall not be necessary to make interim payments under this section,--

 

(i)       in the case of an estate where compensation is payable in one lumpsum, from the fasli year in which the Director had originally determined the compensation under Section 39; and

 

(ii)      in any other case, from the fasli year to which the last instalment of the compensation would have fallen due but for the determination afresh.

(13) ?The provisions of this section shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other authority].

Synopsis

1.        Scope :-- Section 50(3) provides that the interim payment for the fasli year in which the estate is notified may be determined by the Government on a rough calculation, but in respect of the subsequent fasli years, the provision has been made in Section 50 itself that the Government have a duty to revise the amount of interim payment if better data for the calculation thereof is available.[202]

Section 50A - Cessation of interim Payments in cases falling under Section 54-AA

[203]In case the principal landholder or any other person referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 44 has received in the form of bonds deposited by the Government in the office of the tribunal under Section 54-AA, his share in the remaining half of the amount of compensation estimated under sub-section (1) of Section 54, no interim payment under Section 50 shall be payable to such principal landholder or any other person from the Fasli year in which the bonds are deposited by the Government in the office of the Tribunal.

Provided that if the amount deposited in bonds in pursuance of sub-section (1) of Section 54-AA falls short of the remaining half of the amount of compensation estimated under sub-section (1) of Section 54-A, an interim payment equal to a sum which bears the same proportion to the basic annual sum as the amount still remaining unpaid out of the total compensation estimated under Section 54-A bears to such total estimated compensation, shall be payable from the Fasli year aforesaid].

Section 51 - Appeals

(1)     Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Tribunal under Sections 43 to 50, may, within three months, from the date of such decision or such further time as Judge of the High Court nominated for the purpose by the Chief Justice may in his discretion allow, appeal to a Special Tribunal consisting of two judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in that behalf.

 

(2)     Where the members of the Special Tribunal are agreed in their opinion, their decision shall be final. Where the members are divided in their opinion, the case with their opinions thereon shall be laid before another Judge of the High Court nominated for the purpose by the Chief Justice and such Judge shall hear the case as a persona designata and his decision shall be final.

1.        Meaning of the word Decision :--The word "decision" must necessarily connote the order or decree and not the judgment or the reasons for the decisions.[204]

Section 52 - Restrictions on jurisdiction of Tribunal and Special Tribunal

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Special Tribunal shall be limited--

(a)      to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons referred to in Section 42, and the apportionment of the interim payments among the persons referred to in Section 50; and

 

(b)      in cases falling under Section 47, to the division of the lands in respect of which a ryotwari patta may be granted under Section 12 or 14, and neither the Tribunal nor the Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to go into the question of the correctness of the determination, or the adequate of the compensation.

Section 53 - Disbursement of Compensation

All payments made out of the compensation deposited in the office of the Tribunal under Section 41, shall be made by it in accordance with its orders and decisions, subject to the modifications, if any, made on appeal under Section 51.

Section 54 - Interim payment to institutions

(1)     In cases governed by Section 38, after the notified date and before the sums payable to the religious, educational or charitable institutions concerned under sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section have been finally determined, the Government shall pay to the institution--

[205][(a) in respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, such sums as they may, on a rough calculation, determine to be payable to the institution under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 38.

Provided that the rents, if any, collected before the notified date by the institution from the ryots in respect of the fasli year aforesaid and any amount collected by it from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Regulation of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), and outstanding to the credit of the ryots on the first day of the fasli year, shall be deducted].

(b) ???in respect of each subsequent fasli year, the sums determined under clause (a), unless data for the better calculation thereof have since become available, in which case the sums to be paid shall be revised by the Government with reference to such date.

[206][Provided that if, for any reason, the whole or any portion of the rents and excess collections, referred to in the proviso to clause (a) was not deducted in pursuance of that proviso, the amount remaining undeducted shall be deducted from the amount payable under this clause].

(2)     After the sums payable to the institution under Section 38, sub-sections (1) and (2), have been finally determined, all interim payments made to the institution under sub-section (1) of this section [207][together with such rents, if any, collected by it before the notified date and any amount collected by it from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), and outstanding to the credit of the ryots on the first day of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, shall be adjusted towards the sums so determined;] and any deficiency shall be made good to the institution by the Government and any excess shall be deducted from the sums payable to it by the Government in any subsequent fasli year or years.

[208][(3) If any interim payments under Section 50 or any advance compensation under Section 54-A has been paid to any institution before the commencement of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act, 1958, the amount so paid shall be recovered by adjustment from the amounts payable to the institution under sub-section (1) of this section or under Section 38 or both, in such proportion or instalments as the Government may deem fit.

Explanation :--For the purpose of this section, any amount collected by the Government on behalf of the institution as rent from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) and paid to the institution shall be deemed to be an amount collected by the institution].

Synopsis

1.        Payment of Maintenance :--Section 54 (2) of the Madras Estate Abolition Act provides for ascertainment of the amount of maintenance payable to persons who, before the notified date, were entitled to maintenance out of the estate its income either under section 9 or section 12 of the Madras Impartible Estates Act (1904) or under any contract or family arrangement.[209]

Section 54A - Advance payment of compensation and its apportionment, etc.

[210](1) In the case of every estate of not governed by Section 38, the Government shall estimate roughly the amount of the compensation payable in respect of the estate, and deposit one half of that amount within six months from the notified date in the office of the Tribunal, as advance payment on account of compensation :

Provided that in the case of an estate notified before the commencement of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1950, the deposit may be postponed to a date which is not later than the 30th day of June, 1950.

[211][Provided further that where the notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 in respect of an estate is cancelled under sub-section (5) of that section and the said estate is re-notified under sub-section (4) of that section, the amount of compensation for the estate or each of the estates as renotified shall be estimated afresh and the amount, if any, already deposited in respect of the estate as originally notified prior to its re-notification, shall be adjusted towards the estate or each of the estates as so re-notified, either wholly or in proportion to their respective basic annual sums, as the case may be, and all such adjustments, shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the respective amounts were actually deposited with the Tribunal and the additional amount, if any, that becomes payable to any person owing to such fresh estimation shall be paid to him in accordance with provisions of this Act.]

(2) ??From the amount to be deposited under sub-section (1) the Government shall be entitled to deduct--

(a)      one-half of all moneys referred to in the first proviso to Section 41 (1); and

 

(b)      one-half of the basic annual sum referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 50, if the deposit in pursuance of this section is made in the fasli year in which the estate is notified but after the interim payment in respect of that fasli year has been deposited under Section 50.

(3) ??On the making of a deposit in pursuance of this Section, the Government shall be deemed to have been completely discharged in respect of all claims to, or enforce against, the amount deposited.

(4) ??The Tribunal shall, after such inquiry, if any, as it thinks fit, apportion the amount deposited in pursuance of this section among the principal landholder and the other persons referred to in Section 42, as far as possible in accordance with the value of their respective interests; and the provisions of Sections 42 to 46 (both inclusive) 48, 49, 51, 52 and 53 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the amount so deposited.

[212][(5)  (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) to (4), if data for the better calculation of the amount payable as advance compensation become available, the amount to be paid may be recalculated by the Government with reference to such data.

(b) ??Where any amount of advance compensation deposited in respect of any estate under this section exceeds or is less than the amount as recalculated in accordance with clause (a), such amount available with the Tribunal may be withdrawn by the Government, and in the case of a deficiency the Government may deposit with the Tribunal such amount as may be necessary to make up the deficiency.]

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The advance amount of compensation to be deposited under section 54-A is one-half of the amount arrived at on a rough estimate of the amount of compensation payable in respect of the estate.[213]

Section 54AA - Provisional payment of final compensation and its apportionment

[214](1) Where the advance payment on account of the compensation referred to in Section 54-A, has been deposited in the office of the tribunal in respect of any zamindari or under tenure estate referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 54-B, but the amount of compensation payable for such estate is not finally determined under Section 39, the principal landholder or any other person referred to in subsection (1) of Section 44 may make an application to the Tribunal in writing agreeing to receive immediate his share of the remaining half of the amount of compensation estimated under sub-section (1) of Section 54-A and undertaking not to receive, or to receive, a proportionate amount of the annual interim payment under Section 50. On receipt of such application, the Government may deposit, in the office of the Tribunal bonds issued by them equal in value of to the said share as determined by the Tribunal under sub-section (5) as a payment towards his share of the final compensation payable for such estate under this Act. Every application under this section shall be made within three months from the commencement of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1960.

(2) ?The bonds referred to in sub-section (1) shall be issued in multiples of Rs. 100, and the balance, if any, less than Rs. 100 shall be adjusted when the compensation in respect of the estate is finally determined under Section 39. The bonds shall be negotiable and shall carry interest at the rate of three percent per annum and be redeemable over a period of ten years. Ten per cent of the value of each bond shall be redeemed each year.

(3) ?The aggregate of the amounts payable in bonds to all the persons referred to sub-section (1) shall not exceed a sum of rupees one crore and if such aggregate exceeds rupees one crore, a proportionate reduction shall be made in the amount payable to each person so that the aggregate of the amounts payable in respect of all such persons may be limited to the said sum of rupees one crore.

(4) ?On the making of a deposit in bonds in pursuance of this section, the Government shall be deemed to have been completely discharged in respect of all claims to, or enforceable against, the amounts deposited.

(5) ?On receipt of an application, the Tribunal shall after such inquiry as it thinks fit, determine the share of the principal landholder or the other person referred to in Section 42, so far as may be, in accordance with the value of his interest in the final compensation payable, for the estate under the Act and the provisions of Sections 42 to 46 (both inclusive) 48, 49, 51 and 52 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the determination of such share.

Explanation :--For the purpose of determination of such share, an amount equal to the amount of advance compensation specified under sub-section (1) of Section 54-A less the amount referred to in clauses (b) and (c) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 41, and any other sum remaining lawfully due to the Government, shall be deemed to have been deposited under sub-section (1) of Section 41.

(6) ?Where any payment made to any person in bonds under this section exceeds or is less than what he is finally entitled to after the final compensation is determined under this Act, the excess shall be recovered from the person concerned as an arrear of land revenue, or the deficiency shall be made good by deposit of the sum required by the Government in the office of the Tribunal after deducting therefrom any sum remaining lawfully due to the Government.

(7) ?Nothing contained in this section shall affect the right of the landholder to additional compensation under Section 54-B].

Section 54B - Additional compensation and its apportionment

(1)     As soon as may be after [215][the final determination of the amounts of compensation payable under section 39 in respect of?

 

(a)      all the zamindari estates, and

 

(b)      all the under-tenure estates in respect of which there is no decision under Section 10 either of the Settlement Officer or of the Tribunal on appeal from the Settlement Officer, that they were estates created before the dates of the permanent or temporary settlement of the principal estates concerned or before the 13th day of July, 1802, as the case may be] if it is found that the aggregate of such amounts falls short of twelve and a half crores of rupees, the Government shall be under an obligation to distribute among the 1[zamindari estates and under tenure estates aforesaid] an amount equal to that by which the aggregate so falls short, the sum payable in respect of each such estate being in proportion to the amount of compensation as finally determined in respect thereof under Section 39.

 

(2)     The sum payable under sub-section (1) in respect of each such estate shall be deposited by the Government in the officer of the Tribunal, and on the making of such deposit the Government shall be deemed to have been completely discharged in respect of all claims to, or enforceable against, the sum deposited.

 

(3)     The Tribunal shall, after such inquiry, if any, as it thinks fit, apportion the sum deposited under sub-section (2) in respect of any estate among the principal landholder and the other persons referred to in Sections 42, as far as possible, in accordance with the value of their respective interests; and the provisions of Section 42 to 46 (both] inclusive), 48, 49, 51, 52 and 53 shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the sum so deposited] :

[216][Provided that no creditor shall be entitled to apply for the payment of any portion of the sum deposited as aforesaid in respect of which portion his claim has been satisfied on the date of such application.

Section 54C - Amounts which may be deducted under Section 41 recoverable as arrear of Land Revenue

[217] Any sum representing the whole or any portion of the rents and excess collections referred to in clause (c) of the first proviso to subsection (1) of Section 41, which cannot be adjusted by deduction under the said clause, shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

Section 54D - Wrong and excess payments to be recoverable as arrear of land revenue

Where any payment made to any person is subsequently found to be not due to him or to be in excess of the amounts due to him, the amount which is found to be not due or which is in excess, as the case may be, with interest thereon at three percent per annum, or any portion thereof which cannot be otherwise adjusted by deduction from any amounts due to such person, shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

Synopsis

1.        Object :--Before Section 54-D of the Act was brought in by Amending Act XXIV of 1954, Rule 2 of Rules (Promulgated in G.O.No.1633, Revenue on 18th July 1956 under Section 67 of the Act) recites that when "wrong payments" are "detected" for the recovery of such amounts the recovery proceeding is to be transferred to the civil court for "restitution". This Rule was interpreted in the decision, The Chairman Abolition Tribunal (Referring Officer) (1955 ALT 92) to hold the "Tribunal can pass the order of restitution". The Act however was amended to incorporate Section 54-D to State such amounts to be recovered as arrears of land revenue.[218]

Section 54E - Recovery of amount paid on cancellation of notification issued under Section 1(4)

If any amount has been paid to any person under this Act in pursuance of a notification issued under sub-section (4) of Section 1 and if such notification is subsequently quashed by order of Court or cancelled by the Government, the amount so paid, with interest thereon at three per cent per annum, shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.]

Section 55 - Collection of arrears of rent which accrued before the notified date

(1)     After the notified date, the land-holder shall not be entitled to collect any rent which accrued due to him from any ryot before, and is outstanding on, that date; but the manager appointed under Section 6 shall be entitled to collect all such rent and any interest payable thereon together with any costs which may have been decreed, as if they were arrears of land revenue; [219][and there shall be paid to the landholder all amounts so collected, after deducting?

 

(a)      ten per cent of thereof on account of collection charges;

 

(b)      the arrears of peshkash, quit-rent, jodi or other amount, if any, of a like nature, the from the landholder to the Government; and

 

(c)      the rent, if any, collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified under this Act and any amount collected by the landholder from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947), and outstanding to the credit of the ryots on the first day of the fasli year.]

Provided that any such rent, which accrued due in respect of the fasli year 1936 and earlier faslis, shall be reduced on the basis that the landholder is entitled in respect of each of those faslis, only to the rent as determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 :

Provided further that where the ryot-

(a)      has paid before the notified date or pays within two years of that date; or

 

(b)      where the rate or rent for the land has not been fixed under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, before the notified date, pays within two years of the date on which such rates of rent are fixed under that Act, the rent due for the fasli years 1356 and 1357 and any interest payable thereon together with any costs which may have been decreed, then, all arrears of rent due from such ryot in respect of all prior fasli years, including interest and costs, if any, shall be deemed to have been completely discharged.

[220][Explanation :--Any amount collected by the Government on behalf of the landholder as rent from the ryots in excess of the rent determined under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX of 1947) and paid to the landholder shall, for the purpose of this sub-section, be deemed to be an amount collected by the landholder].

[221][Provided also that in the case of an area which became an estate by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, or the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1956, where the ryot,-

(a)      where the rate of rent for the land has been fixed by the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, has paid before the notified date, or pays within two years of that date or within two years from the date of the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1965, whichever is later, or

 

(b)      where the rate of rent for the land has not been fixed under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, before the notified date, pays within two years of the date on which such rate of rent is fixed under that Act or within two years from the date of the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1965, whichever is later, the rent due for the two fasli years immediately preceeding the fasli year in which the estate is notified and any interest payable thereon together with any costs which may have been decreed, then, all arrears of rent due from such ryot in respect of all fasli years preceeding the said two fasli years, including interest and costs, if any, due on such arrears shall be deemed to have been completely discharged; but nothing in this proviso shall apply to arrears which become estates by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1956 and the ryots in respect of which, had already availed themselves of the benefit of the discharge under sub-section (5) of Section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947].

 

(2)     All amounts which the manager is entitled to collect under sub-section (1) shall be a first charge upon the land in respect of which such amounts are payable.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--In State of A.P. vs. Annabattula Rama Rao,[222] it was held:

It is clear that there is no provision that the rights of the zamindar in regard to arrears either of rent or of any other kind of dues are vested in the Government. The Act does not say anywhere that the zamindar loses the right to any amounts due and outstanding, on account of these charges, on the date of the notification. Of course, after the date of the notification, he cannot collect any rent; nor can he collect any of these charges. But his right to collect arrears actually accrued is not interferred with by any provision in the Act except by section 55 (I); and section 55(I), as already notified, is limited to the right to collect arrears of "rent". The word "rent" used in this section must be understood in the sense in which it is defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, because section 2 (I) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act says that

"all expression defined in the Estates Land Act shall have the same respective meanings as in that Act with the modifications, if any, made by this Act."

unless of course there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. The very fact that section 55 (1) expressly provides for the collection of the arrears of rent due before and outstanding on the date of the notification necessarily implies that the legislature did not intend to confer on the Government the right to collect any other kind of arrears. If that position is right, then by authorising their officers under this Government Order to collect such amounts, the Government is not meeting any difficulty created in the working out of this Act but is making a supplemental provision. It is adding, so to say, a new section authorising the collection. An endeavour is made by this Government Order to extend the scope of section 55 (1) so as to include within it only rent but also other kinds of amounts in arrear, a procedure which is clearly ultra vires the powers vested in them under section 68 of the Act. To my mind the matter is clear beyond the shadow of a doubt. The lacuna in the Act should have been supplied by legislative and not by executive action.

2.        Liability of Government :--Under Section 55 of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948, it is the Government alone which is entitled to recover rents, the mere fact that the government has not taken any action would not relieve the government of its liability. Even if the Government has not recovered the rents from the tenants, it will still be held liable to the landholder to pay the amount payable to him by the tenants.[223]

Section 56 - Decision of certain disputes arising after an estate is notified

(1)     Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer.

 

(2)     Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of Law.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide a dispute pending on the date when the estate has been notified.[224]

The Madras Estates Abolition Act puts on end to the pre-existing rights of the landholder and the ryot and confers on them new rights. Section 56 confers special jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer in respect of the following three disputes :

(i)       Whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear ?

 

(ii)      What amount of rent is in arrears ? and

 

(iii)     Who is the lawful ryot in respect of the holding ?

The section, therefore, lays down in explicit terms that the decision of the Tribunal shall not be questioned in a court of law.

The Madras Act creates rights and provides a particular remedy for enforcing those rights. The jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer to determine those rights is exclusive and the necessary consequence of the vesting of this jurisdiction in the Settlement Officer is that the jurisdiction of every court and Tribunal, other than the Tribunal provided by the Act is excluded.[225]

In Cherukuru Muthayya vs. G. Gopal Krishnayya,[226] the full bench of A.P. High Court overruling the decision in Chigurupati Venkatasubbaiah vs. Ravi Punnayya, (1957) 2 Andhra. WR 204, that dispute envisaged in Section 56 is in relation to grant of patta under section 11 and that the machinery for the grant of patta is set up in section 56, held :

Section 56 (1)(c) is not an independent or substantive provision unconnected with Section 56(1) or Section 55 of the Act. No enquiry into the questions covered by Clause (c) therefore can be made if its purpose is not related to Section 56 (1) and Section 55 of the Act. Since in this case, the application was not made for the purpose of Section 55 or Section 56 but was made for purposes other than these, the application was misconceived and ought not to have been entertained by the Settlement Officer. His order therefore is made without jurisdiction and as a result the appellate order of the tribunal would also be an order made without jurisdiction. These orders are of no legal effect.

In M. Chayanna vs. K. Narayana,[227] the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that the scope of Section 56 (1)(c) is not to be restricted as was done by the Full Bench of the A.P. High Court in Cherukuru's case (AIR 1974 AP 85). It was further held that "we are fortunately relieved of the necessity of considering the matter more elaborately in view of the fact that the decision in Cherukuru's case on this part of the case has since been overruled by a full bench of five judges of the High Court of A.P. in T. Munuswami Naidu vs. R. Venkata Reddy,[228] after a through and exhaustive consideration of the question. We may also add here that until the decision in Cherukuru vs. Gadde Gopalakrishna (1973 (2)APLJ 209) for several years it was understood that Section 56 (1)(C) conferred complete and exclusive jurisdiction on the settlement officer to decide rival claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta and Section 55 or 56 (1)(a) and (b) were never understood as controlling section 56(1)(c)." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held :

Now the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect or ryoti lands which were included or ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date and on the land-holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of lands which belonged to him before the notified date as his private lands. The Act makes express provision for the determination of claims by land-holders for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the alleged private lands. If there is provision for the determination of the claims of a landholder for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of his alleged private lands, surely, in an Act aimed at the abolition of intermediaries and the introduction of ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for the determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta. Section 56 (1) is clearly such a provision. But, in Cherukuru Muthayya vs. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya,[229] it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under section 56(1) (c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held that section 56 (1)(c) occurred so closely on the heels of section 55 and section 56 (1) (a) and (b), that the applicability of section 56 (1)(c) must be held to be "intimately and integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that sections 55 and 56 (1)(a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading "Miscellaneous" and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench overlooked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion. The anomaly is that while express provision is found in section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari pattas, there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provisions to the bounds of sections 55 and 56 (1)(a) and (b) on the ground of "contextual interpretation". Interpretation of a staute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthayya vs. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya,[230] was wrongly decided in so far as it held by section 55 and section 56(1)(a) and (b). We do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Munuswami Naidu vs. R. Venkata Reddi,[231] except to add that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya vs. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya,[232] would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.

In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna vs. Sriramamurty.[233]

"Where a Special Tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as is otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta. When a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act."

2.        Lawful Ryot:--An application under section 56 (1)(c) of the A.P. Estate Abolition Act, 1948 to decide a dispute as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of a ryoti land which was either properly included or right to have been included in his holding, is maintainable even after the grant of rough or fair patta to someone under section 11 (a) of the Act.[234]

 

3.        Rent :--The Act does not provide for recovery of the sum due by way of rent to a ryot from his tenant. The word "rent" in this connection is not to be understood in the technical sense in which that word is used in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, the sense which it carries, too, in Section 56 of the Abolition Act.[235]

 

4.        Power of Settlement Officer :-In K. Madurai vs. M. Madurai,[236] Alagiriswami, J., held that, the power of the Settlement Officer under Section 56 to decide who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, only for the purpose of the other two clauses, that is, for the purpose of realisation of the arrears of rent and not for the purpose of issuing patta.

In Appanna vs. Sri Ramamurthy, 1958 Andh. LT 491, the second appeal had arisen out of a suit filed by the land-holder for recovery of rent alleged to be due from the tenant. The facts reveal that the rent was due for the year 1948-49 as well as for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. The defence was that since he is a ryot, the plaintiff land-holder had no right to collect rent from him and that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Bench held that Section 56 confers on the Settlement Officer jurisdiction to decide whether a person is a lawful ryot or not and the two other disputes referred to in that section. It was held that when a statute confers a power on any person, for public purposes, if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is ousted. And where a special tribunal is appointed to determine question as to rights which are the creation of that Act. Then the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive.

In the course of the judgment their Lordships at page 498 considered the argument that the disputes raised do not come under Section 56 of the Act. The argument was repealed. While repelling that contention, their Lordships referred to an observation made by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in Arunachalam Chettiar vs. Narayana Chettiar, 1957- 1 Mad.LJ 183. The observation reads :

"The entire argument of the Tribunal is rested on the collocation of the words "dispute arising after an estate is notified". In the first place, Section 56 occurs in the chapter headed "Miscellaneous". Its position is just after Section 55, which deals with collection of arrears of rent by the land-holder after the notified date. Sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 55 (1) refer to disputes which might arise in connection with the liability of the ryot to pay rent or its quantum. A reference to Section 55 would show that the liability for the rent or its quantum may be in respect of a period anterior to the notification. If Section 56 were to be the machinery for deciding the disputes in relation to the rent payable for faslis 1356 and 1357 it would follow that the disputes referred to in the opening words of Section 56(1) would not exclude disputes whose origin was earlier than the notified date but which have continued since then. If, therefore, a dispute in relation to matters mentioned in Section 56 (1)(a) and (b) would take in disputes originating earlier than the notified date but continuing even afterwards, the nature of the dispute referred to in sub-clause (c) of Section 56(1) would not be different. In my opinion, the proper construction of that section is to hold that all disputes which are factually present after the notified date come within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and within Section 56(1). Disputes which are excluded are only those in regard to which there have been binding adjudications by the ordinary Courts before that date or matters pending before other authorities before the notified date. In regard to all others, the dispute "arises" after the notified date within the meaning of Section 56(1) if notwithstanding its having originated at an earlier date it continues thereafter, for the dispute is a difference which exists until it is settled and it is the existence of the dispute that is referred to in the section and not its origin. In this view the order of the Abolition Tribunal, Madurai, in R.A. No.373 of 1954 is set aside as erroneous."

The learned Judges entirely agreed with the aforesaid observation.

In Adakalathammal vs. Chinnayan Panipunder,[237] Rajamannar, C.J. said that clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act should be read along with the other provisions of the Act and the rights and conferred by or under the Act.

5.        Whether Section 56(1) is retrospectic :--In Neelakanteswaraju vs. Mangamma,[238]a full bench of the A.P. High Court held that the provisions of Section 56 (1) of Act XXVI of 1948 are not retrospective in operation in divesting the jurisdiction of the civil court, but if during the pending of a dispute in a civil court an estate is notified, the civil court will continue to have jurisdiction, but if no case had been filed and is pending in the civil court, it will be the settlement officer in whom the jurisdiction will lie.

It has been pointed out in Siva Kutumba Rao vs. Sarvalakshmamma,[239] that either the landlord or the tenant in possession can file a suit in a civil court for ejectment of the trespasser, because the trespasser is not a person who comes under the Abolition Act and when the rights are not contemplated or governed by the Abolition Act, suits can be entertained by the Civil Court. But, as pointed out in Appana vs. Sriramamurthy, (1958 (1) An.W.R. 420), the jurisdiction of the Tribunals contemplated under the Abolition Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of the Acts is exclusive and the suits with regard to those facts cannot be filed in civil courts.

In Chirugupati Venkatasubbaiah vs. Ravi Punnaya,[240] it was held that the civil courts can certainly take cognizance of suits in which the title to the holding forming part of an estate is put in issue, especially where the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot be granted by the settlement officer, they being beyond his competence, and within the purview of the civil courts.

While noticing the above case,[241] a Bench of the. A.P. High Court in Appanna vs. Sriramamurthy (1958 (1) An.W.R. 420), dissented from it by saying that they cannot agree with the view that the civil court is barred even in respect of disputes between two persons claiming to be lawful ryots.

In Someswaraswamy Varu vs. Sri Rajitam,[242] the reliefs asked are for possession and mesne profit, it is held :

The defendant's possession cannot be disturbed until their right to a patta is adjudicated on by the settlement officer, a Tribunal contemplated under the Act. This dispute is not a question relating to who has the lawful title to the land as title vested only in the Government but as to who is lawfully entitled to a patta, the question relating to the granting of patta as between the landlord and the tenant, also is a question to be decided by the settlement officer, under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. It is not open to the plaintiff to circumvent the Act and go to a civil court and ask for possession when the civil court cannot grant possession unless it goes into the question as to who is entitled to a patta and this is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the settlement officer under the Act.

6.        Rights of Occupancy :--Dealing with a revision petition raising the question whether Section 56 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain the suit in which one of the issues relates to rights of occupancy, the High Court of A.P. in Chigurupati Venkatasubbiah vs. Ravi Punnayya,[243] held :

The machinery for the grant of patta seems to have been set up in section 56. There is no other provision in the Act which deals with the disposal of applications by the ryots for the issue of ryotwari patta. With regard to the applications made by the zamindars for the grant of patta for his private lands provision is made in section 15 for dealing with them. In these circumstances, I feel that this section comes into play only when after the abolition of the estates rival claims are put forward to a particular holding and has to be determined who the real owner thereof is, and has no relation to a case where a person putting forward a claim in respect of the same land was inducted into possession as a lessee some years before notwithstanding the plea of benami raised by the defendants.

The Civil Courts can certainly take cognizance of suits in which the title to the holding forming part of an estate is put in issue. Further, the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot be granted by the Settlement Officer they being beyond his competence, and within the purview of Civil Courts. The principle is now firmly established that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not excluded when special forums could not grant certain prayers. See Swaminatna vs. Asan,[244] and Sukh Dev vs. Vasu Dev.[245] In my opinion, the ratio of this doctrine is that a plaintiff cannot be required to split up his cause of action and seek rendress partly in a civil court and partly before a Special Tribunal. There is no reason why he should be compelled to choose different forums to get different reliefs.

Section 57 - Peshkash, Jodi and quit-rent

Peskash, Jodi or quit rent as the case may be, in respect of an estate shall cease to accrue with effect from the end of the fasli year immediately preceeding the notified date.

Section 58 - Payment of Jodi, Kattubadi, etc., by landholder of inam village which is not an inam estate

With effect on and from the date on which an estate is notified, the landholder of an inam village, which is not an inam estate shall be liable to any annually to the Government, such jodi, kattubadi or other amount of a like nature, as he was liable to pay to the landholder of the notified estate immediately before that date :

Provided that in respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, the jodi, kattubadi or other amount aforesaid shall be reduced by any payments made on that account before the notified date, to the landholder of the notified estate, if such payments are authenticated in the prescribed manner.

Section 58A - Stay of execution proceeding and setting aside of certain Court sales and foreclosures

[246](1) No Court shall, before the date on which the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made, order or continue execution in respect of any decree or order passed against the principal or any other landholder of an estate, against his interest in the estate or against his other immovable property, or against him personally by arrest and detention; and with effect on and from such date, execution in the cases aforesaid may be ordered or continued as specified in, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 59.

(2)? ?Where in execution of any such decree or order, any interest in the estate or any other immovable property of the principal or any other landholder has been sold or foreclosed on or after the 19th April, 1949, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and notwithstanding that the sale has been confirmed, such landholder may apply to the Court within ninety days of the commencement of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1951, to set aside the sale or foreclosure of the property; and the Court shall, if satisfied that the applicant is a landholder, order the sale or foreclosure to be set aside, and thereupon the sale or foreclosure shall be deemed not to have taken place at all;

Provided that no such order shall be made without notice to the decree-holder, the auction purchaser, and other persons interested in such sale or foreclosure and without affording them an opportunity to be heard in the matter :

Provided further that the Court shall not order any such sale to be set aside, unless the

Court is satisfied that the sale price was unduly low.

(3) ??Where a sale is set aside under sub-section (2), the purchaser shall be entitled to an order for repayment of any purchase money paid by him against the person to whom it has been paid :

Provided that no poundage shall be payable in respect of any such sale and provided further that where poundage has been collected, the Court shall direct the same to be refunded.

(4) ??All proceedings for the execution of any decree or order by the arrest and detention in prison of the principal or any other landholder of an estate, pending at the commencement of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1951, shall stand dismissed, and if at such commencement the principal or any other landholder is detained in a prison in execution of any such decree or order, he shall be released forthwith.

(5)?? All alienations of immovable property made by the principal or other landholder of an estate on or after the 19th April, 1949, and before the notified date shall be invalid as against every creditor whose sale in execution or foreclosure decree has been set aside under sub-section (2) or who became entitled to rateable distribution of the proceeds of such sale under Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Explanation :--Nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any alienation to which the provisions of either Section 18, sub-section (3), or Section 20 apply.

(6) ??Notwithstanding anything contained in any other for the time being in force, no principal or other landholder of an estate shall, on or after the notified date and before the date on which the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made, sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise assign or alienate any of his immovable property, and any transaction of the nature hereby prohibited shall be void and inoperative and shall not confer or take away any right whatever on or from any party to the transaction].

Synopsis

1.        Immunity from arrest :--Section 58-A of the Madras Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act declares in terms that immunity of the landholders from arrest and their right to be released forthwith if they are already detained in prison. It is no doubt true that this provision relates to the pending cases, or to persons in detention, as, at the time of the commencement of the Amendment Act. This Section covers the stage anterior to the date of actual deposit pursuant to section 54-A, and Section 59 embraces cases at subsequent stages as well. The clear terms of Section 58-A admits of no argument on the question that a landholder cannot be ordered to be arrested and put in prison in any execution proceedings during the period covered by the provisions.[247]

 

2.        Execution of Decree :--If the deposit pursuant to Section 54-A of the Madras Estates Abolition Act, 1948, is made, there is no bar to the execution being proceeded with. If the amount is not deposited, Section 58-A operates as a bar to order or continue execution. If, on the other land, the Government had set off the amount due to them towards Peish kush or other dues as against compensation payable by them, and if that was the reason why no deposit was made, the decree-holder shall be entitled to proceed with the execution of his decree, because it should then be deemed that the government deposited the amount in pursuance of Section 54-A of the Act.[248]

Section 59 - Transitional provision in regard to other liabilities of landholder, etc.

(1)     No claim or liability enforceable immediately before the notified date against the principal or any other landholder of an estate, or against any other person whose rights stand transferred to the Government in pursuance of Section 3, clause (b), shall, on or after that date, be enforceable against the interest he had in the estate; and all such claims and liabilities shall [249][after the date on which the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made] be enforceable.

 

(a)      against the interim payments or the compensation or other sums paid or payable to him under this Act, to the same extent to which such claims and liabilities were enforceable against his interest in the estate immediately before the notified date; and

 

(b)      against his other property, if any, to the same extent to which such claims and liabilities were enforceable against such property immediately before the notified date.

 

(2)     No Court shall, on or after the notified date, order or continue execution in respect of any decree or order passed against the principal or any other landholder or any other person aforesaid, against the interest he had in the estate; and execution shall be ordered or continued in such cases in conformity with the provisions of sub-section (1), only as against the interim payments or against the compensation or other sum or sums paid or payable to him as aforesaid, or against his other property, if any.

[250][(3) No Court shall, in enforcing any claim or liability against the principal or any other landholder or any other person aforesaid, allow interest at a rate exceeding six percent per annum simple interest for the period commencing on the notified date and ending with the date on which the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made].

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The words of Section 59 of the Act would indicate that no liability shall be enforced after the coming into force of this Act except as provided for under the said section. In case of a decretal liability it would not be open to the creditor to enforce the liability except as provided for under section 59 (3) of the Act.[251]

Section 60 - Provisions for existing estate staff

Notwithstanding any law, custom, or contract to the contrary, the following provisions shall apply in regard to the persons employed in the administration of any estate immediately before the notified date.

(1)     The Government shall have power to terminate the services of any such person after giving him one calendar month's notice or paying him one month's pay in lieu of such notice.

 

(2)     Persons whose services are retained shall be governed by such rules as the Government may make in regard to them.

Section 61 - Maintenance by Government of institutions maintained by landholder

Every educational or other charitable institution which was being maintained during the three fasli years 1354, 1355, and 1356, by any landholder of an estate may, with effect on and from the notified, be maintained by the Government if they think fit.

Section 62 - Omitted

[252][........]

Section 63 - Decision of questions regarding forests

If any question arises whether any land in an estate is a forest or is situated in a forest, or as to the limits of a forest, it shall be determined by the Settlement Officer, subject to an appeal to the Director within such time as may be prescribed and also to revision by the Board of Revenue.

Section 63A - Decision under Section 63 to have over-riding effect

[253]Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Court, tribunal or other authority :--

(a)      the decision of?

 

(b)      the Settlement Officer under Section 63, if no appeal or revision is preferred;

(ii) ??the Director, if no revision is filed;

(iii)? ?the Board of Revenue in revision;

shall be final and binding on all authorities and parties in relation to the claim for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of any land under Section 11 or Section 15.

(b) ??Where a final decision as aforesaid is given under Section 63 either before or after an order is passed, or a decision is given by any tribunal or other authority under Section 11 or Section 15, the said final decision shall prevail over such order or decision of the tribunal or other authority.]

Section 64 - Rights of owner or occupier not to be affected by temporary discontinue of possession or occupation

Where a person--

(a)      is entitled to the ownership or to the possession or occupation of any land or building immediately before the notified date, but has transferred his right to the possession or occupation thereof or has been temporarily dispossessed or deprived of his right to the occupation thereof; and

 

(b)      has not on that date lost his right to remove the possession or occupation of such land or building:

he shall, for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof, be deemed to be the owner, or to be in possession or occupation, of such land or building;

Provided that any lawful transferee of the right to the possession or occupation of such land or building shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, continue to have the same rights against his transferor, as he had immediately before the notified date :

Provided further that any lawful transferee of the title to such land or building shall be entitled to all the rights under this Act or his transferor.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :-After the abolition of Estates, the Government alone is competent to dispossess the persons who are in actual possession of the land or those having a right to possession and those having a right to Ryotwari Patta on the date of notification, but not by third parties on the ground that the Estate was taken over by the Government and that he is not entitled to a ryotwari patta. If any third party wrongfully disposses those persons, the owners of the property, are entitled under the general law either by filing a suit for ejectment or injunction.[254]

In Neelakanteswara Raju vs. Jaddu Mangamma,[255] Krishna Rao J., after referring to sections 3, 11, 12, 20 and 20 of the Estates Abolition Act observed as follows :

The above provisions may be assumed up as follows : On and from the notified date, the entire estate vests in the Government. The Government may take possession of the estate and all other things required for the administration thereof. No person shall be dispossessed whom the Government considers as being prima facie entitled for a ryotwari patta.....All persons whose rights, ownership, possession or occupation were not extinguished by the date of the notification are deemed to be persons holding such rights for the purposes of the Act. It is also significant to note that there is no provision in the Act requiring the existing landholders or the ryots to abandon their lands and surrender the same in favour of the Government. There is also no provision in the Act requiring that the persons entitled to ryotwari pattas should apply within a specified date in default of which they should be deemed to have lost their rights in the property...........Unless the Government decides the said question either in such proceedings taken suo motu or in the proceedings started on the application of the parties no person in actual possession or entitled to such possession, will be deprived of his rights by the Government. Therefore until the claims of persons are examined as aforesaid, the persons in actual possession are entitled to continue as before, even after the notified date.

The object of vesting the property in the Government is to enable the Government, firstly to issue pattas in favour of persons entitled to such pattas and in all other cases to assign the land, to whomsoever the Government desires as the owner of the property. The estate having vested in the Government, it is Government alone that can take proceedings to take possession of the property after evicting persons in occupation. It therefore, follows that it is not open to any person to trespass upon the land in the actual possession of a landholder or a ryot and to plead that in view of the vesting of the estate in the Government he is entitled to trespass on the land and that the only remedy of the erstwhile landholder or ryot is to obtain a patta under the provisions of the Act. This, in our opinion, was not the intention of the legislature. Having regard to the summary of the relevant provisions set out above, the right of persons in actual possession or those having a right to possession on the date of that notification are left intact and specifically preserved by section 64 of the Act.

Perhaps the observations of Kumarayya, J., in Siva Kutumba Rao vs. Sarvalakshmamma,[256] are also pertinent. After referring to section 64 of the Estates Abolition Act the learned Judge observed:

"It is obvious from this provision that, if the plaintiffs were the ownes immediately before the notified date and had not lost their right to recover possession or occupation of such land, they will be deemed to be the owners in possession or occupation of such land as on the notified date. The Courts below have, as already notified, found that in favour of the plaintiff. They have found that the plaintiff were in actual possession of the land within 12 years prior to the date of the suit and that the defendants were mere trespassers and had not perfected their right by adverse possession by efflux of time. The plaintiffs, therefore, within the meaning of section 64 of Act XXVI of 1948 must, be deemed to be the owners in possession of suit lands. As such, their right to recover possession from the trespassers is still intact. The relative position of the parties and their mutual rights and obligations have not suffered any set back. The plaintiffs themselves may, of course, be liable to dispossession by the Government in case they are not prima facie considered to be entitled to ryotwari patta; but that is a matter exclusively within the discretion of the Government. But the defendants can have no say in the matter, nor can they rely on the right of the Government to defeat the due process of law against them. The plaintiffs had come in due time for recovery of possession. Had it not been for the notification which after all is a subsequent event, perhaps it was not possible for the defendants to cast a cloud of doubt on the right and title of the plaintiffs which was absolute. But, as already observed, notwithstanding the issue of notification, the right as against the trespassers still subsists. By reason of the notification, whatever the position of the plaintiff's vis a vis the Government, certainly no right had accrued to the defendants themselves which may be set up as a defence to the claim of the plaintiffs. The Government had not chosen to exercise their right, if any, of taking possession of these lands."

In Smt. R.M. Rathi Devi vs. A.K. Veerabhadra Rao,[257] the High Court of A.P. referring to Neelakanteswara's case (ILR 1969 942) and Siva Kutumba Rao's case (1963 An.W.R. 90) held :

These decisions show that the right of a person who was in possession or occupation of land immediately before the notified date was not completely destroyed by the Estates Abolition Act. Such right became subject to the superior right of the Government which superior right could be exercised only under certain circumstances and in accordance with the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. Sections 3 (d), 12 and 64 recognise that right to possession, and occupation and ownership. The decisions in the State of Madras vs. Karuppiah Ambalam,[258] and Buna China Venkiah vs. Subbarama Sastry,[259] contain some general observations regarding the effect of section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act. But neither of those cases was concerned with the right of a person in occupation to transfer his right of occupation. In my view, the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff could not acquire any right under the settlement deed because of the estate in which the lands are situate having vested in the Government under the Estate Abolition Act.

Section 64A - Resjudicata

[260](1) The decision of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal in any proceeding under this Act, or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a case under Section 51 (2), on any matter falling within its or his jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them, in any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court in so far as such matter in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or proceeding.

(2) ??The decision of a Civil Court (not being the Court of a District Munsif or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal or Special Tribunal, or a Judge of the High Court under Section 51 (2), in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--The obvious intention of the Legislature is that the judgment of a District Munsif or a Court of small causes should be excluded if the decision becomes final only before the said court. But if the decision is taken up to a higher court, it is the decision of the higher court that governs the matter.[261]

A mere reading of this section is sufficient to show that an order of the Settlement Officer, functioning under section 9 of the Estates Abolition Act, is not one of the decisions covered by the provision. So much is concerned by the learned counsel. But he argues that the Settlement Officer is invested with a special jurisdiction under the Estates Abolition Act and his decision on all matters coming within the scope of that jurisdiction must have an overriding effect and that to the extent to which the Settlement Officer is invested with jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred.[262]

In Sanapala Narasamma vs. State of A.P.,3[263] held that Section 64-A of the Act gives an indication that it is permissible for a party, to seek adjudication in civil Court, and that the judgment therein will operate as res judicata and binding on the proceedings under the Act, and vice versa.

2.        Rule of Res Judicata :--In Muddanasetty Suryanarayana vs. Vantaka Pydayya,[264] it was held, the obvious intention of the Legislature is that the judgement of a District Munsiff or a court of Small causes should be excluded if the decision become final only before the said court. But if the decision was taken up to a higher court, it is the decision of the higher court that governs the matter. This was also the view of taken by Basi Reddy, J., in Lakshminarasimham vs. Subbayya.[265]

 

3.        Meaning of the word "Decision" :--In Mokshagundam Narasaiah vs. The Estate Abolition Tribunal, Chittoor,[266] a bench of the A.P. High Court has held that the word "decision" under section 64-A (2) of the Act covers only matters actually decided and not matters constructively decided by civil courts. This construction applies with equal force to the decisions referred to in Section 64-A(1). It was further held that the word used in Section 64-A is a "decision" and not "judgement". The word "judgement" unlike the word a "decision" could include the reasons or grounds for a decision. If the legislature had intended that the reasons or grounds on which a decision proceeded, should be binding it is reasonable to suppose that the word judgement, would have been used instead of the word "decision".

Section 64B - Saving of Limitation

In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application filed in a civil court by a creditor in respect of any matter which was the subject of a proceeding under any of the following sections, namely, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54-A and 54-B, the period commencing on the notified date and ending with the date on which the deposit in pursuance of Section 54-A is made, and the time during which such proceedings were pending as well as the time taken for obtaining certified copies of the order passed in such proceeding shall be excluded.]

Section 65 - Jurisdiction of courts barred in certain cases

(1)     No suit or other proceeding shall lie against the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder.

 

(2)     (a) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any officer or servant of the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder, without the previous sanction of the Government.

(b) ??No officer or servant of the Government shall be liable in respect of any such act in any civil or criminal proceeding, if the act was done in good faith in the court of the execution of the duties, or the discharge of the functions imposed by or under this Act.

(3)     No suit, prosecution, or other proceeding shall be instituted against any officer or servant of the Government for any act done or purporting to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder, after the expiry of six months from the date of the act complained of.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--In S. Narasamma vs. State of A.P.,1[267] held, The bar of jurisdiction of Courts, specified in Section 65 of the Act, is mostly in the form of according protection to the officers, who discharged their functions while implementing the Act in good faith.

The provision does not bar jurisdiction of a civil Court to adjudicate upon the classification of the land, which in turn may become relevant for enforcing the provisions of that Act. In State of Tamilnadu vs. Ramalingam, AIR 1986 SC 794, the Supreme Court dealt with the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, vis-a-vis, the provisions of this very Act. After referring to the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State vs. Mask and Company, AIR 1940 PC 105, and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai vs. State of Madras Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78, and the provisions of the Act, their Lordships held as under :

"It is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the Civil Court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special Tribunal one will have to see whether such special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of civil Court's jurisdiction.... In other words since the Settlement Officer has no power to do what civil Court would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of civil Court's jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer's order under Section 64-C of the Act."

The Supreme Court distinguished certain judgments, which were rendered by it, interpreting altogether different provisions. The scope of the entire enactment, was summarized by the Supreme Court, in the following terms :

"The enactment and its several provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue purposes of the Government, by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof by the Government and in that process, if necessary, to deal with claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands, etc., only incidentally in a summary manner and that too for identifying and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The object of granting a ryotwari patta is also to enable holder thereof to cultivate the land specified therein directly under the Government on payment to it of such assessment or cess that may be lawfully imposed on the land."

In Nallipattu Ramakrishna Reddy vs. Kasala Balaiah, 1987(1) ALT 120, his Lordship Justice Jagannadha Rao, as he then was, held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under Section 11 of the Act, even as to the persons entitled for grant of patta. A Division Bench of this Court in Kosuru Venkata Krishnaiah vs. Molakala Sidda Reddy, 1990 (1) ALT 163 (DB), held that even an order passed by the Settlement Officer under Section 11 of the Act, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court, in the context of nature and classification of the land. After referring to the judgment of this Court in K. Ranga Reddy vs. M. Venkatrami Reddi, 1980 (2) An. W.R. 332, the Bench followed the view expressed by his Lordship Justice Jeevan Reddy, as he then was, in that case, and held that the effect of patta granted under Section 11 of the Act, by the Settlement Officer, is limited to the conversion of tenure, and does not impair the substantive rights or title of the parties, over the land in question. Authorities can be multiplied on this aspect.

2.        Effect of sub-section (1) of Section 65 :--In Koonam Narasareddi vs. State of Andhra,[268] the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. dealing with a question as to what is the meaning and effect of sub-section (1) of section 65 held :

To say the least, its language is not very clear. It seems to us however that this section confers immunity on the Government only from claims for damages in respect of acts done or purporting to be done under the Act. It does not mean that the Government can do anything under colour of the Act and be free from interference by any Court. For instance if a particular property is not an estate at all within the meaning of the Act, the Government could not take it into their lands purporting to do so under the Act, without any remedy being open to the owner against them. This view is supported by authority [vide : Gosukonda Venkatanarasayya vs. State of Madras.)[269] We think that on the same reasoning, if the Government takes over land which a person is entitled to keep by virtue of rights expressly saved by the Act and there is no machinery provided in the Act for the adjudication of such a right, the aggrieved person may well seek his remedy in the civil Court. Where a special forum is provided by the Act, of course, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is taken away by necessary implication but where there is no such provision, the ordinary civil courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction to see that the action of the Government is within the terms of the statute.

Section 66 - Repeals

With effect on and from the notified date--

(i)         the A.P. (Andhra Area) Impartiable Estates Act, 1904, shall be deemed to have been repealed in its application to the estate, if the estate had been governed by the Act immediately before that date; and

 

(ii)        the A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenants and Ryots Protection Act, 1946 shall be deemed to have been repealed in its application to private lands in the estate.

Synopsis

1.        Estate :--The word "estate" in Section 66 of the Madras Estate Abolition Act denotes only the estate governed by the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation and Madras Estates Land and not only other part of impartible zamindari.[270]

Section 67 - Power to make rules

(1)     Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.

 

(2)     In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, such rules may provide for?

 

(a)      all matters expressly required or allowed by this Act to be prescribed.

 

(b)      the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals, Special Tribunal, authorities and officers appointed, or having jurisdiction, under this Act;

 

(c)      the delegation of the powers conferred by this Act on the Government or any other authority, officer or person;

 

(d)      the time within which applications and appeals may be presented under this Act, in cases for which no specific provision in that behalf has been made herein;

 

(e)      the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, to applications, appeals and proceedings under this Act;

 

(f)       the fees to be paid in respect of applications and appeals under this Act;

 

(g)      the transfer of proceedings from one [271][........] authority or officer to another.

Synopsis

1.        Scope :--When the power conferred upon the government is quasi-judicial such power has to be exercised strictly in accordance with provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder.[272]

 

2.        Limitation :--It is true that the rules made under section 67 of the Act makes only section 5 of the Limitation Act, IX of 1908 applicable. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not made applicable.[273]

In V. Bhaskar Rao and Ors. vs. M.R.O.,1[274] it is held that the Settlement Officer is vested with the power to condone.

Section 68 - Power to remove difficulties

If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Government may, as occasion may require, do anything which appears to them necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty.