1. Since common question of law and facts are involved in these cases, same were heard together and are now being disposed of vide this common judgment.

2. Civil Revision No. 91 of 2023 has been filed against order dated 15.5.2023 (Annexure P-2) passed by learned District Judge, Shimla in CMP No. 209-S/6 of 2023, rejecting the prayer made on behalf of petitioners for their impleadment as party respondents by way of application under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC.

3. Civil Revision No. 92 of 2023 has been filed by same petitioners against order dated 15.5.2023 passed by learned District Judge in Civil Misc. Petition No. 328-S/6 of 2018, allowing the petition under S.74 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (hereinafter, ‘Act’) by respondent No.1, for induction as trustee.

4. Similarly, Civil Revision No. 131 of 2023 has been filed by petitioners, who are official trustees of Shri Ram Dharm Kosh Trust i.e. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shimla and Block Development Officer, Mashobra, against order dated 15.5.2023 passed by learned District Judge in Civil Misc. Petition No. 328-S/6 of 2018 (Annexure P3), allowing the application under S.74 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (hereinafter, ‘Act’) by respondent No.1, for induction as trustee.

5. Petitioners in CR No. 91 and 92 of 2023, approached the learned court below for their impleadment as respondents in petition filed S.74 of the Indian Trust Act by Ishwant Rohal, on the ground that they are legal representatives of late Raja Hitender Sen, who was one of party to creation and registration of the Trust namely Shri Ram Dharm Kosh Trust (hereinafter, ‘Trust’). Since, on account of passing order dated 15.5.2023, whereby petition under S.74 of the Indian Trust Act filed by respondent No.1 came to be allowed, nominees of the Government/official trustees, who were appointed as trustees of the Trust in question were removed and new trustees namely Ishwar Rohal, Parmanand Thakur and Anupinder Rohal were inducted as new trustees, have filed Civil Revision No. 131 of 2023.

6. For having bird’s eye view, facts which may be relevant for the adjudication of the case are that on 4.8,1944, late Rani Indumati, Rajmata of Keonthal State created Trust namely “Ram Dharm Kosh Trust” (Annexure P-2 of CR No. 92 of 2023), thereby declaring that the Trust shall be administered by Rajmata during her life time and thereafter by a Board of Trustees consisting of Raja of Jubbal State, Raja of Keonthal and Rai Bahadur Lala Jodha Mal Kuthiala, Timber Merchant and Government Contractor, Shimla. Perusal of Trust deed (Annexure P-2 of CR No. 92 of 2023) reveals that as per Trust Deed, Raja Jubbal was made Chairman of Board of Trustees. After creation of Trust as detailed herein above, a Civil Suit No. 14-S/1 of 1997/1991, came to be filed by persons namely Amar Singh, Devi Saran Verma and Kishan Singh Rohal under S.92 CPC, for removal of existing trustees and for appointment of new trustees. Aforesaid suit was decreed by learned District Judge vide judgment and decree 12.7.1999, as a result of which, trustees appointed by Rani Indumati, at the time of creation of the Trust were removed and in their place, official trustees i.e. Additional Deputy Commissioner Shimla, Block Development Officer Mashobra and sitting member of legislative constituency (MLA), in which area Junga falls, came to be appointed as trustees. Apart from above, decree for Rs.3,12,000 on account of refund of rent also came to be passed (Annexure P-3 of CR No. 92 of 2023).

7. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, late Hitender Sen, filed RFA Nno. 203 of 1999. Since during pendency of first appeal, Raja Hitender Sen expired, his legal representatives including the petitioners in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, were brought on record as appellants. However, fact remains that vide judgment and decree dated 11.4.2012, this court dismissed RFA and upheld the judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge.

8. Though, a review petition was filed against judgment and decree dated 11.7.2012 passed by this Court, but same was also dismissed, as a result of which, judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 passed by learned District Judge, Shimla came to be upheld. After 6 years of dismissal of aforesaid RFA filed by predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, respondents in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, filed an application under S.74 of the, for appointment of new trustees (Annexure P-1), alleging therein that the properties of Trust are not being looked after by the trustees appointed pursuant to judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 and as such, the persons, detailed in para-9 of application be inducted as trustees alongwith official trustees. In the aforesaid proceedings, petitioners herein, who happen to be legal representatives of original trustee late Raja Hitender Sen/Rani Indumati filed application under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC, praying therein for their impleadment on the ground that they were necessary parties. Petitioners averred in the application that otherwise also, they are party in RFA having been filed by their predecessor-in-interest, whereby judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 passed by learned District Judge was upheld. Petitioners, also made reference to order dated 6.11.2009 passed by this court in RFA No. 203 of 1999, whereby application having been filed by the respondent No.1 herein for her impleadment in RFA was allowed. (Annexure P-4, page 63 of CR No. 92).

9. Aforesaid prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, came to be seriously opposed by the respondents by filing reply, wherein they stated that the applicants/petitioners herein not the necessary party, because, their rights, if any, to continue as trustees stand extinguished with passing of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999. Respondents also stated that the plea set up by predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners that property of Trust is their property, already stands already rejected by the competent court of law and as such, they cannot be permitted at this stage to rake up that issue.

10. Learned District Judge, on the basis of aforesaid pleadings adduced on record by the petitioners, passed impugned order dated 15.5.2023 (Annexure P-2 of CR No. 91), thereby rejecting the application filed by petitioners for impleadment, on the ground that since predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, Raja Hitender Sen had lost his right to be trustee in terms of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, passed by learned District Judge, Shimla in Civil Suit No. 14-S/1 of 1997/1991, petitioner cannot be said to have any right to be impleaded in the instant proceedings. Though in the application filed under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC petitioner specifically raised issue with regard to maintainability of petition under S.74 of the, but learned District Judge, after dismissing the application filed under Order I, rule 10 (2) CPC, vide order dated 15.5.2023 (Annexure P-6, CR No. 92 of 2023) allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 under S.74 of the, as a result thereof, official trustees appointed vide judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, in Civil Suit No. 14-S/1 of 97/91 came to be replaced by respondent No.1 and two others. In the aforesaid background, CR No. 91 of 2023 and 131 of 2023, came to be filed by the respective petitioners, laying therein challenge to order dated 15.5.2023, allowing the application under S.74 of the and CR Nno. 92 of 2023 has been filed by the petitioners, laying therein challenge to order dated 15.5.2023, whereby their application for impleadment has been rejected.

11. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, as highlighted in the petitions and further canvassed by Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner is that learned District Judge, while considering prayer made on behalf of the petitioners, failed to take note of the fact that the petitioners, besides being legal representatives of original trustee Raja Hitender Sen, are residents of Keonthal State and as such, they otherwise have/had direct interest in the Trust property. Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate further argued that bare perusal of impugned order dated 15.5.2023, whereby application under Order I, rule 10(2)CPC came to be dismissed, clearly reveals that learned District Judge, while considering prayer made by petitioners for their impleadment was heavily swayed by judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, passed in CS No. 14-1/S of 1997/91, wherein admittedly, learned court below, having taken note of prayer made by respondent No.1 herein, had replaced original trustees with official trustees. He submitted that earlier also, on account of allegations of mis-management, original trustees were replaced. Mr. Lal further argued that at no point of time, opposition ever came to be made by the petitioners as far as creation of Trust is concerned, rather they intend to be impleaded for placing on record true facts with regard to management of property of the Trust. Mr. Lal further submitted that otherwise also, once in application filed under Order I, rule 10 (2) CPC, petitioners had raised a specific question with regard to maintainability of petition under S.74 of the, learned court below ought not have decided petition under S.74 of the, without there being impleadment of petitioners, who besides being legal representatives of original trustee have direct interest in the property of Trust being residents of Keonthal State.

12. Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, also argued that order dated 15.5.2023, whereby petition under S.74 of the Indian Trust Act came to be allowed, is not legally tenable and as such deserves to be set aside. He further submitted that petition under S.74 of Act is/was otherwise not maintainable for the reason that the, is not applicable to public charitable Trust, rather the same governs private, religious or endowment trusts. He submitted that bare perusal of order dated 15.5.2023 clearly reveals that learned District Judge exceeded its jurisdiction while rendering judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, passed in Civil Suit No. 14-S/1 of 1997/91, because no prayer was ever made by the respondents to remove the existing Trustees, rather, prayer on behalf of respondents was to induct them alongwith official trustees.

13. Mr. Vineet Vashishta, Advocate, appearing for respondent No.1, in all the petitions, supported the impugned orders. He submitted that there is on illegality or irregularity therein and as such, no interference is called for. While refuting the submissions made by Mr. Rajnish K. Lal, Advocate and Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Vashishta, vehemently argued that once, predecessor-ininterest of petitioners, namely Raja Hitender Sen had lost his right to be a trustee of the Trust in question in terms of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 passed by learned District Judge in Civil Suit No. 14- S/1 of 97/91, there is no occasion, if any, for the petitioners to get themselves impleaded in the proceedings. He further submitted that the material available on record clearly suggests that the official trustees pursuant to judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 failed to manage the Trust and as such, learned court below rightly took cognizance of the petition under S.74 filed by respondent No.1. While making this court peruse judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bansi Dhar and others, (1974) 1 SCC, 446, Mr. Vashishta made a serious attempt to persuade this Court to agre with his contention that S.74 of the act covers all Trusts, private or public. Mr. Vashishta argued that otherwise also, application under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC, is /was not maintainable for the reason that same was filed after conclusion of arguments in main petition under S.74. To substantiate his aforesaid argument, he placed reliance upon judgment passed by this court on 9.9.2022 in CMPMO No. 263 of 2022 titled Surender Kaur v. Shri Jagtender, whereby this court having taken note of judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Arjun Singh v. . Mohindra Kumar and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993, held that once the case is finally fixed for hearing arguments, application for setting aside ex parte order is not maintainable. He also placed reliance upon a judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Pujya Sindhi Panchayat v. S.L. Mishra, AIR 2020 Raj 294, Rajasthan Financial Corp. v. Pukhraj Jain, AIR 2001 Raj 71, V.N. Krishna Murthy v. Ravikumar, (2020) 9 SCC 501 and Aarogya Pathcare LLP v. Wellness Pathcare India LLP, 2021 SCC

14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record, this court finds that admittedly after creation of Trust by late Rani Indu Mati on 4.8.1944, working of trustees qua Trust properties was laid challenge by persons namely Amar Singh, Devi Saran Verma and Kishan Singh Rohal, by way of Civil Suit under s.92 CPC, wherein they prayed for removal of exiting trustees and appointment of new trustees. Vide judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, learned District Judge Shimla replaced the original trustees with official trustees viz. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, Block Development Officer Mashobra and sitting MLA of constituency, in which Junga fell. After passing of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, which has otherwise attained finality, official trustees, as detailed above, kept on managing and supervising the properties of the Trust, but the respondents herein filed petition under S.74 of the, praying therein for their induction as trustees on the ground that the official trustees have failed to take care of the property and they are over burdened on account of official work, as a result thereof, Trust property is in state of utter neglect. Respondents averred in application that even after passing of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, no steps were taken by official trustees to look after the Trust property and as such, they be also inducted as trustees alongwith official trustees.

15. Before the aforesaid petition under S.74 of the, could be finally decided by learned District Judge, petitioners in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, namely Vijay Jyoti Sen and others, filed an application under Order I, rule 10 CPC for their impleadment but such prayer of them came to be rejected on 15.5.2023 on the ground that their predecessor-in-interest late Raja Hitender Sen, was held to be ineligible to be remain as a trustee by learned District Judge in its judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999.

16. No doubt perusal of judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 suggests that the trustees appointed by Rani Indu Mati in 1944, were ordered to be replaced by learned District Judge vide judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999 on the ground that they failed to protect the Trust property but definitely, such finding would not debar legal representatives of the deceased original trustee Raja Hitender Sen to file an application under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC for their impleadment, especially when it is not in dispute that they are also the residents of Keonthal State, for whom the Trust was created by late Rani Indumati. It is none of the case of the parties that by way of application under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC, petitioners in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, ever opposed the prayer made by respondent No.1, for being inducted as trustees, rather by way of impleadment they intended to place on record factual position with regard to management of Trust, which was allegedly not being taken care of by official trustees.

17. Learned District Judge, while rejecting the application filed by the petitioners in CR Nos. 91 and 92 of 2023, under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC, fell in grave error by ignoring the fact that the petitioners like respondent No.1, are also beneficiaries of Trust property and as such, could always raise question qua management of the same. Right of petitioners to participate in the proceedings, initiated by respondent No.1 under S.74 of the, can not be defeated merely for the reason that their predecessor-in-interest Raja Hitender Sen was declared ineligible to be a trustee by learned District Judge in judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999.

18. No doubt, in the RFA filed by predecessor-in-interest of petitioners against the judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, petitioners were also made party, but said fact also would not debar petitioners herein from laying challenge to the claim put forth by the respondents for being inducted as trustees, especially when there is ample material available on record suggestive of the fact that the Trust in question was actually created by predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. No doubt after creation of Trust, petitioners cannot claim to have any ownership/proprietary rights qua the property of Trust but being beneficiaries, can always raise objection qua induction of some of the persons as trustees. However, learned District Judge, while rejecting the prayer made on behalf of the petitioners for impleadment, scuttled aforesaid right of the petitioners, who in the event of being arrayed as party respondents, may have placed on record material, suggestive of the fact that the persons seeking to be inducted as trustees are not fit for being inducted as such.

19. More over, this court finds that no prejudice would have been caused to any of the parties, on account of impleadment of petitioners in petition under S.74 of the filed by respondent No.1, which otherwise is/was required to be decided by learned court below in accordance with law and on the basis of material adduced on record by parties. Hence, learned court below has erred inasmuch rejecting the prayer of the petitioners for their impleadment.

20. Next question, which falls for adjudication is, “whether application under Order I, rule 10(2) having been filed by the petitioners could be entertained by the learned court below, after conclusion of final arguments”

21. Judgment referred to in Surender Kaur supra, decided by this court on 9.9.2022, which is based upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in supra, is not applicable to the facts of the present case, because in that case, this court having taken note of Arjun Singh supra held that application under Order IX rule 7 CPC for setting aside ex parte order can be entertained, if filed before conclusion of trial but definitely not after closure of the arguments. In Surender Kaur supra, this court has categorically held that any application filed after conclusion of arguments is not maintainable.

22. High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in M/s BDR Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Narsingh Shah @ Narsingh Sah, CM(M) 412/2020, CM Appls. 18635/2020 & 3384/2021, decided on 3.8.2021, while interpreting judgment in Arjun Singh supra held that the "stage" of a suit and the hearing" of a suit do not connote the same thing. The suit progresses through various stages, whereas there may be several dates of hearing during the course of recording of evidence as it may involve the examination of the witnesses. During multiple hearings when the witnesses are being examined, the "stage" for the recording of evidence would remain the same. A party, which absents during a date of hearing can join the proceedings, if the arguments have not been heard finally and only judgment remains to be pronounced. In BDR Developers supra, Delhi High Court, held that exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC is dependent upon “stage” of case and not “hearing” of the case. Ipso facto, therefore, the judgment of Arjun Singh (supra) cannot be applied to the disposal of an application under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. The "hearing" may conclude once the "judgment" is reserved. But, the pronouncement of judgment is also a stage, just as on the filing of an appeal, that would also be a stage in the life of a suit. Delhi High Court in BDR Developers supra, held as under:

“16. Unlike Order IX Rule 7 of CPC, which was being discussed by the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh (supra), where the word used was "hearing", which would indicate that the suit is still to be finally disposed of, Order XII Rule 6 of CPC refers to the "stage" of a suit. The "stage" of a suit and the "hearing" of a suit do not connote the same thing. The suit progresses through various stages. For instance, the stage for filing of Signature Not Verified Signed By:MANJEET KAUR Signing Date:03.08.2021 20:18:13 documents, stage for admission/denial of documents, the stage for framing of issues, the stage for leading of evidence, and so on and so forth. Hearings would take place at each stage, multiple times. There may be several dates of hearing during the course of recording of evide nce as it may involve the examination of the witnesses. During multiple hearings when the witnesses are being examined, the "stage" for the recording of evidence would remain the same. A party who absents during a date of hearing can join the proceedings if the stage of the case allows it, that is, arguments had not been heard finally and only judgment remains to be pronounced.

23. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court and the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench). In Om Rice Mill v. Banaras State Bank Ltd., 1999 SCC OnLine All 966, the High Court of Allahabad, while relying on the judgments in Roe v. Davies, (1876) 2 Ch D 729, 733, Baker Ltd. v. Medway & Co., (1958) 1 WLR 1216 (CA), Badri v. S. Kripal, AIR 1981 Madh Pra 228 and B.N. Das v. Bijaya, AIR 1982 Orissa 145, observed that the expression used in Order IX Rule 7 of CPC and that in Order VI Rule 17 of CPC are completely different and no analogy could be drawn in order to interpret the term "at any stage" occurring in Order VI Rule 17 of CPC on the basis of an interpretation of Order IX Rule 7 of CPC.

23. In view of aforesaid discussion and law taken note of, this court finds no merit in the submission of learned counsel for respondent No.1, that the application filed by the petitioners under Order I, rule 10(2) CPC, after conclusion of order was not maintainable.

24. Next question, which arises for determination is with regard to maintainability of proceedings under S. 74 of the. Mr. Vashishta, learned counsel for the respondents, while placing reliance upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Bansi Dhar supra, vehemently argued that the provisions of the are also applicable to public Trusts because principles governing public Trust and private Trusts remain the same, as such, petition filed under S.74 of the, for  appointment of new trustee on the ground of mis-management of property of Trust can be said to be maintainable.

25. However, having perused aforesaid judgment, this court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Vashishta, learned counsel for respondent No.1, because aforesaid judgment, if read in its entirety, clearly reveals that Hon'ble Apex Court in aforesaid judgment, while making observation that the provision of Indian Trust Act proprio vigore, do not apply to public Trusts, categorically observed that a caveat is added therein that care must certainly be exercised not to import by analogy what is not germane to the general law of trust. Reliance is the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Trustees of Heh The Nizam’s Pilgrimage Money Trust v. C.I.T., (2000) 4 SCC 179, wherein, Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

“10. However, the learned counsel submitted that Section 34 of the Trusts Act might be taken as wrongly mentioned and the order passed by the court be treated as on a suit/petition for change of the objects of the Trust by applying the doctrine of Cypres to save the Trust from failing. He relied on the decisions of this Court in Sheikh Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai [1963 (3) SCR 623] and State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bansi Dhar and Ors. [1974 (1) SCC 446]. The principle laid down in those cases is that the general principles of trust adumbrated in the provisions of the Trusts Act can be applied by invoking the universal rules of equity and good conscience even though provisions of the Trusts Act proprio vigore do not apply to public charitable trusts. A caveat is added therein that care must certainly be exercised not to import by analogy what is not germane to the general law of trust. In the case first-mentioned, fiduciary relationship of a trustee and in the case second-mentioned, the principle of resultant trust in favour of the settlor were involved. In the instant case, no general principle of law of trusts is embodied in Section 34 of the Trusts Act which is a special provision conferring jurisdiction on the courts to pass appropriate order in the management of the Trust. We cannot also accept the contention of the learned counsel that the application under Section 34 of the Trusts Act be treated as a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reasons more than one. Suffice it to say that the application purported to be under Section 34 of the Trusts Act does not satisfy requirements of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

26. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court categorically held that application under Section 34 of the Trusts Act could not be treated as a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reasons that the application purported to be under Section 34 of the Trusts Act does not satisfy requirements of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

27. No doubt, in Bansi Dhar supra, Hon'ble Apex Court held that there is there is a common area of legal principles which covers all trusts, private and public, and merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act, they cannot became 'untouchable' where public trusts are involved, but while rendering judgment in Trustees of Heh The Nizam’s Pilgrimage Money Trust Hon'ble Apex Court clarified that in the judgment in Bansi Dhar’s case, Hon'ble Apex Court carefully added the caveat that care must certainly be exercised not to import by analogy what is not, germane to the general law of trusts.

28. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 1 of the:

“1. Short title, commencement—This Act may be called the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 and it shall come into force on the first day of March, 1882.  Local extent, Savings.— [It extends to [the whole of India (except the State of Jammu and Kashmir) and] the Andaman and Nicobar Islands[***]but the Central Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend it to 6 [the, Andaman and Nicobar Islands] or to any part thereof.] But nothing herein contained affects the rules of Muhammadan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, or applies to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors; and nothing in the Second Chapter of this Act applies to trusts created before the said day.”

29. Since very preamble of Indian Trust Act, which came into force on 1.3.1882, provides that though the object of the Indian Trust Act is to codify the law relating to trusts in the wider sense but it does not affect the rules of Muhammadan law as to waqf, or the mutual relations of the members of an undivided family as determined by any customary or personal law, and it does not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments, or to trusts to distribute prizes taken in war among the captors nor does it apply to public trusts and charitable trusts as is evident from Preamble and S.1 of the. Undoubtedly, Trust in question is a public Trust as is evident from Trust deed and the findings given by learned District Judge in Civil Suit while passing judgment and decree dated 12.7.1999, which were upheld in RFA by this Court.

30. Judgment in Bansi Dhar came to be distinguished in judgment of Full Bench of Bombay (Nagpur) Bench in Shyamabai Surajkaran Joshi v. Madan Mohan Mandir Sanstha (FB), AIR 2010 Bombay 88, wherein Full Bench of Bombay High Court having taken note of judgment in Bansi Dhar, again reiterated that Hon'ble Apex Court  while delivering aforesaid judgment gave a word of caution by saying that care must be certainly exercised not to import by analogy the provisions of the Trusts Act, 1882 when they are not germane to the general law of Trusts. Subsequently, similarly decision came to be rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in case Thayarammal v. Kanakammal, (2005) 1 SCC 457, in view of preamble or the Indian Trust Act. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court held that Indian Trust Act is only applicable to private Trusts and not to public Trusts. It would be relevant to take note of following para of judgment supra:

“15. The contents of the stone inscription clearly indicate that the owner has dedicated the property for use as “Dharamchatra” meaning a resting place for the travelers and pilgrims visiting the Thyagaraja Temple. Such a dedication in the strict legal sense is neither a “gift” as understood in the Transfer of Property Act which requires an acceptance by the donee of the property donated nor is it a “trust”. The Indian Trusts Act, as clear by its preamble and contents is applicable only to private trusts and not to public trusts. A dedication by a Hindu for religious or charitable purposes is neither a “gift” nor a “trust” in the strict legal sense. (See B.K. Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 5th Edn. By A.C. Sen, pp.102-03)”

31. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion and law taken into consideration this court finds merit in all the petitions and same are allowed. Orders dated 15.5.2023 passed by learned District Judge, Shimla in CMP No. 209-S/6 of 2023 (Annexure P-2 of CR No. 91 of 2023) and dated 15.5.2023 in Civil Misc. Petition No. 328-S/6 of 2018 (Annexure P-6 of CR No. 92 of 2023 and Annexure P-3 of CR No. 131 of 2023), are quashed and set aside.