This is a petition for revising an order of the District Court of Godaveri refusing to grant an injunction restraining the execution of a decree obtained by the defendant against the plaintiffs father. The Subordinate Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to grant such an injunction and this view was upheld by the District Judge.

It is now contended that such an injunction will come under O. 39, either rule 1 or rule

2. It certainly cannot come within the language of R. 1, for there is no suggestion that the property of which delivery is to be given is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated. It is then argued that R. 2 would be applicable and that this is an injunction to restrain the defendant from committing other injury of any kind. The alleged injury is the execution of a decree lawfully obtained. In order to hold that that does constitute an injury, it is necessary to hold that that decree is illegal, for, if the decree is legal, the defendant has every right to execute it and in doing so he cannot be said to commit any injury.

It is then argued that Sect. 94, Civil Procedure Code, is wider than O. 39, and covers the present case, but I think that contention must be at once negatived in view of the language of the section which says in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, the Court may, if it is so prescribed, that is to say, the Court is given power provided that the rules make provision for the exercise of that power. The section is clearly governed by O. 39, which contains the rules prescribed.

A further contention is put forward that the injunction may be granted under the inherent powers of the Court under Sect. 151, Civil Procedure Code, and the petitioner relies on a decision of the Lahore High Court Kanshi Ram v. Sharaf Din (73 I.C., 909). The reason for holding this view is not very clearly stated in that judgment and it appears to be opposed to the principles adopted by a Full Bench of this Court in Neelaveni v. Narayana Reddi (I.L.R., 43 Mad., 94) [LQ/MadHC/1919/247] , followed in Krishnaswami Naidu v. Chengalroya Naidu (I.L.R., Mad., 171 = 18 L. W., 870), and in the case Joshi Shile Prakash v. Jhinguria (I.L.R., 46 All., 144). The principle there laid down is that when the Code makes provision for a certain procedure, the Code must be deemed to be exhaustive in that respect, and the provisions of Sect. 151, cannot be invoked in opposition to that provision. Here, the Code lays down in Sect. 94, that the Court shall only have power if it is given by rules framed under the Code. It, therefore, seems to me impossible to hold that when rules have been framed to give the Court power, further power should be given by Sect 15

1. If then the principle laid down in the Full Bench of this Court is correct, and I see no reason to doubt its correctness, it is applicable to this case also, and the District Judge was right in his order.

I may add that from the facts put before me here, although they were not considered by the Lower Courts, the petitioner does not seem to have much ground for his present complaint.

The petition is dismissed with costs.