S.N. Variava, J.

1. This appeal is against the judgment dated 8-1-1998.

2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

The appellant is a statutory board established under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950. The appellants manage temples in Travancore. In the course of management of temples, the appellant invited tenders for supply of polythene containers for packing Aravana during the festival in Sabarimala Temple. Various parties submitted their tenders. The respondent was the lowest tenderer. Therefore, his tender was accepted for the year 1990-91. A formal agreement was entered into on 12-10-1990. The respondent was to supply 15 lakh containers of 250 ml and 1,25,000 containers of 500 ml. Clause 2 of the agreement provided that the rate quoted in the contract will be firm till the close of May 1991. On 17-10-1990 the respondent made a representation. He claimed escalation of price due to increase in price of the raw material as a result of the Gulf War and due to difficulties in transportation resulting from the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation.

3. It must be mentioned that under the contract the material was to be supplied before the end of September 1990. There was some delay in supply. However, the respondent supplied the quantity by March 1991. Instead of supplying one lakh 500 ml containers he supplied two lakh 250 ml containers. The same was accepted by the appellants.

4. It appears that payment was not made to the respondent. The respondent filed a petition in the High Court. The same was disposed of by the High Court by merely asking the appellants to settle the claim of the respondent and to consider the representations of the respondent for escalation of price. Payment as per the original contract was then made but a sum of Rs. 37,864 was withheld.

5. The respondent then instituted a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 12,09,946.50 being the price of the containers @ Rs. 2.15 per container less payments already made as per the original contract. The averments in the plaint are that there was an assurance by the officers of the appellant that the losses would be met. It is averred that on such assurances the containers were supplied. It is averred that the appellant never declined the request for enhancement of rate. These averments would indicate that, even according to the respondent, no concluded contract to vary the rate had come into existence. The respondent then goes on to claim that there was promissory estoppel and that the appellants were precluded from denying the claim of the respondent. It is also averred that there was a fresh agreement between the appellant and the respondent for variation of the contract rate.

6. The trial court allowed a most unusual practice to be adopted. The respondent examined as their witnesses the President and a member of the Board of the appellant as PWs 2 and 3 respectively. As was to be expected they gave evidence against the respondents. This was the risk that the respondent took when it decided to examine witnesses of the other side. Surprisingly, the trial court then permitted the respondent to cross-examine these witnesses. Even after following this unusual practice, which must be deprecated in no uncertain terms, no evidence favourable to the respondent could be obtained. The witnesses asserted that no concluded contract to vary the prices had come into existence. They, however, admitted that they had taken the opinion of (a) the legal officer of the Board, (b) Kerala Industrial and Technical Consultancy Organisation Limited, (c) a firm of M/s. Menon & Menon, and (d) of a Senior Counsel.

7. Thus, before the trial court there was no evidence that the price had been varied by any oral or written agreement. There was no evidence on the basis of which a contract varying the price could be implied. Surprisingly the trial court relied upon a statement of the President of the Board appearing in a newspaper which read as follows:

"In view of the imposition of Gulf surcharge for petrol, though the price of containers of Aravana may increase, the price of Aravana will not increase."

8. The trial court concluded that this indicates that there was an agreement to vary price. It is to be noted that this press statement appeared in the newspaper on 20-10-1990. The representation to vary the price was made only on 17-10-1990. It was not even the respondents case that by 20-10-1990 a concluded contract varying the price had been arrived at. Even according to the respondent the variation is by the subsequent conduct in (a) taking legal opinions, (b) in allowing the respondent to complete supply, (c) in allowing variation of supply from 500 ml to 250 ml, and (d) allowing supply at the later date. Thus, it is clear that the trial court has completely misdirected itself. It has passed a decree on no material before it and on a basis which was not even the case of the party before it.

9. The appellants then filed an appeal. The High Court by the impugned judgment has partly allowed the appeal. The High Court has concluded that there was an oral variation of the contract. However, it has reduced the amount awarded to the respondent.

10. As stated above, the representation was made on 17-10-1990. In December 1990 the appellant obtained the opinion of their legal officers. In March 1991, they called for the opinion of Kerala Industrial and Technical Consultancy Organisation Limited. This opinion was submitted on 2-4-1991. It must be mentioned at this stage that by the time this opinion was submitted the entire supply had already been made. If one looks at this opinion, it is clear that the reference to this Organisation is to enable the appellant Board to take an informed decision on the matter. Thus, this clearly shows that till 2-4-1991 no decision had been taken. Thus, no concluded contract to vary had as yet been arrived at. The respondent was well aware of this position. He had already made the supply knowing that there was no concluded agreement, oral or written, to vary the price. The respondent was well aware that the appellant Board was still considering whether or not the claim for escalation should be allowed. Thereafter on 3-5-1991, the opinion of the legal firm M/s. Menon & Menon was obtained. On 1-7-1991 the opinion of a Senior Advocate was obtained. We are unable to accept submission that the conduct in obtaining all these opinions shows that the appellant Board wanted to allow escalation of price. In our view, all that this conduct shows is that the appellant Board had taken no decision and remained uncertain. There is no material on record to show that, either by conduct or by implication, the agreement dated 12-10-1990 had been varied and/or an enhancement in rates had been agreed to. Both the courts below were wrong in concluding that there was an oral agreement to vary the agreement dated 12-10-1990 and/or to enhance the rates.

11. The question then remains whether assurances supposedly given to the respondent would create any right in favour of the respondent. It is not disputed that there was an escalation of price of raw material as a result of the Gulf War. It cannot be disputed that the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation had taken place and that this had resulted in difficulty of transport. However, there was no frustration of contract. It is not the respondents case that the contract got frustrated. The respondent has made the supply. Of course it became more onerous to fulfil the contract. The question is whether this can justify the courts granting relief.

12. The law on the subject is well settled. In the case of Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 588, this Court has held that the Contract Act, 1872 does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof. It is held that the Contract Act does not permit a party to claim payment of consideration for performance of contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on some vague plea of equity. It is held that in the performance of a contract, one often faces, in the course of carrying it out, a turn of events which are not anticipated e.g. an abnormal rise or fall in prices, sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution or the like. It is held that these do not affect the bargain that has been made. It is held that there is no general liberty reserved to the courts to absolve a party from liability to perform his part of the contract, merely because on account of an uncontemplated turn of events, the performance of the contract has become onerous. It is held that compensation quantum meruit is awarded when the price is not fixed by the contract. It is held that for work done or services rendered pursuant to the terms of contract, compensation quantum meruit cannot be awarded.

13. The above law fully governs this case. In this case the contract between the parties laid down the price. Clause 2 specifically provides that this price was to remain firm till May 1991. As stated above, the circumstances enumerated by the respondents were not such as frustrated the contract. Merely because performance had become more onerous was not a ground for non-performance or for claiming enhancement of price.

14. The principles laid down in the above decision have since been reaffirmed in the decisions in the cases of Continental Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P., (1988) 3 SCC 82, and Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engg. Enterprises, (1999) 9 SCC 283.

15. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the trial court and the High Court cannot be sustained. They need to be and are hereby set aside to the extent that they award to the respondent enhanced price for the supply made.

16. However, both the trial court and the High Court have also directed the appellant to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 37,864 which had been withheld by the appellant. This is a sum due at the original price for supply admittedly made. In our view, both the courts were right in directing the appellants to pay this amount to the respondent with interest as awarded. To that extent the decree is upheld.

17. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

18. There will be no order as to costs.