N.K. Jain, Actg. C.J.

1. This reference has been referred to this Bench by a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 17.7.1992 made in C.M.A. No. 1036 of 1990. The question referred to this Bench is as follows:

Whether the expression public place for the purpose of Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 will cover all places including those of private ownership where members of the public have an access whether free or controlled in any manner whatsoever

or

Whether it will cover only places where any member of the public would have access as of right to those places, whether public or private

2. The facts leading to the order of reference are as follows:

An award of compensation for the death of Devasundaram, a mazdoor in Madras Harbour, occurred in the motor accident which took place on 24.1.1987, was passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal against the appellant insurance company and respondent No. 5 owner of the lorry. Considering the oral and documentary evidence and on perusing the material on record, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,25,200 against the insurance company and the owner of the vehicle. Against that order, C.M.A. has been filed in this Court.

3. Before a Division Bench, learned Counsel for the appellant insurance company contended that the driver of the vehicle did not possess a valid heavy motor vehicle licence. It is further contended that the place of accident is not a public place and as such the liability cannot be fastened on the insurance company. The counsel for the appellant insurance company relied on the decisions in Dharmalinga Muda-liar v. N. Mohamed Ebrahim, 1977 ACJ 36 (Madras); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mahadevayya, 1981 TNLJ 170; E. Enjanadevi v. Arumugham, 1983 ACJ 625 (Madras) and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. A. Babu, . On the question of public place, he also relied on some other decisions.

4. Counsel for the claimants submits that the place of accident is a public place. On consideration, after taking into account the conflicting decisions of this Court and various High Courts, the Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench, as mentioned above.

5. Before us, learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company, reiterating the arguments put forth before the Division Bench of this Court, submits that Section 2 (24) of the Motor Vehicles Act, clearly establishes a place as a public place. According to him, if it is construed in that way, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court holds the field and the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation. Our attention had been drawn by the learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company to the decision in In re: Kuchampudi Satyanarayana Raju, , in which it has been held as follows:

To constitute a public place it is not necessary that the place should be a public property but if it is private property it must be proved that not only public could have access to it but it is a place to which members of public in fact resort.

6. In a case referred to in Rajammal v. Associated Transport Co., 1970 ACJ 44 (Madras), an accident took place inside the precincts of a factory. It has been held that the public had no right of access and as such the insurance company would not be liable for compensation.

7. Much reliance has been shown on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mangalam v. Express Newspapers Ltd., 1982 ACJ (Supp) 203 (Madras), in which it is observed as follows:

What is a public place Public place is one where the public can go no matter whether they have a right to go or not. Express Estate is surrounded by a compound and has a gate through which the entry is regulated by permission. Hence, accident occurred in private place.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the insurance company contended that Section 2 (24) of the Motor Vehicles Act, clearly establishes a place as a public place. If it is construed in that way, as per the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the claimants submits that a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Pandurang Chimaji Agale v. New India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., 1988 ACJ 674 (Bombay), has dealt with a similar question and answered in their favour. In that decision, after taking into account the proposition derived by a Division Bench of this Court in Mangalams case, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 203 (Madras), observed that all places where the members of public have an access, would be covered by the definition of public place attracting Section 2 (24) of Motor Vehicles Act and in such circumstances, the insurance company is liable to pay compensation. According to the learned Counsel, the same had been brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court, which referred the matter to this Court for reference. Learned counsel pointed out that in the case on hand, the Division Bench itself would have followed the principle laid down in the case of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court mentioned above. He further submitted that it has been clearly pointed out that the word used in Section 2 (24) of the Motor Vehicles Act should be construed to the effect that "the word used is right of access and not access as of right". According to him, the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the insurance company had been relied on by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case mentioned above. As such, it has to be held that the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation.

10. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side. We have given our careful consideration to the decisions relied on by either of the parties.

11. The cardinal law on interpretation is that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with a clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible.

12. It is also settled that a dictionary meaning of a word will not be useful one, words of a common parlance have to be construed. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense which is different from what it ordinarily conveys. The duty of the court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision of the section and the word are to be read as a whole, and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.

13. In the instant case, whether a restricted place can also be said as a public place within the meaning of public place as found in Section 2 (24) of theis only to be seen.

14. Section 2 (24) of thedefines public place as a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage. Various decisions of this Court had been drawn to our attention. In Narsingh v. Balkishan, 1988 ACJ 288 (MP), the compound of a printing press owned by a private individual was held to be a public place. In Kannammal v. A.S. Kasim, 1989 ACJ 647 (Madras), while discussing the access as of right, it has been held that petrol bunk owned by a private individual is not a public place within the meaning of Section 2 (24) of the. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Pandurang Chimaji Agales case, 1988 ACJ 674 (Bombay), was also strongly relied on to show that the expression used in the definition is right of access and not access as of right. No doubt, a pubic place is one to which the public go whether they have a right to do so or not. A legal right of access is not essential to constitute a public place. In that decision, it has been observed as follows:

... It is also necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the expression right of access and access as of right. The latter expression denotes a place where the members of public have a right of its use as members of public and as a matter of right, whether regulated, restricted or not. They cannot, however, be denied the said right except on legal grounds. On the other hand, where there is only a right of access, the owner of the place, if he happens to be a private owner, may deny the access to any members of the public on any ground which he chooses. In other words, in the former case, the right of the members of the public to use the place is restricted compared to their right to use in the latter case. The definition under the uses the expression right of access as pointed out earlier. What is, therefore, significant to note is that under the present definition even a place the right to use of which is restricted is a public place. Once this is borne in mind much of the controversy raised before us around the correct meaning of the expression public place loses its edge.

15. On a perusal of the above judgment, it is seen that while considering whether a place is a public place or a private place, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that,

What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members of public and be available for their use, enjoyment, avocation or other purposes.

In that decision, an accident occurred on a private road in the compound of an industrial establishment. The entry was regulated by passes. In that circumstance of the case, the above mentioned Full Bench had held that:

It will have, therefore, to be held that all places where the members of public have an access, for whatever reasons, whether as of right or controlled in any manner whatsoever, would be covered by the definition of public place in Section 2 (24) of the.

The above mentioned decision was relied upon in a recent decision of another Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Forbes Campbel & Co. Ltd. v. Vilasrao Deshmukh, , holding that:

the ratio of the above decision clearly applied to the Bombay Dock area and it has to be held to be a public place within the meaning of Section 2 (24) of the 1939 Act.

On consideration, we are in full agreement with the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court (cited supra).

16. The definition of public place is very wide. A perusal of the same reveals that the public at large has a right to access though that right is regulated or restricted. It is also seen that this Act is beneficial legislation, so also the law of interpretation has to be construed in the benefit of public. In the overall legal position and the fact that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it has to be construed in the benefit of the public, we are of the view that the word public place, wherever used as a right or controlled in any manner whatsoever, would attract Section 2 (24) of the. In view of this, as stated, the private place used with permission or without permission would amount to be a public place.

17. In view of what we have discussed above, we hold that the expression public place for the purpose of Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 will cover all places including those of private ownership where members of the public have an access whether free or controlled in any manner whatsoever.

18. The reference is answered accordingly. Post the matter before the Division Bench for orders.