K.C. Sharma, J.

1. Heard Counsel for the parties.

2. The complainant petitioner, namely, Vishnu Gopal lodged a written report on 4.3.1991 at Police Station, Sodala, Jaipur about the death of his daughter Smt. Renu and her child aged 2 years. Having registered a case vide FIR No. 117/91 for offence under Sections 304-B and 498-A, I.P.C., the police investigated in the matter and on completion thereof, submitted a charge-sheet against accused respondent Rama Kant Pareek, thereby alleging offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C.

3. It appears that on 8.11.1996 the complainant petitioner filed an application under Sections 216 and 190, Cr.P.C. before the Trial Court with the prayer that cognizance of the offence under Sections 304B and 306, I.P.C. be taken and the case be committed to the Court of Sessions. It was further prayed that cognizance of offence against other persons named in the FIR and against whom the police did not submit charge-sheet, may also be taken. On considering the material and after hearing arguments of Counsel for the parties, the learned Trial Court vide its order dated 29.7.1997 dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Trial Court, the petitioner approached this Court. This Court vide order dated 2.12.1997 while disposing of the petition of the petitioner, directed the Trial Court that if, in the course of trial, such material disclosing the commission of an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions is placed before the Magistrate, the learned Magistrate may proceed with the case in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 323, Cr. P.C. At the same time such evidence, if it discloses the complicity of such other persons in the commission of offence, as were not charge-sheeted by the police, may also be summoned as additional accused, in exercise of powers under Section 319, Cr.P.C.

4. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined P.W. 1 complainant Vishnu Gopal (father of deceased), P.W. 3 Radhey Shyam and P.W. 5 Bhaskar. After the above named 3 witnesses were examined, the petitioner moved an application under Sections 319 and 323, Cr.P.C. on 19.5.1999 with a prayer to summon Mohan Lal Pareek (since dead), Madhusudan Pareek, Sita Devi and Smt. Vidhya Devi as an additional accused and to commit the case to the Court of Session for trial of offence under Section 304-B, I.P.C.

5. The learned Trial Court, after considering the evidence and material, dismissed the petitioners application vide its order dated 30.3.2001. Feeling dissatisfied with the order dated 30.3.2001, the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Court of Session, which came to be decided by the Special Judge (Fake Currency Cases), Jaipur and the learned Special Judge considering every aspect of the matter dismissed the revision petition vide its order dated 20.12.2001 and affirmed the order passed by the Trial Court.

6. It was in the above circumstances that the petitioner has invoked inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the orders dated 30.3.2001 and 20.12.2001, the earlier being passed by the Trial Court and later being passed by the Revisional Court.

7. In assailing the impugned orders, the main thrust of the argument of Mr. S.K. Gupta, appearing for the petitioner is that meticulous examination of evidence and critical evaluation thereof by both the Courts below at the stage of deciding the application filed under Sections 319 and 323, Cr.P.C. is not permissible and hence the Courts below have committed grave error in dismissing the petitioners application. According to him, otherwise also, from the evidence and material available on record it is clearly made out that the accused other than the present accused respondents are also involved in the commission of crime and that the present case is exclusively triable by the Court of Session in view of Sections 304B and 306, I.P.C.

8. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for accused respondent has supported the impugned orders passed by the two Courts below and has strenuously contended that once the matter has already been examined by the Revisional Court, the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise it again in second revision by resorting to the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C. In support of his argument, Mr. Sharma has relied upon various decisions of this Court and that of a decision of the Apex Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan, VI (1999) SLT 93=(1999) 6 SCC 326 [LQ/SC/1999/627] .

9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and gone through the evidence and material available on record and the reasons assigned by the Courts below in the impugned orders dismissing the petitioners application filed under Sections 323 and 319, Cr.P.C. There is hardly any dispute on the point that while deciding the application under Section 319, Cr.P.C. the Court is not required to have meticulous examination of the evidence. But at the same time the Court is required to examine the evidence with a view to find out whether there exists reasonable prospect of conviction as against other newly added accused. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Apex Court in Machael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation, II (2000) SLT 488=I (2000) CCR 298 (SC)=2000 Cr.LJ 1706, wherein, Their Lordships in para 14 of the judgment have held as hereunder:

.....Unless the Court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned we would say that the Court should refrain from adopting such a course of action.

10. I have gone through the record, in particular, the statements of witnesses, and the reasons assigned by the Courts below in disallowing the application of the petitioner filed under Sections 319 and 323, Cr.P.C. and I do not find any good ground to differ with the findings arrived at by the Trial Court as also by the Revisional Court. It appears that the Courts below have considered the evidence, both ocular and documentary, in right perspective. In declining the request of the petitioner both the Courts below have taken into consideration the letters produced in evidence. The Revisional Court has considered the letters Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 allegedly written by the deceased. These letters do not find any mention which could suggest that deceased was ever harassed or subjected to cruelty on account of demand of dowry by the persons against whom charge-sheet has not been submitted. Even in letter (Exhibit-6) written by the father of respondent No. 2 there is nothing about the demand of any dowry. The Revisional Court has further considered the important fact which came to be revealed from the evidence brought on record that neither the parents-in-law nor Jeth and sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased ever lived with her and her husband. After considering the entire evidence available on record, the Revisional Court concluded that prima facie no offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. is made out against the persons against whom the police after investigation did not submit charge-sheet making out a case either for offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. or under any section of Penal Code.

11. As regards the offence under Section 304-B, I.P.C., the Revisional Court after considering the evidence both documentary and ocular concluded that there is no evidence available on record to the effect that soon before the death of deceased she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

12. From what has been discussed above, it must be concluded that both the Courts below have touched the evidence available on record and the legal ingredients of the offence in true perspective and has rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner. That being so, the impugned orders call for no interference.

13. That apart, the order passed by the learned Trial Court rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Sections 323 and 319, I.P.C. has already been gone into by the Revisional Court. In my firm view, once the matter has already been examined by the Revisional Court in exercise of its power under Section 397(3), Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise it again in second revision by resorting to the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C. In my considered view, inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 cannot be utilised as a substitute for second revision. The object of Section 397(3) is clear. It is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders. It is well settled that any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Criminal Court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. In the case at hand the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court and, therefore, as stated above the inherent powers of this Court cannot be invoked as a substitute for second revision. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Apex Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan, (supra).

14. Resultantly, this misc. petition being devoid of merit fails and is hereby dismissed and the orders passed by the Courts below are maintained.