1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is aggrieved by the Judgment dated 27.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Gujarat in CR-MA No. 14624/2007 whereby the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction has quashed the FIR being Crime Register No. I-284 of 2007 registered at J.P. Road Police Station, Vadodara, lodged by the appellant herein, with the observation that the second complaint is not only non-maintainable but has the colour of abuse of process of law at the instance of respondent No. 2 (appellant herein).

3. Learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on a catena of Judgments of this Court submits that the subsequent FIR lodged by the appellant herein is based on entirely independent facts against a different set of people and relates to a completely different time period with a gap of 2½ years. He further submits that an FIR cannot be quashed by terming the same as second FIR simply because the complainant is the same person, offence relates to same company and the Police Station is same.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the High Court has rightly quashed the FIR after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the principle of "sameness".

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the facts and circumstances of the case as also the law laid down by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings arising out of the second FIR as the investigation is at nascent stage and it will hamper the investigation in the case. Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), reported in (1979) 2 SCC 322 , [LQ/SC/1979/11] and Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441 , [LQ/SC/2008/2163] wherein this Court has observed that IInd FIR/subsequent FIR is permissible where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications and it cannot be equated with the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. In the present case the IInd FIR/subsequent FIR was lodged on a complaint made by the same complainant on account of occurrence of a separate incident after a gap of 2½ years of the first complaint in regard to completely different set of allegations and against different set of accused, though including the only accused of first complaint as well. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in quashing the proceedings arising out of the subsequent FIR filed by the appellant by applying the principle of "sameness" and proceeding on the basis that the subsequent FIR lodged by the appellant was in fact a IInd FIR.

6. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.