B.N. KIRPAL

(1) This is an application, alleging that the respondents have committed contempt of Court and that action should be taken against thEM.

(2) It appears that there was a dispute between the parties, which was the subject -matter of an Award of the Industrial Tribunal on a reference having been made under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said Award was challenged by the respondents by filing a writ petition in this Court, but without success. As the terms of the Award had not been complied with by the respondents, the petitioner herein filed an application for contempt. At the hearing of the same, an undertaking was given by the respondents that subject to the outcome of the Special Leave Petition, which had been filed, the respondents shall comply with the terms of the Award and the judgment of this Court, upholding the Award.

(3) The Special Leave Petition has been dismissed. According to the respondents, they have complied with the terms of the Award, in as much as the employees have been regularised with effect from the date of their initial appointment, to the regular scales and, further, full backwages had been paid.

(4) It is the contention of the petitioner herein that proper seniority has not been given to the employees, full benefits have also been denied and there has been a deliberate non-compliance with the orders of the Tribunal. It is also contended that difference in salary has not been paid.

(5) As has already been noticed, this is an Award, which was passed under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. When this Act was, originally, framed, there was no provision relating to the execution of the Award. It is with the incorporation of Sec. 33C that specific provision has been made for recovery of money due from an employer under the Settlement, or an Award. The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, dealt with the nature and scope of the provisions of Sec. 33C. In 1968 (1) LLJ 6 [LQ/SC/1967/224] , in the case of East India Coal Company Limited v. Rameshwar, the Supreme Court took note of the decisions of that Court itself, relating to Sec. 33C(2), and then held that the following propositions on the question as to the scope of Sec. 33C(2) were deducible :- "(1) The legislative history indicates that the legislature, after providing broadly for the investigation and settlement of disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognized the need of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights and therefore, inserted Sec. 33A in 1950 and Sec. 33C in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to Sec. 10(1) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case. (2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of Sec. 33C. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers, such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the, as for instance, under Sec. 10(1). But, having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sought to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore, though in determining the scope of Sec. 33C care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance under Sec. 10(1), cannot be brought under Sec. 33C. (3) Sec. 33C which is in terms similar to those in Sec. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is a provision in the nature of an executing provision. (4) Sec. 33C(1) applies to cases where money is due to a workman under an award or settlement or under Chap. V-A of the already calculated and ascertained and therefore, there is no dispute about its computation. But sub-sec. (2) applies both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits. In the case of monetary benefit it applies where such benefit though due is not calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation. (5) Sec. 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is bassed is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests. (6) The fact that the words of limitation used in Sec. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, are omitted in Sec. 33C(2) shows that the scope of Sec. 33C(2) is wider than that of Sec. 33C(1). Therefore, whereas sub-sec. (1) is confined to claims arising under an award of settlement or Chap. V-A, claims which can be entertained under sub-sec. (2) are not so confined to those under an Award, Settlement or Chap. V-A. (7) Though the Court did not indicate which cases other than those under subsec. (1) would fall under sub-sec. (2) it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under sub-sec. (2), viz., cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under Sec. 10(1) or claims which have already been the subject-matter of settlement to which Secs. 18 and 19 would apply. (8) Since proceedings under Sec. 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an executing Court, the Labour Court, like the executing Court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under Sec. 33C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or settlement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction." These 8 propositions, summarised in East India Coal case and approved by it, included the proposition that Sec. 33C was a provision in the nature of an executing provision and it applied to cases where money was due to workmen under an Award or a Settlement and that sub-sec. (2) applied both to non-monetary as well as monetary benefits.

(6) In our opinion, when an Award of the Tribunal on a reference made under Sec. 10 has been given, then the non-compliance of the same would entitle the employee to apply under Sec. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(7) We have gone through the pleadings in the present case and we are not satisfied that there is any wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree or direction. The provisions of Sec. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, in other words, are not applicable in the instant case.

(8) Counsel for the petitioner has referred to AIR 1972 SC 2466 [LQ/SC/1972/477] (Baradkanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit) and 1989 Criminal Law Journal 2065 (Dr. Sajad Majid v. Syed Zahoor Ahmed) and contended that where the orders of the Court are flouted, the Court has the jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings against the contemner. There can be no doubt with this proposition. But, we are not satisfied that, in the instant case, any such situation has arisen. The proceeding for contempt should not be used with a view, merely, to see to the execution of an Award. Execution of the Award is contemplated under Sec. 33C(2) and with regard to the direction regarding regularisation, the Award itself says that 50 employees will be made permanent by computing half-year's service from the date of their appointment, which means that credit is to be given to the employment for 50% of their service and the regularisation is to take place accordingly. The letters of appointment, on the contrary, seems to indicate that these 50 persons have been regularised from the date of their initial appointment, which does not appear to be what has been directed by the Tribunal and this error, if any, is really in favour of the employees. We are not satisfied that there is any breach of undertaking in this case. Nor is there any deliberate disobedience with any of the orders passed by this Court or the Tribunal. We do not see any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed.

(9) Counsel for the petitioner asks for certificate to go to the Supreme Court. In our view, this is not a fit case for granting the certificate, as prayed for. Dismissed.