Kumarayya, J. 1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India raises two questions: one is a mixed question of law and fact and the other which is of some importance is a question relating to jurisdiction. The first question is whether the compensation awarded is full compensation within the meaning of section 10 (d) of the Indian Telegraph Act (13 of 1885) (which will hereafter be called, the Act) and is determined on a correct legal basis. The second question is, whether the determination of such compensation by an Additional District Judge is in the eye of law, a determination by a District Judge within the meaning of section 16 of the Act. 2. The brief facts of the case are these: The electric department laid electric transmission lines through the fields of the petitioner and also others. The trees under the said line as a result had to be cut. By this act, the petitioner happened to suffer damage to some of his trees in survey numbers 267/3 and 268/1 The trees alleged to be so cut were in all 32 coconut trees, three babul trees and a date and a palmyra tree and the branches of a big mango tree. After they were cut, they were taken away by the Electricity Department. The Telegraph Act, of course, legalises civil trespass of the kind but provides for payment of full compensation for the damage done. The petitioner was informed that the concerned authorities had fixed a sum of Rs. 250/- for the trees cut. But having regard to the magnitude of the damage the sum offered, in the opinion of the petitioner, was but paltry. As the dispute relating to the sufficiency of compensation was justiciable even under the clear provisions of the Act in the forum prescribed by the Act, the petitioner, in compliance with the statute, made an application to the District Judge claiming compensation in the sum of Rs. 8,203/-. 3. The District Judge transferred the proceedings to the file of the Additional District Judge who on the evidence adduced, came to the conclusion that 32 coconut trees and 7 big branches of mango tree of the petitioner were cut and the trees so cut were taken away by the Electricity department. He further found that each coconut tree thus cut was expected to yield about 100 coconuts at the maximum per year and that these trees were about 40 years old and would, in the normal circumstances, yield fruits for about 20 years more. Having thus determined the number of trees cut and their expected period and extent of yield, he proceeded to assess their market-value. On the evidence of the karnam, he came to the conclusion that the market-value of Ac. 1-00 of land with 60 or 70 such trees thereon was Rs. 2,000/-. On this basis, he proposed to determine the compensation. As the trees cut were only 32 and the land remained with the petitioner as ever, he held that a sum of Rs. 1000/- could constitute full compensation for the damage sustained by the plaintiff as a result of felling the trees. In the result, he gave a decree for Rs. 1000/- besides the statutory interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date when the trees were cut by the respondent. It is this order that is called in question by the petitioner. 4. Sri Balaparameswari Rao, the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner contends that the basis adopted cannot be said to be a proper legal basis for assessment of compensation in such eases. According to him, the true dependable basis can be found only in the method of capitalisation of annual net income from the trees at ten years purchase. In support of this contention he relies on Shunmuga Velayuda v. collector of Tanjore, A.I.R. 1926 Madras 945(2). That was a case under Land Acquisition Act which is a self-contained enactment embodying also provisions concerning the mode of assessment of compensation. The Telegraph Act, however, makes no such provision. All that it says is that the petitioner is entitled to full compensation and this compensation, on dispute being raised, shall be determined by the District Judge and his determination shall be final. Thus the Act recognises the civil rights and leaves the dispute as to sufficiency of compensation to the determination of a specified civil court and subject to the proviso therein attaches finality to its decision. If at all there is any restriction imposed by this enactment on the enforcement of this ordinary civil right, it is only to this extent. Otherwise, the right of the party to get redress is unimpaired. He has, as ever his right to get his full compensation, determined on the established principles of law and justice. So then, the provisions of any other special enactment in the matter of determination of Compensation may be only of some assistance but not a sure and full guide. Reliance therefore exclusively on decisions and cases under Land Acquisition Act for purposes of assessment of full compensation for damage within the meaning of the Telegraph Act may not be of great help. Much must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. In the present case, the learned Judge sought to assess the damage incurred by the plaintiff by taking into account the deterioration of the property in value by reason of the act which resulted in damage. I do not think that could on no account be a legal basis for determination of compensation for the damage complained of. Assuming that there could be also other basis on which the computation could possibly be made, more appropriately, this being a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of superintendence of this Court would not extend to the correction of such errors. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, 1960 SCJ 1065 at p.107: (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 137 at p.142), it was observed thus: "However wide it may be than the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure , it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under that section assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. If anything it may merely be an erroneous decision which, the error not being apparent ton the face of the record, cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227." It was further observed: "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record." In view of this pronouncement, the first point raised does not merit acceptance. 5. Now as regards the second point, the argument is two-fold. Firstly, it is contended that the reference to District Judge in section 16 being made as persona designata, the District Judge could not delegate his authority to the Additional District Judge. The second contention is that even otherwise, when the law enjoins that the District Judge should determine the dispute, Additional District Judge could not have any jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case. 6. Now the matter largely turns upon the question whether the District Judge while exercising the powers under Section 16 of the Act was intended to act as a persona designata and not as a court of civil jurisdiction. A reference to clauses (3), (4) and (5) of section 16 may be appropriate in this behalf which read thus: "x x x x (3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency a of the compensation to be paid under section 10, clause (d), it shall, on application for that purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him. (4) If any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it, the telegraph authority may pay into Court of the District Judge such amount as he deems sufficient, or, whether all the disputing parties having in writing admitted the amount tendered to be sufficient or the amount has been determined under sub-section (3), that amount; and the District Judge, after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, shall determine the persons entitled to receive the compensation or as the case may be, the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it. (5) Every determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) shall be final: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of any compensation paid by the Telegraph authorities from the person who has received the same." It may be noticed that the reference in the above provision in clause (3) is to "District Judge", in clause (4) it is to the court of the District Judge whereas in clause (5) it is to "a District Judge". The expression persona designata connotes a person pointed out by name or other personal description in contra-distinction to one whose identity is to be ascertained by the office which he holds. So then, where a person is indicated in a Statute not by name but by an official designation, a question will arise whether the intention was to single him out as a persona designata, that is, as an individual, the designation being merely a further description of him or it was that he would cease to be the person so indicated on losing his official designation. Surely if he be a judicial officer as in this case and is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity or court of civil jurisdiction, he cannot come within the expression "persona designata" so that he may, irrespective of his continuance in office, perform the duty. Whether the intention is one or the other has to be gathered from the words used, nature of the functions to be performed and object and purpose of the statute. 7. As already pointed out, the Telegraph Act legalises civil trespass of the kind but preserves intact the right of the person to be fully compensated for the damage resulting from infringement of his civil right. It however so far as the determination of compensation is concerned prescribes the forum and the manner in which it is to be moved and declares its decision as final. The ordinary right of a civil suit, if at all, may be deemed to be affected only to this extent. Thus, the determination of compensation under the Act must be by the District Judge, a Judge of the principal civil court of original civil jurisdiction. It is possible that even under the ordinary law certain cases though not all, having regard to their pecuniary value may have to be instituted normally in such a court. But what is more significant is that this law contemplates an application and not a suit for getting redress which indeed is a departure from the ordinary rule. This, obviously, is intended to get justice without much expense. Further, as already observed, the provision attaches finality to the determination by the District Judge evidently to obviate unnecessary delay without any risk of failure of justice. Certainly the decision by a higher court in matters so simple as these affords full protection against such risks. Thus it is manifest that the determination of civil rights of the kind being normally the duty of the civil courts, the Act has for its object and purpose getting disputes as to the sufficiency of compensation determined finally by the principal court of original jurisdiction without much expense to the parties. The language of the section on its proper construction also makes it clear that reference to the District Judge therein is in no other capacity than that of a civil Court. As a matter of fact, in sub-clause (4) of the same section, there is a reference to the court of the District Judge. It is provided in that section that in case of dispute as to persons entitled to receive compensation or as to the relative shares of various persons interested, the Telegraph authority may deposit in the court of the District Judge such amount as be deems sufficient or the amount admitted in writing to he sufficient by the disputing party. It further provides that the amounts determined by the District Judge as full compensation also may be paid into the court of the District Judge. It is reasonably clear that reference to the District Judge is in no manner apart from his capacity as a civil court of principal jurisdiction. It may further be noticed that the Act provides for payment of court fee and issue of process in its section 34. This is a further indication that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction was being made available for the settlement of dispute. As observed in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General, 1913 AC 546, by Lord Parker of Waddington: "Where by statute matters are referred to the determination of a court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters as a court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same." But these observations, it is argued, are applicable only to cases where reference is made in explicit terms to the court and not to the particular judicial officer and that a distinction should be drawn between a reference to the District Judge and that to the District Court. Whatever may be said of such a distinction, I find none in the above mentioned provisions having regard to the clear intent of the Act which I have set out in the above paragraph at some length. An argument of the king. in a case under the Telegraph Act was advanced before a Bench of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Punjab Government Lahore, A.I.R. 1942 Lahore 186 at p.187. Justice Beckett who spoke for the court observed: "I think, it may be safely said, however, that when a Court normally consists of a single judicial officer, as the Court of a District Judge does, it is quite an ordinary practice in the drafting of Indian statutes for a reference to be made to that officer under his particular title when the intention is to refer to the court;..........." With respect, I find myself in complete agreement with the above observation. That apart, as already discussed when on a true construction of the provisions of the Act it is abundantly clear that the intention of the Act was to obtain determination of civil rights of the kind by a civil court, the use of expressions "the District Judge" or "a District Judge" who are the presiding officers of the District Court, does not militate against any inference as to their being used as synonym for the District Court and such officers on that account cannot be said to have been selected to exercise the powers of a persona designata. 8. The learned counsel cited several cases dealing with the expression "persona designata" but none of them relate to assessment of compensation for breach of a civil right. Most of them relate to election or industrial matters and are not of much assistance for our purpose and therefore need not be discussed here. In the cases cited, there are also some rulings of the Madras High Court prior to the decision in Mahabaleswarappa v. Gopalaswami, A.I.R. 1935 Madras 673 which certainly is not in his favour. A.I.R. 1942 Lahore 186 is the only authority on the question under the Indian Telegraph Act. That is a decision by the Lahore High Court and is against the petitioner. In B. Krishna Brahman v. D. Chenchi Reddy, A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 129 at p.132 the question arose in relation to a Magistrate whether while acting under section 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1951) he was acting as persona designata or by virtue of his office. After review of case law it was observed thus: "The effect of all these decisions is that if the Presiding Officer was selected to act in a particular matter in his private or individual capacity he acts as a persona designata and not in his capacity as a Judge; and if additional duties are entrusted to him as the Presiding Officer of that Court he discharges them as a Court attracting all the incidence of such jurisdiction such as appeal, revision, etc., attached to it. When new functions are assigned to him, his jurisdiction as Presiding Officer is enlarged quite dissimilar to the situation where the officer is constituted a special authority and does not act in the discharge of those functions as the Presiding Officer." That with respect, correctly sums up the position. Thus, on the clear language and intention of the provisions, the nature of the duties, and the purpose of the Act that it intended to get the civil rights letermined by the civil court of the rank of a District Judge finally, it admits of little doubt that the reference to District Judge in Section 16 is not in his personal capacity or as an individual, but as a court. As a matter of fact, sub-clauses (3) (4) and (5) of section 16 of the Act unequivecally point to the fact that the determination by a District Judge is a determination by the civil court. 9. That being the case, the next question that arises is, whether the expression "the District Judge" would include "an Additional District Judge". When it is once clear that the reference to District Judge is in fact a reference to District court as normally that court consists of a single Judicial Officer, whatever function the District Judge was intended to perform could also be lawfully delegated to the Additional District Judge who is a Judge of the same court. Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act is clear on this point and reads thus : "When in the opinion of the High Court, the state of business pending before the Judge of any District Court (hereinafter called the District Judge) so requires, the State Government may appoint one or more Additional District Judges to that Court for such period as they may deem necessary, the Additional District Judge so appointed shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under this Act or any other law for the time being in force which the District Judge may assign to them, and, in the discharge of those functions, they shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge." This provision permits the assignment of the duties not only in cases ordinarily instituted in the civil court but also in cases where they are instituted under any particular law before the District Judge. In either case, the District Judge has power to assign them to the Additional District Judge, who thus seised of the case can lawfully dispose it of as a Judge of the District Court as contemplated by section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act. The question whether an Additional District Judge can thus lawfully act in matters which are within the domain of the District Judge under special laws incidentally came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of S.A. First Grade Pleader, Coimbatore, 1940-1 Mad LJ 259 which arose under the Legal Practictioners Act. The learned Chief Justice who spoke for the court, after referring to the provisions of Section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act observed thus: "Therefore an Additional District Judge may lawfully deal with matters which come within the province of the District Judge under the Act or any other law for the time being in force." It is argued that the term district judge has not been defined in the Telegraph Act and that expression as defined in the General Clauses Act means the Judge of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and therefore it does not include the Additional District Judge and that the Madras Civil Courts Act will have no application to these cases. This argument also is devoid of force. It admits of little argument that Additional District Judge also is "a" if not "the" only Judge of the principal court of original jurisdiction. When once it is held that being a civil right the intention of the Act was to get the matter determined by the District Court and section 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act permits assignment of cases filed under any other law to the Additional District Judge and gives the same status to the Additional District Judge, the definition under Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act must be taken to include the Additional District Judge. Nothing in the context of the Act is in any manner repugnant to this meaning. As a matter of fact, it may be seen that in sub-clause (5) of Section 16 of the Telegraph Act indefinite article "a" and not definite article "the" in relation to District Judge is used. In other words, the determination of cases under the Telegraph Act can be by any District Judge. This is a clear indication that it is not necessary that the determination should be only by the principal District Judge and not by an Additional District Judge. In these circumstances it is manifest that the expression "the District Judge" used in the Telegraph Act includes the Additional District Judge. That apart, when the reference to the District Judge in that Act is virtually to the District Court, the Madras Civil Courts Act will have its operation unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. Above all, the Constitution of India which now holds the field includes in Article 236 an Additional Sessions Judge also in the expression "the District Judge" It follows that the expression "District Judge" is wide enough to cover the Additional District Judge. A similar question had arisen in relation to the expression "the Subordinate Judge" in one of the cases decided by this Court. It was contended there that the expression subordinate Judge does not include Additional Subordinate Judge. In a decision rendered by Satyanarayana Raju, J. in Maturi Umamaheswararao v. Khota Kamraju, 1957 Andh LT 814 it was held that the expression "subordinate Judge" is wide enough to include the principal as well as an Additional Subordinate Judge. For the reasons shown above, the plea that the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to determine the compensation cannot be accepted. 10. A preliminary ground to render the above plea itself unentertainable was originally raised by the counsel for the respondent on the basis that since the petitioner took no such objection as to the jurisdiction before the Additional District Judge when the case was taken up he is estopped from taking that objection after the result has gone against him. I do not see any substance in this point. If the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction, certainly consent of the parties could not confer any. If that was not a validly constituted tribunal or court, acquiescence in the proceedings will not turn it into a lawful tribunal. In other words, if it was illegal at its inception, it will remain so till the end. But as already observed, the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction in the matter. This petition would therefore fail and it is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.