1. The petitioner is aggrieved by refusal of her prayer to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by the impugned order dated 06.12.2024 passed in Civil Original Suit No.96/2024. Besides the petitioner, respondent No.8 – Suman Lava had also prayed for rejection of plaint by filing a separate petition, which was dismissed on 06.12.2024 itself. Respondent No.8 – Suman Lava did not choose to challenge the impugned order anywhere.

2. The prayer was on two grounds; (a) the suit was barred by limitation; (b) the plaintiff has no real cause of action, rather, illusionary cause of action was cleverly drafted and presented before the court.

3. The plaintiff-respondent No.1 - Imarti Devi has brought the aforesaid suit for a decree of specific performance of contract. It would be worth to mention the admitted pedigree of the family of the parties. One Khoba Ram died leaving behind two issues, Imarti Devi - the plaintiff and late Joga Ram a son. Late Joga Ram left behind three daughters, who are petitioners – Usha, defendant No.8 Suma Lava and defendant No.9 Kusum. Late Joga Ram had a son late Prakash Meghwal, who pre deceased Joga Ram, as such, wife and children of late Prakash Meghwal are party to the suit as defendant No.2 to 7.

4. The case and claim of plaintiff – Imarti Devi, as disclosed in the plaint, is that father Khoba Ram had purchased agricultural land vide Khasra No.140/01 area 19 Bigha and 19 Biswas in village Pal, Patwar Shetra District of Jodhpur in the name of Joga Ram in 1972. The plaintiff paid Rs.5,00,000/- on different occasions to Joga Ram on demand of Joga Ram for his personal requirement. The said amount was value of the suit property, hence, Late Joga Ram on 22.05.2004 executed a deed in the nature of agreement to sale in favour of the plaintiff. In the said deed, it is specifically mentioned that Joga Ram received entire consideration money of the suit property and transferred physical possession of the suit property to the plaintiff, who was already in cultivating possession of the same after death of the father. It is not disputed that Joga Ram retired as Chief Medical Health Officer, as such, he was a well educated person. The plaintiff further asserted that Joga Ram had assured that he will execute the registered sale deed as and when required by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts that since the relationship between Joga Ram and the plaintiff was of full brother and sister, the plaintiff never disbelieved Joga Ram.

5. Moreover, the plaintiff had to perform no part of the contract as entire consideration money was already paid and physical possession of the purchased land was already handed over to the plaintiff. The factum of existence of agreement to sale was known to the children of Joga Ram. Joga Ram died in the year 2021 leaving behind his successors, who are party to the suit including the petitioner. The plaintiff stated that there were other lands of Khoba Ram bearing Khasra No.153 & 161. After death of Khoba Ram, in his place, name of Jaga Ram was recorded in the revenue records though the plaintiff was in cultivating possession of those land as well. In January, 2024, defendant No.1 got his name mutated in the revenue records and stated to the plaintiff that he would sale the property to prospective purchsers. Thereafter, the plaintiff challenged the said mutation order in appeal. Till then, the plaintiff was not in doubt that the children of Joga Ram would not execute the agreement to sale in favour of the plaintiff. In July, 2024, the plaintiff along with her son Hari Ram went to the house of defendant No.1, met with defendant Nos.1 to 6 and requested them for execution of sale deed in pursuance of the agreement entered with Joga Ram. Then the defendant asked the plaintiff to withdraw the appeal against mutation order, as condition precedent to execution of sale deed. Then, the plaintiff contacted the daughters of late Joga Ram for execution of sale deed, but they demanded half of the market cost of the suit property as a condition for execution of the sale deed. Then, the plaintiff was satisfied that the defendants have refused to comply with the agreement to sale. Hence, cause of action arose in July, 2024 and the suit was filed on 12.08.2024.

6. It is evident from the agreement to sale available on the record that no time was fixed for performance of the contract. It is also evident that as per conditions disclosed in the agreement, only the registered sale deed was to be executed and other formalities of sale was complete in as much as, the entire consideration money was received by the vendor and possession of the suit property was handed over to the purchaser.

7. In the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. Vs. Kavita Ganashamdas reported in 2014 AIR SCW 6288 the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the applicable provision of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, which is being reproduced below:- 54. For specific performance of a contract. Three years The date of fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused.

8. In para 49 and 50 of the said judgment, it was held:-

“49. Mere reading of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would show that if the date is fixed for performance of the agreement, then non-compliance of the agreement on the date would give a cause of action to file suit for specific performance within three years from the date so fixed. However, when no such date is fixed, limitation of three years to file a suit for specific performance would begin when the plaintiff has noticed that the defendant has refused the performance of the agreement.

50. The case at hand admittedly does not fall in the first category of Article 54 of the Limitation Act because as observed supra, no date was fixed in the agreement for its performance. The case would thus be governed by the second category viz., when plaintiff has a notice that performance is refused.”

9. The fact of the above case was that an agreement to sale was executed on 15.02.1989 and suit for enforcement of the agreement was filed on 31.03.2000. Entire consideration money of Rs.3,50,000/- was paid and possession of the property was transferred to the purchaser on the date of agreement itself. The vendor unilaterally cancelled the agreement on 25.10.1995 and sold the property to some other person on 09.02.1998. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that suit was not barred by limitation from the date of cause of action.

10. In the case on hand, no date was fixed in the agreement for performance of the contract, therefore, the cause of action would arise when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

11. The plaintiff has pleaded that performance was refused in July, 2024 by the defendants. The nature of relationship between the parties to the agreement and the parties to the suit would go to show that due to intimacy in relationship neither the plaintiff insisted nor the defendants or late Joga Ram ever refused prior to July, 2024 to execute the sale deed, rather, plaintiff has specifically stated in the plaint that Joga Ram never refused to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the suit was filed within time and it cannot be said that it was barred under the law of limitation.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that spurious agreement has been produced which was not known to the defendants ever. No specific date has been mentioned when the plaintiff demanded for execution of the sale deed from Joga Ram and Joga Ram deferred the same. Moreover, the defendants have specifically stated that they were unaware of any such agreement.

13. Since, late Joga Ram was a well educated person, his signature on the agreement paper with his admitted signature could be compared only during the trial and appropriate decision could be taken, but the plaint cannot be thrown away at the threshold by saying that the agreement is spurious one. When the plaintiff is specific that late Joga Ram never refused to go with the agreement and after death of Joga Ram, his children could only refuse to execute the registered sale deed when the plaintiff did not succumb to their condition to forgo claim on the land left by her father Khoba Ram or to pay half of the market value of the suit property as a condition precedent for registration of the sale deed.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of this Court in Mahaveer Lunia & Ors. Vs. Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. & Ors. in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.99/2023 decided on 31.01.2025.

On the facts of this case, the case of Mahaveer Lunia (supra) is distinguishable. In Mahaveer Lunia’s case, the plaintiff - Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. had resolved in the meeting of the Board of Directors to sale out the company property referred in the resolution on proper value of the suit property. Accordingly, the authorized person had entered into an agreement to sale with the defendants of the suit and after years of the execution of the agreement, the sale deed was executed in favour of the purchasers. The purchasers were mutated in the revenue records in pursuance of the registered sale deed executed in their favour. Thereafter, Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. brought the suit that in fact the transaction between the parties was a mortgage transaction and not a sale transaction.

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, this Court had held that the suit was required to be nipped in the bud as it was result of clever drafting creating illusionary cause of action and no real cause of action.

15. In Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) THR LRS & Ors. Reported in (2020) & SCC 366, Hon’ble the Supreme Court stated the law in the matter of exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as follows:-

“12.7 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., [(2004) 9 SCC 512] which reads as:

"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed."

In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. [(2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact [(D.Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, {(1999) 3 SCC 267}].

12.8 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

12.9 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557]. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain.

12.10 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. "Cause of action" means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [(2005) 10 SCC 51] this Court held :

"24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded"

In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. [(1977) 4 SCC 467] this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words :-

"5....The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing...”

Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, [(1998) 2 SCC 70] this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.

If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [(2017) 13 SCC 174] held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage.

The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.”

16. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. Vs. Assistant Charity Comisioner and Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 1801, the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law for appreciation of disclosure of real cause of action as follows :

“10. In Saleem Bhai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order VII Rule 11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are the germane: the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.

11. I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Ors. [(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

12. The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X of the Code.

13. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.

14. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII was applicable.

15. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat Justice on hair-splitting technicalities.”

17. Keeping the aforesaid guidelines on fore, this Court has examined the plaint carefully to come to the conclusion that the plaint discloses a real cause of action as recitals of the plaint referred above would go on to show that it clearly discloses existence of cause of action. It has been settled by catena of judicial pronouncements that cause of action is bundle of facts, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support her right to a judgment of the Court.

18. The genuineness of the agreement and non refusal to execute the registered sale deed by the vendor would be disputed question of fact to be tried in the suit as specific issue; But cannot be a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) CPC.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 759. In Saleem Bhai’s case (supra), the trial court said that prayer for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC would be considered only after filing of the written statement. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that it was not necessary to file written statement, rather, the prayer under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was to be decided on the basis of averments made in the plaint. In the case on hand, such issue is not there that the trial court asked the petitioner to first file written statement, then only the prayer would be considered.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has next relied on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Fatehji & Company & Anr. Vs. L.M. Nagpal & Ors. reported in AIR 2015 Supreme Court 2301. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court said that only for the reason that the plaintiff-purchaser was put in possession of the property agreed to be sold, it would not make any difference with regard to limitation for filing of suit for specific performance. Evidently, in the aforesaid case, the suit was not filed within the period of three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action, which occurred on the date when the suit was filed by the sons of the defendant for declaration that the suit property is joint family ancestral property and the sale made by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff was null and void.

Moreover, in the above case, date for performance of the contract was fixed and by oral agreement, that was extended for four years. Factually, this case stands on different footing.

The petitioner has next relied on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association Vs. Sri Bala & Co. reported in 2025 INSC 42. In the aforesaid case, agreement to sale was executed on 26.04.1991. The plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of contract in the year 1993. The said plaint was rejected for non payment of requisite court fee by the plaintiff vide order dated 12.01.1998. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed another suit for specific performance of the same contract vide Original Suit No.49/2007. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that Article 54 of the Limitation

Act would not apply as it was applicable in the matter of first suit only and the limitation for the second suit would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Evidently, the aforesaid case is also distinguishable.

20. The plaint of the present case on consideration in entirety discloses a valid cause of action to be adjudicated in the suit. Genuineness of the agreement or accrual of cause of action on earlier occasion due to refusal to execute the sale deed in pursuance of the agreement would be disputed question of fact to be decided during the trial.

21. Consequently, this Court does not find any ground to reject the plaint or interfere with the impugned order, hence, this Civil Revision stands dismissed as devoid of any merit.