Scroope, J.In these two revrsional applications there are four petitioners out of five convicted persons. No. 513 of 1932 is the application of Uma Singh, Ratan Singh and Baijnath Lal and No. 514 of 1932 is of Damodar Singh. The first named three persons with Ramautar Singh and Damodar Singh were tried and charged u/s 420 and 120-B, I.P.C. by a First Class Magistrate of Arrah. Uma Singh received a sentence of 18 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300, in default a further rigorous imprisonment of six months u/s 420 I.P.C. Ratan Singh and Baijnath lal along with Ramautar Singh were sentenced to nine months rigorous imprisonment each and a fine of Rs. 200 each, in default six months rigorous imprisonment whilst Damodar was sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100, in default a further period of rigorous imprisonment for three months u/s 420. All these accused persons were also convicted u/s 120-B. at the same trial and received sentences of six months each to run concurrently with the above mentioned sentences, and out of the fines Rs. 200 was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation. Damodar Singh has filed a separate revision application, No. 514 of 1932, against his conviction. The convictions and sentences u/s 420, I.P.C, were upheld by the Sessions Judge of Shahabad, but he set aside the conviction for conspiracy.

2. The prosecution case is shortly this: the complainant Sitaram Das is a Sadhu and lives at Morha Mathia in Mauza Banwalia; petitioner Damodar Singh is one of his chelas and he came to him one day in Asarh before last and told him that he had four or five friends who knew how to double notes, and that he could get the Sadhus, notes doubled if he gave him some. Then a practical demonstration was arranged, and the four petitioners and Ramautar doubled currency-notes of Rs. 10 each and thus gained the confidence of the complainant who then agreed to give them Rs. 1,500 worth) of notes to be doubled. At the same time the complainant also gave them about Rs. 175 for incidental expenses

3. To make a long story short, eventually one day the petitioners got Rs. 1,300 out of the complainant and pretended to start note doubling. They gave the complainant a packet to carry home and told him that they would complete the operation on the following day, again taking incidental expenses from the complainant. On the following day then Damodar, petitoner, came to the complainant and told him that he could not trace the note doubters. The packet was opened and was found to contain charred papers. The complainant then threatened Damodar with a criminal prosecution and Damodar similarly threatened the complainant. A few days later the complainant met. Uma Singh at Arrah Railway Station and demanded back his money; the latter promised to pay it back. Then there was a panchayati over the affair and Damodar is alleged to have confessed his guilt and eventually offered complainant a gold necklace alleged to be worth Rs. 150. This when tested by a blacksmith turned out to be gilt. The patience of the complainant being thus at an end, he reported the matter to the police; and eventually these petitioners were put on trial on the charges mentioned above and were convicted.

4. The material facts for understanding the first contention urged by Mr. Yunus in this Revisional Application No. 513 of 1932 are as follows: the complainant; as I have said, lodged his first information on 25th August 1931 charging the five petitioners with conspiracy and cheating and eventually a final report was submitted by the police u/s 173, Criminal P.C, to the effect that the case was true but the evidence was insufficient.

5. At the same time it was stated in the final report that a separate case would have to be instituted by the Sub-Inspector of Shahpur in respect of, what I may call, the necklace part of the incident, as the delivery of the necklace by Damodar Singh to the complainant constituted quite a separate offence of cheating by him. The informant Sitaram however filed a protest petition before the Subdivisional Officer against the police report. The complainant was directed to appear in support of it on 8th November 1931 and on 20th November 1931 the Magistrate recorded the following order:

I have heard the Mukhtear for the prosecution and considered the police report. As there is not sufficient evidence against the accused, the police have not sent them up for trial. I also see no reason to call for charge-sheet or to put them on trial. Enter true Section 420, I.P.C.

6. This case, it is to be noted, bore G.R. No. 865 of 1931. On the 28th November 1931 the Shahpur Police submitted charge-sheet in the necklace case, No. 1147 of 1931 against Damodar Singh and Uma Singh, and on 12th January the complainant Sitaram Das moved the Sessions Judge against the order of the Subdivisional Magistrate declining to proceed further with the note doubling case. That is the case No. 865 of 1931. The Sessions Judge allowed this application recording the following order:

This application will have to be allowed if only because the learned Magistrate failed to examine the applicant on oath on his protest petition, although surely he should have known by now that he was bound to do so. The learned Magistrate should now examine the applicant accordingly and consider his case on its merits.

7. Thereupon, on 22nd February, the Subdivisional Magistrate recorded the following order on the order-sheet of the necklace case: that is case G.R. No. 1147 of 1931:

Call on the police to submit charge-sheet against the remaining three accused also for 4th March,

and this resulted in the trial in question.

8. On the above facts Mr. Yunus contends that the whole trial in this note doubling case was illegal as the Magistrate, having declined to take cognizance on the original police report, even, after the complainants protest petition, could not reopen the case and call for a charge-sheet. There was some slight confusion in the matter as the learned Magistrate instead of recording his order for a charge-sheet on the order-sheet of the note doubling case No. 845 did so on the order-sheet of the necklace case No. 1147 in which charge-sheet had already been submitted against two persons. But it is dear enough that this order referred to the note doubling case, for he also directed that the record of the G.R. case No. 865 of 1931 is to be amalgamated with this case No. 1147 of 1931 and that there is to be only one trial, though eventually the two cases had to be tried separately. This is really what has given rise to Mr. Yunuss contention and I see no force in it. It is unreasonable to contend, as Mr. Yunus does in effect, that a Magistrate having once disposed of a police report u/s 173, as here, has no power to revise his order and call for a charge-sheet. The Magistrates order directing a case reported to him by the police u/s 173, to be struck off, as in this case, is not a judicial order.

9. In Ganga Ram v. Emperor, Cr. Rev. Case No. 10 of 1932., of this Court decided on 12th February 1932, it was held that a Magistrate could reopen a case by calling for a charge sheet after disposing of a police report u/s 173 with the order: "Either mistake of fact." Such orders are purely administrative or ministerial and the principle autrefois acquit which is really at the basis of Mr. Yunuss contention cannot possibly apply to them. To accept this contention would mean for instance that if a Magistrate after disposing of a police report in this fashion, were to suspect or discover that the report was dishonest, his hands would be tied by his previous order. He can, for instance, reopen the case u/s 190 Shukadeva Sahay Vs. Hamid Mian, .

10. The only authority Mr. Yunus cites is Shukadeva Sahay Vs. Hamid Mian, , where it was held that a District Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet where a Subdivisional Magistrate has declined to take cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1)(b), after recommendation to that effect has been submitted by the police to the Sub-divisional Magistrate u/s 173, Criminal P.C. For one thing that case is not on all fours with the present case; and in the second place the decision does not take into account Section 190(1)(c) Criminal P.C. and in so far as it can be taken to lay down that administrative order of this kind cannot be reopened either by the Subdivisional Magistrate or a District Magistrate, I must altogether dissent from it. Laws of Procedure, as the Privy Council has laid down, are not meant to hamper the administration of justice it is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance u/s 190(1)(c) he must give the accused the option of being tried by some other Magistrate but that point does not arise here as the trying Magistrate was not the Magistrate who called for the charge-sheet. Moreover, he had fresh material before him in the shape of charge-sheet in the necklace case as well as in the Sessions Judges order directing further enquiry.

11. Mr. Yunus contends that so far as it relates to the Sessions Judges order directing further enquiry, the Magistrate cannot fortify himself with it in respect of the order complained of because, the Sessions Judge directed only that the complainant should be examined. But the Sessions Judges order did not, in my opinion, debar the Magistrate from summoning the accused; it only directed the Magistrate to examine the complainant and consider the case on the merits. This order was complied with when the Magistrate examined the complainant in the actual trial after charge-sheet which he had called for had been submitted. In my opinion this contention must fail.

12. The second point was that the Magistrate did not give the petitioners opportunity of having their witnesses examined. When the defence filed their list of witnesses the Magistrate, as he was entitled to do not being satisfied that they were bona fide witnesses insisted in the case of certain of these witnesses that their expenses should be deposited. That was on 29th June. On the next day, 30th June, we find the petitioners protested recorded the following order: recorded the following order:

I have already passed orders after consultation with the defence Mukhtar. If the accused want to summon those witnesses they must pay the costs by tomorrow the latest.

13. It will be seen, therefore, that the order was passed after the consultation with their legal adviser and the position was accepted by him. The accused took no steps in the matter of getting these witnesses summoned.

14. On 11th July Ratan Singh then said that he was still unable to get the cost for his witnesses. However he was offered and accepted what was known as dasti summons. The witnesses were to be produced by 15th July and there the matter ended as no defence witnesses were produced and there was no further petition in the matter. This point evidently was not argued before the Sessions Judge at all; for his very exhaustive judgment is silent on the point. Above all before us and in the petition to this Court the petitioners do not refer to any particular witness much less what he would prove in their favour. There is simply a general allegation that they did not get an adequate chance of summoning their witnesses; and I am satisfied that there is no substance in their objection.

15. These are the points on which these two separate applications in revision were pressed and they must both fail. As regards the compensation which was directed to be paid to the complainant, I do not consider that he deserves any compensation as he deliberately allowed himself to be fooled in this fashion, and he deserves no sympathy from a Court, and I would set that portion of the order aside.

Courtney-Terrell, C.J.

16. I agree.