K.C. Agrawal, J.This appeal u/s 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act has been preferred by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. Lucknow, against the award dated 27-1-1975 given by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Allahabad.

2. The award was in respect of a claim made by Respondents 1 to 3 for compensation in regard to an accident in which Vidya Sagar Dwivedi, husband of Respondent 1 and father of Respondents 2 and 3 died on 11th October, 1971. The allegations were that at about 9.00 P.M. when Vidya Sagar Dwivedi was driving a motor cycle near village Ramnagar, the driver of the Roadways Bus No. U.P.Z. 4537 dashed him, as a result of which Vidya Sagar Dwivedi was thrown out and received serious injuries to which he succumbed at the spot. The allegation made by Respondents 1 to 3 was that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the Roadways Bus by its driver Rudra Pratap Singh. It was alleged that, the deceased was going on the motor cycle on his left when the aforesaid Bus driven by Rudra Pratap Singh rashly struck the deceased.

3. The claim was contested by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, and the allegations of negligence were denied. The Corporation alleged that the deceased Vidya Sagar Dwivedi was drunk and in that state of mind he had no control over the motor cycle which (sic) was driving on the middle of the road and despite the best efforts by the driver of the Bus, the accident could not be avoided. In this background, the plea was that the deceased Vidya Sagar Dwivedi himself was responsible for the accident, and that he was not entitled to get any compensation from the Corporation.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, the claims Tribunal framed the following issues:

1. Whether the claimants Petitioners are legally entitled to receive compensation if any

2. Whether the driver of vehicle No. UPZ 4537 was driving the bus rashly and negligently

3. Whether the deceased was driving the motor cycle rashly and negligently

4. To what amount of compensation the claimants Petitioners are entitled

5. For proving their case, Raja Ram Singh was examined by the claimants. He claimed that he was present at the time of the accident at about 9.00 P.M. at the shop of one Ramji, and that he had seen the accident which, according to his statement, occurred on account of rashness of the Bus driver. In rebuttal, the Corporation had examined Rudra Pratap Singh, the driver of the Roadways Bus. He denied that the bus was being driven by him negligently, and that the accident occurred on account of the rashness on his part. He stated that the motorcycle was being driven in a zigzag manner by the deceased, and that despite his best efforts he could not avoid the accident. He also stated that the deceased Vidya Sagar Dwivedi was drunk at the time of the accident.

6. The Claims Tribunal decided the issue of negligence against the corporation, and holding that the claimants had established their case, .awarded a sum of Rs. 75,000/- as compensation to Respondents l to 3. Against the said award, the present appeal has been filed.

7. From the facts admitted and the report received from the district judgship, Allahabad, it appears that the entire record of the case was destroyed by Are, as a result whereof we did not have the benefit of considering the evidence ourselves and recording the findings on the various issues which arise for decision in this appeal. We also gave time to the learned Counsel for the parties, but they were unable to produce the copies of the statements of the witnesses produced from, the side of the claimants and the corporation. In the absence of the statements of the witnesses, it is not possible for us to find as to whether the judgment of the Claims Tribunal on various questions of fact was correct or not.

8. u/s 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, under which the appeal has been preferred, this Court has jurisdiction to go into the questions of fact and examine itself the correctness of the findings recorded on the same. It is like an appeal which is filed u/s 96 of Code of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act laying down the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeals filed before it. In this regard, the law settled is that if the Special Act is silent in respect of the procedure to be followed by the appellate Court, the appellate jurisdiction has to be exercised in the same manner as the High Court exercises its general appellate jurisdiction and the appeal so filled must be regulated by the method and procedure of the High Court. It is a well settled rule that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then the appeal should be regulated by the procedure of that Court. Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Company Limited, and his Majestys Postmaster General. (1913) AC 546, stated:

When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without mode, it in my opinion imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.

9. That being the position, an appeal u/s 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act is equivalent to one that is filed u/s 96 of Code of Civil Procedure. In such an appeal, the High Court is obliged to consider the evidence and to record its findings on the various controversies arising for decision therein.

10. In the instant case from the grounds of appeal and the points urged, it is necessary for us to consider ourselves the oral evidence led by the parties before the Claims Tribunal. This oral evidence is not available before us. The question therefore, is about the alternative course which should be adopted in such an event.

11. Before we express our opinion on the actual coarse to be adopted in this case, we wish to note about the power in exercise of which a direction regarding reconstruction of the record which has been destroyed can be given. There are rules in the General Rules (Civil) and also there are circulars issued by the High Court from time to time to the Courts below about the reconstruction of record. However, in regard to the record of the Court below, there appears to be no difficulty for a Court of appeal to direct it to prepare the same in accordance with the directions which may be issued in that regard. This, to our mind, can be done u/s 151 of the CPC Section 151 CPC preserves inherent power which a Court of general jurisdiction is required to exercise in the ends of justice. The "inherent power", observed by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, , "has not been conferred on the Court, it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties, before it."

12. It may further be stated that it is one of the first and the highest duties of the Courts to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the litigants. Accordingly, if on account of some accident, the record of a Court is lost or destroyed by fire, it is the duty of the Court to reconstruct the same so that justice is done between the parties on its basis.

13. The argument raised in this regard was that as there is no specific power in CPC for reconstruction of a destroyed record, the Court is not empowered in exercise of its inherent power to get it reconstructed. It is undeniable that the Court cannot exercise its inherent power which is otherwise prohibited by any specific provision or impliedly barred. In the exercise of its inherent power, the Court should be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles and is not in conflict with them or the intention of the legislature. In In Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey ILR (1883) 5 All 163 (FR), Mahmood, J., observed:

Courts are not to act on the principles that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converge principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown, to be prohibited by the law.

14. From the above, the principle, that can be culled out is that in the exercise of its inherent power the Court mast be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles, and that in the absence of any specific provision made in regard to a particular matter, the course required to be adopted in the ends of justice should not be deemed to be prohibited or barred.

15. In the instant case, the ends of justice required that the record should be reconstructed so that the rights of the parties are decided on its basis.

16. The controversy relating to the reconstruction of the record, which is destroyed, came up directly for consideration before the Madras High Court in Marakkarutti and Others Vs. T.P.M. Veeran Kutty and Others, . In this case, the Court held:

I think that one can safely start with the proposition that there is inherent power in every Court to reconstruct its own records and I think it follows that there is inherent power in the appellate Court to reconstruct the records of the Court from which an appeal lies to it.

17. This power of reconstruction has been recognised in England. The English case on the subject Ls Douglass v. Yallop (1759) 97 ER 532. Babu Guru Dayal Singh v. Durbaree Lal Tewaree (1867) 7 Suth WR 18 is another case on the point, in controversy. In that case, the records had been lost in transit from first Court to the second, and the second Court acted on some documents purporting to be office copies, which the High Court held were not regularly proved or admitted. The High Court held further that one of the courses open to the lower appellate Court was to receive such secondary evidence of the contents of the original documents as may be forthcoming or to order an entirely new trial. In the Madras High Courts case, noted above, this decision was followed and it was held that the Court will have to apply its mind to ascertain as to what were the records destroyed and then decide the course which may be best suited in the circumstances of the case. In some cases, the Madras High Court found that it may be necessary for the Court to take evidence afresh, if the appellate Court is unable to reconstruct the record to its satisfaction. To the same effect was the view taken by the Madhya Bharat High Court in Wamanrao v. Majbut Singh AIR 1955 NUC 3823.

18. To us, in the circumstances of the present case, it appears that this is the duty of the Court to get the records reconstructed and decide the appeal thereafter. It has been held by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Marakkarutti and Others Vs. T.P.M. Veeran Kutty and Others, that this reconstruction of the record may go to the extent of rehearing of the case itself, which may mean directing the parties to produce the relevant witnesses. In doing so, the Court will have to ascertain not only what the rights of the parties were, but also what the destroyed record was. In Katam Achutharamayya v. Rikki Nagabhushanam ILR (1957) AP 739, the Andhra Pradesh High Court was required to decide the desirability of reconstructing the record of which the original award had been lost for no fault of either party. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the Court could under the Courts inherent power direct for reconstruction and upon the reconstruction of the record it would have the same effect as of the originals themselves.

19 In this regard, it is pertinent to note what was said by the American Court in Mc. London v. Joints (1845) 42 Am Dec 640:

Cases must frequently have occurred in which, by accident, the records of the Courts of justice have been destroyed or lost, and it would seem strange if the common law had provided no adequate means by which the injuries growing out of such accident could be averted or remedied.

20. We, in the circumstances, therefore, consider it appropriate to direct the Claims Tribunal to reconstruct the record. As in the instant case, the material evidence required to be brought on record is only the statements of the two witnesses, named above, the purpose of the present appeal would be served by directing the Claims Tribunal to get the same on record. We have noted above that Counsel for the parties were unable to file the copies of the statements of those witnesses. However, in the ends of justice, we consider it appropriate to give another opportunity to the parties to produce the same before the Claims Tribunal on the case going to it in pursuance of our order. The Claims Tribunal will first serve the parties with the notice requiring them to produce the copies of the statements of the witnesses if they have in their possession within three weeks. If the copies of the statements are produced before the Claims Tribunal, it will satisfy itself whether they the correct ones. If, however, the parties fail in doing so, the Tribunal may ask them to reproduce the witnesses for making the statements. It goes without saying that the parties will have the right of cross-examination of each others witness.

21, The Claims Tribunal, Allahabad, is directed to comply with the above directions within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.