Rajasekhar Mantha, J.

1. MAT 1500 of 2023 has been filed challenging the order dated 7th September 2021 in WPA 13475 of 2021, and the orders dated 23rd February 2023 and 11th May 2023 in WPCRC No. 14 of 2023 passed by the Learned Single Bench of this Court. In fact the challenge to the order dated 7th September 2023 would have an automatic consequence on the other two orders.

2. In view of the delay of 700 days in filing MAT 1500 of 2023, the appellants have filed CAN 1 of 2023 for condonation of such delay.

3. CAN 2 of 2023 has been filed for stay of operation of the said orders dated 7th September 2021, 23rd February 2023, and 11th May 2023. On the day the appeal was taken up for admission, i.e. 14th September 2023. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate of the Respondents/ Writ Petitioners, on the 31st of August 2023, used a preliminary affidavit on facts and earlier proceedings and aggressively opposed the condonation of delay in filing of the instant appeal. The Appellant/Union of India has also filed a supplementary affidavit to CAN 1 of 2023 on the same day.

4. Both in the pleadings filed and oral submission made, extensive reference has been made by both sides, particularly the respondents, to the facts in the main appeal and the writ petition. This Court, therefore, called the parties to exchange affidavits in CAN 1 of 2023.

THE FACTS IN BRIEF

5. The fixation of price of jute bags of type A and B, B Twill 580 grams jute bags (50 kg. capacity) is the subject matter of the Lis. A provisional price was published by the Jute Commissioner on 5th July 2017 pending a formal recommendation of the Tariff Commission and further steps by the Central Government.

6. Prior to the year 1976, the Tariff Commission was constituted under the Tariff Commissions Act 1951. The said Act was repealed by the Parliament by a Repealing Act of 1976. Since then Tariff Commission has been functioning under a Government order of the year 1997.

7. The fixation of price of Jute products in India is governed by the Jute and Jute Textile Control Order of 2016. The Jute Commissioner is an authority constituted under the said Control Order. The Central Government is the principal purchaser of Jute bags and is responsible for implementation of the Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory use in Packaging Commodities), Act of 1987. The Statute aims at preserving and protecting the Jute Industry in India.

8. By the said Control Order of 2016, the Jute Commissioner is empowered to notify the price of jute bags. Such power is exercised only after a process of consultation with the Ministry of Textiles and several other Ministries like Food and Packaging, Industries, Agriculture, Finance etc. It is only thereafter that the matter is placed for final approval of the Cabinet Committee headed by the Prime Minister’s office. The report of the Cabinet Committee thereafter percolates back to the Jute Commissioner through the Ministry of Textiles of the Central Government.

9. Since the order of 2016, the petitioners have been functioning under a provisional price fixed by the Jute Commissioner. The writ petitioner/respondent is an association called Indian Jute Mills in India (IJMA).

10. Initially the Tariff Commission filed a report on 14th February 2018 which reduced the sale price of the Jute bags. Aggrieved by the said pricing the IJMA filed WPA 15205 of 2019.

11. By an order dated 14th August 2019, passed by a Single bench of this Court, the earlier report of the Tariff Commission of 2018 was impliedly abandoned and a fresh study was directed to be conducted, after receiving financial data from the IJMA from 2016 to 2017. The said data was to be certified by the Jute Commissioner. The provisional price declared by the Jute Commissioner was continuing to operate in the meantime. The Tariff Commission thereafter submitted a fresh report on the normative price to the Ministry of Textile on 31st March 2021.

12. The Ministry considered the said report and may have, in principle, approved the same. The methodology of computation of the price in the TC Report dated 31st March 2021 was found improper by the Jute Commissioner. He was not consulted by the Tariff Commission.

13. Since the price of jute bags would have an impact on and required concurrence of, several Central Government Ministries already mentioned hereinabove, opinions were being sought from them, by the Ministry of Textiles.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SINGLE BENCH

14. The writ petitioners/respondents thereafter filed the impugned writ petition, WPA 13475 of 2021, on 27th August 2021, praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the Ministry of Textiles to declare the final price of the subject jute bags in terms of the report of the Tariff Commission dated 31st March 2021. Mandamus was also sought commanding the Jute Commissioner to pay a differential price determined by the Tariff Commission report dated 31st March 2021 and the pricing difference report dated 9th September 2016 was filed.

15. Curiously in the writ petition at paragraph 8 it was averred as follows:-

“The report of the Tariff Commission has to be accepted by the Government or by the appropriate ministry to make it enforcialble” (Emphasis applied)

16. The writ petition was moved on 7th September 2021. In its order the Court the submissions of the Union of India that time may be required for finalizing the price. The Court held that it was high time that the Ministry (of Textiles) took a decision in the matter.

17. Despite recording the above, the Court observed that the issue was pending consideration for quite some time and by the said order dated 7th September 2021, disposed of the writ petition at the instance of the writ petitioners, directing the Central Government shall take all necessary steps to “approve the report of the Tariff Commission dated 31st March 2021 and make payment in terms of the said Tariff Commission of the report positively by 30th November 2021”.

18. The Appellants immediately thereafter on 4th October 2021 filed an application for modification of the said order dated 7th September 2021 (CAN 1 of 2021). The appellants mentioned the application for modification on several occasions, on 5th October 2021, 30th November 2021, 24th November 2021, and 30th March 2022 i.e. during Covid times and thereafter.

19. On the 14th of February 2022 the respondents/IJMA filed an application alleging contempt of the order dated 7th September 2021 CPAN 135 of 2022 (later numbered WPCRC 14 of 2023) inter alia against the Jute Commissioner. The respondents annexed the application for modification (CAN 1 of 2021) to CPAN 135 of 2021. The contempt application was being aggressively pressed by the IJMA during a time when the Single Bench was already over-burdened by several writ petitions involving very contentious issue.

20. In the contempt application, the appellant has filed an affidavit of compliance of the order dated 7th September 2022 and sought an extension of time to comply with the said order. The entire rigmarole in the process of consideration of the report of the Tariff Commission was duly mentioned in the said affidavit of Compliance.

21. Several orders were passed from time to time in the contempt application on 11th August 2022, 22nd September 2022, 24th November 2022, and 5th January 2023. It appears from the record that for the first time on 23rd February 2023, the Ld. Single Bench had recorded that the application for modification being CAN 1 of 2021 would be considered analogously with the contempt application.

22. The appellants thereafter filed CAN 2 of 2023 and CAN 3 of 2023 on 18th July 2023 for expeditious disposal of the application for modification being CAN 1 of 2021.

23. However by order dated 11th May 2023 the Ld Single Bench directed that the respondents must continue to comply with the impugned order dated 7th September 2021. It is then that that the appellants felt and realised that their application for modification of the said order dated 7th September 2021 has been abandoned and or rendered infructous and the instant appeal was filed on the 7th of August 2023.

24. As already indicated hereinabove while opposing the prayer for condonation of delay, both Mr. Ranjit Kumar and Anindya Kumar Mitra, Ld. Senior Advocates for the respondents IJMA, have made several references to the merits of the writ petition and several previous orders passed in earlier writ petitions by two Single Benches of this Court. The merits have also been argued at length. However, in view of the fact that the respondents wanted to file a formal affidavit in opposition to the application under Section 5, this Court permitted exchange of affidavits.

ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANTS

25. Mr. Ashok Kr. Chakraborty, Ld. Additional Solicitor General (ASG) would argue as follows :-

a) In view of the application for modification of the order dated 7th September 2021. being CAN 1 of 2021 having been filed within 30 days, the application having been rendered infructuous by the Single bench on 11th May 2023, they have bonafide pursued, “like cause”, in the appeal, against the impugned order, albeit before a different forum. The time from the date of filing of the said CAN 1 of 2021 before the Single judge should be excluded, from under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1963.

b) The subject matter of CAN 1 of 2021 before the Single Bench and the subject matter of the appeal are substantially similar.

c) It is only when the Ld. Single Bench had proceeded with the contempt application, keeping the modification application pending, that the appellants were compelled to take a decision, sometime in August 2023, to challenge the order dated 7th September 2021 in question.

d) The Court below, by issuing a Rule in the Contempt application and asking for the personal presence of the Jute Commissioner, was in essence seeking to enforce the order dated 7th September 2021 without pronouncing upon the application for modification of the said order.

e) In the last line of paragraph 8 of the writ petition (set out earlier above), it has been admitted that the report of the Tariff Commission requires a formal acceptance by the Government or proper Ministry to make it enforceable.

f) In the backdrop of such admission by the petitioners themselves, the writ petitioners could not have prayed for a Mandamus and the Single Bench could not have issued mandamus, directing implementation of the Tariff Commission report and directed payment to the petitioners in terms thereof.

g) The Single bench has directed enforcement of a report which is at best a recommendation and could not be binding on and under no circumstance be enforced by or imposed on, the appellants.

h) The Tariff Commission’s report is required to be considered and approved by the Ministry of Textiles and several other Ministries of the Central Government. It is only thereafter the matter can be placed for approval by the Cabinet Committee headed by the Prime Minister, for formal approval. With the approval, if any, of the Cabinet Committee the matter comes back to the Ministry of Textiles for vetting and is finally sent to the Jute Commissioner for implementation.

i) The Single Bench, therefore, has issued a mandamus to comply with the recommendation of the Tariff Commission de hors the aforesaid rules of procedure of Government business, which was impermissible in law.

j) It is further submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that the application for modification being CAN 1 of 2023 is of a different subject matter than that of the subject appeal, the order passed by the Single Bench in the writ petition is ex facie illegal which warrants interference by this Court. Given the strong case on merits, the delay, if any and if at all committed by the Union in preferring the appeal, must be condoned in the interest of justice.

k) There is otherwise no lack of bonafides or willful negligence or latches on the part of the appellants. The appellants are the government and are entitled to some special consideration for the natural delay that occurs in decision making. There is therefore sufficient and good cause to explain the delay in filing of the instant appeal and the same is liable to be controlled for the ends of Justice.

l) In the affidavit in opposition the respondents have not averred that there are any deliberate or willful latches on the part of the appellants. The denial by the deponent of the affidavit in opposition to the mentioning of the modification application before the single bench could not have been true to his personal knowledge.

26. Mr. Chakraborty, Ld. ASG, would relied upon the following decisions:-

a. A decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shakti Tubes Limited v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (2009) 1 SCC 786 [LQ/SC/2008/2503] particularly paragraph 20, 21 and 22 thereof in support of his case under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1963.

b. The decision of Ram Nath Sao and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195, [LQ/SC/2002/277] paragraph 12 thereof on the proposition that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 must be given a liberal interpretation.

c. The case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 [LQ/SC/2005/428] where it was held that it is progressive view must be taken while condoning delay by the Government. Substantive justice must be preferred as opposed a technical approach.

d. The case of Sri Rani Satiji Mandir and Ors. v. Shyam Jhunjhunwala and Ors. reported in AIR 1984 Cal 20 [LQ/CalHC/1983/88] particularly paragraph 12, 12 and 14 thereof by exercising of inherent powers and the powers inherent in the Court to do substantially justice stay of the order mean can be granted under order 43 rule 2 without being restricted by rule 3A of order 41.

e. The case of State of UP v. Harish Chandra and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 2713 particularly paragraph 7 and 10 thereof on the proposition that where the merits of an appeal can also be considered by dealing with an application for condonation of delay.

27. Mr. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, Senior Advocate, appearing for the Jute Commissoner, adopted the submissions of Ld. ASG and relied upon the decision of the SC in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition and Anr. v. Mst Katiji and Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 [LQ/SC/1987/214] . He submits that a just and fair approach must be taken by a court while dealing with application for condonation of delay. The power under Section 5 is elastic enough to enable a Court to take a meaningful view to do substantial justice.

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS

28. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, Ld. Counsel for the respondent Writ Petitioner IJMA, would argue that the Tariff Commission’s report was already accepted in the Ministry of Textiles in a office memorandum dated 26th July 2021 annexed to CAN 3 of 2023 filed by the respondents in the court below. The writ petitioners are manufacturers of jute bags and were suffering huge losses for delay on the part of the Central Government in price fixation. In several proceedings before the subject writ petition i.e WP 5075(W) of 2017 and WPA 15205 of 2019 and contempt proceedings arising thereunder, the appellants only kept on assuring that price of the said jute bags would be finalized soon but did not do so.

29. The order dated 7th September 2021 was not seriously opposed by the appellants. On the contrary the counsel for the Union and the Jute Commissioner had on several occasions asked for time to comply with the order and it also filed affidavits of compliance to that effect. The appeal itself is therefore without any legs.

30. It is argued that the Union has falsely alleged that the application for modification has been rendered infructuous. It was kept pending by the Single bench. It is also incorrectly alleged in subject para 16 of para 3 of the supplementary affidavit to CAN 1 of 2023 that the Single Bench has turned down the request of the petitioner for hearing the modification application prior to the contempt application.

31. On the prayer for condonation of delay under CAN 1 of 2023 it is argued by the Counsel for the IJMA as follows :-

a. The application for condonation of delay has been filed only under Section 5 and not under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellants are therefore not entitled to take the benefit of Section 14 and seek exclusion of period of 700 days.

b. The subject matter of the modification application is substantially different from the subject matter of the appeal. The cause in the application for modification is not a proceeding of a “like nature” as that of the instant appeal.

c. The non-disposal of the modification application by the Single Bench and proceeding with the contempt application does not come within the expression defect of jurisdiction. The application for modification was fixed to be heard along with the contempt application. The respondents cannot therefore invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act 1963.

d. The appellants have made false statements on affidavits that sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that such cause has not in fact been explained.

e. The decision to file the appeal has been taken in August 2023 way beyond the period of 30 days after the order dated 7th September 2021. The appellants have failed to explain the delay from September 2021 till the date of filing of the appeal i.e. 700 days. Since there is no explanation what so ever for delay of 2 years in taking the decision for preferring the appeal the Government cannot be allowed any leverage or special treatment in condonation in the instant case.

32. Mr. Mitra placed reliance on the following decisions:-

a. The case of Union of India and Ors. v. Nripen Sharma reported in (2013) 4 SCC 57 [LQ/SC/2011/267] in the said case no satisfactory explanation given for condonation of 114 days by the Central Government.

b. The case of Postmaster General and Ors. v. Living Media India Limited and Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 [LQ/SC/2012/212] at paragraphs 21 to 29 thereof.

c. The decision of Amalendu Kumar Bera and Ors. v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 4 SCC 52 [LQ/SC/2013/331] at paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof.

d. The decision of Union of India and Ors. v. Tata Yodogawa Limited and Anr. reported in (2015) 9 SCC 102 [LQ/SC/1988/492] .

e. The case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Anr. v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited reported in (2021) 5 SCC 738 [LQ/SC/2021/190 ;] particularly paragraph 48 thereof, on the proposition that the specific section must be pleaded to extension limitation from the date of the cause of action which arose initially.

f. The case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Anr. reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 [LQ/SC/2010/235] at paragraphs 9, 16, 19, 27 and 28 on the proposition that, when incorrect and false statements are made on affidavit, the application for condonation of delay must be rejected.

g. On the same proposition cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Anr. reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448 [LQ/SC/2008/2190] at paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 thereof.

ANALYSIS OF THIS COURT

33. This Court has carefully heard the arguments of the parties and has considered the pleadings and the orders impugned and other orders passed in the matter.

34. BSNL decision (supra) was a case arising out of Section 11(6) (a) (b) (c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is in this backdrop that the Supreme Court observed of the requirement of pleading of specific sections of the limitation Act for considering an application under section 11 behind time. The said decision has no manner of application in the facts of the case.

35. It is now well settled that the strict rules of pleadings of the CPC 1908 are not applicable to the writ petitions. It is only the principles of the Civil Code that apply. There are sufficient pleadings under section 14 (2) of the Act of 1963, in CAN 1 of 2023.

36. This Court does not find any incorrect or false statements made by the appellants in CAN 1 of 2023. It does also appear to this Court that while the Ld. Single Bench had noticed the application of modification of the order dated 7th September 2021 pending before it, went on to proceed to deal with the contempt application.

37. The Tata Yodagawa decision (supra) was a case where Central Government, the Excise Authority, passed an order under Section11A without notice to the assessee. The Court did not find any serious case on merits made out by the Collector. It is in that context that a delay of even 51 days made by the Union was not condoned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The said decision is distinguishable in the facts of the case.

38. In the Amalendu Bera decision (supra) it has also been specified that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be considered with pragmatism and justice-oriented approach must be taken. The observations in paragraph 9 of the said decision must be noticed.

“9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State. There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient cause” for explaining every day's delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sarma [(2013) 4 SCC 57 [LQ/SC/2011/267] : AIR 2011 SC 1237 [LQ/SC/2011/267] ] the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.”

39. In the said case the Supreme Court was found no cause whatsoever has been shown to explain the delay by the State of West Bengal. The Court found serious latches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in a civil suit.

40. In the case of Nripen Sarma (supra) the Supreme Court found in the said case that in addition to negligence on the part of the Union, the case was not tenable in merits as well. In the instant case the appellants appear to have a good case on merits. The said decision is of no relevance. The facts are therefore distinguishable.

41. In the Post Master General (supra) the Supreme Court held at paragraph 28 that when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or no lack bona fides on the part of the Union, a liberal approached must be adopted. It was observed as follows:-

“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

42. In the Oriental Aroma Case (Supra) it was held at paragraphs 14,15 and16:-

“14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate—Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107 [LQ/SC/1987/214] : AIR 1987 SC 1353 [LQ/SC/1987/214] ] , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 [LQ/SC/1998/904] : JT (1998) 6 SC 242 [LQ/SC/1998/904] ] and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [(2001) 9 SCC 106] [LQ/SC/2001/1449] .

16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasising that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay—G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] [LQ/SC/1988/166] , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] : AIR 1996 SC 1623 [LQ/SC/1996/235 ;] ] , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [(1996) 9 SCC 309 [LQ/SC/1996/796] : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1240] , State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu [(1996) 10 SCC 635] [LQ/SC/1996/1236] , State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO [(2005) 3 SCC 752 [LQ/SC/2005/428] : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] [LQ/SC/2005/428] and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582 [LQ/SC/2008/1650] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 864] .”

43. Each of the cases cited by Mr. Anindya Mitra have to been seen in the facts under which they have been decided. The ratio of a case cannot be seen de-hors the facts. Reference in this regard is made to paragraph 64 of the case of State of MP v. Narmada Bachao Andolan reported in (2011) 7 SCC 639 [LQ/SC/2011/713] .

“64. The court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision. A judgment of the court is not to be read as a statute, as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have been made in setting of the facts of a particular case. One additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper. (Vide MCD v. Gurnam Kaur [(1989) 1 SCC 101 [LQ/SC/1988/456] : AIR 1989 SC 38 [LQ/SC/1988/456] ] , Govt. of Karnataka v. Gowramma [(2007) 13 SCC 482 [LQ/SC/2007/1573] : AIR 2008 SC 863 [LQ/SC/2007/1573] ] and State of Haryana v. Dharam Singh [(2009) 4 SCC 340 [LQ/SC/2009/253 ;] : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 112] .)”

44. In The Regional Manager v. Pavan Kumar Dubey reported in (1976) 3 SCC 334 [LQ/SC/1976/82] at paragraph 7 it was held as follows :-

“7. We think that the principles involved in applying Article 311(2) having been sufficiently explained in Shamsher Singh case it should no longer be possible to urge that Sughar Singh case could give rise to some misapprehension of the law. Indeed, we do not think that the principles of law declared and applied so often have really changed. But, the application of the same law to the differing circumstances and facts of various cases which have come up to this Court could create the impression sometimes that there is some conflict between different decisions of this Court. Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.”

45. The law of limitation has undergone changes over the decades. The Indian Limitation Act of 1908 was replaced by the Limitation Act of 1963. It has been amended in 1980, 1993, 2018, 2019, and 2020. The strict rules of explaining every day of delay has since been watered down. The Supreme Court in various decisions has pronounced upon the interpretation and application of section 5 and other provisions and articles of the Limitation Act 1963.

46. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition and Anr. v. Mst Katiji and Ors. (supra) need to be noticed. The principles set out hereunder must be etched in stone.

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.”

47. One cannot ignore the merits of the Appeal as already discussed above the respondents may have deviously and dishonestly obtained the writ of Mandamus to enforce a Tariff Committee report that was incapable of any enforcement or value in law. The Single bench appears to have been misled by the respondents into passing and enforcing the order dated 7th September 2021.

48. Useful reference in this regard may be made to paragraphs 7 and 10 of State of UP v. Harish Chandra (supra) which are setout hereinbelow:-

“7. So far as the question of delay is concerned the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Commr. of Wealth-tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 603, and urged that the grounds taken for condonation is due to the delay in processing the matter through official channel and cannot be held to be good ground for condonation. It is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking for condonation of delay is duty bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by this Court in several cases, the, very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. That apart the respondents themselves approached the High Court in the year 1990 making a grievance that they had not been appointed even though they are included in the Select List of 1987 and 1987 list itself expired under the Rules on 4-4-1988. In this view of the matter and in view of the merits of the case we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay and accordingly we have condoned the delay.

10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do some- thing which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to under- stand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4-4-87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority, Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4-4-87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not.”

49. This Court notes that Union had already filed an application for modification of the instant case. There was no lack of bona fides on its part. In any event none of the above case cited by the respondent can be applied in the instant case. This Court is of the view that the appellants’ case for condonation of delay is actually one for exclusion of the time, within Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963. The application for modification filed by the Union of the order dated 7th September 2021 within the stipulated time within 30 days. The entire time from filing of CAN 1 of 2021 (4th October 2021) until the date of taking a decision to prefer the appeal, i.e. August, 2023 must be excluded, in the instant case. The Union is reasonably found to be awaiting the decision on its application for modification of the order in question.

50. This Court is therefore of the view that the decision of Shakti Tubes (supra) would clearly apply herein:-

“20. Section 14 of the Limitation Act speaks of prosecution of the proceedings in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. What would be the true purport of the words “other cause of a like nature” The same must relate to the subject-matter of the issue. A three-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the same in Rameshwarlal v. Municipal Council, Tonk [(1996) 6 SCC 100] [LQ/SC/1996/1362] wherein it was held: (SCC p. 101, para 3)

“3. Normally for application of Section 14, the court dealing with the matter in the first instance, which is the subject of the issue in the later case, must be found to have lack of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature to entertain the matter. However, since the High Court expressly declined to grant relief relegating the petitioner to a suit in the civil court, the petitioner cannot be left remediless. Accordingly, the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court and this Court, obviously pursued diligently and bona fide, needs to be excluded.”

51. (emphasis in original)

21. The question again came up for consideration before this Court in Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 458] [LQ/SC/2004/279] wherein Lahoti, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), held as under: (SCC p. 464, para 14)

“14. … In the submission of the learned Senior Counsel, filing of civil writ petition claiming money relief cannot be said to be a proceeding instituted in good faith and secondly, dismissal of writ petition on the ground that it was not an appropriate remedy for seeking money relief cannot be said to be ‘defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature’ within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the writ petition was not dismissed by the High Court on the ground of defect of jurisdiction. However, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide in its application, inasmuch as it is not confined in its applicability only to cases of defect of jurisdiction but it is applicable also to cases where the prior proceedings have failed on account of other causes of like nature. The expression ‘other cause of like nature’ came up for the consideration of this Court in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi [(1975) 4 SCC 628] [LQ/SC/1974/331] and it was held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide enough to cover such cases where the defects are not merely jurisdictional strictly so called but others more or less neighbours to such deficiencies. Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right.”

22. We may also notice that in India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh [(1971) 1 SCC 24 [LQ/SC/1970/363] : (1971) 2 SCR 397 [LQ/SC/1970/363] ] this Court held: (SCC pp. 28-29, para 7)

“7. It is well settled that although all questions of limitation must be decided by the provisions of the Act and the courts cannot travel beyond them the words ‘or other cause of a like nature’ must be construed liberally. Some clue is furnished with regard to the intention of the legislature by Explanation III in Section 14(2). Before the enactment of the Act in 1908, there was a conflict amongst the High Courts on the question whether misjoinder and non-joinder were defects which were covered by the words ‘or other cause of a like nature’. It was to set at rest this conflict that Explanation III was added. An extended meaning was thus given to these words. Strictly speaking misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties could hardly be regarded as a defect of jurisdiction or something similar or analogous to it.””

52. The application for condonation of delay is therefore allowed. The appeal is directed to be formally numbered by the registry.

53. This Court also finds force in the submission of the counsel for the appellants that the prayers in the writ petition themselves were ex-facie illegal and could not have been entertained. The misleading of the Single Judge by the writ petitioner respondents, which has led to the erroneous passing of a writ of mandamus directing the implementation of the Tariff Commission report, is despicable.

54. The Tariff Commission report is at best a recommendation. It is only advisory which the other ministries of the government and the Cabinet Committee may or may not accept. The Central Government is to take a decision on the matter after inputs not only from the Ministry of Textiles but also from the Ministry of Food and Packaging, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industries, Ministry of Agriculture etc.

55. It is only thereafter that the matter is placed for a decision by the Cabinet Committee headed by the Prime Minister. The Tariff Commission report cannot be enforced by writ of mandamus. The filing of reports of compliance and the seeking of extension of time by the Union, before the Single Bench, cannot bind them to the report of the Tariff Commission. There is no estoppel against the law and procedure and rules of Government business.

56. The appellant Central Government therefore has a very good case in merits. The delay ought to be condoned on this ground alone.

CONCLUSION

57. In view of the above CAN 1 of 2023 is allowed and disposed of. The delay in filing of this appeal is condoned.

58. CAN 2 is an application for stay of the Judgment and order dated 7th September 2021. In view of the observations made hereinabove, there shall be an interim order of stay of the order dated 7th September 2021, until disposal of the appeal. Consequently, all further proceedings in the WPCRC 14 of 2023 shall remain stayed until further orders of this Court.

59. Let affidavits in opposition be filed to the application for stay being CAN 1 of 2023 within the period of two weeks. Reply if any with a period of 2 weeks thereafter. The appeal itself shall be heard along with the application for stay. Liberty to mention for listing after completion of pleadings in CAN 2 of 2023.

60. There shall be no order as to Costs.

61. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties subject to compliance with requisite formalities.

62. I agree.