M. Jagannadha Rao, J.This is an appeal preferred by the legal representatives of the deceased claiming compensation in a sum of Rs. 52,000/- u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the). The accident occurred on 8-4-1984 and the deceased who met with the accident died three days later, on 11-4-1984. At the time of death, the deceased was was aged 40 years and it is claimed that he was earning Rs. 30/- per day by selling kirana articles on his cycle. The Tribunal went into this question and awarded a sum of Rs. 25,600/-, out of which Rs. 21,600/- is relatable to the loss of dependency and Rs. 4,000/- is towards loss of consortium. Interest was awarded at 6% P.A. from the date of petition. The claimants in this case are the wife, mother and two sons of the deceased.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant, Sri P. Gopaldas representing Sri P. Ramakrishna Raju has contended that the award is liable to be enhanced not only by increasing pecuniary damages but that some amount must be awarded for the non-pecuniary damages, in all cases of death. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company, Sri S. Hanumaiah has, however, contended that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is sufficient. He also contended that in view of the Judgment of the Full Bench in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Narsavva no amount is payable towards pain and suffering (physical or mental) or loss of ameneties. He also contended that in cases of death, instantaneous or otherwise, no amount can be claimed towards non-pecuniary damages viz., loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of ameneties.

3. On these contentions four points arise for consideration :--

(1) Whether the decision of the Full Bench in The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Narasavva and Others, precludes the making of an award for pain and suffering, (physical or mental), or other non-pecuniary damages or loss to the estate

(2) What is the life-span or expectation of life, at different age levels applicable to our country

(3) Whether in case of death, (instantaneously or otherwise), it is not obligatory for the Tribunal to award non-pecuniary damages for loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of ameneties--for the short interval before the death--and if so what should the conventional amount be

(4) Whether, on facts, any enhancement is to be made in the pecuniary damages or loss to the dependancy

4. Point No. 1 :--It is argued for the respondent that in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Narsavva, no award should be made towards pain and suffering. In my opinion, this submission is not correct. In that case, the tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 3,000/- towards the mental pain and suffering of the dependants. That was held to be not permissible in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Sivammal and Others Vs. Managing Director, Pandian Roadways Corporation and Another, where the Supreme Court set aside a similar award of Rs. 5,000/- towards the mental agony of the dependants made by the Madras High Court. The Full Bench also partly over-ruled Srisailam Devastanam Vs. Bhavani Pramilamma and Others, N.R.C. where also a sum of Rs. 2000/- was awarded towards mental pain suffered by the dependants.

5. The distinction between the above rulings and the present case is that we are here concerned not with the award for the pain and suffering of the dependants but with the pain and suffering of the deceased, i.e. for that endured between the time of the accident and his death. It is now too well settled by several decisions in England and India that under the head of loss to the estate or the non-pecuniary damages as they are called, we have to make an award for pain and suffering of the deceased, loss of expectation of life and loss of ameneties. Though in the case of a claim by an injured person, the award towards pain and suffering and loss of ameneties may be substantial--still, conventional damages have to be awarded even in case of death, towards the pain and suffering and loss of ameneties attributable to the deceased, for the interval between the time of accident and time of death, however short it may be, as detailed under point No. 2 below. This award for the pain and suffering of the deceased cannot be. confused with the wrong award for the pain and suffering of the dependants. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Sivammals case (2 supra) while deleting the sum of Rs. 5,000/- awarded by the High Court towards the mental agony of the dependants, did not reduce the total award by the said sum, but maintained the same total figure, by awarding Rs. 5,000/- towards the pain and suffering of the deceased. While it is true that the Full Bench in Narsavvas case (1 supra) deleted Rs. 3,000/- awarded by the Tribunal for the mental agony or suffering of the dependants and did not make any award for the pain and suffering of the deceased it is important to note that the Supreme Court in Sivammals case (2 supra) made an award of Rs. 5,000/- for the pain and suffering of the deceased, and thereby maintained the total award without reduction. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Full Bench in Narsavvas (1 supra) held against making any award for pain and suffering of the deceased. That question was not decided by the Full Bench. In fact, the Supreme Court judgment in Sivammals case(2 supra) permits such an award. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly.

6. Point No. 2 :--It is important to have an idea of the expectation on the part of the deceased in regard to his future span of life. The life expectation (ex) for persons dying at different age-intervals has been published by the Registrar General, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, in 1985. The Table has been appended to my judgment in the first part of the Appendix in Bhagwandas Vs. Mohd. Arif, It gives the balance of the life expectation for different age intervals for Rural, Urban and Combined populations and for Males, Females and generally for all persons, separately. That Table published by the Government will set at rest various conjectures by the Courts as to the average span of life. Some decided cases put it at 60, some at 65 and others go upto 70 or 80. It will be noted from the Table that expectation of life will be different at different age levels, starting from birth. In view of the high rate of child-mortality, it will be less at birth and is lower upto 10 years, and increases in respect of those who survive 10 years. For example, for those in the age interval 35-40 years, the future expectation of life in years is (A) Rural : 32.2 (Male) ; 35.0 (Female) ; 33.5 (Person) and (B) Urban : 34.3 (Male) ; 37.2 (Female) ; and 35.6 (Person). Likewise, it will be noted that those who survive upto 70 years, are however, likely to survive for another 9 to 11 years. That gives an idea of the balance years of expected life. For the benefit of readers, the Expectation of Life (ex) (remaining expected life span) at different age intervals as per the figures of the Registrar General (Government of India) (1976-80) are set out below :

7. Recently, the Supreme Court, in Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam, 1987 A C.J. 172 proceeded on the basis that the life span of a person (who died on 21-10-1973) at the age of 45 years could be taken to be upto 70 years. The said assumption of the Supreme Court appears to be, more or less, consistent with the above official figures.

8. The above table of official figures published by the Registrar General, Government of India, will, I hope, be of sufficient guidance. Point No. 2 is decided accordingly.

9. Point No. 3:--In every case relating to the death of a person in a motor vehicles accident, compensation is payable under the law of Torts read with the Fatal Accidents Act and can be claimed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The claim consists of two parts. One is for pecuniary damages to the dependants of the deceased and the other is for the loss to the estate comprising of atleast three items viz., loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of amenities. The Tribunal is bound to award damages under each of these heads depending upon the evidence adduced by the parties.

10. It is unfortunate that several tribunals in our Stale are not awarding any amount towards non-pecuniary damages in case of fatal acccidents where the deceased died instantaneously or where the deceased died some time after the accident. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. and Another Vs. R.M.K. Veluswami and Others, , the damages have to be computed both towards the loss to the dependency as well as loss to the estate. Even in Sivammals case (2 supra), an award was made in this regard. In A.P.S.R.T.C. v. S.V. Perumal Chetty, 1982 (2) ALT 922, I had occasion to consider in greater detail, whether non-pecuniary damages falling under the head of loss to the estate and comprising these three items--loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of amenities--are to be paid even in cases of instantaneous death.

(A) So far as loss of expectation of life is concerned, in Perumal Chettys case (1 supra) I have referred to Winfield and Jolowicz on Law of Torts, 12th Edn. 1984 (at page 625) wherein it is clearly laid down that an award should be made for loss of expectation of life even in the case of instantaneous death. It was being paid by courts in England till the award towards the loss of expectation of life was abolished by statute recently in 1982. The relevant passage in the treatise mentioned above reads as follows :

"A person is entitled to damages under this head for the mental suffering caused by his awareness that his life expectation has been shortened by the injuries, but the separate head of loss of expectation of life was abolished by the Administration of Justice Act 1982. Before that Act a claim lay for the shortening of life expectancy even though the plaintiff was unaware of the loss, and, indeed, even in cases of instantaneous death (Rose v. Ford, (1937) AC 826) but the difficulties of valuation of such an item soon persuaded the Courts to adopt a modest conventional sum ( 200 in Benham v. Gambling, (1941) AC 157 which would rarely be departed from (for an extreme case in Burns v. Edman, (1970) QB 541. In fact, the principle function of this head of damage was to provide in an indirect way for damages for bereavement in certain cases."

Likewise, in Charlesworth on Negligence (at page 1428), it is again observed that damages are payable for loss of expectation of life even in case of instantaneous death. The said passage reads as follows :

"The House of Lords in Rose v. Ford (7 supra) decided that a claim under this head of damage was also available in an action brought under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1934 on behalf of a deceased persons estate and an award will be made even although the deceased was killed instantaneously. (Morgan v. Scoulding, (1938) 1KB 786".

After referring to the above said passage, I pointed out in Perumal Chettys case (6 Supra) that in England damages under this head of loss of expectation of life were being awarded at the rate of 200 earlier and later it was raised to 500 in 1967 and subsequently 750 in 1973. After referring to the cases from various High Courts I pointed out that the Gujarat, Karnataka, Madras and Madhya Pradesh High Courts have been consistently awarding damages for loss of expectation of life in every case where the death occurred and instantaneously or some time after the accident. I also pointed out that the award in this regard is between Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. After considering the case law, I held a sum of Rs. 7,500/- is payable towards loss of expectation of life, in respect of accidents which have taken place around 1981. For accidents which occurred much later, the amount can be increased depending upon the inflation.

(B) In the same judgment, I also pointed out that a conventional amount has to be awarded, even in case of instantaneous death towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some amount is payable towards pain and suffering and loss of ameneties. A slightly higher figure can be awarded if the death is not instantaneous. Having regard to the decided cases, I held that atleast a sum of Rs. 7,500/- is payable towards pain and suffering and loss of ameneties even in case of instantaneous death.

11. In Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami(5 Supra) the Supreme Court awarded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards loss to the estate which obviously comprises of the award towards loss of expectation of life and for pain and suffering and for loss of ameneties. The Supreme Court case related to an accident long before 1960. It is therefore reasonable to award a total sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards non-pecuniary damages under the head of loss to the estate comprising of the three items--loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of ameneties-- , even in case of instantaneous death. In Sivammals case (2 supra) also, Rs. 5,000/- was awarded as non-pecuniary damages.

12. Though, there is a larger question whether the award for pecuniary damages to the dependancy should be reduced by the figure awarded as non-pecuniary damages to the estate, I am not going into that question here because both in Gobald Motor case (5 supra) as well as Sivammals case (2 supra), the Supreme Court added the award for the estate to the award for the dependancy and did not deduct the former from the latter. Further, the practice in several High Courts is, as stated in Perumal Chettys (6 supra), to add up both the awards for the dependancy and to the estate.

13. In the result, I hold that in every case of fatal accident an award of Rs. 7,500/- towards loss of expectation of life and another sum of Rs. 7,500/-towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities atleast, has to be made, in effect a total sum of Rs. 15,000/-. The award must consist of pecuniary damages payable to the dependancy which is based on the earning capacity of the deceased and also a separate award towards the non-pecuniary damages or loss to the estate comprising of the above three items which in any event, cannot be below Rs. 15,000, whether the case is one of instantaneous death or otherwise. The Motor Vehicle Tribunals are directed to take notice of this fundamental principle of law in every case. Point No. 3 is decided accordingly.

14. Point No. 4:--This point relates to the pecuniary damages award-able to the dependancy in the present case. The monthly dependancy to the estate is at Rs. 150/-. Applying the actuarial multiplier table laid down in Bhagwandas v. Md. Arif(4supra), the appropriate multiplier for a person aged 40 years at the time of his death in the motor accident will be 12.79. As the deceased in this case is not an employee who is to retire at the age of 60 years, the multiplier mentioned above is to be slightly increased. The multiplier of 13.79 is accordingly applied. The present value of the future pecuniary loss to the dependancy will be 13.79 X 150 X 12, which comes to Rs. 24,822/-and is rounded off as Rs. 24,800/-. This is the loss to the dependancy.

15. Coming to the question of loss to the estate comprising of loss to the expectation of life, pain and suffering and loss of ameneties, I am making an award of Rs. 15,000/- for the reasons mentioned above. In the result, the award passed by the lower Court is enhanced from, Rs. 25,600/- to Rs. 39,800. Interest will be payable at 12% P.A. on the amount of enhanced compensasation of Rs. 14,200/-.

16. In the result, there will be an award in a sum of Rs. 39,800/- out of which Rs. 25,600/- will carry interst at 6% P.A. from the date of petition till the date of payment and Rs. 14,200/- will carry interest at 12% P.A. from the date of petition till date of payment.

17. Out of the total sum mentioned above, the widow of the deceased will be initially awarded Rs. 10,000/- with interest and the mother of the deceased Rs. 5,000/- with interest. The remaining amount will be invested in fixed deposit by the Tribunal for an appropriate period to cover the period of minority of the minors. During that period the interest accruing thereon will be paid to the mother of the minors quarterly without security.

18. The C.M.A. is partly allowed and disposed of as mentioned above. No costs.