T.N. Singh, J.

1. This appeal is directed against an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Appellant before me is the Union of India, because one of the vehicles of the Appellant met with an accident in the course of which the claimant-Respondent sustained grave injuries resulting in fracture of right shoulder joint. At the relevant time, admitted facts of the case are that, the Respondent was working as Time-Keeper in the J.C. Mils and he has been compensated on different counts by the award passed for a total amount of Rs. 25,062.75.

2. Before me as it is a First Appeal, the counsel took me through the evidence. Statements on which counsel relies are those of the claimant himself and his witness, Laxmishankar Pandey. Appellants counsel, Mr. Mittal, has, in forcefully arguing Appellants case, placed implicit reliance on few statements; which he read out to me, from the evidence of the claimant, recorded in paragraphs 12 and 15, which are as follows:

...| . . |

He has also relied on para 4 of the statement of PW 1. Laxmishankar Pandey, which is as follows:

Earn Leave | | ...| |

Mr. Haswani, appearing for the claimant-Respondent, has, on the other hand, drawn my attention also to the evidence of the same witness and in particular to the statement in para 10 of the statement, which is as follows:

allotted work . . | salary | | , | allotted | , | |

I have extracted in the forefront the relevant evidence relied on by the counsel to appreciate the rival contentions. Mr. Mittal has strenuously contended that the award in so far as payments for items valued at Rs. 1,083/- are concerned is illegal. Because, the claimant was not entitled to leave and overtime allowance for which a sum of Rs. 1,083/- is allowed and he was also not entitled to the loss of earning capacity which the Tribunal has determined at Rs. 75/- per month for 15 years and on that count the Tribunal made an award of Rs. 13,500/-. Mr. Mittal has also drawn my attention to a judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. Dayali : 1971 ACJ 425(MP), to submit that the High Court can interfere with the award of the Tribunal when the amount is inordinately higher. Another decision cited by him is the case of Dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd. v. Bimla Gupta : 1986 ACJ 334 (Allahabad), in support of the contention that for lump sum payment there ought to have been deduction made at the rate of 25% because in the instant case, admittedly, in compliance with the award, the Appellant has made a lump sum payment though it was a part payment of the awarded amount. Against the total award of Rs. 25,062.75, a sum of Rs. 10,000/-, Mr. Haswani admits, has been paid to the claimant though the interest awarded at the rate of 9% per annum remains unpaid, as also the balance amount of the award.

3. I propose to take first the last point and hold at once that the contention of Mr. Mittal has not appealed to me in the least. What appears in paragraph 54 itself of Dyer Meakins case : 1986 ACJ 334 (Allahabad), is destructive of the arguments advanced. It was observed that different Division Benches of that court, had consistently allowed a deduction at the rate of 25%, indeed on account not merely of "lump sum payment" but the deduction was made on two counts, (a) a lump sum payment and (b) uncertainties of life. This is a reasonable view which is also the view of a Full Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Hira Devi v. Bhaba Kanti Das : 1977 ACJ 293(Assam), wherein it was held that 10% deduction would be reasonable deduction to be made on account of "lump sum payment". The question of uncertainty of life is not relevant in this case because claim was not made for any fatality in which case the question of loss of dependency to the claimant on account of the death had to be determined and the question about uncertainty of deceaseds life would have arisen. What happened in the instant case is that the claimant suffered fracture of the collar bone which, admittedly, took eight weeks to heal. But as per evidence, it resulted in his partial disablement; none the less he lost his normal working capacity. Therefore, deduction on that count cannot be pressed for my consideration in the instant case.

4. Mr. Haswani does not dispute that in this case no deduction for lump sum payment has been made by the Tribunal. It is his submission that as an absolute proposition of law the courts have not laid down anywhere that for all times to come the deduction should be fixed at 10%. Indeed, Mr. Haswani submits that in the last 20 years the value of rupee has been slashed by more than 25% and as such the old decisions have no relevancy in so far as the rate of deduction for lump sum payment is concerned. His argument has appealed to me because I must take a reasonable view of the realities of the life. Law to be just and relevant must meet challenge of changing times. Slump in money value must obviously reflect in proportionate lowering of what may be called credit value in terms of the economics of creditworthiness. Indeed, a millionaire ten years ago must be a billionaire today to maintain his creditworthiness and of what importance is lump sum payment if not to increase the creditworthiness of the recipient of the awarded amount. Otherwise, for subsistence and survival not lump sum, but recurring payment, would be of greater value equally to all classes of fully or partially disabled or destitute persons--a damsel in distress, an orphan, toddler or an aged person or an infirm, mostly for loss of total dependency, but otherwise also. That apart such deduction has to be viewed as a rebate and ought to be made conditional upon lump sum payment being actually made to discharge fully the liability under the award. Even if, due to judicial intervention, payment is delayed in any case, the benefit of rebate should be deemed to have been denied or even waived. Accordingly, although I hold that the award of the Tribunal is erroneous in this respect, it can be modified by a direction that whatever amount is awarded by this Court, on a computation made on different counts of the claim, the total awarded amount shall be subject to a deduction for lump sum payment, indeed at the rate of 5% only.

5. I now puropose to deal with the other two contentions of Mr. Mittal, which relate to pure questions of fact and after giving my anxious consideration to the submissions of counsel for both sides and appreciating the evidence extracted I do not feel inclined to take a different view in the matter to disturb the findings; reasonably reached by the Tribunal. True, the claimant admitted having drawn salary but the fact remains that he lost by that the earned leave and the accident caused him the loss for which he has to be compensated. True, again, that the claimant has not been totally disabled but the fact remains that he has admittedly been partially disabled and because of that he has suffered a loss in his normal earning capacity. It is not a question of right to promotion on which much stress was laid by Mr. Mittal. The question is of the claimants present loss which is projected vocally in the extracted evidence. Before the mishap, it is in evidence, he had the capability to earn overtime, which he lost after the accident and the claimant has to be reasonably compensated for the loss which was occasioned directly by the accident. I say no more on this point merely to enlarge corpus of the judgment, as I have already extracted evidence which counsel have relied and the factual position is manifested in the evidence itself. Accordingly, I uphold the award of Rs. 1,083/- for the salary, which Mr. Mittal says would amount to double payment and which I say was not so, because the salary was for "leave earned", not for the accident. I also uphold the award for Rs. 13.500/- which has been rightly calculated only for 15 years and only at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month although on the facts proved in the evidence, the claimant is entitled to be compensated for the loss of earning capacity at Rs. 150/- per month for a period of 30 years as he was aged only 29 years at the time of accident and he had another 28 years to go for retirement. I must say that the amount awarded cannot be said to be inordinately high, though it is not also inordinately low.

6. However, before I conclude I must correct the jurisdictional error as claimants counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Shantibais case. Misc. Petition No. 27 of 1981; decided on 30.11.1985 and direct that the rate of interest which has been awarded by the Tribunal at 9% p.a. shall stand modified and the claimant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% on the amount awarded from the date of application to the date of payment of the full award together with the interest.

7. In the result, the appeal is partially allowed. On account of lump sum payment a 5% deduction is allowed and the total amount of award is accordingly reduced to Rs. 23,809.75. Indeed, together with the interest, as directed. However, in the circumstances of this case I award no cost because a substantial part of the awarded amount has been timely paid to the claimant notwithstanding pendency of this appeal. Despite there being no order for costs a direction for early payment of balance amount is still warranted as a rebate is given for lump sum payment and accordingly, I direct that payment of the balance amount of the modified award with interest shall be made within a period of three months.