(Prayer: Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to call for the records culminated in C.C.No.633 of 2017 on the file of Judicial Magistrate, Alandur and quash the same, in respect of the petitioners/Accused 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6.)

1. This petition has been filed to call for the records in C.C.No.633 of 2017 on the file of Judicial Magistrate Court, Alandur and quash the same, in respect of the petitioners.

2. On the complaint lodged by Porkodi, the Inspector of Police (Law & Order) S-9, Palavanthangal Police Station, the Inspector of Police, St.Thomas Mount Police Station has registered a case in Cr.No.548 of 2017 on 13.04.2017 and after completing the investigation, has filed a charge sheet in C.C.No.633 of 2017 for the offences under Sections 143, 145, 147, 188, 189, 353 and 506(i) IPC against the petitioners herein, for quashing which, this application has been filed.

3. Heard Mr.R.Prabhakaran, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mrs.Kritika Kamal, P., learned Government Advocate [Crl.Side] for the State.

4. It is the case of the prosecution that on 13.04.2017, around 9.30 a.m., the accused herein, along with others, had formed an unlawful assembly on the either side of Kathipra flyover and blocked the ingress and egress of the flyover by tying steel chains across the entrance and exit of the flyover and when Porkodi, the lady Inspector of Police intervened, they pushed her and prevented her from discharging her duties. Hence, the FIR and the consequent charge sheet.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the first petitioner is a famous film Director and that in order to highlight the plight of the farmers, the public demonstration was done, which cannot be termed as illegal. He submitted that in all democracies, when demonstrations take place, thoroughfares are blocked and no penal action is taken against the demonstrators. He cited the instance of lakhs of people gathering in the streets of Washington to demonstrate against President Trump. He further submitted that the de facto complainant in this case is a Police Officer and not any independent person and hence, a prosecution founded on the FIR given by a Police Officer should be quashed. It is his further contention that the provisions of IPC will not apply and only the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 will apply.

6. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate [Crl.Side] submitted that there are 14 cases registered against the first petitioner in various Police Stations and that by blocking the Kathipara flyover, the accused had brought the whole city to a standstill and had further prevented the Inspector of Police from removing the chains which they had tied across the flyover.

7. This Court gave its anxious consideration to the rival submissions.

8. This Court is perfectly justified in taking judicial notice of the fact that Kathipara Junction and flyover is an arterial highway that connects the Airport to the city of Chennai. Several hospitals and Courts are located on either side of the flyover. The Air Force and the Army have their establishment on the southern side of Kathipara junction. Bearing this in mind, if one reads the final report and Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. statement of the witnesses, it is seen that the accused herein, along with others, suddenly indulged in blockage of the flyover by putting chains across the entry and exit points around 9.30 a.m. on 13.04.2017, in the peak hour, and thereby, bringing the whole area to a standstill. The complaint of Porkodi, the Woman Inspector of Police shows that when she attempted to untie the chains, she was pushed and threatened by the accused. Though democracy recognises the right to dissent, yet, we are bound to act within the constitutional means, under which, right to form an assembly is not an absolute right and it is subject to certain restrictions. For example, in New Delhi, Jantar Mantar has been earmarked as the place for conducting demonstrations and protests. Similarly, in Chennai city, State Guest House area and Valluvar Kottam area have been earmarked for the said purpose. Had it been the idea of the accused to highlight the plight of the farmers, they could have sought permission and conducted the protest in any of the earmarked places, instead, they, on account of a preconcerted design, gathered at peak hours on 13.04.2017 and physically prevented the flow of traffic over the Kathipara Highway, on account of which, ordinary office goers suffered hardship. The movement of ambulance and people going for interviews and examinations would have been crippled. Further, on a perusal of the case diary, this Court found photographs showing how the accused had blocked the Kathipara Highway with steel chains, which obviously show that they have come well prepared to violate the law, come what may.

9. The contention of Mr.Prabhakaran, that in the U.S. and other democracies, such protests are permitted and therefore, no penal action should be taken against the petitioners herein deserves to be stated only to be rejected, because, when their actions amounted to breach of the law, the police cannot be expected to stand mute. It is the duty of the police to protect ordinary citizens and ensure that there is no disturbance to their day-to-day activities. If a crime takes place in the presence of a Police Officer, he can very well be the first informant. In this case, Porkodi, the Woman Inspector of Police was the first informant and the investigation was not conducted by her, but, was conducted by the Inspector of Police, St.Thomas Mount Police Station.

10. As regards the contention that the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 will apply, this Court is unable to persuade itself to this submission, because, the scope and objects of those enactments are entirely different and it can in no way abridge the power of the police to intercede and prevent the situation becoming explosive.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Preamble and Section 39 of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 and contended that since Kathipara flyover is a National Highway, the State police would not have the jurisdiction to remove the protesters and arrest them. He submitted that it is only the officials of the Highways Department who can intervene. To appreciate his argument, it may be relevant to extract Section 39 of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 Act:

"39. Offence and penalty. (1) If any person, who has been evicted from any unauthorised occupation on a highway land under this Act, again occupies any highway land without permission for such occupation under this Act, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees per square metre of so occupied highway land but which shall not exceed two times the cost of such highway land, or with both.

(2) Any court, convicting a person under sub-section (1), may make an order for evicting that person from such occupied highway land summarily and he shall be liable to such eviction without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the offence punishable under sub-section (1) shall be cognizable.

12. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners smacks of ignorance of first principles of criminal jurisprudence. A bare reading of Section 39 shows that it penalises re-occupation of Highways by those who have been evicted. Sections 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C. clearly states that all investigations will be conducted only in accordance with the Code. Under Section 149 of Cr.P.C., the police have the power to interpose to prevent the commission of an offence. It will be ludicrous to say that only the officials from the Highways Department can evict such protesters and not the police.

13. Learned counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh [(2014) 2 SCC 1] [LQ/SC/2013/1244] and submitted that only after conducting a preliminary enquiry, the police should have registered an FIR. This once again shows that he has not really understood the import of the said judgment. In Lalita Kumari (supra), the Supreme Court has held that an FIR should be immediately registered if the complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. However, the Supreme Court has also held that in certain cases like matrimonial, a preliminary enquiry can be conducted. Obviously, the overt acts attributed to the petitioners herein will not fall under any of the categories enumerated in Lalita Kumari (supra).

14. Though the learned counsel for the accused had failed to argue a particular legal aspect which is favourable to him, this Court does not want to take advantage of his ignorance. A Court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC on a police report filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., but only on the complaint by a concerned public servant in the light of Section 195 Cr.P.C. (See: C.Muniappan and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2010) 9 SCC 567] [LQ/SC/2010/900] . Thus, the prosecution of the accused under Section 188 IPC stands quashed. Except the above, there are sufficient materials for the prosecution to proceed against the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. The petitioners shall face the trial and if any one absconds, it is open to the police to file a fresh FIR under Section 229-A IPC. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.