K. Haripal, J. (Member (J))

1. The applicant was a Gramin Dak Sevak BPM at Mukkada Branch Post Office under Karikattoor Post Office in Changanassery Postal Division from October 1981. On noticing some irregularities by the Inspector of Post Offices, Mundakkayam, she was put off from duty since 27.09.2010. Later, a charge sheet containing 3 Articles of charge was served on her alleging failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, in violation of Rule 21 of the Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. Annexure-A1 is the copy of the charge. She gave Annexure-A2 reply to the same, denying the allegations. Thereafter, Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices, Changanassery was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. After conducting inquiry he gave Annexure-A4 report holding that charges I and II were only partially proved and the 3rd charge was not proved beyond doubt. However, the 1st respondent, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings in Annexure-A4 and the copy of the disagreement note was served on her. The applicant gave reply to the disagreement note. However, by Annexure-A8 order dated 08.12.2014, the Superintendent ordered to remove her from engagement with immediate effect. She preferred Annexure-A9 appeal before the appellate authority, who by Annexure-A11 order dated 26.11.2015 rejected the same and thus she has approached this Tribunal for quashing Annexure-A1 charge memo, Annexure-A4 enquiry report, Annexure-A8 order of the disciplinary authority and Annexure-A11 order in appeal.

2. According to the applicant, Annexure-A1 is lacking particulars and the report of the Inquiry Officer that Articles-I and II were partially proved has no logic. Articles of charge do not have different parts, instead of stating whether the charges are proved or not proved, there is no sense in saying that it were partially proved. From the inquiry report it is clear that Shylaja and Suma Kuttappan, who might have been affected by the allegations in Articles-I and II respectively were not examined during inquiry. Similarly, Swapna M.M. who is the addressee of the registered letter in respect of Article-III was also not examined. The inquiry officer also did not consider various documents like ledger cards of the SB accounts maintained at the Head Office, that ledger cards are not maintained in the Branch Post Office. In the Annexure-A6 disagreement note, necessary documents were not taken into consideration. Non-production of branch office journal is also intriguing. The allegations that she had kept the article in custody without delivering to the addressee is absolutely incorrect. No entries were seen in the Post Master Book. Details of leave taken by her also were not considered. Non production of the TA bills of the Inspector and Mail Overseer who had allegedly visited the Post Office and recorded statements also is important. The Mail Overseer had recorded the statements purportedly obtained from the depositors. There is no independent witness for such statements. Material pieces of evidence were withheld and the Inspector of Post Office as investigating officer and the Mail Overseer, Mundakkayam were forging documents. Disciplinary authority has suppressed material facts. After she was put off from duty, a person close to the Mail Overseer was appointed as temporary BPM. Everything was done with malafide intention to hold the person working as temporary BPM. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have acted on presumptions and assumptions; they did not act in judicious manner but acted with bias and prejudice. There is no material evidence to satisfy the test of preponderance of probability. On these considerations, entire proceedings are sought to be quashed and the applicant is to be exonerated.

3. On behalf of the respondents the 1st respondent filed a reply challenging the very maintainability of the Original Application. According to him, on 25.07.2010 when the Inspector of Post Offices visited the Branch Post Office where the applicant was working, some misappropriation of SB accounts were noticed in respect of the account of one Shylaja M.K., Pathalil House, Mukkada. On verification, misappropriation to the tune of Rs. 900/- as permanent misappropriation and Rs. 11,719/- as temporary misappropriation were detected. Thereafter, charge sheet under Rule 10 of the Rules was issued; when the applicant denied the allegations Smt. K.S. Mini, ASP, Changanassery Sub Division was appointed as the Inquiry Authority and Smt. Smitha Sagar, Inspector of Posts (Public Grievances), Changanassery was appointed as the presenting officer to conduct the inquiry. The applicant was defended by a retired Superintendent of Post Offices. When Annexure-A4 report with the aforementioned findings was presented, the disciplinary authority did not agree with the conclusions and thus by Annexure-A6 disagreement note dated 29.01.2014 the findings of the Inquiry Officer were disapproved and the 1st respondent found the applicant guilty of the charges. Thereafter, the impugned orders were passed.

4. According to the respondents, irregularities and the misappropriations were detected on 25.07.2010 and the Annexure-R1 statement of the applicant was recorded on 26.07.2010 which admit commission of misappropriation in respect of Article-I. That means, after receiving the amounts she had intentionally put illegible date stamps in the pass book. Even though Annexures- A3 and A5 were produced, those are not part of the inquiry report and was not placed before the Inquiry Officer. The registered article in respect of Article-III was received in Mukkada Post Office on 22.12.2008. Later it was noticed that even after three years it was not delivered to the addressee. The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have noticed that the money transactions were between the depositor and the applicant, that she had purposely put illegible date stamps in the respective pass books. The applicant alone is responsible for such irregularities. From the statement of the mail deliverer it is clear that the registered letter was not entrusted with him, the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have found all the allegations proved. The applicant was the custodian of the stamps and seals of the office. Documents produced before the Inquiry Officer indicate that money was entrusted with her by the depositors. The applicant had admitted her fault before the Inquiry Officer. The SB pass book, branch office journal, branch office account book etc. also proved the irregularity. The applicant never raised any objection with regard to the marking of documents. The enquiry authority had reasons to find her guilty. But the omission has been corrected by the disciplinary authority which stands confirmed in appeal. The impugned punishment was imposed after finding that she had acted illegally.

5. The applicant filed a rejoinder denying the contentions in the reply. She reiterated that the inquiry and the finding are not based on any valid grounds or documents. There is no point in saying that it is a transaction between the depositor and the BPM. There was no impediment in making the deposit through a messenger. Non-examination of the depositors is fatal. The respondents also did not make sure that the applicant was available in the Post Office, without availing any leave, on the relevant dates. Her personal files were not perused. There is no material to show that she had accepted the money allegedly deposited. The statements of some of the witnesses during the preliminary enquiry were recorded by K.P. Shylaja, Mail Overseer, in the absence of the Inspector, who has special interests in the matter. So, the applicant reiterated that the Articles of charge were not proved. The respondents filed an additional reply to the rejoinder reiterating the earlier contentions.

6. We heard the learned counsel for the applicant and also the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for the respondents. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, the very charge raised against the applicant is invalid and void ab initio since it was issued invoking the provisions of the 2011 Rules whereas the alleged misconduct had taken place between 2008 and 2010. In that case, the Department of Posts GDS (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 should have been invoked. In the 2011 Rules, there is no saving clause. Secondly, there is considerable delay in completing the proceedings. Even though the alleged incidents had happened between 2008 and 2010, the charge sheet was served only on 27.04.2012 and the proceedings were moved at a slow pace. Even after preferring the appeal, she had to approach this Tribunal for getting the appeal disposed at the earliest. So, the delay has caused her considerable prejudice. The learned counsel also argued at length touching the merits of the matter like non-examination of material witnesses, non-production of documents, misreading of evidence and suppression of material facts. He also filed an argument note. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the decisions of the Principle Bench of this Tribunal in O.A. 2805/2013, the decisions in Hardwari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others[ : AIR 2000 SC 277 [LQ/SC/1999/1046] ], LIC of India v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [: 2010 Supreme (UK) 106], Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank 2008 Supreme (SC) 1927] and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha : 2010 Supreme (SC) 130].

7. On the other hand, the learned ACGSC pointed out that Annexure-A4 report of the Inquiry Officer was disagreed by the disciplinary authority raising specific points. There are materials to show that the Inquiry Officer had failed to consider material pieces of evidence properly. All the relevant aspects were properly considered by the disciplinary as well as appellate authority and the scope of interference by this Tribunal is very limited. Therefore, she pressed for dismissing the Original Application.

8. Following are the three Articles of charges faced by the applicant:

Article -I

That Smt. T.U. Mariamma while working as GDSBPM Mukkada during the period from 13/10/1981 to 26/07/2010 accepted Rs. 500/-, Rs. 200/-, Rs. 250/- Rs. 250/-, Rs. 250/-, Rs. 250/- Rs. 350/- Rs. 250/- and Rs. 250/- on different dates after 24/09/09 from Smt. Shylaja M.K., Pathalil house Mukkada for depositing in her SB account No. 503149 standing opened at Mukkada Post office, but these amounts were not brought into post office accounts. She has also not brought into post office account an amount of withdrawal of Rs. 2000/- entered in the above pass book without any date or date stamp impression.

By the above act Smt. T.U. Mariamma GDSBPM Mukkada (under put off duty) failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in contravention of Rule 21 of the Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011.

Article-II

That the said Smt. T.U. Mariamma while working as GDSBPM Mukkada during the aforesaid period, accepted Rs. 250/- and Rs. 100/- on different dates after 11/11/2009 from Smt. Suma Kuttappan, Aruvakkel house, Mukkada for depositing in her SB account No. 503175 standing opened at Mukkada PO, but these amounts were not brought into post office accounts.

By the above act Smt. T.U. Mariamma GDSBPM Mukkada (under put off duty) failed to maintain absolute Integrity and devotion to duty in contravention of Rule 21 of the Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011.

Article-III

That the said Smt. T.U. Mariamma while working as GDSBPM Mukkada kept in her custody registered letter No. 2246 dated 16/12/08 addressed to Swapna M.M., Puthenpurackal, Mukkada PO sent by Postmaster General, Central Postal Region, Kochi-682011 received at Mukkada PO on 22/12/08 without effecting delivery to the addressee. By the above act Smt. T.U. Mariamma GDSBPM Mukkada (under put off duty) failed to follow the provisions of Rule 86 of Rules for Branch Offices Seventh Edition(Reprint) corrected upto 31 March, 1986) and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in contravention of Rule 21 of the Department of Posts, Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011."

As stated earlier, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and found her guilty of all the charges. Appeal preferred against the same has been rejected.

9. We shall first advert to the argument of the learned counsel that the very charge memo and disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant are invalid, the Rules of 2011 had no application in the facts of the case since the alleged acts of misconduct were committed during 2008-2010. According to the counsel, Rules 2001 ought to have been invoked, invocation of Rules 2011 makes the proceedings void ab initio. We have no difficulty in rejecting this plea. It is true that the proceedings have been initiated invoking the provisions under Rule 2011, which was in vogue from 18.04.2011. Rule 2011 says that it is issued 'in supersession of the Department of Posts, GDS (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession'. That means, it is issued in supersession of Rule 2001 by name Department of Posts, GDS (Conduct and Employment) Rules. New Rules take care of things done or omitted to be done before such supersession. In other words, there is deemed saving of things done or omitted to be done during the period of operations of the Conduct and Employment Rules, 2001.

10. Secondly and more importantly, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act also assumes relevance, which reads thus:

"6. Effect of repeal.-Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) ................

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) .................

(d) .................

(e) .................

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."

Section 3(51) of the General Clauses Act says that "rule" shall mean a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, and shall include a Regulation made as a rule under any enactment. That means, despite the fact that the alleged misconduct of the applicant had happened during 2008-2010, as the proceedings had initiated after the introduction of the 2011 Rules, there is no legal impediment in initiating proceedings against the applicant under this Rules. In fact, after the introduction of the Rules on 18.04.2011, the 2011 Rules alone could be invoked.

11. The argument regarding the delay in the disciplinary proceedings also cannot be sustained. It is true that for the alleged act of malfeasance and misfeasance of 2008 and 2009, charge dated 27.04.2012 was issued; inquiry report was filed on 27.10.2013 followed by issue of Annexure-A6 disagreement note dated 29.01.2014 and Annexure-A8 proceedings removing the applicant from engagement by the 1st respondent on 08.12.2014; Annexure-A11 appeal order was passed on 26.11.2015. Of course, there is delay in completing the proceedings. All the same, in our view, those were natural delay occurred in the completion of the disciplinary proceedings. But mainly for two reasons, the contentions urged by the learned counsel before us highlighting the delay cannot be countenanced. Firstly, such a contention was raised for the first time, before the Tribunal, without raising the same either before the inquiry authority or before the disciplinary authority or before the appellate authority. In the Annexure-A7 reply given by the applicant or in the Annexure-A9 appeal memorandum nothing has been stated about the delay.

12. Secondly, worsening the case of the applicant, after participating in the entire proceedings without any demur the applicant is estopped from raising the question of delay at the fag end of the proceedings. In this connection, we are fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 776] [LQ/SC/2006/397] where the Apex Court has extracted with approval the observations in State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal : (1995) 2 SCC 570] [LQ/SC/1995/165] , which reads thus:

"9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five-and-a-half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing."

Ultimately, despite such long delay, the Apex Court held that after the applicant taking part in the disciplinary proceedings without any demur whatsoever but even cross examined witnesses and entered into defence and without raising such a contention before either the enquiry authority or other superior forum the contention of delay is of no avail.

13. Moreover, the applicant has neither pleaded nor proved that such delay has caused any prejudice to her. That means, the second contention also falls to the ground.

14. The third contention touches upon the merits of the question and correctness of the view taken by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority.

15. At the outset, it must be stated, basing on settled principles of law that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to enter into the various nitty gritties of the disciplinary proceedings are very limited. It is trite that the Tribunal can take only a bird's-eye-view of the disciplinary proceedings and oversee whether principles of natural justice were followed in throughout the proceedings. In various decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the scope of interference by the Court or Tribunal in such matters. In one of the earlier decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao : AIR 1963 SC 1723 [LQ/SC/1963/105] ] a Full Bench of the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"(7) There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has again ruled on the scope of interference in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others (1995) 6 SCC 749] [LQ/SC/1995/1057] . It is apposite to extract paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said decision:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel : (1964) 4 SCR 718 [LQ/SC/1963/208] ] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

The Court ruled that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of facts to that of disciplinary/appellate authority. This has been reiterated in various other decisions.

16. Thus the consistent stand of Courts is that it is not within the realm of the Court or Tribunal to go into the niceties of the disciplinary proceedings or to act as an appellate forum over the disciplinary/statutory authorities. That means, the High Court or this Tribunal is not a Court of appeal over the decision taken by the authorities holding the departmental enquiry against a public servant. The only look out is whether the enquiry was held by the authorities competent in that behalf, following the procedure prescribed by the rules, whether principles of natural justice are violated. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557] [LQ/SC/1975/315] it is stated that where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court or Tribunal to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. It is further stated that findings of fact reached by an inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. It is further stated with regard to the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In other words, the finding of facts recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the inquiry officer is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding.

17. That means, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this aspect is crystal clear. This Tribunal can only oversee whether the procedure has been followed by the Inquiry Officer, disciplinary authority and appellate authority properly and regularly. Adhering to the principles of natural justice is more important. If there are violations of the principles of natural justice, necessarily the Tribunal is bound to interfere. The Tribunal cannot go into the other aspects of the matter.

18. There are certain exceptions to the above rule. The first and foremost consideration is whether authorities are competent to initiate proceedings against the public servant. Secondly, it must be ensured that principles of natural justice and followed stricto sensu. Moreover, if the proceedings were conducted in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry, or if the ultimate finding was guided by extraneous and irrelevant considerations or the finding was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable then there is justification in intervention by the Tribunal. To put it in other words, if only there are glaring discrepancies in the conduct of inquiry, then alone, the Tribunal is justified in interfering with the finding.

19. The case advanced by the applicant touching the merit of the finding has to be considered in the above backdrop. As noticed earlier, materials indicate that on an inspection done by the Inspector of Posts, certain irregularities were noticed in Mukkada Post Office, where the applicant was the BPM. A preliminary inquiry was conducted, statement of account holders and that of the applicant herself were recorded, following which she was put off from service. Thereafter, formal memo of charges along with statement of allegations containing three specific Articles of charge were served on her. On her denying the allegations, a formal inquiry was ordered in which the Assistant Superintendent of Post Offices was appointed as the inquiry authority.

20. The Inquiry Officer collected evidence after affording opportunity to the applicant. Witnesses were examined and the applicant was allowed to cross examine them. She defended the inquiry with the assistance of a former Superintendent of Posts. Material documents were also placed before the officer. By Annexure-A4 order the Inquiry Officer concluded that first and second charges were partially proved and the third charge was not proved beyond doubt. The disciplinary authority disagreed with that conclusions. After going through the materials, through Annexure-A6 disagreement note dated 29.01.2014, the Superintendent of Post Offices, the disciplinary authority reversed the entire findings of the Inquiry Officer. Copy of the disagreement note was served on the applicant and she was given opportunity to give her version. Thereafter, Annexure-A8 order was passed by the 1st respondent removing the applicant from service. Annexure-A8 is also a speaking order like that of Annexure-A6. Thereafter, she preferred an appeal which stands rejected by Annexure-A11. This is the substance of the proceedings faced by the applicant.

21. As noticed, entire proceedings were conducted with the full participation of the applicant. She was not heard to say that she was not afforded opportunity of being heard, or that anything was done behind her back or that principles of natural justice were violated.

22. Even when we are conscious of the fact that the scope of interference is rather thin, we have rushed through the materials placed before us. In our view, overwhelming materials are not available to say that the statutory authorities had acted in an arbitrary or illegal manner with the malafide intention of fixing the applicant. Even though it is stated that the Inspector of Post Offices and the Mail Overseer had some axes to grind, no malice or ill-will is attributed against the 1st respondent. It is important to note that Annexure-A8 was issued by the successor officer who passed Annexure-A6. Both have taken consistent stand in the matter of holding the applicant guilty of lack of integrity. Though the respondents did not allege any act of misappropriation, in fact there are elements of temporary misappropriation and breach of trust committed by the applicant. It appears that the Inquiry Officer had concluded Articles I and II of charges 'proved only partially' apparently because of the fact that the account holders were not available for examination. But we cannot forget the fact that in a disciplinary proceedings the allegations need not be proved to the hilt, beyond all reasonable doubts, as in a criminal trial. Preponderance of probability is the standard of proof required in such proceedings. In an inquiry the evidence in the nature of oral, documentary and circumstantial are acceptable. Merely for the reason that the presence of the depositors were not procured by the Inquiry Officer, it was not appropriate to throw the charge over board. During the course of inquiry, necessary material documents and oral testimony of the Inspector who conducted preliminary inquiry and the mail deliverer etc. were available before the Inquiry Officer. She also noticed that the passbook bore date stamps though it were not legible.

23. Top it all, immediately after detecting the irregularities the signed statement of the applicant, delinquent officer, was recorded. She has retracted from such statement. Still that statement was available before the Inquiry Officer in black and white. The disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have considered this aspect also in deciding the issue.

24. It is intriguing to note that the depositors or the addressee in the 3rd Article could not be examined for the inquiry. Learned counsel for the applicant highlighted Annexures-A3 and A5. But it remains a fact that Annexures-A3 and A5 missives are not part of the records. That itself is suspicious. There cannot be any doubt that both these communications were created at the instance of the applicant. We also noticed that both the communications, prima facie, were prepared by the very same hand. Whatever it may be, the authorities did not have opportunity to consider the letters. There are reasons to think that concerted efforts were made to see that those material witnesses do not depose before the Inquiry Officer. On the other hand, the Inquiry Officer had statements of the Inspector of Posts, who had recorded their earlier statements who had vouched about the statements recorded at the time of the preliminary inquiry.

25. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the non-examination of witnesses, dispute regarding the marking of documents etc. are not falling within the realm of this Tribunal as we cannot act as an appellate forum over the disciplinary and appellate authorities.

26. Having gone through the materials and sequences of events, we have also reasons to think that everything was stage managed by the applicant by not allowing the material witnesses examined before the Inquiry Officer. In all probability, they must have been won over and Annexures-A3 and A5 must be the offshoot of such an ingenuity. Even though the amounts involved are too small, these are justifications for the respondents to doubt the integrity of the applicant.

27. On overall consideration of the materials in the light of the settled principles of law, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders.

The Original Application is liable to be dismissed. Dismissed. No costs.