1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Leave granted.

2. The Union of India (Appellant herein) is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 19-2-2013 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in G.A. No. 29 of 2013 arising out of W.P. No. 458 of 2012. The Division Bench has made a stray observation relating to a letter dated 9-6-2011, which was not on the record before the Division Bench, but did not go into the merits and did not adjudicate whether the views of the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition of the Respondent was dismissed, requires interference or not. The Division Bench instead set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and disposed of the appeal only by granting liberty to the writ-Petitioner (Respondent herein) to prefer appeal within 30 days from date in respect of Shipping Bill Nos. 012643, dated June 9, 2011, 494409, dated August 10, 2011 and 4944210, dated August 10, 2011. It was further observed in the impugned order that in the event the appeal is preferred within time as indicated in the order, the same shall be heard on merits.

3. Mrs. Madhvi Diwan, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant has relied upon law laid down by this Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 453 [LQ/SC/1996/941] : 1996 (84) E.L.T. 401 (S.C.) as well as in the case of Asstt. C.C.E. & Anr. v. Kashyap Engg. & Metallurgical (P) Ltd. (2002) 10 SCC 443 [LQ/SC/2002/517] : 2002 (142) E.L.T. 518 (S.C.) to support her submission that the High Court while deciding the writ petition has to take note of provisions of the Act and therefore it should exercise its discretion consistent with those provisions. Both the judgments were rendered in the context of the Customs Act, 1962. In respect of statutory provisions governing limitation, this Court made it clear that even while acting Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is required to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the authorities and organs of the States should be directed only to act in accordance with law.

4. We are in respectful agreement with the said view and concur with the proposition that ordinarily writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law.

5. In view of the proposition of law noticed above, the order under appeal has to be set aside. We order accordingly. As already observed and as submitted by learned Counsel for the Respondent, since the High Court has not considered the merits of the appeal preferred before the Division Bench, we remand the matter to the Division Bench for re-hearing the appeal on its own merits without being influenced by any observations made in this order or in the order that we have interfered with.

6. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the controversy between the parties. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no orders as to costs.