An Issue the Government Can No Longer Ignore
The recent incident at the Barabanki toll plaza, where an advocate was allegedly assaulted during a dispute with toll personnel, has sparked widespread outrage within the legal fraternity. While the immediate concerns related to safety and dignity, the episode raises a deeper constitutional concern: Whether advocates, who are essential to the functioning of courts, are being subjected to infrastructural barriers that impede the administration of justice ?
This is not merely an altercation between a road user and toll staff. It is a moment that exposes the structural friction between private toll operators and the constitutional justice system.
Advocacy as a Constitutional Function, Not Merely a Profession
The Constitution of India does not treat legal representation as a matter of convenience. Under Article 22(1), the right of an accused to be defended by a legal practitioner is a guaranteed fundamental right. This right is operational only when Advocates are able to physically appear before courts.
Courts are permanent institutions. Advocates are required to attend them in person whether at the Hon’ble District Court, Hon’ble High Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Travel to courts is therefore not discretionary, the justice system does not function remotely by default. It is a necessary incidence of constitutional duty.
Advocates as Sui Generis participants in the Justice Delivery System
Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognised that Advocates occupy a sui generis position within the judiciary system. They are officers of the court, regulated by statutory and ethical frameworks, and subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the judiciary.
In Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court emphasised that the legal profession carries public responsibilities and plays a direct role in maintaining the rule of law. Similarly, in State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi (1995), the Court acknowledged the intrinsic connection between the legal profession and democratic governance.
The sui generis status underlines that advocacy is integral to the institutional framework of justice, not merely a private commercial activity.
Why Comparisons with Other Professions Do Not Hold ?
Arguments that toll exemption for Advocates are unfair because other professionals could seek similar treatment are constitutionally misplaced. This argument does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Doctors, though socially vital, are not constitutionally required to appear at a institution daily and not even required mandatory to be present. Patients travel to them and emergency movement is accommodated via ambulances (exempted vehicle). Journalism, though protected under Article 19(1)(a), is fundamentally a private activity driven by editorial discretion and commercial considerations. There is no constitutional or statutory mandate requiring journalists to be physically present at a particular State location to enable fundamental rights of others.
Advocates, by contrast:
- Are regulated by the Advocates Act, 1961
- Are essential to the enforcement of Articles 21, 22, and 39A
- Play indispensable roles in criminal procedure, bail hearings, remand proceedings, and trials
- Cannot opt out of the justice process without systemic consequences
They form a distinct constitutional class, and differential treatment does not contravene the equality principle under Article 14.
Toll as a User Fee and its Constitutional limits
It is often stated that toll is a “user fee” and not a tax. Even assuming this distinction, constitutional law is clear that no fee can be imposed in a manner that obstructs the exercise of fundamental rights or the functioning of constitutional institutions.
In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), the Supreme Court held that access to justice is an inseparable component of Article 21. Administrative practices that delay or hinder justice violate constitutional guarantees.
Delays, harassed, or coercive conduct at toll plazas while travelling for court work, the impact is not personal alone. It affects:
- Bail and remand proceedings
- Judicial efficiency
- The rights of litigants awaiting representation
The Barabanki incident demonstrates how toll plazas, operated by private concessionaires, can become points of obstruction within the justice delivery chain.
Central and State Responsibility to Facilitation of Justice
The administration of justice is recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005), the Supreme Court underscored the State’s obligation to ensure that courts function smoothly and effectively.
Facilitating the movement of Advocates is not a matter of professional privilege; it is constitutional obligation. It is part of the State’s duty to ensure that constitutional rights are not rendered illusory by logistical or infrastructural barriers.
If the Government can design exemptions and facilitation mechanisms to protect life under Article 21, it can equally design mechanisms to protect liberty and fair trial by ensuring unhindered access of Advocates to courts.
Beyond Barabanki: A Structural Issue
Terminating a toll operator’s contract, as was done after the Barabanki incident, addresses misconduct. It does not resolve the underlying structural conflict between toll administration and justice delivery.
As long as Advocates are treated merely as ordinary road users while performing constitutionally mandated functions, similar confrontations are bound to recur, unfortunately.
Constitutionally viable solution exist, such as FASTag-based identification or Advocates passes, similar to life and health insurance. It will provide formal recognition of Advocates as justice-delivery functionaries for limited facilitation purposes. This measure will respect constitutional principles without undermining toll infrastructure.
Conclusion
The Barabanki incident demands serious constitutional reflection. The justice system cannot function on paper guarantees while placing physical and financial barriers before those who sustain it. Advocates are not seeking exemption as a privilege - they are seeking facilitation as a constitutional necessity.
If access to justice is fundamental, then ensuring that advocates can have access to courts freely, safely, and with dignity is the duty of the State. It is not optional policy —it is a constitutional obligation.
Judicial References :
- Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 8 SCC 335
- Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1979) 3 SCC 532
- Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344
- State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi, (1995) 5 SCC 730
Harshit Thareja, LL.M., MBA, Advocate, Delhi High Court, IIM Calcutta Alumnus, practises independently in Delhi, with experience in arbitration, criminal law, civil law, and matters under the Delhi Rent Control Act. He serves as a Legal Services Advocate with the Delhi State Legal Services Authority (DLSA), South District Delhi, and is also a panel Advocate for multiple public sector and government entities. Combining practical litigation experience, he provides nuanced insights on constitutional, procedural, and systemic legal issues.
