Per: SH. RAMESH SINGH THAKUR MEMBER (J):

MA No. 060/2395/2023 (Condonation of Delay)

1. This MA has been filed by the applicant seeking condonation of delay of 55 days in filing the Original Application.

2. It has been submitted by the applicant that the applicant approached his counsel in the second week of October, 2023 after arranging the relevant documents. The limitation period expired as most of the documents and orders were not in the public domain and it took time to arrange the same and secondly, the respondents kept falsely assuring the applicant that he would be posted as DGP (HoPF) and was intimated that the orders dated 02.09.2022 are in reconsideration.

3. It has been further submitted by the applicant that there is no delay as the applicant has a recurring cause of action as his appointment as DGP (HoPF) has to continue for a period of two years in view of The Punjab Police Act, 2007 as well as the directions in Prakash Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others reported as (2006) 8 SCC 1, yet as an abundant caution, the applicant moved the present Miscellaneous Application under Section 21(3) of the A.T. Act, 1985 praying for condonation of delay of 55 days in filing the present Original Application.

4. The respondent No. 1 i.e. Union of India has filed reply to this MA wherein it has been submitted by it that the false averment has been made in para 4 of the MA by the applicant that he is entitled for benefit of judgement rendered in the case of Prakash Singh and others (supra) and the benefit of the Punjab Police Act, 2007. It has been submitted by the replying respondent that on the one hand, the applicant is staking his claim to remain as DGP (HoPF) whereas on the other hand, the present MA is being filed seeking condonation of delay of 55 days in filing the Original Application.

5. It has been specifically submitted by the replying respondent that the above judgement nowhere deals with the issue of condonation of delay in approaching the Hon’ble Court particularly in the case of appointment on the highly sensitive post of Director General of Police.

6. It has further been submitted by the replying respondent that the explanation given in para No. 2 of the MA is no explanation in the eyes of law and the averments made in para No. 2 that the applicant approached his counsel in the second week of October, 2023 after arranging the relevant documents are vague.

7. The replying respondent has relied upon the judgement passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Ratan Chandra Samanta Vs. Union of India, 1990 SCR (3) 1 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the question of delay and laches, has observed that “Delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law. In absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy of lapse of time loses his right as well”.

8. The replying respondent has also relied upon the matter of State of Karnataka Vs. S.M. Kotrayya, 1996 SCC (L & S) 1499 wherein the Apex Court observed by referring to the provisions of Section 21 (1) and Section 21 (2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, that it is not only necessary that the applicants should give explanation for the delay which occasioned for the period mentioned in Sub-section 2 of Section 21 but they should give the explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should be required to satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper explanation. As there is no such explanation, the Original Application is liable to be dismissed.

9. The replying respondent has also relied upon the judgement passed by the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma Vs. Udam Singh Kamal and Ors.. 2000(2) SLJ 90 wherein it has been held that the OA barred by limitation cannot be and should not be disposed of on merit in view of the statutory provisions contained in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

10. The replying respondent has also relied upon the judgement passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Ghanshyam Dass and Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 374 wherein the principles stated in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana (1977) 6 SCC 538 were reiterated.

11. The replying respondent has also relied upon the judgement passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Bhup Singh Versus Union of India & Ors. (1992) A.I.R. S.C. Page 1414 and also relied on Union of India & Ors. Versus M.K. Sarkar, 2010 (2) S.C.C. Page 58 wherein it has been reiterated by the Apex Court that the limitation has to be counted from the date of original cause of action and a decision on the belated representation would not revive the cause of action.

12. Respondent No. 2, i.e. UPSC has also filed the reply to this MA. It has been submitted by the replying respondent that with regard to the contents of paras 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the MA, the submissions made by the State Government may also be referred.

13. It has been specifically submitted that the UPSC vide letter dated 05.01.2022, had forwarded the panel of three officers to the Government of Punjab.

14. We have also carefully perused the replies filed by Respondents No. 3 and 4 in this MA wherein it has been stated that the applicant did not bother to approach the counsel within period of one year and the applicant has proceeded in the matter in a totally casual manner and has failed to produce sufficient cause as required under Section 21(2) and Section 21(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

15. We find that the present Miscellaneous Application has been filed for condoning the delay of 55 days. The case of the applicant is that he was forced to go on leave w.e.f. 05.07.2022. In that case, the cause of action had already accrued to him on the same date and from the said date, the delay in filing the present Application is 114 days. Further, the charge report dated 04.07.2022 makes it absolutely clear that applicant had relinquished the charge from the post of DGP (HoPF) and accordingly, the cause of action occurred on the said date itself and subsequent order dated 02.09.2022 is a posting order on account of action taken against the applicant under the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. Thus, actually, there is delay of 1 year and 114 days which remains unexplained by the applicant. Thus, the present Application is a motivated application, filed at the fag end of the career.

16. Moreover, we find that the application for condonation of delay makes it evident that the same has been preferred with the casual approach. The reason assigned in the application is that the applicant allegedly approached his counsel in the second week of October, 2023 i.e. after the limitation period expired and delay is on the pretext of arranging the relevant documents which were not in public domain. Whereas, the replying respondents specifically submitted that the documents attached with the Original Application (Annexures A-1 toA-4) are orders/judgements passed by the Apex Court which were available on the website of the Apex Court and are thus, in public domain. The remaining annexures are letters and orders which are directly addressed to the applicant or have been written by the applicant himself. So, such excuses cannot be considered as proper explanations for not approaching the Tribunal within the limitation period.

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (SC), 2013 (12) SCC 649 has mandated that an application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern citing cogent reasons for delay and the application should not be in haphazard manner.

18. In Basawaraj V. Special Land Acquisition Officer (SC), 2013 (14) SCC 81, the Apex Court has held that Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.

19. Qua the reason of unavailability of documents for seeking condonation of delay, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bherulal, (SC) 2020 (10) SCC 654, has held that delay due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the same cannot be condoned.

20. It is also stated by the replying respondent that the applicant as well as his counsel were aware of the orders passed as they were part of earlier litigation regarding appointing to the post of DGP (HoPF), Punjab filed by Sh. Siddharth Chattopadhyaya and Sh. Mohd. Mustafa, being OA No. 2011/2019 and 199/2019 respectively.

21. It is also seen that the fact of false assurance given to the applicant is misleading as the applicant has not stated as to who has given him the false assurance. Moreover, the applicant possesses the qualification of LLB and LLM and being a legally trained mind, he has proceeded in a casual manner.

22. Hence, the present Miscellaneous Application is liable to be dismissed on the following grounds:-

(i) The averments made by the applicant are absolutely vague. Neither any disclosure has been made as to when and how the relevant documents were being arranged, whether any application under RTI was made or not, nor the date on which the information was received, has been disclosed. Thus, the fact of delay in arranging documents is just cooked up for explaining the delay in filing the present OA.

(ii) The other reason given by the applicant regarding delay in filing the present OA is itself contradictory as it is the stand of the applicant himself that the respondent State was pressurizing him to leave the charge of the post and he was forcibly made to go on leave. So, once the stand of the applicant himself is that his rights were being prejudiced, no question arises of any assurance.

23. Hence, we are of considered view that the reasons given in the application for condonation of delay like non-availability of documents and false assurance given by the unnamed person are not cogent and sufficient reasons to explain the same. Hence, the MA No. 060/2395/2023 seeking condonation of delay in filing the Original Application is dismissed.

24. Accordingly, the Original Application No. 060/1079/2023 is also dismissed on the ground of limitation as well as delay and laches.

25. There shall be no order so as to costs.