R. Balasubramanian, J.

1. In our order we will refer the parties to the writ petitions as employer and employee respectively for the purpose of convenience. The employee went before the Tribunal in O.A. Nos: 193 of 2002 and 194 of 2002, the former one to quash the charge memo dated 26.12.2000 and the later one to promote him to the next higher post. The Tribunal sustained the points put forward by the employee. Therefore, the employer is before this Court in these two writ petitions.

2. The following facts are not in dispute:

On 17.3.1992, the employee was served with a charge memo; he submitted his explanation in March 1992 itself; the employee challenged the validity of the charge memo by filing O.A. No: 689 of 1992 before the Central Administrative Tribunal; on 7.10.1994 the original application was dismissed meaning thereby the validity of the charge memo was upheld; the enquiring authority sent his proceedings dated 20.3.1997 returning the papers to the employer; on 26.12.2000, the employer issued the second charge memo contemplating fresh enquiry into the charges.

At that stage only the employee went before the Tribunal again. The Tribunal found that the contents of the charge memo dated 17.3.1992 and that of 26.12.2000 is verbatim the same; there is absence of power to commence a fresh inquiry by issuing a second charge memo on the same set of facts and that in any event there was latches on the part of the employer in completing the inquiry. For this the Tribunal relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court of India State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Krishnan, 1998 (3) Service Law Journal 162 and State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) S.C.C. 570.

3. Heard Mr. Syed Mustafa, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners and Mr. Bharathy Chakravarthy, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. It is true that from the date of issue of the first charge memo namely 17.3.1992, no immediate progress could be made because the employee went before the Central Administrative Tribunal in the year 1993 by filing O.A. No: 1689 of 1993 challenging the validity of the above referred to charge memo. The Tribunal dismissed that original application on 7.10.1994. Therefore, the failure to make progress on the charge memo dated 17.3.1992 till 7.10.1994 definitely stands explained. The question that follows is what action did the employer take after 7.10.1994. The enquiring authoritys proceeding dated 23.10.1997 shows all the details in regard thereto. It says,

On 24.12.1995, the preliminary hearing was held and the charged official perused the photo copies of the statement available with the enquiring authority; the presenting officer was asked to produce originals of those records before the commencement of the regular hearing when the sole departmental witness is to be examined; the enquiring authority by his letter dated 5.1.1996 addressed the higher official to send the original document to his file so that the enquiry could be taken up and the higher authority was reminded by the enquiring authoritys letters dated 15.2.1996, 21.6.1996 and 8.7.1996; enquiry was held on 3.12.1996 and 20.3.1997 and during those two hearings also no progress could be made due to inaction on the part of the presenting officer.

With the above notings the inquiring authority returned the papers to the disciplinary authority for taking an appropriate action in that matter. Again, there was a long lull during which time no move at all was made by the disciplinary authority. Suddenly on 26.12.2000, which is almost one year and nine months later, the second charge memo was issued.

4. Having regard to the above undisputed facts we asked a question to ourselves as to whether, in such stated circumstances, should the enquiry be allowed to continue assuming the orders in challenge are liable to be set aside when for all the delay the employee cannot be found fault with at all. The Supreme Court in the judgment in State of Punjab and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) S.C.C. 570 held that even the delay in serving the charge sheet would vitiate the charges and the Court should, on the facts available in each case, adopt a balancing process i.e. weighing the factors for and against and then take a decision on the totality of circumstances. It also held that the Court cannot infer that the employer had dropped the idea of proceeding against the delinquent from the mere inaction on the part of the Government. In another decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another, 1990 (Supplement) S.C.C. 738, the Honble Supreme Court had come down heavily when there is latches on the part of the employer in conducting departmental enquiry. Finding that on the facts of that case, there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, the Supreme Court went on to hold that it would be unfair to order the departmental enquiry to proceed with even at that late stage. These two judgments, in our considered opinion, squarely applies to the case on hand. Except challenging the charge memo dated 7.3.2002 by filing O.A. No. 1689 of 1993, which was dismissed on 7.10.1994, there is nothing on record to show that the employee was at fault at any stage of the departmental enquiry. Even assuming for a minute that till 7.10.1994 the proceedings based on the charge memo dated 17.3.1992 could not be followed up because of the filing of the O.A. itself as referred to above, yet there is nothing on record to show that as to what prevented the Government from pursuing the charge memo re ferred to earlier atleast after 7.10.1994 in a diligent manner. The enquiring authoritys report referred to earlier contains so many facts which stare at the Government from which the only conclusion that could be legally arrived at is that the Government is at fault. According to the charge memo the alleged misconduct was during the year 1984-85 and twenty long years have since gone by from that and yet no progress whatsoever made by the Government till the Tribunal passed orders challenged in these w rit petitions. In other words, there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 7.10.1994, the date on which O.A. No. 1689 of 1993 was dismissed by the Tribunal, till 26.2.2000 when the Government issued the second charge memo. Again, we find there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 26.2.2000 till the employee again went before the Tribunal in the year 2002. The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Government to continue with the enquiry any further. Therefore, on that ground stated by us, the orders in challenge are sustained and the writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are dismissed. No costs.