M. R. A. ANSARI, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal and the cross objections arise out of the judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) awarding compensation of Rs. 6,000. 00 to the parents of a boy aged 5 years by name Kamal in respect of a motor accident which occurred on 26. 4. 64. The parents of the boy (who will be hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed a petition before the Tribunal under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming a sum of Rs. 30,000. 00 by way of compensation for the death of their boy who met with his death in the said accident. The claim was made against the owner of the car involved in the accident and the General Assurance Company with which the said car had been insured. They will be referred to hereinafter as the respondents. The respondents have filed the appeal against the award of compensation of Rs. 6,000. 00 and the petitioners have filed the cross objections for enhancement of the compensation amount.

( 2 ) THE case of the petitioners is that on 26. 4. 1964 at about 4. 15 P. M. when their son Kamal was crossing the Ramjas Road opposite Sant Permanand Eye Hospital, Karol Bagh, Delhi, the car bearing registration No. DLF 2595 owned by the 1st respondent and driven by his driver came at a fast speed from the Original Road without the horn being sounded and knocked down the boy who was crossing the road. The boy came under the front right wheel of the car and met with serious injuries and died on the spot. The petitioner No. 1, who is the father of the deceased, was employed as senior draftsman in the National mineral Development Corporation at Faridabad and was drawing Rs. 325. 00 as basic salary besides allowances. According to the petitioners the deceased was a bright boy and the boy had very good prospects in life, and was expected to earn a decent living so as to be a source of financial assistance to his parents. They, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 30,000. 00 as compensation.

( 3 ) THE application was resisted by the respondents on the ground that the accident occurred entirely due to the fault of the deceased as the boy having crossed the road suddenly turned back and hit the car and that the accident did not occur due to any negligence on the part of the driver. They also contested the petitioners claim for compensation on the ground that it was excessive.

( 4 ) THE learned Tribunal framed the following issues :"1. What is the effect of there being no allegation that the driver was driving the car at the time of accident under the employment or control of respondent No. 1 the owner 2. Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the car in question 3. Whether deceased was guilty of contributory negligence 4. To what amount if any, is the petitioner entitled 5. Relief. All the issues were held in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents and the learned Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 6,000. 00.

( 5 ) THREE witnesses were examined by the petitioners to prove the manner in which the accident occurred. They are Public Witness 2, Public Witness 3 and 4. One of them, Public Witness 3, is the resident of the house in front of which the accident is said to have occurred. All these witnesses stated that it was while the deceased was crossing the road that the car came at a fast speed from the Original Road and after taking the turning at the junction of the Original Road and Ramjas Road knocked down the deceased. They also stated that the driver of the car did not sound the horn before he took the turning. They denied the suggestion made on behalf of the respondents that the boy after crossing the road had suddenly turned back. The evidence of these witnesses is challenged on the ground that admittedly the car was stopped immediately after it had knocked down the boy and that the boy was actually found between right front wheel and the right rear wheel of the car which would prove that the car could not have been going at a high speed. High speed and low speed are relative terms and whether a car was going at high speed or low speed has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. A car travelling at 40 to 50 miles an hour on a national highway cannot be said to be travelling at high speed but the same car going on a crowded road at that speed will certainly be taken as going at a high speed. In the present case, the car had come from the Original Road which was the main road and had taken a turn into Ramjas Road which was a side road and there were khokhas at the junction of the two roads. As the Ramjas Road would not be visible to the car driver before he took the turning, he, as a prudent driver, ought to slow down the car sufficiently in order to be able to prevent any accident. The fact that he could not stop the car before hitting the deceased shows that he was not driving the car at such a slow speed as was necessary under the circumstances.

( 6 ) AS already stated Public Witness 2, Public Witness 3, and 4 have denied the suggestion that the boy had crossed the road and suddenly turned back and hit the car. The respondent did not adduce any evidence whatever in support of their suggestion and in rebuttal of the evidence of these witnesses. The fact, which has not been denied by the respondents, is that the boy was knocked down by the front right side of the car and was run over by the front right wheel, would belly the suggestion of the respondents because if the boy had crossed the road from the eastern side to the western side and had turned back then he would have been hit by the front left side of the car and he would have been run over by the front left wheel. Neither in the reply filed by the respondents nor in the cross examination of these witnesses have they stated that the boy had crossed the road from the western side to the eastern side and then turned back. Therefore, I have no difficulty at all in agreeing with the finding of the learned Tribunal that the accident was entirely due to the negligence of the driver.

( 7 ) THE next question to be considered is with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded to the petitioners by the learned Tribunal. While the respondents in their appeal contend that the compensation was excessive, the petitioners have filed the cross objections for enhancement of the compensation. The learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the cross objection filed by the petitioners. The learned counsel contends that the Act is self contained and it did not provide for the filing of any cross objection. In reply the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that where the Act is silent, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would apply and that under the said Code where one party files an appeal, the opposite party is at liberty to file cross objections. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Munjula Devi Bhutta and another v. Manjusri Raha and others1 wherein it was held that "as soon as this Court becomes seized of an appeal, even where an appellate jurisdiction is conferred under a special statute, the rules of practice and procedure of this Court applicable to a civil appeal will, in the absence of any specific rule to the contrary govern such appeal. " In support of this view their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court have referred to a decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Ram Rao2 and also to a decision of the Supreme Court in. V. S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros3. The learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to cite any decision contra to the one cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and which would support his own contention. The practice in This Court also appears to permit the filing of cross objection when appeals are filed against judgment of the Tribunal. I, therefore, hold that the cross objections filed by the petitioners are maintainable.

( 8 ) WITH regard to the quantum of compensation, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the provisions governing the determination of compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act do not apply to cases under the Act. This contention is certainly supported not only by the decision of the Madras High Court in Cainnaponnu Ammal v. T. N. Mooka Pillai and another4 but also by the decision of a Division Bench of our own High Court in Ishwari Devi and others v. Union of India and others. 6 Though the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents has to be upheld it would not be of very great help to him in view of the decision of this Court in Ishwari Devis case in which it was held that the word "just" appearing in section 110B of the Act has a wider ambit than the words used in sections 1 (A) and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and that the Claims Tribunal may apply the principles laid down in the decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act if they, in the opinion of the Tribunal, would serve as a proper measure of what is "just" compensation in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.

( 9 ) THE learned Tribunal has taken into consideration all the relevant factors for determining the amount of compensation, such as the potential earning capacity of the deceased, the normal expectation of his life, the status of the family of the deceased, and the estimate of the financial assistance which the petitioners expected from the deceased if he had lived his normal age. Unless there are compelling reasons, and in this case no compelling reasons have been shown to me by either side, it would not be proper to interfere with the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, either by way of reduction or by way of enhancement. The judgment of the learned Tribunal is, therefore, confirmed and both the appeal and the cross objections are dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.