K. Ramaswamy & N. Venkatachala, JJ.

Leave granted.

2. Notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894, for short `the Act, acquiring 80 bighas 18 biswas of land situated in revenue estate, Bhatinda, Tehsil and Distt. Bhatinda alongwith other lands was published on October 9, 1974. The Collector made an award under s. 11 on June 11, 1975 determining the market value, based on the classification of the land, between Rs. 4,500/- to Rs. 16,000/- per acre. The respondents has accepted the compensation without protest and did not seek any reference under S.18. Some other claimants sought and secured reference under s. 18 of the Act. The Addl. Distt. Judge by his award dated July 13, 1979 determined the compensation enhancing the market value of Rs. 5,625/- to Rs. 20,000/- per acre. On appeal, the High Court had modified the award. Ultimately on appeal, this Court determined the market value at Rs. 15/- to Rs. 17/- per sq. yd. by judgment dated August 24, 1987. The respondents made a written application under S. 28-A on November 24, 1987. The Land Acquisition Collector had redetermined the market value under S. 28-A(2) by his award dated February 28, 1989 but did not award solatium and interest and the additional compensation under S. 23(1-A) of the Act. The respondents made another application - C.M. No. 4978/90 - enclosing another award dated March 15, 1990 made by the Distt. Court in yet another reference and sought the statutory benefits. Since it was denied, in the respondents writ petition, a learned Single Judge, by his order dated December 21, 1990, allowed the W.P. and directed the award of the additional benefits. In LPA No. 1211/92 filed by the appellants by judgment and order dated December 21, 1992, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. Thus this appeal by special leave.

3. It is contended by Sri V.R. Reddy, the learned Addl. Solicitor General for the appellants that though the award made by the Collector under S. 28-A dated February 28, 1989 was not separately challenged, the appellants have in fact impugned its validity in the LPA before the Division Bench and grounds also have been raised in this appeal. It is also contended that the Amendment Act had since come into force on September 24, 1984, the earliest award, on the reference court made on July 31, 1979, should be the relevant one and any subsequent award made by the reference court or the judgment of this Court dated August 24, 1987 do not furnish any cause of action to file the application under S. 28-A. The award made under S.28-A, therefore, is without jurisdiction and a nullity. It is also contended that the High Court committed illegality in making the award and failed to correct the manifest error of law committed by the Collector in his award made under S. 28-A. Shri R.K. Jain, learned Senior counsel for the respondents, contends that in Babua Ram. v. State of U.P., Civil Appeal No. 563/94, by judgment dated October 4, 1994, this Court has held that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 is prospective in operation and that, therefore, any award made by the reference court after the Amendment Act has come into force would furnish the cause of action to the claimants to make an application within three months thereafter. The award was made in another reference on March 15, 1990 and within three months thereafter, the respondents are entitled to file an application under S. 28-A. Therefore, the application filed on November 24, 1987 could be treated to be one filed pursuant to that award. Even otherwise, when all other claimants have been awarded enhanced compensation, in equity the respondents also are entitled to parity in payment of the compensation. This court had granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 15 to Rs. 16 per sq. yd. So the respondents too are entitled to the same. It is further contended that the order passed by the Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench is not a substitution to the Collectors award but only an additional benefit. The award made under S. 28-A(2) having been allowed to become final, it is not open to the appellants to contend that the award passed by the Collector under S. 28-A(2) is illegal or without jurisdiction. Even otherwise, it is not a fit case warranting interference by this Court under Arts. 136 or 142 of the Constitution.

4. Having given our anxious and deep consideration, we think that it is a case warranting interference. In Babua Rams case, considering the entire controversy, this Court held that:

``The legislature prescribed three months limitation to quicken diligence like caveat emptor and provided to a non-protester right to redetermination provided the application in writing is made to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction, excluding the requisite time taken to obtain a copy of the award. In other words, the rights and remedy provided by S. 28-A(1) stands extinguished with the expiry of three months from the date of the award under S. 26. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one reference under s.18 at the behest of different claimants of the lands covered by S. 4(1). Notification and the court may make successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given in an earliest award.

In the teeth of the express language in sub-s.(1) of S.28-A, limitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time under S. 28-A(1) nor provide fresh cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Application under S. 28-A(1) may be made at the instance of the self-same person or different persons. Any other interpretation would amount to re-writing the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 28A. The judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal either under S. 54 or under s. 96 of CPC or under Articles 132, 133, or 136 of the Constitution does not furnish fresh cause of action nor provide fresh limitation to make application under S. 28A(1) of the Act. As has already been held in that they are not covered under Part III of the Act. May be that they are continuation of original decree made in S.26(2) and in law the executable decree is that of the Supreme Court or the High Courts. But the legislature has conferred right of reopening the award under S. 11 only when the civil court under S. 26 awarded higher compensation in Part III to a person having an interest in the land covered by the same Notification under S.4(1) and an application in writing if made within limitation.

``It is, therefore, clear that S. 28-A does not apply to an award under s. 26 made prior to September 24, 1984."

``If an owner of the land or person interested in compensation of the land acquired by the same Notification under S.4(1) had not sought reference under s. 18 in respect to an award made under S. 11 by the Collector/LAO, but if on a reference made under S. 18 prior to September 24, 1984 in respect of land covered by the same notification any award made under s. 26, prior to the Amendment Act had come into force, the award under S. 11 is not liable to be reopened for redetermination of compensation even though three months period has not expired by September 24, 1984 for to hold otherwise would amount to giving retrospective operation to s. 28-A. Any other non-protester claimant will not be entitled to get an award reopened under s. 11 though on reference at the instance of one or other owner or interested person had the benefit of determination of higher compensation by an award made under s. 26 before September 24, 1984 on his reference under s. 18 made prior to Sept. 24, 1984."

5. Thus, it would be clear that cause of action for making an application under s. 28-A would arise when an award has been made by the Civil Court, on a reference under s.18, enhancing the compensation over and above the amount awarded by the Collector in his award under s.11 and the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of the limitation of three months as provided in the proviso to s.28-A(1). It is seen that the earliest award was made on July 31, 1979 by which date the Amendment Act had not come into force. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 has given prospective operation to s.28A from September 24, 1984. Therefore, it does not furnish any right to the claimants to make any application after the Act has come into force. The latter award dated March 15, 1990 does not give any fresh right or cause of action to file an application under s.28A(1). The question then is whether the claimants are entitled to make an application after the appeal was allowed by this Court from appeals arising from one of the references. This question also was considered in the same judgment and it was held that it does not furnish any cause of action. This was also the view of another three Judges Bench of this Court in Scheduled Castes Co- op. Land Owning Society, Bhatinda v. Union of India., 1990(2) RRR 492(SC) : 1991 (2) SCC 174 [LQ/SC/1991/93] . Therefore, we are of the firm view that the judgment and order of this Court enhancing the compensation on August 24, 1987 does not furnish any cause of action to make the application under s.28-A.

6. It is true that in another reference, the civil court had enhanced the compensation on March 15, 1990 after the Amendment Act has come into force. Since the earliest award on reference under s.18 was made on July 31, 1979, by which date s.28A was not in force or the period of three months had already expired, the subsequent award made on March 15, 1990 does not furnish any cause of action to the claimants to make the application under s. 28A(1). Therefore, the claimants also are not entitled to take aid from the award dated March 15, 1990. The argument of parity and denial of equality in payment of compensation as violative of Art. 14 was also considered in Babua Rams case but was rejected. For the same reasons, the plea of parity cannot be given any countenance.

7. The question, therefore, is whether the award of the Collector under s. 28-A(2) is valid in law. It is clear from the facts that the award made by the Collector is clearly without jurisdiction. Section 28-A(3) provides that the provisions of ss. 18 to 28 shall apply, as far as it may, for the reference under s. 28-A. Section 23(1) gives power to the Court to determine the compensation and sub-s.(2) thereof provides that ``in addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition". In other words, there is no independent right or power vested in the Collector or the Court to award statutory benefits. Its application arises when the court determined the compensation in excess of the award of the Collector made under s.11. Equally by s.28 also empowers award of interest on enhanced compensation. Equally by s.23(1A). In other words, the statutory benefits would be granted when compensation was enhanced by the Court over and above the compensation determined by the Collector. Thereby, the award of the statutory benefits is not independent of the award or in its substitution. Therefore, when the claimants sought for additional statutory benefits in the Writ Petition, and when they were awarded it is only in modification of the award made by the Collector under s.28-A(2) of the Act. When that be the legal position, the question emerges whether the High Court was right in granting the additional statutory benefits as well. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed grievous error of law in awarding the additional statutory benefits when the Collector himself has no jurisdiction to grant the enhanced compensation under s. 28-A(2) based on the judgment and order of this Court dated August 24, 1987 or of the civil court in another award dated March 15, 1990. The High Court equally has no power to award statutory benefits and have them substituted in the award of the Collector made under s. 28A(1). Thereby, the order of the Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench is clearly illegal. Thus we hold that the entire order gets vitiated by manifest errors of law.

8. It is true that this Court when exercises its discretionary power under Art. 136 or passes any order under Art. 142, it does so with great care and due circumspection. But, when we are settling the law in exercise of this courts discretion, such law, so settled, should be clear and become operational instead of being kept in vague, so that it could become a binding precedent in all similar cases to or arise in future. Considering from this perspective, we are of the considered view that it is a case warranting interference. The orders of the High Court in the W.P. and in the LPA are set aside. The W.P. stands dismissed. The award made by the Collector under s. 28A(2) is declared as that made without jurisdiction and a nullity. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed but the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.