Thomas, J.

1. The question raised in this appeal has some moment for victims in motor accidents. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the New Act") came into force on 1-7-1989 containing S.140 in which the amount of compensation for "liability without fault" in accident cases has been fixed at twenty five thousand rupees in respect of death and twelve thousand rupees in respect of permanent disablement. The question raised is this: Whether the victim (or his legal representatives) in a motor accident which happened before the said date is entitled to compensation as provided in the New Act Some of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in this State have awarded compensation according to the amount fixed in the New Act and appeals have been filed against such awards in which the aforesaid question alone has been raised. When we heard arguments in this appeal, we had the assistance of arguments addressed by some of the standing counsel engaged by Insurance Companies in this High Court. Besides the counsel for victim/ respondent in this appeal, we are also benefited by the able assistance provided by Shri. V. Giri whose services were requested for by us as amicus curiae. We place on record our gratitude to all the counsel.

2. The motor accident in this case took place on 20-11-1988. The claim was preferred by the legal representative of the victim of the motor accident claiming compensation under S.110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for shortthe repealed Act). During the pendency of proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, a claim was made under S.92 A of the repealed Act for compensation under "no fault liability". The Claims Tribunal by an interim award granted twenty five thousand rupees as per S.140 of the New Act. The contention of the appellant, who is the insurer, is that since the accident happened before the New Act came into force, the amount under "no fault liability" should not have been in excess of what is provided in S.92A of the repealed Act.

3. Before we proceeded to hear the merits of the appeal, a preliminary objection was raised against maintainability of the appeal. Shri. James Vincent, learned counsel appearing for a similar claimant in another appeal, contended that no appeal will lie against an interim award. S.173 of the New Act(which corresponds to S.110(D) of the repealed Act) provides for appeals. The said provision says that any person "aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court". S.173, thus, confers a right of appeal against "an award of a Claims Tribunal". The word "award" is not, of course, defined either in the New Act or in the repealed Act. Hence it has to be given its ordinary meaning. To award ordinarily means "to adjudge to be due or by judicial determination or deliberate judgment" (Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar) Compensation for "no fault liability" was envisaged in S.92A of the repealed Act and in S.140 of the New Act. S.141(2) of the New Act which is identical with S.92(b)(2) of the repealed Act reads thus: "A claim for compensation under S.140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under S.140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under S.140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place". The section evidently recognises two types of claims. The corollary thereto is that there can be two types of awards. One is the claim for compensation for "no fault liability" (under S.140) and the other is the claim based on fault of the opposite side. The statute enjoins on the Claims Tribunal to dispose of both the claims independently, one first in time and the other next. This means, two awards may have to be passed by the Claims Tribunal in favour of one claimant in the same proceedings arising from one accident S.168 of the New Act deals with "award" of the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (1) mentions of disposal of the application made under. S.166 and its proviso deals with disposal of the application made under S.140. Sub-section (2) says that the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties. Sub-section (3) says that "when an award is made under this Section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct". It is thus clear that a claim under S.140 must also be disposed of through an award. Such an award can be passed only after the opposite party or parties concerned filed their written statements or objections or at least after affording a reasonable opportunity to them to file their written statement and after hearing them. The Claims Tribunal must be satisfied that conditions specified in S.140 have been substantiated to make an award under the section. In this view, we have no doubt that the Claims Tribunal has to pass an award under S.140. Hence an appeal is maintainable under S.173. The preliminary objection is overruled.

4. Chapter VII A containing a fasciculus of S.92 A to 92 E was incorporated in the repealed Act by Act 47 of 1982 with effect from 1-10-1982. The Chapter was given the title "liability without fault in certain cases". Sub-section (2) of S.92 A has fixed the amount of compensation as Rs.15,000/- in respect of death and Rs.7,500/- in respect of permanent disablement arising from motor accident. In the corresponding provision of the New Act (S. 140), the amount was enhanced to Rs.25,000/- and Rs. 12,000/- respectively. In regard to alt other details, the provisions of S.140 to 144 of the new Act are identical with the corresponding provisions in the repealed Act. The question is whether the award should be in tune with the amount fixed in the New Act or in the repealed Act for the claims in respect of accidents which occurred prior to the aiming into force of the New Act.

5. Learned counsel for the Insurance Companies referred us to S.217 of the New Act dealing with repeal and savings. Sub-section (1) says that the repealed Act and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the New Act in that State "are hereby repealed". Some actions taken under the repealed Act were saved through sub-section (2) despite such repeal. There is no contention that sub-section (2) has any application in this case. Sub-section (4) reads thus: "The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals". It must be that even without particular mention of application of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, the principles therein would apply when an enactment is repealed. However, since the repeal clause of the New Act makes special mention of application of S.6 of the General Clauses Act, there is no escape from considering its impact on the repeal. The material words in S.6 of the General Clauses Act are these: "Where this Act or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereinafter to be made unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed". Here the contention is that a new right has been created under S.140 i.e. a right to have compensation for twenty five thousand rupees in the case of death and twelve thousand rupees in the case of permanent disablement under "no fault liability". The right created in favour of one has its corresponding liability against another. Here the right has been created in favour of the victim or his legal representatives and the corresponding liability is imposed on the owner of the vehicle.

6. What we have to examine now is whether a new right has been created through S.140 of the New Act which is different from the right envisaged in S 92 A of the repealed Act. Until the introduction of Chapter VII A in the repealed Act, the right of victim or his legal representative for compensation depended upon fault (such as negligence) of the opposite party. This common law right was fortified through precedents followed over the years. The said common law right gained statutory protection to a great extent in India with the enactment of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Even the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1861-73 Al1.E.R.1) was not totally divorced from the fault theory. Thus the right to have compensation in accident cases depended on fault of the opposite side directly or vicariously. A departure from the said pristine premise was made for the first time when Parliament introduced Chapter VII A in the repealed Act. Right to compensation has been created in a new direction irrespective of whether there was fault on the opposite party. The mere fact that a person sustained injuries in a motor accident was made the basis. Of course the right was limited to cases of death or permanent disablement It is pertinent in this context to refer to G. S. R. T. Corporation v. Ramanbhai (AIR 1987 S.C.1690). The Supreme Court observed thus: "From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. "Hit and run" cases, where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known, are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet, to some extent, the responsibility of society to the deaths and injuries caused inroad accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social demand Chapter VIIA was introduced in the This part of the is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified".

7. Thus, the right created in Chapter VIIA of the repealed Act is to have compensation irrespective of whether the opposite party is guilty of any fault. The amount of compensation was fixed in the statute itself in respect of such right. What we see in S.140 is preservation of same right with some enhancement in the amount of compensation. Will this enhancement in the amount of compensation create a different right This can be answered by considering the reason for the enhancement.

8. Erosion of value of currency is intertwined with inflation in prices and costs. For a very long time currency maintained its value unaffected by economic vicissitudes. But the post second world war period registered steep plunge in money value with corresponding hike in prices of materials. Erosion of sterling value was practically untouched by the legal world before the second world war. But the devastating change in money value persuaded the judges to think differently about the norms in assessing compensation. In British Transport Commission v. Gourley - H. L (1955)3 A11.E.R.196 (at page 808) Lord Reid said:

"The general principle on which damages are assessed is not in doubt. A successful plaintiff is entitled to have awarded to him such sum as will, make good to him the financial loss which he has suffered, and will probably suffer, as a result of the wrong done to him for which the defendant is responsible Such

damages can only be an estimate, often a very rough estimate, of the present value of his prospective loss".

9. In the book written by Kemp and Kemp on "the Quantum of Damages" (page 7--001 of the Special Edition 1986) the following comments have been made. "In the case of this head of damages the court undoubtedly should maintain a general level of damages so as broadly to keep pace with inflation If a court is seeking to make a comparison with some earlier award and if by the date of the comparison the currency in which the earlier award was made has declined by, say 50 per cent., one must surely double the earlier award in order to make a valid comparison But. taken broadly the level of awards should keep abreast of inflation, if the courts are to maintain the consensus which they have evolved over the years. That seems to us plain common sense. If an injured person receives the conventional award for his injuries, adjusted to take account of past inflation, he is merely receiving the same standard of award as has been evolved by the courts in earlier years". (emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid passages in the book gained judicial approval in Walker v. John Mclean & Sons Ltd. (1979) 2 A11.E.R. 965). Lawton, J. has commented in Lim v. Camden Health Authority ((1979) 1 Q.B. 196) that "the sum of 16,000/- awarded to the plaintiff in Philips v. London & South Western Railway Co. (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 406) one hundred years ago would represent a very large sum in terms of todays devalued currency", and hence he suggested that the award would be nearly 2000,000 in terms of todays pound. The Indian courts also followed the aforesaid principle and amounts of damages have been fixed in consideration of depletion of money value also (Vide Jaimal Singh v. Jawala Devi (AIR 1976 Delhi 127) and K.S.E.B. v. Kamalakshy Amma (1986 KLT 1124). We have no doubt that Parliament, by enhancing the quantum of compensation was guided by the plummeting factor in currency value along with the rate of inflation grown during the interval between fixation of the amount in the repealed enactment and the date of fixation in the New Act.

10. In this context we may profitably refer to another decision of the Supreme court which really paved the way for enhancing the quantum of compensation under "no fault liability". In M. K. Kunhimohammed v. P. A. Ahmedkutty (AIR 1987 S.C. 2158) Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) made special notice of certain provisions in the Motor Vehicles Bill No. 56/87 (which later became the New Act). Their Lordships felt that those clauses in the Bill which corresponded to the provisions in Chapter VII A of the repealed Act did not in fact retain the original concern for the victims as the amount of compensation under no fault liability suggested in the Bill remained the same as in the repealed Act. Hence Their Lordships made the following observations:

"Having regard to the inflationary pressures and the consequent loss of purchasing power of the rupee we feel that the amount of Rs. 15,000/- and the amount of Rs.7,500/- in the above provisions appear to have become unrealistic. We, therefore, suggest that the limits of compensation in respect of death and in respect of permanent disablement, payable in the event of there being no proof of fault, should be raised adequately to meet the current situation".

11. The said suggestion of the Supreme Court was given due respect by the law making machinery when the Bill was finally introduced in Parliament. This fact can be discerned from the Statement of Objects and Reasons prefaced in the New Act. Therefore, in effect the Parliament has only retained the same right which was conferred on the victims through Chapter VIIA of the repealed Act. The difference in the quantum of compensation is only intended to make the right realistic and on a par with the earlier fixed amount. Hence S.6 of the General Clauses Act would not impede the enforcement of S.140 of the New Act in relation to an accident which occurred prior to the coming into force of the New Act.

12. For yet another reason, we can support the said conclusion. S.6 of the General Clauses Act permits switching over to the repealed Act only if a different intention does not appear in the new statute. Such a different intention can be discerned from the New Act. It is in Chapter X of the New Act that provisions regarding "no fault liability" have been included. The chapter starts with S.140 and ends with S.144. The last Section reads as follows: "The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect - notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force". The different intention manifested in the New Act is that provisions in Chapter X should get predominance over all other laws. The provisions contained in that Chapter must be given effect to notwithstanding any contrary provision in any other law including S.6 of the General Clauses Act. All other provisions, therefore, must yield to the provisions contained in Chapter X of the New Act. This is the legislative intention manifested through S.144 of the New Act.

We, therefore, uphold the award and dismiss the appeal. No costs.