Pankaj Bhatia, J. - Heard counsel for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present petition has been filed seeking quashing of the charge-sheet dated 28.12.2019 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition). In the said charge-sheet, it was alleged against the petitioner that while the petitioner was appointed in Police Station Phase III Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar on 3.2.2018, failed in performing his duties in a proper and reasonable manner, which resulted into one Jitendra sustaining bullet injuries and in this regard, the brother of the said Jitendra, Sri Dharmendra Yadav lodged an F.I.R. in the Police Station Phase III, Gautam Budh Nagar, which was registered as Case Crime No. 249 of 2018, under Section 394, 307 I.P.C. It was further alleged that on a preliminary enquiry, it was found that the petitioner has not discharged his duties with utmost care and alacrity. In the said charge-sheet, three witnesses were disclosed and the petitioner were called upon to file his defence reply, so that the proceedings for disciplinary enquiry be proceeded with.

3. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that with regard to the offence, which was registered as Case Crime No. 249 of 2018, under Sections 394, 307 I.P.C., the criminal trial has concluded and a judgment was given on 5.8.2019, wherein the Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution could not establish the case against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubts and thus the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of doubt and the prosecution was dismissed. In the said judgment, directions were also issued for initiating the proceedings against Dharmendra Yadav, the informant, under Section 344 I.P.C.

4. The counsel for the petitioner argues that in view of the conclusion of the trial, the charge-sheet deserves to be quashed and no useful purpose would be served for continuing the departmental proceedings, as proposed to be concluded in the charge-sheet dated 28.12.2019.

5. The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another; (1999) 3 SCC 679 [LQ/SC/1999/333] . In the said case, the Supreme Court proceeded to quash the ex-parte departmental proceedings against the petitioner, which were initiated on the same grounds, in which the petitioner was exonerated in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court while rendering the judgment, recorded as under:-

35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.

6. The reasons as culled out from the said judgment for quashing the proceedings were two folds, one that the criminal trial and the departmental proceedings were initiated on the same charge and the same witnesses had deposed in the departmental proceedings, who were also the witnesses in the criminal trial and the second reasoning was that the departmental enquiry was an ex-parte enquiry relying on the same set of witness, without affording any opportunity of hearing.

7. The next case cited by the counsel for the petitioner is State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna & others; 2000 (8) Supreme 105 . The counsel for the petitioner has specifically relied upon paragraph 35, which is as under:-

35. While it is true that justifiability of the charges at this stage of initiating a disciplinary proceeding cannot possibly be delved into by any court pending inquiry but it is equally well settled that in the event there is an element of malce or malafide, motive involved in the matter of issue of a charge-sheet or the concerned authority is so biased that the inquiry would be a mere farcical show and the conclusions are well known then and in that event law courts are otherwise justified in interfering at the earliest stage so as to avoid the harassment and humiliation of a public official. It is not a question of shielding any misdeed that the Court would be anxious, it is the due process of law which should permeate in the society and in the event of there being any affectation of such process of law that law courts ought to rise up to the occasion and the High Court in the contextual facts has delved into the issue on that score. On the basis of the findings no exception can be taken and that has been the precise reason as to why this Court dealt with the issue in so great a detail so as to examine the judicial propriety at this stage of the proceedings

8. In the present case, there is no allegation, mala fide or motive involved or any allegation of apprehension of bias, thus the said judgments will have no applicability to the present case.

9. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram; 2013 (1) SCC 598 [LQ/SC/2012/1056] has extensively dealt with the question of simultaneous proceedings in the disciplinary enquiry and the criminal trial. The Supreme Court has held as under:-

19. The propositions which the respondent wanted to canvass placing reliance on the judgment in M. Paul Anthony case [ M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 [LQ/SC/1999/333] : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810 ] read as follows: (SCC p. 691, para 20)

(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.

20. This Court in Southern Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India [(2009) 9 SCC 24 [LQ/SC/2009/1620] : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 552] held that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The Court reiterated that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officer had been acquitted of the criminal charge.

21. In State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [(2008) 15 SCC 657 [LQ/SC/2008/977] : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 489] (SCC p. 662, para 18) this Court held that there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of the superior courts in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the enquiring officer is limited and that the High Court would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment and there cannot be any doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or where the departmental proceedings had already been initiated, to continue therewith. In that judgment, this Court further held as follows: (SCC p. 662, para 20)

20. The legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the same set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a departmental proceedings and in a criminal case simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The dicta of this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 [LQ/SC/1999/333] : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] however, remains unshaken although the applicability thereof had been found to be dependent on the fact situation obtaining in each case.

22. In a later judgment of this Court in Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao [(2012) 1 SCC 442 [LQ/SC/2011/1476] : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 171] this Court after a detailed survey of various judgments rendered by this Court on the issue with regard to the effect of criminal proceedings on the departmental enquiry, held that the disciplinary authority imposing the punishment of dismissal from service cannot be held to be disproportionate or non-commensurate to the delinquency.

23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over PWs 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the prosecution had not examined Head Constable Adiyodi (No. 1368) and Peter (No. 1079) of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with PWs 1 and 2, husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (complainant husband) is found in Ext. P-1 complaint. Further, the doctor, PW 8 has also clearly stated before the enquiry officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined.

24. The meaning of the expression honourable acquittal came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 [LQ/SC/1993/962] : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594 : (1994) 26 ATC 619] . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions honourable acquittal, acquitted of blame, fully exonerated are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression honourably acquitted. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787 [LQ/SC/1963/258] ] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows: ( Raghava case [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] , SLR p. 47, para 8)

8. The expression honourably acquitted is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term honourably acquitted. ( Robert Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] , ILR pp. 188-89)

26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.

10. In view of the said categorical pronouncement, the question to be decided in the present writ petition is whether the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed, as prayed for by the counsel for the petitioner.

11. A perusal of the judgment in the criminal trial makes it clear that the petitioner has been exonerated on the basis of benefit of doubt and after recording that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge, levelled against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubts. In the charge-sheet, which is sought to be quashed in the present case, reliance has been placed on three witnesses, out of which one was a witness in a criminal trial and the rest two witnesses were not examined in the criminal trial. Besides that fact, a perusal of the charge-sheet makes it clear that the charges are two folds in nature, the first being that on account of negligence in performance of his duties, an F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner and secondly that on the basis of a preliminary enquiry, there were reasons to believe that the petitioner was negligent in not performing his duties with alacrity.

12. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram (Supra), I am of a firm view that no case is made out for quashing of the charge-sheet, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13. The petitioner is permitted to file a reply to the charge-sheet within a period of four weeks from today and it is further directed that steps be taken for expeditious disposal of the disciplinary enquiry, as initiated and is pending against the petitioner.

14. The writ petition is disposed off in terms of the above direction.