1. Heard Mr. Vijayakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Ms. V.M. Velumani, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.

2. This Writ Petition has been filed, praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorarifiedmandamus, to call for the records relating to the third respondent vide proceedings No. Roc.Ser. 2(4)7731 of 2011, dated 28.3.2011, quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to pay the retirement benefits pursuant to her superannuation on 31.5.2011.

3. The petitioner joined in the Revenue Department as Junior Assistant on 2.7.1976 after being selected through Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. He was promoted to the post of Assistant in the year 1979 and thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Deputy Tahsildar in the year 1993 and in the year, 1997 to the post of Tahsildar. In the year 2006, he was further promoted to the post of Deputy Collector and subsequently to the post of District Revenue Officer in the year 2009. According to the petitioner, so far he had put in 35 years of unblemished service and discharged his duties to the satisfaction of his superiors.

4. While that be so, the petitioner was served with a charge memo by the third respondent vide proceedings No. Roc.Ser.2(4)/ 7731 of 2011 dated 28.3.2011 under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter, the Rules) seeking his explanation for the alleged charges relating to the non-filing of appeal against the enhanced compensation awarded to the claimants in O.P. No. 23 to 25 and 27 of 1991, dated 4.12.2000 on the file of the Sub Court, Erode, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. As per the said award, it seems that the Sub Court, Erode had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 63,000/- per hectare which is three times over and above the compensation fixed in the award by the Land Acquisition Officer, the third respondent herein.

5. As per the charge memo, dated 28.3.2011, the petitioner failed to supervise the concerned Assistants in charge of land acquisition files and failed to take steps to file appeals against the award passed by the Sub Court in O.P. Nos. 23 to 25 and 27 of 1991 and thereby caused loss to the Government for a sum of Rs. 64,80,174/- on account of enhanced compensation by the Sub Court, Erode in its award. Further, the petitioner was the responsible for dismissal of the appeals on account of inordinate delay of 9 years.

6. According to the petitioner, at the time when the award passed by the Sub Court, Erode on 4.12.2000 in O.P. Nos. 23 to 25 and 27 of 1991, the petitioner was serving as Personal Assistant to District Supply Officer, Collectors Office, Erode and he was transferred as Tahsildar at Perunthurai only on 3.11.2003 and for filing the appeals against the award of the Sub Court, Erode is 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment and by the time when he was transferred, the appeal time was over and therefore, he was not responsible for not taking the steps in filing the appeals against the award of the Sub Court, Erode and also for the alleged loss to the Government.

7. It is also case of the petitioner that the respondents have ultimately filed the- appeals with the petition for condonation of delay of 9 years in AS.SR. Nos. 8490 to 8492 of 2010 and the same were dismissed by this Court not only on the ground of delay, but also on merits holding that the similar connected appeals were already dismissed and compensation was also awarded to the land owners by the Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No. 892 of 1993 etc. Batch, dated 23.1.2002.

8. According to the petitioner, the respondents had not taken any action against the officials who were serving in the concerned department at the relevant point of time and they were permitted to retire without any remarks whatsoever. The following officers had served in Perundurai taluk as Tahsildars/Deputy Tahsildars.

Sl. No.NamePeriod of serviceDate of Retirement

1P.Subramaniam, Tahsildar28.10.1999 to 16.3.20013.1.2007

2A. Panneerselvam, Tahsildar29.6.2002 to 28.6.200331.3.2006

3P. Karthikeyani, Tahsildar29.6.2003 to 2.11.200331.3.2006

4S. Palanisamy, Head quar ters Deputy Tahsildar22.2.2001 to 31.5.2001 & 1.9.2001 to 7.4.200231.7.2006

5N. Vaithianathan, Head quar ters Deputy Tahsildar12.6.2002 to 18.3.200330.4.2004

6Pon. Subramaniam, Tahsildar17.3.2001 to 28.6.200231.3.2007

7R. Muthusamy, Tahsildar7.10.2005 to 16.11.200631.7.2008

8V. Venkittu Subramani, Tahsildar24.12.1999 to 21.2.200130.9.2009

9P. Natarajan, Head quar ters Deputy Tahsildar1.6.2001 to 31.8.200130.6.2010

10S. Dharmalingam, Head quar ters Deputy Tahsildar19.3.2003 to 7.8.200131.5.2010

11R. Prema8.8.2003 to 7.12.200430.4.2009

12N. Visalakshi15.4.2004 to 17.9.200430.4.2007

9. The petitioner was posted as Tahsildar only on 3.11.2003. It is the further case of the petitioner is that subsequent to the order of the Division Bench of this Court confirming the award passed by the Sub Court not only on the ground of delay, but also on merits, the respondents allowed the similarly placed persons working as Tahsildars to retire from service, viz., N. Vijayalakshmi, R. Prema and S. Dharmalingam by orders, dated 30.4.2007, 29.4.2009 and 27.4.2010 respectively and initiating proceedings only against the petitioner is discriminatory and unsustainable.

10. The respondents have filed counter affidavit, wherein, it has been stated that for the purpose of construction of Orathupalayam Dam in Kodumanal village, Perundurai taluk, an extent of 10.86.5 hectares of dry lands in S. Nos. 15/1, 2B, 3B etc., were acquired under the land acquisition proceedings. After getting the compensation under protest, the respective land owners filed LAOPs before the Sub Court, Erode for enhancement of the compensation. The Sub Court, Erode has enhanced the compensation from Rs. 17,500/- to 63,000/- per hectare, which is more than three times than the compensation already awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Subsequent to such huge enhancement by the Sub Court, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 845 Revenue (LAI) Department, dated 16.10.1998 directing the concerned officials to file appeals immediately even without getting prior permission of the higher officials or legal opinion of the Government Pleader in respect of the cases where, the compensation was enhanced more than three times or more than one lakh. While so, the petitioner was working as Tahsildar from 3.11.2003 to 6.10.2005 at the time of receipt of copy of the judgment, but she failed to take action for filing the appeal against the judgment upto 6.10.2005, i.e. Till she relieved from the post and therefore, she is primarily responsible for the above lapse. Though the judgment was passed by the Sub Court on 4.12.2005, but corrected copy of the judgment was received in the Taluk Office, Perundurai on 4.2.2005 while the petitioner was working as Tahsildar. For such lapse on the part of the petitioner which resulted in loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 64,80,175/-, the Government initiated disciplinary action by issuing charge memo under Rule 17(b) against the petitioner in pursuant to the G.O. Ms. No. 3(D) No. 42, PW (SI) Department, dated 19.11.2010. In such circumstances, it is stated that the issuance of the charge memo against the petitioner is sustainable and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that the impugned charge memo issued by the third respondent is arbitrary and perverse since it was issued for the alleged lapses took place in the year 2000, whereas, the petitioner joined duty as Tahsildar of Perunthurai taluk in the year 2003 by the time, the award enhancing the compensation was already passed by the Sub Court, Erode on 4.12.2000 and therefore, the petitioner was not at all in the picture and hence, the charge alleging that she is responsible for having not filed the appeals within the period of limitation against the award of the Sub Court, Erode cannot be sustained. Therefore, the charge memo is liable to be set aside on the ground of inordinate delay in issuance of the same. The learned counsel further contended even assuming that the appeals were filed within allowable time, no purpose would be served since the Division Bench of this. Court dismissed similar appeals holding that the award passed by the Sub Court in the land acquisition proceedings regarding enhancement of compensation was just and proper and requires no interference. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that even on merits also, the impugned charge memo cannot stand. It is also contended by the learned counsel that during the occurrence of alleged lapse, similarly placed Tahsildars/Deputy Tahsildars who served prior to the petitioner, were allowed to retire without initiating any disciplinary proceedings against them, but the petitioner was issued impugned charge memo just two months (sic) prior to his retirement, therefore, there is discrimination in initiating the proceedings against the petitioner.

12. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions:

(i) a Supreme Court decision in the case of RanjeetSingh v. State of Haryana and Others, 2008 (3) CTC 781 [LQ/SC/2008/1344] : LNIND 2008 SC 1318

We find that the Trial Court decreed the suit primarily for three reasons : (a) There was an unexplained delay of nine years in issuing the charge-sheet; (b) There was an unexplained delay of seven years in issuing show cause notice after the enquiry report was submitted in January 1985; (c) The appellant was promoted thrice between the dates of alleged misconduct and imposition of punishment (which was about nineteen years). This Court has repeatedly held that inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings is a ground for quashing the enquiry unless the employer satisfactorily explains the delay. For example, where the matter is referred to CBI for investigation and there is delay in getting its report or where the charge is of misappropriation and the facts leading to misappropriation come to light belatedly, it can be said that the delay is not fatal. But where the alleged misconduct was known and there was no investigation pending and when no explanation is forthcoming in regard to the delay, necessarily the unexplained delay would cause serious prejudice to the employee and therefore, enquiry will have to be quashed. (Vide State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 [LQ/SC/1998/448] and P.V. Mahadevan v. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636 [LQ/SC/2005/778] : 2005 (4) CTC 403 [LQ/SC/2005/778] ).

(ii) a Division Bench decision of this Court in Union of India, Pondicherry v. Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench and Another 2005 (2) CTC 169 [LQ/MadHC/2005/416] : LNIND 2005 MAD 370 [LQ/MadHC/2005/117] ).

3.... With the above notings the inquiry authority returned the papers to the disciplinary authority for taking an appropriate action in that matter. Again, there was a long lull during which time no move at all was made by the disciplinary authority. Suddenly, on 26.12.2000, which is almost one year and nine months later, the second charge memo was issued.

4.... According to the charge memo the alleged misconduct was during the year 1984-85 and twenty long years have since gone by from that and yet no progress whatsoever made by the Government till the Tribunal passed orders challenged in these writ petitions. In other words, there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 7.10.1994, the date on which O.A. No. 1689 of 1993 was dismissed by the Tribunal, till 26.2.2000 when the Government issued the second charge memo. Again, we find there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 26.2.2000 till the employee again went before the Tribunal in the year 2002. The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Government to continue with the enquiry any further. Therefore, on that ground stated by us, the orders in challenge are sustained and the writ petitions are dismissed....

(iii) another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of A. Obaidhullah v. The State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai - 9 and Another 2005 (5) CTC 380 : LNIND 2005 MAD 1542 : 2006-IV-LLJ-216 at p. 223 of LLJ:

15. Mr. K.V. Srinivasaraghavan has also brought to our notice a letter (Ms) No. 1118/Per.N.87 dated 22.12.1987 issued by Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Government of Tamil Nadu to all the heads of departments how the disciplinary cases should be disposed of expeditiously and prescribed a revised time limit for disposal of disciplinary cases. A perusal of the communication shows the time limit has been prescribed for completion of investigation/enquiry at every stage, including report by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, etc. In the absence of explanation at all on the side of the Government, except change of Government then and there, we are of the view that the Tribunal ought to have accepted the case of the petitioner (A. Obaidhullah) and quashed the charge memo on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay.

(iv) yet another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk, Chennai and Another v. N. Sivasamy LNIND 2005 MAD 1535 : 2006-II- LLJ-194 : (2005) 4 MLJ 659 [LQ/MadHC/2005/1672] at p. 666 of MLJ:

14.... We have already pointed out that though the applicant filed Original Application No. 6284 of 1997 challenging the charge memo dated 15.7.1997, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with disciplinary proceedings; there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo dated 15.7.1997.

(v) a decision of the Madurai Bench of this Court in the case of R. Tirupathy and Others v. The District Collector, Madurai District and Others, 2006 (2) CTC 574 : LNIND 2006 BMM 17 :

36. Therefore, a combined reading of the communication of the first respondent to the second respondent and consequently, the impugned order passed by the third respondent based on the communication of the second respondent shows that the impugned charge memos have been framed not with an independent mind but with a predetermined view. It is like a second show cause notice given normally for Government servants after conducting enquiry and finding the delinquent liable to be punished. In this case, without any enquiry and without giving any opportunity to the petitioners the impugned charge memos are issued which are really in..the form of a second show cause notice as to why the petitioners should not be removed from service....

(vi) yet another decision of the Madurai Bench of this Court in the case of M. Elangovan v. Trichy District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Tiruchirappalli and Another 2006 (2) CTC 635 : LNIND 2006 BMM 13 : (2006) 3 MLJ 621 at p. 624 of MLJ:

12. Likewise in respect of the other case, the charge memo was issued on 19.11.2001 in respect of an incident namely granting of loan which is stated to have happened in the year 1992 namely nearly ten years before the said period. The second show cause notice in the case was issued on 3.10.2003 proposing the punishment of recovery of amount of Rs. 2,74,303. The petitioner has also given his explanation on 22.2.2004. One has to appreciate that the case of petitioner is that even though, the charge memo has not been specifically challenged, the grievance is that during the verge of retirement, when the proposed punishment itself is only the stoppage of six months increments and the recovery of amount, if the order has been passed even proposed punishment (and) the period of punishment would have been over and the petitioner would have been promoted to the next cadre. It is due to the inordinate delay even from the date the second show cause notice was issued the petitioner has incurred huge loss which cannot be compensated. In fact, the petitioner has given various incidents to show as to how this chance of the promotion has been obstructed due to the pendency of these proceedings.

16.... it can safely be concluded that the petitioner has already suffered enough on account of the disciplinary proceedings and as pointed out and the mental agony and sufferings of the petitioner due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the proposed punishment itself. For the mistakes committed by the department in inordinate delay in the initiating proceedings and also during the conducting of the proceedings the petitioner shall not be made to suffer any further.

(vii) a decision of this Court reported in the case of K. Kumaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai - 5 2007 (3) CTC 763 [LQ/MadHC/2007/2261] : (2007) 4 MLJ 1243 at p. 1246 of MLJ:

9. In the above said two judgments, the Honourable Supreme Court held that normally the Disciplinary Proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per the relevant Rules, but then the delay defeats justice, delay cause prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to be blamed for the delay or where there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting Disciplinary Proceedings. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner has not caused any delay and the inordinate delay of 18 years is not properly explained by the respondents. It is also necessary to mention that earlier the petitioner has filed a Writ Petition in W.P. No. 20261 of 2004, seeking for a direction to the respondents therein to pass final orders, which was disposed of directing the respondents to pass final orders in the Disciplinary Proceedings on or before 30.9.2004, which was not complied with.

(viii) yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu, Chennai v. R. Ramarajan and Others 2009 (3) TLNJ 132 (Civil) : LNIND 2009 Mad 1786 : (2009) 5 MLJ 1221 [LQ/MadHC/2009/2243] at p. 1229 of MLJ:

19. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, when initially an inquiry by the CB-CID to probe into the alleged involvement of the first respondent in running of illegal gambling dens and casinos in Karur District was ordered, which did not bring out any adverse findings against the first respondent and thereafter, even in the inquiry and re-inquiry ordered to be conducted by the DVAC on the allegation of accumulation of disproportionate wealth nothing incriminating was found against the first respondent, thirdly the delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings in respect of the events which took place in the year 2000-02, i.e. the alleged irregular transfers effected and finally prolonging the disciplinary proceedings for a considerable length of time, we have no hesitation to conclude that the very object of initiating the departmental proceedings and allowing it to prolong for a considerable length of time is nothing but to harass the first respondent and to deprive him the promotion and other benefits....

The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in W.P. Nos. 7894 and 9377 of 2011, wherein, a similar charge memo issued another Deputy Tahsildar for the alleged non-filing of the appeals in time, came to be quashed by this Court holding that the said charge cannot be sustained in law.

13. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents contended that for the purpose of construction of Orathupalayam Dam in Kodumanal village, Perundurai taluk, an extent of 10.86.5 hectares of dry lands in S. Nos. 15/1, 2B, 3B etc., were acquired under the land acquisition proceedings and fixed Rs. 17,500/- as compensation per hectare which was objected by the land owners and the matter was referred to the Sub Court, Erode and by order, dated 4.12.2000 the Sub Court enhanced the compensation at the rate of Rs. 63,000/- per hectare which is three times more higher than the compensation fixed by the land acquisition officer and in such circumstances, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 845 Revenue Department dated 16.10.1988 directing the Land Acquisition Officers to file appeals uniformly in all cases where enhanced compensation exceeds three times of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer or Rs. 1 lakh and in such cases opinion of the Government Pleader is not necessary. In the said judgment dated 4.12.2000, some mistakes were crept in regarding survey numbers and extents. Therefore, the Government Pleader was requested to get the judgment corrected. Accordingly, the judgment with due corrections was received in the Taluk office on 4.2.2005 and at that time the petitioner was holding the post of Tahsildar, that is from 3.11.2003 to 6.10.2005, but she failed to file appeal against the Sub Court orders, which resulted in the land owners filing execution petition, which resulted in sanction of Rs. 64,80,175/- towards enhanced compensation to the land owners with thereof. Therefore, the respondents have rightly initiated the disciplinary proceedings by issuing 17(b) charge memo against the petitioner on 28.3.2011. The learned Special Government Pleader also submitted that the appeal should have been filed by the petitioner after getting the judgments corrected, which was received only on 4.2.2005 and at the relevant point of time the petitioner was holding the post of Tahsildar, who is responsible for filing the appeal and therefore, the charge framed against the petitioner is maintainable. In support of her contentions, the learned Special Government Pleader relied upon the decision in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. V. Appala Swamy (2007) 14 SCC 49 [LQ/SC/2007/97 ;] : LNIND 2007 SC 89, wherein, the Honble Supreme Court declined to be (sic) fortified with the view of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in quashing the disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent and held as under in para 11.

11. It may be true that there was some delay on the part of the appellants to conclude the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that only by reason thereof the entire departmental proceedings became vitiated. The High Court thus, in our opinion, was required to consider the question as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case particularly in view of the nature of the charge levelled against the respondent as also the explanation offered by the appellants in this behalf, it was a case where the entire proceedings should have been quashed. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not address itself the said question. It, as noticed hereinbefore, from the very beginning proceeded on the premise that the pension was payable to the respondent on his retirement. The High Court furthermore did not determine the question as to. whether a proceeding could have been initiated against the respondent in terms of Rules 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (CCA) Rules, 1963. If it is held that the second proceeding was maintainable in terms of the extant rules, ordinarily, the Tribunal or the High Court should not have interfered therewith. This aspect of the matter is concluded by the decisions of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Braham Dutta Sharma and Another, (1987) 2 SCC 179 [LQ/SC/1987/250] and State of U.P. v. Harihar Bhole Nath, (2006) 11 SCALE 322 [LQ/SC/2006/1028] .

The learned Special Government Pleader also relied upon a decision in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 [LQ/SC/2006/1136] : LNIND 2006 SC 1006 : 2007-I-LLJ-770 , wherein, the Honble Supreme Court has held as under in para 9 at p. 772 of LLJ:

9. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

14. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents and perused the entire materials placed before this Court.

15. The petitioner served as Tahsildar at Perunthurai from 3.11.2003 to 6.10.2005. It is not in dispute that the Sub Court, Erode has passed the award on 4.12.2000 enhancing the compensation in O.P. Nos. 23 to 25 and 27 of 1991 and the limitation period for filing the appeals against the said award is for 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of the judgment. At this relevant point of time, admittedly, the petitioner was not serving as Tahsildar at Perunthurai. The specific charge against the petitioner is that she failed to file appeals against the judgment of the Sub Court, Erode in O.P. Nos. 23 to 25 and 27 of 1991 within limitation period and that the condone delay petition filed belated was dismissed by this Court, which resulted in loss of Rs. 64,80, 175/- to the Government. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, though the Sub Court, Erode passed the judgment on 4.12.2000, the corrected copy of the judgment was received in the Taluk Office on 4.2.2005 and at that time, the petitioner was working as Tahsildar and despite specific instructions in G.O. Ms. No. 845, dated 16.10.1998, she failed to take appropriate action in filing the appeal against the judgment till 6.10.2005 on which date, she was relieved. To put it differently, if the petitioner had taken steps in filing the appeal, matter would have been contested in appellate Court so that the compensation awarded three times more than the actual compensation by the Sub Court could have been reduced and therefore, because of her failure in filing the appeal, the petitioner is responsible for the loss caused to the Government. This contention put forth on behalf of the Government by the learned Special Government Pleader merits no acceptance for more than one reason. Firstly, though the judgment was delivered by the Sub Court, Erode as early as on 4.12.2000, no steps were taken by the erstwhile Tahsildars to get the certified copy of the judgment for the purpose of filing the appeal till 4.2.2005 on which date only, it is stated that corrected judgment copy was received in Taluk Office. Therefore, there was a considerable delay of more than five years even in mere getting the copy of the judgment. It is surprising to note that the respondents had not taken any disciplinary action against the officers who worked and were allowed to retire at the relevant point of time when the judgment was delivered by the Sub Court, Erode in the year 2000, during which period, the petitioner was not at all in the picture as she assumed charge only from the year 2003 onwards. Therefore, the petitioner alone cannot be held responsible for the so-called failure in filing the appeal in time. Thus, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is discrimination in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for the alleged non-filing of appeals within time, that too at the fag end of his career. Secondly, even assuming for a moment that the appeals were filed in time and taken for consideration, nothing would have been served since an appeal in respect of L.A.O.P. No. 24 of 1991 filed along with condone delay petition in A.S.S.R. No. 8490 of 2010 and M.P. No. 1 of 2010 was dismissed by this Court on 22.7.2010 with the following observation in para 3 and 4:

3. Even otherwise, the compensation ordered by the Court below cannot be said to be excessive or exorbitant. Already a Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No. 892 of 1993 and batch cases, dated 23.1.2002 had rejected similar appeals directed against the judgments and decrees passed by the Court below in the lands belonging to neighbouring land owners.

4. In the light of the above, this appeal at the stage of A.S.S.R will stand dismissed. No costs.

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner produced a judgment made in A.S. No. 892 of 1993 etc. batch, dated 23.1.2002. The Division Bench of this Court in the said decision held that the award passed by the Sub Court in the land acquisition proceedings regarding enhancement of compensation is just and proper and requires no interference. Therefore, on this ground also, the respondents are not entitled to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Further, it is not the case of the respondents that the order passed in the above said ASSR has been appealed. It is submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that the award has been implemented by the respondents by paying compensation to the land owners which reveals the acceptance of the order passed by this Court. It is to be noted that the main intention to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner is for the loss sustained by the Government due to nonfiling of the appeals by the petitioner and no other motive is attributed against her.

17. It is settled law that ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet as at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is also well settled law that the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings has to be considered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. There is no general rule that whenever there is a delay, charge sheet should be quashed. While, considering the question of delay, the Courts have to look into the nature of charges, gravity of the misconduct, extent of delay as well as the possible prejudice which would be caused to the delinquent on account of such belated initiation of disciplinary proceedings. There is no straight jacket formula in such cases to be applied to all situations and cases. But, when the facts and circumstances of the present case are considered in the light of the above decisions, it can be held that the nature of the charges framed against the petitioner are not tenable and also there is considerable delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings since for the occurrence which took place in the year 2000, disciplinary proceedings were initiated in the year 2011 against the petitioner. Further, as already discussed supra, the respondents have not taken steps to initiate the proceedings against the predecessors of the petitioner who were working during the year 2000 at the time when the judgment of the Sub Court, Erode was passed and after a lapse of five years from the date of judgment of the Sub Court, the respondents started to probe the matter. Moreover, even the charges framed against the petitioner merit no acceptance in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court holding that the award passed by the Sub Court in the land acquisition proceedings regarding enhancement of compensation is just and proper and requires no interference.

18. For all the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the third respondent is not justified in issuing the impugned charge memo, dated 28.3.2001 against the petitioner and it is liable to be set aside.

In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned charge memo, dated in 28.3.2001 issued by the third respondent is hereby set aside. In view of the setting aside of the said implugned charge memo dated 28.3.2001, the respondents are directed to settle the retirement benefits of the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, the connected MPs are closed.