S.K. Jha, J.

1. In this writ application two rules nisi have been issued, one for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing Annexure-5 to the writ application and another for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents, namely, the State of Bihar, the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi and the Cinema Magistrate. Ranchi not to enforce the direction or restriction imposed under the impugned order Annexure-5. The petitioner M/s. Vishnu Talkies is a partnership firm carrying its business of exhibiting cinematographic films in the town of Ranchi under a licence duly granted to it by the licensing authority, namely, the District Magistrate, who in the present case is the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi, Respondent No. 2 in pursuance of the provisions contained in Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Cinema (Regulations) Act, 1954 (Bihar Act XV of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. Shortly stated, the facts giving rise to this application are these. The petitioner firm has been carrying on business of exhibiting films in the town of Ranchi for the last 20 years and is holding a licence which is annually renewed on and with effect from the 1st of April every year, as we have been informed at the Bar. Before the enactment of the Bihar Act in question the cinema proprietors had to take out licences for exhibiting of films under the Cinematographs Act, 1918 (Central Act II of 1918) (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act 1918). The Central Act of 1918 was replaced by a later Central Act known as the Cinematographs Act 1952 (Act XXVII of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act 1952) and the 1918 Act was repealed to the extent that such a repeal shall have effect only in so far as the 1918 Act related to the sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition. Subsequently, however, the State Acts were enacted in different States in the chain of which the Bihar Act in question also came to be inserted in the Statute Book. As to the legislative history of the Bihar Act in question, I shall advert to it at some length at its proper place. The Bihar Act received the assent of the Governor of Bihar on the 17th of March, 1954 and the licensing authority under Section 4 of the Act was prescribed to be the District Magistrate. Under Section 5 (2) of the Act it was laid down that subject to certain provisions of the section and to the control of the State Government to which I shall refer in some detail in due course, the licensing authority may grant licences under this Act to the exhibitors. It was in pursuance of this power vested in the District Magistrate that for the year ending the 81st of March. 1974 the petitioners licence was renewed and one of the conditions or restrictions to which the licence issued to the petitioner was subjected and with which alone we are concerned in the present case was that contained in condition 8 (b) of the licence. A true copy of the licence issued to the petitioner as renewed for the year 1973-74 has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ application, condition 8 (b) of which is reproduced below:

"8 (b) Number of show to be held daily in the cinema will be four i.e. noon, 3 p. m., 6 p. m. and 9 p. m. no other show will be held in any circumstances without obtaining prior permission of the licensing authority. The time of the daily show should be changed only after obtaining the permission of the licensing authority."

3. According to the case of the petitioner, the licensing authority on appreciating the increasing demand of the cinema going public permitted the petitioner to exhibit four film shows every day, as would be apparent from condition No. 8 (b) of the licence granted to the petitioner, as quoted above. On the 27th of April 1973 the petitioners firm was served with an order passed by respondent No. 2, the Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi directing that with immediate effect no show should be held before 3 p.m. and on holidays permission could be granted for holding morning shows provided separate applications were filed for the purpose. A true copy of the said letter dated the 27th of April, 1973, has been marked Annexure-2 to the application. It seems the directions contained in Annexure-2 were also issued to cinema exhibitors of other towns including those of Patna and one of such film exhibitors had filed a writ application being C.W.J.C. No. 587 of 1973 challenging the validity of such a direction which was quashed by this Court by an order dated the 17th of August, 1973. I may mention here that so far as C. W. J. C. No. 587 of 1973 is concerned, I was a party to the Judgment of the Bench dated the 17th of August. 1973 by which the aforesaid impugned order was quashed solely on the ground that it was the licensing authority who had the power to impose restrictions or to put conditions and the State Government which was the appellate authority as also the re-visional authority under the Bihar Act in question (could) not take upon itself the statutory powers and duties vested in or put upon the original licensing authority, namely, the District Magistrate; and as the impugned order in that case had been issued as per directions of the State Government without the licensing authority applying its own mind, it was held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, quashed. Be that as it may, after that judgment, on the 27th of September, 1973, a copy of an order dated the 26-9-1973, passed by the licensing authority was communicated to the petitioner to the following effect; (the translation from Hindi to English has been rendered by me).

"Complaints had come to the notice of the licensing authority that on the days when schools, colleges or other educational institutions were open many students instead of going to the educational institutions went to attend the cinema shows held before 3 P.M. causing great obstruction to the educational pursuits of the students. Having considered the matter from all aspects, it had been decided that on the days when the schools, colleges and/or other educational institutions remained open, no such cinema shows should be exhibited before 3 p. m. and, therefore, by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1954 the permission which had been accorded to the licensees to exhibit cinema shows before 3 P.M. was revoked and it was further ordered that on such days as the schools, colleges and other educational institutions were open, no cinema shows before 3 p.m. should be exhibited: and this restriction on the licence as a part of the conditions of the licence should be treated to have come into force with immediate effect".

It is this order as contained in Annexure-5 which is the subject matter of challenge in this writ application.

4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Deputy Commissioner and the Cinema Magistrate of Ranchi wherein in Paragraph 4 it has been stated that the statements made in the writ application to the effect that the permission to exhibit four film shows daily was given on appreciating an increasing demand of the cinema going public of Ranchi town was not admitted. Rather, the permission for four shows daily was granted in a routine manner just as a usual course. It has further been asserted that during the recent past a growing tendency had been noticed amongst the students to run away from educational institutions to the cinema houses during the Noon-shows which had in its turn serious adverse effect on the interests of- the general public, and it was necessary in the interests of the general public to put a restriction on exhibition of cinematograph films in cinema houses before 3 P. M. on the days on which educational institutions remained open. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit it has further been asserted that comparatively the number of students for whom classes were held in the morning and noon was much higher than those for whom classes were held in the evening. It has further been submitted that the impugned order does not put any unreasonable restriction on the petitioner, or for that matter, any cinema exhibitors right to carry on business or trade. Rather, the restriction was reasonable being impelled in the interest of the general public.

5. I may point out here that, the averment in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit to the effect that it was necessary in the interest of the general public to put such a restriction on exhibition of films in "cinema houses" shows that this restriction was so put not only on the licence of the present petitioner but on all the cinematograph exhibitors and there is nothing on the record to suggest anything to the contrary.

6. Mr. Vasudev Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner with his usual ingenious and able assistance to this Court has attacked the validity of Annexure-5 on the following grounds:

(i) Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Act confers unguided. unbriddled arbitrary and uncanalised power to the licensing authority and empowers it to act in such a manner as would attract the infraction of both Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It must as such, be held to be ultra vires.

(ii) In any event Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and should, therefore, be struck down.

(iii) If it be held that the provisions of Section 5 (2) are not ultra vires the Constitution on any of these grounds, then the kind of restriction that has been sought to be imposed by the licensing authority by issuing an order of the nature contained in Annexure-5 is not authorised by the provisions of Section 5 of the Act or any other provisions and, therefore, the action of the Deputy Commissioner in imposing such a restriction must be held by itself to be an unreasonable restriction specially as it is not regulatory in character but a prohibition on carrying on the petitioners trade or business and such an executive action de hors the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act, must itself be struck down as being unreasonable restriction not warranted by the provisions of Article 19.

(iv) Lastly, during the currency of the licence of the petitioner such a restriction could not be imposed to its detriment without affording it an opportunity of being heard, as this would be against the fundamental principles of natural justice embodied in the doctrine of audi alteram partem.

7. Before dealing with each of the points urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner, I think it worthwhile in order to appreciate the points involved and the application of the principles, which to my mind are not much in controversy to the facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping in view the exigencies of the situation in which the present restriction has been imposed, to give a legislative back-ground of how this State Act was brought on the Statute Book. The Cinematograph Act of 1918, which was a pre-Constitution Act was of mixed contents dealing with two distinct matters, namely, examination and certification of films as suitable for public exhibition and regulation and licensing of cinemas. After the coming into force of the Constitution of India "sanctioning of Cinematograph films for exhibition" was included in Entry No. 60 of the Union list and "cinemas subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I" was included in Entry 33 of the State list. Accordingly, the Central Act 37 of 1952 was to separate the provisions of the control of Act 1918 as amended in 1949, separating the provisions relating to the sanctioning of films for exhibition which was a Union subject from the provisions relating to licensing and regulating of cinemas which became a State subject limited only by the provisions of Entry 60 of List One. In the year 1952 or soon thereafter State Legislatures, accordingly, passed different State Acts some of which I shall merely mention here. Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act 1952 (Punjab Act XI of 1952), the Bombay Cinemas (Regulation) Act 1953 (Bombay Act XI of 1953), the Assam Cinemas (Regulation) Act. 1954) (Assam Act XIV of 1954), the West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act 1954 (West Bengal Act XXXIX of 1954) and the present Bihar Act XV of 1964 among other State Legislations on the subject were brought on the Statute Books. Without going into the details with regard to the respective provisions of the different State Acts mentioned above, suffice it to say that the provisions of all these State Acts, excepting with regard to the sequences of some of the sub-sections of Section 5 with which we are not concerned in the present case, the legislative intent and purport as well as the language of the different sections and their serial numbers are more or less the same. But so far as the Punjab Act mentioned above is concerned, the provisions thereof are mutatis mutandis the same as of the Bihar Act; rather the language used by the two State Legislatures also appears to be identical. I have chosen to make a special reference to the Punjab Act aforesaid merely for the purpose of indicating very shortly the scheme of the Bihar Act which is the same as was found to be the scheme of the Punjab Act by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan : AIR 1966 SC 1081 [LQ/SC/1965/369] . Section 3 of the Act provides that no person shall give an exhibition by means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under the Act or otherwise than in compliance with any conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. Section 4 provides that tha licensing authority under the Act shall be the District Magistrate provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute, for the whole or any part of the State any other authority as it may specify by a notification to be the licensing authority. Section 5 which is the crucial section to be discussed in this case must be reproduced here:

"5. Restrictions on powers of licensing authority-- (1) The licensing authority shall not grant a licence under this Act unless it is satisfied that--

(a) the rules made under this Act have been substantially complied with; and

(b) adequate precautions have been taken in the place, in respect of which the licence is to be given, to provide for the safety of persons attending exhibitions therein.

(2) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section and to the control of the State Government, the licensing authority may grant licences under this Act to such persons as that authority thinks fit and on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine.

(3) Any person aggrieved by the decision of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license under this Act may within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to the State Government or to such officer as the State Government may specify in this behalf, and the State Government or the officer, as the case may be may make such order in the case as it or he thinks fit.

(4) The State Government may, from time to time, issue directions to licensees generally or to any licensee in particular for the purpose of regulating the exhibition of any film or class of films, so that scientific films intended for educational purposes, films dealing with news and current events, documentary films or indigenous films secure an adequate opportunity of being exhibited and where any such directions have been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted."

It would thus be seen that while Sub-section (3) of Section 5 provides that any person aggrieved by the decision of a licensing authority refusing to grant a licence under this Act may appeal to the State Government or to such officer as the State Government may specify in that behalf, Sub-section (4) thereof authorises the Government to issue directions to the licensees generally or to any licensee in particular for the purpose of regulating the exhibition of any film or class of films etc., apart from the revisional power or power of supervision conferred under the first part of Section 5 (2). Section 6 empowers the State Government or the local authority to suspend exhibition of films in certain cases. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that there where an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 had been issued by a District Magistrate, a copy thereof together with a statement of reasons therefor, must forthwith be forwarded to the State Government which has been empowered either to confirm or annul that order. Sub-section (31 of Section 6 lays down that the period of such suspension of exhibition of films if not annulled by the State Government under Section 6 (2) would remain in force for a period of two months only subject of course to the final decision of the State Government which may, if it is of opinion, that the order should continue in force, direct the period of suspension to be extended by such further period as may be thought fit. Section 7 provides for penalties for infraction of any of the provisions of the Act or the terms or the conditions of the licence. Section 8 provides for the power on the licensing authority to revoke or suspend the licence under certain circumstances for such period as it may think fit and again the licensee or any person aggrieved by the order of the licensing authority revoking or suspending a licence has been given the right to prefer an appeal to the State Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 8. Section 9 vests the State Government to frame appropriate rules covering both general and special fields for the purposes of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Section 9 (21 (a) specifically provides that the State Government may by notification provide for rules prescribing the terms, conditions and restrictions, if any subject to which licence is granted under this Act, and Section 10 empowers the State Government to exempt subject to certain conditions and restrictions in cinematograph exhibition or class of such exhibition from any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder and by Section 11 which is the last section of the Act the Cinematograph Act 1918, in its application to the State of Bihar and in so far as it related to matters other than the sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition was repealed.

8. This being the general framework and the scheme of the Act. I shall now proceed to discuss and decide each of the points raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The first point raised by Mr. Basudev Prasad is to the effect that Section 5 (e) specially the latter part of it, namely:--

"..... and on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine;"

must be struck down as ultra vires since no guideline is to be found anywhere in the Act by which the exercise of such a power can be canalised. The power thus conferred according to learned Counsel being unbriddled without any guideline and uncanalised must be struck down as invalid under the Constitution. Learned Counsel has relied vehemently on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council : AIR 1967 SC 829 [LQ/SC/1966/279] , State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah : AIR 1967 SC 1189 [LQ/SC/1967/7 ;] ; Harakchand Ratanchand v. Union of India : AIR 1970 SC 1453 [LQ/SC/1969/206] and a Bench decision of this Court in Gauri Shankar Badri Narain v. State of Bihar 1973 Pat LJR 129. Before dealing with the facts of each of these cases, I may state here that on principle there is no difference between learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents for they both agree and in my opinion rightly so, that it is a well settled principle of law that if a statutory provision confers such wide and unregulated powers upon the executive and administrative authority without any check or guideline to suspend or cancel a licence, it sanctions an arbitrary exercise of power and obviously would attract the infraction of both Articles 14 and 19 --Article 14 for it sanctions an act of discrimination arbitrarily. Article 19 because it sanctions unreasonable restrictions to be put by the administrative authority on the citizens right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g). This being the well-settled principle of law, I shall now examine as to which of the cases relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner can be pressed into service to support his submission.

In the case of Hari Chand Sarda : AIR 1967 SC 829 [LQ/SC/1966/279] (Supra) the Supreme Court was concerned with the vires of Section 3 of the Cushai Hills District (Trading by non-Tribals) Regulation (2 of 1953). While dealing with that question the Supreme Court laid down on a review of quite a number of decisions that the fundamental rights of a citizen to carry on trade could be restricted only by making a law in the interest of the general public putting reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such a right, that such restrictions should not be arbitrary or excessive or beyond what is required in the interest of the general public and that an uncontrolled and uncanalised power conferred on the authority would mean an unreasonable restriction on such right. Though a legislative policy may be expressed in statute it must provide a suitable machinery for implementing that policy in such a manner that such implementation does not result in undue or excessive hardship and arbitrariness. The question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is clearly a justiciable concept and it is for the court to come to one conclusion or the other having regard to the considerations laid down in the case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row : AIR 1952 SC 196 [LQ/SC/1952/23] and the considerations laid down in V.G. Rows case were thus enunciated bv the Supreme Court--

"..... the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought, to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the Judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative Judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."

In this background of the law the Supreme Court was considering the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by Section 3 of the Regulation in question. Section 9 of that Regulation authorised the Executive Committee to cancel the licence--presumably both permanent and temporary --if the licensee were convicted for contravention of any of the provisions of the Regulation, although the power of refusal under Section 3 was not limited or circumscribed by any such provision or any other criterion. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the power of refusal under Section 3 of the Regulation was thus left entirely unguided and untrammelled and how arbitrary the exercise of such an unguided power can be was seen from the fact that the Executive Committee not only refused to renew the appellants licence in that case who was a non-Tribal, but also directed him to remove his property by the end of specified period in the event of a failure to do so punitive action by way of imposition of a fine was attached thereto. In these circumstances, the majority judgment in Hari Chand Sardas case declared Section 3 of the Regulation as putting an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and it was thus struck down as being void. Section 3 of the relevant Regulation and the Rules with which their Lordships in that case were concerned are absolutely distinct from the statutory provisions with which we are concerned in this case.

The case of H. Sanjeevtah : AIR 1967 SC 1189 [LQ/SC/1967/7 ;] (Supra), in my view, is not at all in point. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Rule 2 with its two provisos framed under Section 37 of the Mysore Forest Act (11 of 1900). By Section 37 of the Mysore Act in question the State Government was authorised to make Rules to regulate the transit of forest produce. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 37 the State Government had framed Rules to regulate the transit of timber, firewood, charcoal and bamboos from all lands. By Rule 2 framed on October 13, 1952 it was provided that no person shall import forest produce into, export forest produce from, or move forest produce within, any of the areas specified in Schedule A unless such forest produce was accompanied by a permit prescribed in Rule 3. On April 15, 1959 the State Government issued a notification adding a proviso to Rule 2 which put a complete ban on the transport of forest produce between sun-set and sun-rise in any of the areas specified in Schedule A. On September 14, 1960. another proviso to Rule 2 aforesaid was added by which it was laid down that the permission could be granted to timber merchants on their requisition to transport timber upto 10 p.m. under certain conditions. The Supreme Court while considering the validity of the two provisos to Rule 2 aforesaid held that they being restrictive of trade and commerce would prima facie be void as derogating from the freedom declared by Article 301 of the Constitution of India. It was further held in this connection that the provisos were not regulatory in character, but restrictive of the right to transport the forest produce, and as the power conferred on the State Government under Section 37 (1) of the Act in question was merely to regulate the transit of forest produce and not to restrict it, the State Government had exceeded the limits of the powers conferred on it by Section 37 (1) in framing such a Rule. It was on these grounds that the impugned Rule 2 was held to be invalid.

Learned Counsel then referred to the case of Harakchand Ratanchand : AIR 1970 SC 1453 [LQ/SC/1969/206] (Supra). That case again merely lays down the proposition as enunciated in the case of V.G. Row AIR 1952 SC 198 (Supra) that no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. On the facts and in the circumstances of that case judging in the light of the principles above enunciated their Lordships further held that it was necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it and then to apply a dual test as to whether the classification made was rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group. Judging in the light of the above principles their Lordships struck down some of the provisions of the Gold Control Act, 1968. Section 5 (2) (b) of that Act was also struck down as suffering from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers on the ground that the Administrator under the Gold Control Act had been given more or less the same powers to frame Rules and Regulations which power under different sections of the same statute had been vested in the Rule making authority, namely, the Central Government. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there could not be two parallel subordinate legislative bodies under the same Statute covering the same field. The special feature of that case was that the Rules when framed by the Government had yet to be placed before both the Houses of Parliament for legislative approval before they could have the force even of a subordinate legislation. It may well be seen that whereas the Government which was made the Rule making authority was still made to be supervised and controlled by the two Houses of the Parliament itself, rules and conditions covering the same field were also left to be framed by the Administrator -- a power which the appropriate Government had not even been vested with was left to be so determined and exercised at the whim of the executive officer called the Administrator.

Reliance was next placed upon a Bench decision of this Court in the M/s. Gauri Shankar Badri Narains case 1973 Pat LJR 129 (Supra). In that case this Court was considering the validity of Clause 8 (2) of the Bihar Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1966 which ran in these terms:

"8 (2) -- The State Government may without giving any previous notice and without assigning any reasons suspend or cancel any licence issued under this Order."

From the clause impugned in that case quoted above, three things were very clear. The State Government (i) could suspend or cancel any licence, (ii) without assigning any reasons and (iii) without giving any notice and it further appeared that there was no provision for appeal in the case of such a rejection either. Such being the nature of the order which fell for consideration before their Lordships, their Lordships held that on a reasonable interpretation of Clause 8 (2) of the Order, it conferred a wide and unregulated power upon the State Government to suspend or cancel a licence and it obviously constituted an unreasonable restriction upon the right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and accordingly Clause 8 (2) of the impugned order was held to be void.

9. As I shall presently show the cases cited above on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner have on facts no similarity with the instant case. In this connection. I may first refer to a decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Advocate-General in Kishan Chand v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta : AIR 1961 SC 705 [LQ/SC/1960/333] . In that case although their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the Constitutional validity of Section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, No. IV of 1866 which was a pre-Constitution Act, they were yet considering the vires of the provisions of that section which were impugned putting it to the test of validity in view of the Constitutional provisions contained in Articles 13 14 and 19. That case came up before the Supreme Court by way of an application under Article 32 of the Constitution and the point that was raised was merely as to whether Section 39 of the Act in question left an un-guided, untrammelled and an arbitrary power to the Police Commissioner in refusing to grant licence or cancelling the same so as to render it unconstitutional, as violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This case in my view will have sufficient bearing upon the decision of the instant case and, therefore, I propose to deal with it at some length. Section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act was in these terms:

"The Commissioner of Police may, at his discretion from time to time, grant licences to the keepers of such houses or places of public resort and entertainment as aforesaid for which no licence as is specified in the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, is required upon such conditions, to be inserted in every such licence, as he, with the sanction of the said Government from time to time shall order, for securing the good behaviour of the keepers of the said houses or places of public resort or entertainment, and the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using the same; and the said licences may be granted by the said Commissioner, for any time not exceeding one year."

It was contended on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the language of Section 39 aforesaid showed that an absolute discretion, untrammelled by any considerations was conferred on the Commissioner by that section and there was nothing either in the section or anywhere in that Act to guide the discretion of the Commissioner in the matter of granting such licences. It was, therefore, argued that the power so conferred was arbitrary and unguided and such a power should necessarily be struck down as being an unreasonable restriction. While dealing with this question the Supreme Court held that there was no doubt that if the section empowered the Commissioner to grant or refuse a licence without any criteria to guide him, it would be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade. Therefore, it was necessary to see whether there was any guidance either in the section or in the Act to regulate the exercise of such discretion of the Commissioner in the matter of granting such licences. While construing Section 39 their Lordships held that it certainly gave powers to the Commissioner to grant licences at his discretion. These words, however, by themselves did not necessarily mean that the Commissioner had the power to act arbitrarily and grant licences where he pleases and refuse where he does not please to do so. The section provided further that the licence had to be granted upon certain conditions and those conditions had to satisfy two objects namely, securing of the good behaviour of the keepers of the said houses or places of public resort and entertainment and secondly the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using the same. Their Lordships did not read the section Impugned as laying down that the discretion was absolute and that the imposing of conditions of the aforesaid two objects only arose after that absolute discretion had been exercised in favour of the grant of licences. The Supreme Court went further on to hold that it seemed to their Lordships that Section 39 clearly provided that the Commissioner would use his discretion in deciding whether the person applying for a licence is in actual and effective control and possession of the place where the eating house is to be kept as a keeper thereof. He would also satisfy himself that the keeper is a person of good behaviour and further that he was able to prevent drunkenness and disorder in the eating house. If the Commissioner was satisfied on these matters it seemed to the Supreme Court that the section contemplated that the discretion would be exercised in favour of the grant of the licence. The contention that even though an intending licensee satisfied these points yet the Commissioner could in his discretion refuse to grant a licence was negatived and it was held that the discretion that was given to the Commissioner was to satisfy himself on these three points and if he was so satisfied about them, then he had to grant the licence. On the other hand, if he was not so satisfied on any one or more of these points he would exercise the discretion by refusing the licence. As for the conditions which would be inserted in the licence, they were only for the purpose of carrying on the two objects specified along with the obvious implication in the section that the person applying must have actual and effective control of the place where he is going to keep the eating house and these were the criteria which would govern the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner. The argument, therefore, that Section 39 conferred an arbitrary and uncanalised power without any criteria for guiding the discretion of the licensing authority was held to be untenable. It would, therefore, be relevant to find out from the provisions of either Section 5 or for that matter all the other provisions of the Act as to whether any guideline has been given for the exercise of discretion by the licensing authority under the Bihar Act in question or whether the discretion has been left to be exercised in an irrational, whimsical and arbitrary manner even if opposed to the policy of the Act by a licensing authority. As has already been analysed above. Section 5 (1) of the Bihar Act prescribes that the licensing authority shall not grant a licence under this Act unless it is satisfied that --(a) the rules made under this Act have been substantially complied with; and (b) adequate precautions have been taken in the place, in respect of which the licence is to be given, to provide for the safety of persons attending exhibitions therein. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 starts with the clause subject to the foregoing provisions of this section. I would, therefore, construe Section 5 (1) as laying down the general condition and the guideline which as a rule would induce a licensing authority to grant a licence normally if he is satisfied with regard to the two conditions laid down in Section 5 (1), of course, all the time keeping public interest in view. Apart from the grant of licence being subject to those provisions it has further been laid down in Section 5 (2) that the exercise of the power or discretion by the licensing authority shall also be subject to the control of the State Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 5 lays down that in the case of refusal of a licence any person aggrieved may appeal to the State Government or any officer specially empowered in that behalf. The true intent and purport of Sub-section (2) of Section 5, therefore, in my view, is this that if the licensing authorities were satisfied in regard to the two conditions laid down in Section 5 (1) and in the absence of any order to the contrary governing the grant or refusal of any class of licences by the State Government, as a rule and normally the licensing authority may grant a licence, and in furtherance of the object contained in the two clauses of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 and subject to the appellate and revisional authority of the State Government and subject to any rule framed under Section 9 (2) (a) prescribing the terms, conditions and restrictions, if any, subject to which licences, may be granted under this Act, the licensing authority shall grant licences to persons and put such terms and conditions and such restrictions therein as may be in consonance with the aforesaid provisions. This, however, in my view, shall not preclude the District Magistrate while laying down such a term or condition in a licence or subjecting it to such a restriction from taking into consideration the general public interest at any given time and in certain circumstances. It is a different matter that in spite of the guidelines being given in the Statute if the licensing authority still chooses not to act within the four corners of the statutory provisions and chooses to traverse a field not assigned to it, its administrative action by itself may be subject to attack on the ground of any constitutional infirmity, but that will not render the provisions of the statute itself in question ultra vires any of the provisions of the Constitution. It is again a different matter, as is the admitted position at the Bar that the State Government have not yet framed any Rule in exercise of the powers conferred on them by Section 9 of the Act. In the absence of any such rules there cannot be any question of the licensing authority inserting a condition or imposing a restriction on the licence which could militate against any rules so framed or the statute itself being invalid constitutionally.

10. In support of the second point urged on behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel submitted on the authority of the case of Harakchand Ratanchand : AIR 1970 SC 1453 [LQ/SC/1969/206] (Supra) that Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Act in question must also be struck down as suffering from the vice of excessive delegation. I fail to see how that decision of the Supreme Court can support the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner. I have already discussed above the main features of that case and have pointed out that the Gold Control Act, 1968 on the one hand empowered the Central Government to frame Rules which would have to be placed before both the Houses of the Parliament before they could become valid pieces of delegated legislation. But under the same Act the same Rule making power was also conferred on an Executive Authority called the Administrator. The Administrator under that Act had been held to be empowered to frame Rules as a parallel subordinate legislative authority to the Central Government which could only frame Rules subject to their being approved by the Parliament. In the instant case, Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Act does not confer any Rule making power on the licensing authority at all. The question of any excessive delegation of legislative power, therefore, cannot and does not arise in this case.

11. It will next have to be seen as to whether the impugned order contained in Annexure-5, passed by respondent No. 2, the licensing authority, revoking one of the conditions in condition 8 (b) of the licence of the petitioner can be assailed on any of the grounds urged by learned Counsel.

12. Learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the order of the licensing authority in question was purely of an administrative nature and was, therefore, not subject to the supervision by this Court of the proceedings so as to entitle the petitioner to a writ of certiorari. Learned Advocate-General rather vehemently contended that there being no lis the impugned order fell completely within the administrative domain of an executive officer and as such, his modifying any of the terms of the licence or revoking any of the clause thereof could not be justiciable. Reliance was sought to be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Police Commr.s case : AIR 1961 SC 705 [LQ/SC/1960/333] (Supra). In my view, this case does not support the contention of learned Advocate-General. Though their Lordships did hold in that case that the exercise by the Commissioner of Police of his powers under Section 39 was in the nature of disciplinary action for the maintenance of law and order to that extent the exercise of such a power was administrative in nature. All the same their Lordships did go into the question of reasonableness of the restrictions so imposed by the Commissioner of Police in that case in exercise of such an administrative power. He also placed reliance on the case of R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr. Ex parte Parker 1953 (2) All ER 717 for the proposition that the exercise of the power of the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police under the London Cab Order, 1934. Para 30 (1) as the licencing authority to revoke the licence on his satisfaction that the applicant was not a fit person to hold such a licence, it was in the nature of a disciplinary proceeding, purely administrative in nature, invoking no lis and, therefore, not attracting the principles of natural justice. The case as read by learned Advocate-General as being the authority for the proposition that he has with great respect, enunciated does not find support from the true ratio of the case. True, there was an observation while dealing with the case that the principle of natural justice may not be said to be attracted as the Commissioner of Police was exercising police power for the interest of law and order in the particular circumstances of that case. In that case two police constables had made a complaint against a cab driver that he was using his cab regularly for the purpose of carrying women of dubious character behaving in a disorderly way during the nights. The Police Commissioner by authority of the power conferred on him under para 30 (1) of the London Cab Order 1934 revoked the licence and issued a notice to the cab driver concerned to appear before the licensing committee consisting of more members than one to be confronted with the two police constables who had made complaints and he also issued instruction to the committee that the licence was to be revoked unless anything transpired before the committee favourable to the cab driver concerned. The cab driver accordingly appeared before the committee cross-examined the two police constables merely and prayed for summoning a defence witness which prayer was turned down. The committee accordingly recommended that nothing favourable had transpired in course of the proceeding and, therefore, the order of revocation stood as final. It was urged before the Q.B.D. that the order of the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police in so far as no opportunity was given to the petitioner to call a defence witness was against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, void. While dealing with this matter Lord Goddard, C.J., held in the first instance that where law and order problem was concerned, the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police must be held to be acting in his disciplinary and, therefore, administrative capacity, but all the same, it was held in that case that the principles of natural justice were sufficiently complied with. It is now in my opinion, futile to go into any controversy as to whether the order is administrative in character or Judicial or quasi-judicial in nature so as to attract the principle of audi alteram partem. In this connection, before adverting to the case law, I am very much tempted to quote a passage from Justice and Administrative Law by William A. Robsen, Third Edition at page 36--

"A very great deal has been written and talked, during the past two thousand years, about the changing body of doctrine which we term the law Hardly anything has been said about that equally important element in the Judicial process which may be called the judicial mind. Without a Judicial mind to apply it, our body of law would disintegrate in a year, and society relapse into savagery..... of all psychological developments, perhaps none has been more important in the history of man than the gradual emergence of the Judicial idea, not merely in regard to questions which come before the courts of law but also in reference to a vast province covering nearly all the rational activities of the human race."

This is in essence, exactly what their Lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India (: AIR1970 SC 150) where their Lordships have held the dividing line at page 154 thus:

"The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the frame work of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised .....

In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now considered as a quasi-judicial power."

In this connection, their Lordships quoted with approval a passage from C.J. Lord Parkers Judgment in 1967 2 QB 864 at page 86 () (Reg. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; ex parte Lain):

"At one time the writ only went to an inferior court. Later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter partes. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or subsequent rights of citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing a public duty."

Again very recently in the case of Keshava Mills Co,. Ltd. v. Union of India : AIR 1973 SC 389 [LQ/SC/1972/578] , it has been laid down that the principles of natural justice do apply to administrative orders or proceedings. In the case of State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta : AIR 1973 SC 834 [LQ/SC/1972/462] as well as in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.M.K. Parasurama Gurukul : AIR 1973 SC 2237 [LQ/SC/1973/192] the principle has been reiterated that with the proliferation of administrative decision in the welfare State it is now further recognised by the Courts both in England and in this country that where a body or authority is characteristically administrative, the principle of natural justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that body or authority affects individual rights or interest. If a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject then although there is no lis and although there are no two parties apart from the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority, call it administrative, call it quasi-judicial, does not absolve the authority from adherence to the principle of natural justice. I would accordingly hold that even if a statutory authority is exercising any of the administrative powers conferred on such authority by statute affecting the rights or interests of a subject to his prejudice or detriment, the principles of natural justice would ordinarily apply.

13. That, however, will not be conclusive in so far as this aspect of the case is concerned, in the instant case, for as I shall presently show after disposing of one other point of some importance, so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there could not be any scope for the application of the fundamental principle of natural justice; but as I have already said above, I shall advert to this point at a later stage.

14. Mr. Basudev Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner very vehemently urged that putting or inserting a restriction of the present nature was an unreasonable restriction attracting the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. He relied upon a decision in the case of R.M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate. Tanjore : AIR 1954 SC 747 [LQ/SC/1954/123] . In this case the Supreme Court was concerned with the reasonableness of restrictions imposed as a condition of the licence of a cinema licensee by the licensing authority. Under Section 8 of the Cinematograph Act, 1898 as amended from time to time the State of Madras issued two notifications, one dated the 28th of March, 1948, and the other dated the 15th of September. 1948 by which two conditions were imposed by the District Magistrate in the licence granted to the appellant in that case. One of the conditions was to the effect that the licensee shall exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such length of time as the Provincial Government may, by general or special order, direct. The other condition which was termed as Special Condition No. 3 was that the licensee should exhibit at the commencement of each performance not less than 2,000 feet of one or more approved films. These conditions imposed in the licence of the licensee were being attacked. It was in view of the two conditions attached to the licence as mentioned above that the Supreme Court in that case held that the first condition which was condition 4 (a) compelled the licencee to exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such length of time as the Government may direct. Neither the length of the films nor the period of time for which it may be shown was specified in the condition and as such the Government was vested with an unregulated discretion to compel a licensee to exhibit a film of any length at its discretion which may consume the whole or the greater part of the time for which such performance was given. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that a condition couched in such wide language is bound to operate harshly upon the cinema business and it savoured more of the nature of an imposition than a restriction and it was in those circumstances that the two conditions mentioned above as imposed in the licence of the appellant in that case were struck down as being unreasonable restrictions. The facts of that case are wholly distinguishable for the purpose of attracting the principle laid down there in the instant case.

For the purpose of showing that a restriction of the nature impugned was not reasonable, learned Counsel further placed reliance on the decision in an English case in Theatre De Luxe (Halifax), Ltd. v. Gledhill 1915 (2) KB 49. For the sake of bravity I shall refer to this case as the Halifax case. Shortly stated, the facts of that case were that under Section 2 (1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1909, it was provided that--

"A county council may grant licences to such persons as they think lit to use the premises specified in the licence ..... for cinematograph exhibition -- on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions as subject to regulations of the Secretary of State, the council may by the respective licences determine."

A licence was granted in that case with a condition that--

"Children under fourteen years of age shall not be allowed to enter into or be in the licensed premises after the hour of 9 P. M. unaccompanied by a parent or guardian. No child under the age of ten years shall be allowed in the licensed premises under any circumstances after 9 P. M."

The case was heard by three learned Judges and the decision of the majority was given by Lush. J., and Rowlatt, J., Atkin, J., delivered a dissenting Judgment. It was by the majority decision in that case that the condition or restriction imposed under the licence was declared ultra vires inasmuch as it was held that there was no connection between the ground upon which the condition was imposed namely, regard for the health and welfare of young children generally, and the subject-matter of the licence, namely, the use of the premises for the giving of cinematograph exhibitions. For a particular reason, which I shall hereinafter elaborate, I must make a pointed reference to the dissenting Judgment of Atkin, J., who held that the conditions were intra vires on the ground that the restriction upon the power of the licensing authority to impose conditions on the grant of licences is that they must be (1) reasonable; (2) in respect of the use of the licensed premises; and (3) in the public interest. While Rowlatt. J., in his judgment at page 57 held that the licensing authority was addressing itself to a social question, they were not the Judges of the question of public policy under the Act concerned. In this connection, Atkin, J., however, held at page 59, which I think worth while to quote:

"That there is a limitation of the powers of the County Council, namely, that the restriction must be reasonable and in relation to the exercise of the powers granted under the licence of the licensed premises qua licensed premises and in relation of the public interest."

At page 60 of the report the learned Judge went on to hold--

"The power is not made use of by the authorities because they think the entertainment would be more disorderly if the house remained opened till 12 Oclock but because they think it in the public interest generally for the house to close at 11. They have power to say that the entertainment shall not begin till 2 Oclock in the afternoon. I imagine they are entitled to say that because they do not think it is in the interest of the public at large that these places of entertainment shall be open in the morning, just as it is open to licensing Justices to say that the sale of drink shall not take place before a particular hour in the morning. I think they are entitled to fix their hours in relation to the public interest, and in my Judgment if they take into account the interests of a very substantial and large section of the public they are entitled to do so. In my opinion, therefore, in the exercise of these powers they are entitled to take into account the public interest so far as children are affected."

Having thus held, the learned Judge found that the provision or restriction imposed was one which in no sense could be said to be unreasonable and was quite within the competence of the licensing authority to make. While learned Counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on the majority Judgment in Halifax case, I must point out that the majority Judgment in that case has never been supposed to be good law even by the Courts of England and the dissenting Judgment of Atkin, J., has always been cited with approval. In this case of Harman v. Butt 1944 (1) All ER 558. Atkinson, J., was dealing with the question as to whether a condition excluding children under the age of 16, attached to a licence to open the Regent Picture House on Sundays, was ultra vires or unreasonable. While discussing this question Atkinson, J., at p. 564 held

"I can see no justification, myself, for cutting down the discretion, unlimited in terms, which is given to the licensing authority ..... bearing in mind what the later Divisional Courts have said, that the Halifax case applied only where the facts are precisely the same, I think that I am at liberty to hold that it has no bearing upon an application for leave to show on Sundays under a different Act, namely, Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932."

In my view, this was just a mild way of saying that the majority judgment in Halifax case was not correct and which the learned Single Judge while deciding Harmans case could not possibly say. But in a later case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 (1) All ER 498 Henn Collins, J., while dealing with the 1932 Act mentioned above having been confronted by the Halifax case preferred to follow Harmans case. Commenting on the Halifax case he said--

"Whenever that case was cited in relation to the Cinematograph Act, 1909, it was. I will not say, blown on, but at any rate, strictly cribbled cabined and confined within the particular circumstances, and it has never been taken, as I see it, for a decision on the words which appeared in Section 2 (1) of the Act (of 1909): "on such terms and conditions and under such restrictions .....the council may by the respective licences determine", or any similar words, wherever they appear in whatever correlation."

When this decision of Collins. J., came up to be tested by the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 (2) All ER 680 : 1948 (1) KB 223 the unanimous Judgment of three learned Judges was delivered by Lord Greene M.R. and while referring to the Halifax case, the Bench made the following observations at p. 684 of the All England Law Reports--

"The case is one which I think I am right in saying has never been referred to with approval, but has often been referred to with disapproval, though it has never been expressly overruled."

While agreeing with the dissenting Judgment of Atkin. J,, in the Halifax case Lord Greene, M.R., further explained the dissenting Judgment in the following manner:

"I do not read him as in any way dissenting from the view which I have ventured to express that the task of the Court is not to decide what it thinks is reasonable, but to decide whether the condition imposed by the local authority is one which no reasonable authority, acting within the four corners of their jurisdiction, could, have decided to impose..... Once the local authority have properly taken into consideration a matter of public interest such as, in the present case, the moral and physical health of children, it seems to me, there is nothing in what Atkin, J., says which suggests that a court could interfere with a decision because it took a different view of what was the public interest."

According to the decision of Lord Greene, M.R. the court was entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether it had taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or conversely, refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matter which it ought to take into account. And it was in that sense that the question of reasonableness even if decided by an administrative authority was held to be justiciable. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents referred to the cases of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar : AIR 1958 SC 731 [LQ/SC/1958/60] as an authority for the proposition that the reasonableness of any restriction has not to be judged only from the stand point of the petitioner and on the decision in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, : AIR 1961 SC 1602 [LQ/SC/1961/201] at p. 1608 for the proposition that the policy and purpose has to be gathered from whole of the Act. In my view, there is great force in the submission of learned Advocates-General that the test of reasonableness to be applied cannot be the subjective test of a petitioner seeking a licence under the Act in question. While it is true as has been held by the Supreme Court in Hari Chand Sardas case (Supra) : AIR 1967 SC 829 [LQ/SC/1966/279] at p. 832 that it was not the function of the court to search for an undisclosed Policy in the crevices of the statute, for by doing so this court will not only be finding an excuse to resuscitate an invalid law but also be encouraging the making of laws by appropriate authorities in derogation of fundamental rights. But the case also lays down that though a legislative policy may be expressed in a statute it must provide a suitable machinery for implementing that policy in such a manner that such implementation does not result in undue or excessive hardship and arbitrariness. The present case is not one of such a nature where we have to search for an undisclosed policy in the crevices of the statute. I would rather hold that the object and the policy of the Act in question is writ large on the statute itself read as a whole. As already pointed out earlier, the power under Section 5 (2) of the Act is not capable of being arbitrarily exercised for the action of the licensing authority, discretionary or administrative as it may, or may not be. is subject to at least three things, (1) supervision and necessary correction of the same by the State Government as an appellate authority under Section 5 (3), (2) subject to general supervision and control and directions of the State Government acting in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 5 (2) in its earlier part which clearly specifies that the action of the licensing authority shall always be subject to the control of the State Government; and (3) subject to the provisions of Section 5 (1) (a) and (b). There is a further safeguard against any inroad likely to arise on a citizens right through any arbitrariness of the licensing authority in suspending and revoking the licence by providing an appellate machinery again under Section 8 (b) of the Act and further limitations upon any arbitrary exercise of powers by the licensing authority by framing of rules by the State Government under Section 9 of the Act. Can it then be said that sufficient scope for arbitrariness has been left in the discretion to be exercised by the licensing authority Unguided, unbridled and untrammelled by any of the provisions of the Act In my view, the answer must be in the negative,

15. Learned Advocate-General also drew our attention to the provisions of Article 39(f) of the Constitution of India appearing in Part IV relating to the Directive principles of State policy which lays down that--

"The State, shall in particular, direct its policy towards securing--

xx xx xx

(f) that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment."

Having regard to the provisions, quoted above, in my view, it will be pertinent to point out that the test of reasonableness of any restriction must also take into account conscience of our Constitution fixing certain social and economic goals. While putting a restriction to the test of reasonableness one cannot ignore that the importance of the Directive Principles can in no manner be minimised, as they can be effective to subserve the common good at the cost of the so-called fundamental rights of a few. The concept of property right in the Constitution must be conditioned by social interest and social justice which may vary from time to time and individual rights may have to be limited in a given set of circumstances.

16. It is necessary for me incidentally to dispose of another connected matter which was mildly urged at the Bar. Mr. Basudev Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed great reliance upon the preamble of the Act which reads thus:

"An Act to make provision for regulating exhibitions by means of cinematographs in the State of Bihar. Whereas it is expedient tp make provision for regulating exhibitions by means of cinematographs in the State of Bihar; ....."

Mr. Prasad therefore submitted that the purpose of the Act was merely to make provision for regulating exhibitions and, therefore, it was not within the competence of licensing authority to put any restriction or condition in the licence of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, apart from the well settled principles that the preamble will not itself provide a safe guideline to ascertain the object and policy of the Act de hors the specific provisions in the statute itself, it may also be pertinent to quote a portion of the statement of objects and reasons of this Act:

".....The Bihar Act XV of 1954 accordingly made suitable provisions regulating exhibitions of films and the licensing of cinema houses in the State."

Referring to the special provisions of the statute it will be found that Section 5 in express terms deals with a matter with regard to the grant of licence, imposition of conditions and terms and such restrictions as the licensing authority may determine. It would, therefore, be wrong to suggest that the Act did not empower or had not made any specific provisions in the statute to put any restrictions or conditions on the licence of the petitioner.

17. As I have discussed at great length the decisions of the English Courts, which have all laid down that the matter of public interest is a very valuable consideration to be taken into account by the licensing authority in so far as such terms be in the interest of children, I do not see any justification in not holding the restriction as has been sought to be imposed by Annexure-5 to be in the public interest in so far why a large majority of the student community, all adolescents be not protected by means of such restrictions in the interest of their mental and moral hygiene as well as in the pursuit of their academic interest. This in its turn is a matter not concerning the students or adolescents as a class by themselves, but also their guardians, their teachers and indeed the future generations of the society to come. Can it then be said that the restriction as contained in Annexure-5 is either alien to the object of the Act or is such a restriction as would come within the mischief of Article 19(1)(g) In my view there is great force in the contention of the learned Advocate-General that even if it be held that the provisions of the Act are to be so construed as to be merely regulatory in nature, even so as has been held by the Supreme Court in Ramdhandas v. State of Punjab : AIR 1961 SC 1559 [LQ/SC/1961/170] p. 1563, regulation of hours of work or putting time limits upon certain nature of works are merely regulatory in nature. When in the public interest a restriction has been sought to be put not to exhibit any cinematograph films before 3 p. m., it cannot attract the principle enunciated by their Lordships in a number of cases that a restriction which is in the nature of an imposition or a complete ban was bound to attract the property and trade clauses in Article 19. As a matter of fact, having held that the restriction of the present nature as contained in Annexure-5 was in public interest, I also find force in the submission of the learned Advocate-General that it was expressly saved by virtue of the provisions of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. It is well settled now that permits or licences subject to such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils is always a justifiable and reasonable restriction. As a matter of fact, as has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Virendra v. State of Punjab : AIR 1957 SC 896 [LQ/SC/1957/79] the ambit of protection under Article 19(6), is much wider than that under Article 18(8) or 19(3) of the Constitution of India.

18. Having already held that Section 5 (2) of the Bihar Act in question was not ultra vires either Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution of India nor on the ground that it had given no guidelines for the exercise of the discretion by a licensing authority thus leaving any scope for unguided, arbitrary, unbridled and untrammelled exercise of discretion, nor has the discretion been exercised unreasonably, the next question that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether any restriction could be imposed in the licence during the currency of its term. As has already been stated above, the licence in question is valid upto the 31st of March, 1974 and while conceding that such a restriction could be imposed if it was held to be a reasonable one with effect from the 1st of April, 1974, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no such restriction could be so imposed during its currency. In my view there is no substance in this submission of learned Counsel either. And this for the simple reason that Section 5 (2) of the Act clearly lays down that the licensing authority may grant licences under this Act on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine. I do not find myself in a position to construe this provision as laying down that the determination must be at the time of the grant or renewal of the licence only and not during its currency on any account whatsoever. I am inclined to take the view that the terms "as it may determine" must be understood to mean "as it may determine from time to time" having regard to the special circumstances and exigencies that a particular situation may demand. If the public interest so demands, I see no reason to construe the language of Section 5 (2) to prohibit the licensing authority from putting any such restriction in the public interest even during the currency of the licence. As I have already held above, the object behind the putting of such a restriction is laudable indeed and as I have already held, it is in public Interest. In such circumstances it is futile to urge that even if the circumstances so demand that a restriction could not be imposed in public interest during the currency of a licence, and the licensing authority must be held to be precluded from exercising any such jurisdiction.

19. That then brings me to the question as to whether in the special circumstances of this case there could be any scope for the application of the principle of natural justice. I have already dealt with at great length that even though an order may be purely of an administrative character, that by itself does not preclude the application of the principles of natural justice. To reiterate once more in the language of the Supreme Court in the Kesava Mills case : AIR 1973 SC 389 [LQ/SC/1972/578] (Supra), "it is true that the order of the Government of India that has been challenged by the appellants was a purely executive order embodying an administrative decision. Even so the question of natural justice does arise in this case. It is too late now to contend that the principles of natural justice need not apply to administrative orders ....." But I must also point out to the series of decisions of the Supreme Court to which Kesava Mills case itself and Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi : AIR 1973 SC 1260 [LQ/SC/1973/117] relying upon an earlier decision of the same Court in Union of India v. P.K. Roy : AIR 1968 SC 850 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] : (1968) 2 SCR 186 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] at p. 202) held that "the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straitjacket of a rigid formula and its application depends upon several factors. These principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may vary in different circumstances". As pointed out in Kesava Mills case at page 393 "it is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly". If, therefore, it be held in the present case that on the facts and; in the circumstances of the instant case the reasons for such a restriction had been communicated to the petitioner and that the restrictions were not at all arbitrary or unreasonable and that the licensing authority had acted fairly and impartially, then merely because putting of such a restriction may involve the petitioner in some pecuniary loss at the cost of public interest, it cannot be held that justice and fair play have not been kept into consideration and that the order contained in Annexure-5 suffers from any violation of principles of natural justice. As I have indicated at the very outset the case of the respondents as put in the counter-affidavit shows that such restrictions have been put on all the cinematograph exhibitors licences in Ranchi, which fact has not been challenged at the Bar also, then it also cannot be said that the restrictions imposed by virtue of Annexure-5 were either biased or partial or an act punitive in nature in so far as the petitioner was concerned. If the petitioner had made out a case that it was only singled out for the purpose of putting such a restriction on its licence much could be said in support of the petitioners case, for it is now well settled that any punitive act, although administrative or ministerial in nature must attract the principles of audi alteram par-tem. In the present case apart from an averment in the petition that the imposition of the restriction contained in Annexure-5 will entail some pecuniary loss to the petitioner, it has nowhere been suggested even as to what possible defence could the petitioner take before the licensing authority for the reasons as contained in Annexure-5 if it was called upon to meet that case before the licensing authority. It the decision has been taken governing the entire class of cases on a matter concerning public policy and in public interest, then as held by the Supreme Court in the Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha : AIR 1970 SC 1269 [LQ/SC/1970/117] little room is left for the application of the doctrine on such facts and in such circumstances. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with the cancellation of an examination by the Board on the ground of use of unfair means at a mass scale and their Lordships countenancing the contention that the principles of natural justice had been violated held that--

"This is not a case of any particular individual who is being charged with adoption of unfair means but of the conduct of all the examinees or at least a vast majority of them at a particular centre. If it is not a question of charging any one individually with unfair means but to condemn the examination as ineffective for the purpose it was held, must the Board give an opportunity to all the candidates to represent their cases We think not."

Since the action was not punitive in nature as against anyone, but was taken at the dictates of a public policy on the facts and in the circumstances no scope for such an application of the principle of audi alteram partem was left. I, accordingly hold that in the circumstances of the present case, there is nothing to suggest that the order imposing restriction as contained in Annexure-5 is in any way unreasonable or punitive in nature, rather the decision has been taken as a matter of public policy in the public interest and as such there could not be any possible or reasonable question to be answered by the petitioner if called upon to meet the case before the licensing authority. In this connection I may also refer to a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Wasudeo Laxman Nandanwar v. Union of India, reported in 1974 Lab IC 141 (Bom) wherein it has been laid down that the principle of natural justice incorporated in the maxim audi alteram partem could not be applicable in cases where no change in result was possible even by hearing a party affected, since it would only be an empty formality or an exercise in futility.

20. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in this application which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rules discharged.

S.N.P. Singh, J.

21. I agree.