B. V. RANGA RAJU, J.

( 1 ) THE plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for declaration of his title in the plaint b schedule property, for a direction to the defendants to put him in vacant possession of the b Schedule property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the a Schedule property.

( 2 ) AS per the plaint averments, the plaintiff purchased Ac. 1. 25 cts. of land bearing patta No. 70 in Sy. No. 82/1 under a registered sale deed dated 24-3-1977. However, by the date of purchase, the defendants were residing in a house (b Schedule property ). The vendors of the plaintiff told him that the defendants have been residing in the said house, that they will vacate the same as and when demanded, that the defendants also agreed before the plaintiff to vacate the house as and when he demands, that however, in the month of October, 1979 when the plaintiff asked to vacate the same, they refused to do so, that they have been obstructing the passage towards Bheemunipatnam-Visakhapatnam road and that they also started leaving their cattle into the lands. Therefore, he filed the suit for the above mentioned reliefs.

( 3 ) THE defendants in their written statement contended that the above allegations are false. The house, cattle shed etc. are in existence since the time of their fore-fathers and they have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same more than 200 years, and they have been enjoying the same in their own right. The plaintiff has been trying to tag on the plaint b Schedule property which is nothing to do with the a Schedule property and they are not in the same survey number. It was further contended that the defendants have been drawing water from the well from the time of their fore-fathers and that there is a demarcated path from their house to the well and that the plaintiff has no right to question the same. The Trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff has got valid title to plaint a and b Schedule properties 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that he is absolute owner of plaint b Schedule property 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of plaint b Schedule property 4. Whether the plaint a and b schedule are correct 5. Whether the plaintiffs vendor has got title and right to sell plaint a and b Schedule properties 6. Whether the defendants are in permissive possession of plaint b schedule property 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for 8. To what relief the Trial Court on issues 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish the right over the b Schedule property and as the defendants are admittedly in possession of plaint b Schedule property, the plaintiff would be entitled to the injunction against the defendants so far as the plaint a Schedule property is concerned. On appeal, the learned i Additional District Judge confirmed the finding of the Trial Court, regarding b schedule property and has also set aside the finding of the Trial Court with regard to the plaint a Schedule property, as there was no need for the Trial Court to grant injunction against the defendants in respect of a schedule property, as the defendants contended that they have never interfered with the possession of the plaintiff.

( 4 ) THE point for consideration as framed by the lower appellate Court is as follows:- "whether the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Bheemunipatnam in O. S. No. 151/79 is liable to be set aside

( 5 ) ORDER 41, Rule 31 of the Civil procedure Code squarely envisages that the judgment of the appellate Court shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled to.

( 6 ) IN the face of the issues framed and the findings given by the Trial Court, the framing of such a point for consideration which is general in nature is in my opinion totally unsustainable. Any Appellate Court must address itself to the dispute and so frame the points for determination. At any rate, the point for determination cannot be as to whether the Trial Court is justified in its conclusions. It should not appear to any one that goes through the judgment in appeal that the lower Appellate Court has not addressed itself to the points in issue and when there is a specific provision in the Civil procedure Code, the lower appellate Courts must necessarily acquaint themselves with the nature of the dispute between the parties and so frame the points for determination. If, a bald point for determination as framed by the lower Appellate Court is framed, one is justified to comment that the lower Appellate court has not addressed itself to the real issues in contraversy. As such, I am of the opinion that the lower Appellate Court has abdicated its duty in framing the correct point for determination and decide the same.

( 7 ) THE points that arise for consideration are (1) whether the plaintiff has established that the b Schedule property is part of the property conveyed under Exs. A. 1 and (2) if so, whether he is entitled to the injunction against b Schedule property also.

( 8 ) THE plaintiff stated that at the time of execution of the sale deed, defendants were in possession of the b Schedule property. The extent of b Schedule is 4 to 5 1/2 cts. The reasoning of the lower Appellate Court is that, even if the plaintiff/appellant has purchased Ac. 1. 25 cts. under Ex. A-1 out of the total extent of Ac. 3. 51 cts. in Sy. No. 81/1, it is not proved that the site which is admittedly in occupation of the respondents/defendants (b Schedule) is part of the property under ex. A-1. It has also commented that there was failure on the part of the plaintiff to examine his vendor and mark title deed of his vendor. The plaintiff had to show the property in two separate Schedules (A and B) for the reason that he did not allege that the defendants in fact were in possession of the a Schedule property. It is also seen that the lower Appellate Court has not given a finding as to whether b Schedule property is not part of the property which was purchased under Ex. A. 1, or that the identity of the property which is in possession of the defendants, is not satisfactorily established by the plaintiff. The defendants have not set up any title to the b Schedule property. In para 2 of the written statement, the defendants denied that the plaint a and b Schedule properties are covered in Sy. No. 82/1 in patta no. 70. An effort was made in the Lower Court to locate the property which is in dispute. Though the report of the Commissioner, appointed by the Lower Court, is not marked in the suit, the same was relied upon by both sides before me. It is seen from the copy of the due report filed along with this appeal that both a and b schedules are portions of the Sy. No. 82/1. The Trial Court while adverting to the same, has pointed out that the report of the Commissioner shows that he has fixed the Western boundary and Survey stones as per the boundary shown by the plaintiff himself and did not fix the survey stones though they were present on the land, and as such, the report of the Commissioner cannot completely relied on for proving the case of the plaintiff. This finding of the Trial court was not, referred to by the lower appellate Court. The Commissioners report itself shows that the plaint a and b schedule properties are part of Sy. No. 82/1. On the issuance of rough patta to an extent of 5 1/2 cts. in Sy. No. 82/1 (Ex. A-2) a serious comment was made by the lower Court as to how he could have obtained the rough patta in August, 1976 itself, when he obtained the sale-deed on 24-3-1977 under Ex. A. l. It is seen from Ex. A-2 that the old Sy. No. is 82/1 and the present Sy. No. is 82/13. So far as the description in the sale deed Ex. A-1 is concerned, it shows that the extent is ac. 1. 25 cts. out of total extent of Ac. 3. 51 cts. in Sy. No. 82/1 in patta No. 70. The right of the plaintiff under the sale deed cannot be disputed unless the identity itself is not established by the plaintiff. That being the factual position, the defendants can only succeed if they establish that the b Schedule property is not part of the property that was purchased by the plaintiff under Ex. A-1. As already pointed out, it is not the case of the defendants that they are the owners of the said property or b Schedule property. It is also seen that no issue regarding adverse possession was framed and no finding in that regard was recorded by the lower appellate Court. The payment of tax after 1977 by the defendants under Exs. B-1 to b-14 does not help their case, as there is no reference to any survey number. So far as obtaining the pass book under Ex. B-16 is concerned, it is seen that Peethala Sanyasi is the pattedar. It is not known when the said pass book was issued. If the case of the defendants is that they became the owners, and if both sides stated that the plaint b Schedule is part of Sy. No. 82/1, the defendants also must establish that the property for which pass book is given, is the very same property that is in dispute. The lower Appellate Court without adverting to any documentary evidence and merely basing on the failure of the plaintiff to examine his vendor, cannot record a finding that the b Schedule property was not purchased by the plaintiff under Ex. A-1. The lower appellate Court ought not to have ignored the entire documentary evidence and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish his title over the b Schedule property without even referring to the report of the Commissioner. The Judgment under appeal would not have been interferred with had the lower Appellate Court given a positive finding that the property described as b Schedule does not tally with the physical features on the land as found by the commissioner. As such, I deem it proper to remand the matter for fresh disposal to the lower Appellate Court, by directing it to take into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence and the Commissioners report. The Second Appeal is, therefore, allowed. The matter is remanded to the lower Appellate Court for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made by me. The appellant is, entitled to refund of the court fee paid on the Memorandum of second Appeal. The parties are directed to appear before the I Additional District Judge, visakhapatnam on 22-4-1997.