1. These five appeals have come before this Court on certificates granted by the High Court of Kerala. They raise common question of law and will be dealt with together. One of the appeals (No. 262) arises out of a writ petition by the karanavan of a Muslim Mopla Tarwad in the District of North Malabar, governed by the Marumakkathayam Law. The other four appeals arise out of writ petitions by Karanavans of Hindu undivided families in Malabar and Cochin. These five writ petitions challenged the constitutionality of the Wealth Tax Act, No. 27 of 1957, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and prayed for the quashing of the wealth-tax assessments made in these cases. There are certain differences of facts in the five petitions, but we do not propose to refer to those differences as we propose to confine ourselves to the attack on the constitutionality of the Act.

2. The main contentions of the respondents before the High Court with respect to the constitutionality of the Act were two-fold, namely - (1) that Parliament was not competent to include Hindu undivided families in the charging S.3 of the Act in view of the provision in Enquiry 86 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and (2) that the provision relating to Hindu undivided families was discriminatory and denied equal protection of laws and was therefore hit by Art.14 of the Constitution.

3. The High Court held on the first question that Parliament was competent to include Hindu undivided families in S.3 of the Act. On the second question, the High Court held that though the contention under Art.14 had not been taken in the petition before it in the form in which it was presented at the time of argument, it was open to it to go into the question in view of certain adjournments granted to the parties in this connection and also in view of the fact that the matter had been fully argued before it by learned counsel for the parties. Eventually the High Court said that the issue as to discrimination had been fully argued on both sides and the department had sufficient opportunity to meet the objection under Art.14 and it therefore finally proceeded to consider the same. The main contention under this head before the High Court was that the Act though it subjected Hindu undivided families to a tax under S.3 thereof made no provision for Muslim Mopla Tarwads which were also undivided families and therefore there was discrimination so far as undivided families were concerned. In that connection the contention of the appellant before the High Court was that Muslim Mopla Tarwads were so insignificant in number that their existence could be ignored and the practice of the appellant had been to assess such Tarwads under the Act as individuals. The High Court however was not impressed by this contention on behalf of the appellant and said that it behoved the department to furnish some information to sustain the contention that Muslim Mopla Tarwads were so insignificant in number as to be negligible and that had not been done. The High Court therefore finally held that there was discrimination as between Hindu undivided families and Muslim Mopla Tarwads which were also undivided families and therefore the charging section in so far as it governed undivided families was hit by Art.14.

4. We have come to the conclusion that these cases must be remanded to the High Court for further consideration after giving parties an opportunity to place full facts in connection with the application of Art.14 before it. The High Court itself pointed out that there was no averment on behalf of the writ petitioners before the High Court (no respondents before us) on the line, on which the argument finally developed at the hearing. It is true that some adjournments were granted by the High Court in this connection; but we are not satisfied that the case for the application or otherwise of Art.14 was properly put before the High Court by either side. We should like also to point out that the High Court seemed to take the view that it was for the State to show that Art.14 was not applicable. This is not correct, for it is for the party who comes forward with the allegation that equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws is being denied to him to adduce facts to prove such denial. It would therefore have been open to the High Court, in the absence of proper allegation supported by proper facts on the part of the respondents, to dismiss their writ petitions. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the issue about the constitutional validity of any statutory provision cannot be effectively or satisfactorily determined unless the petitioner sets out specific pleas and adduces satisfactory evidence in support of them. But we feel in the interest of justice that it is necessary that an opportunity should be given to the respondents to put forward their case under Art.14 properly before the High Court supported by facts and figures. We are also of opinion that after such facts and figures are put forward by the respondents before the High Court, an opportunity should be given to the State to meet the facts and figures and thereafter the High Court should proceed to consider whether there has been denial of equality before the law or of equal protection of the laws so far as undivided families are concerned. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary at this stage for us to consider whether the view of the High Court on the first question relating to legislative competence is or is not correct.

5. We therefore allow the appeals, set aside the orders of the High Court and remand the cases to the High Court to consider whether Art.14 applies in these cases or not after giving parties opportunity of putting forward their respective cases before it supported by facts and figures. In the circumstances, we order the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.