Surendra Mohan, J.

1. As per a resolution dated 18.7.2016 passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly, and a subsequent Notification dated 27.7.2016 issued by the State Government, four Schools, namely,

(i) A.U.P. School, Malapparamba,

(ii) A.U.P. School, Palat,

(iii) A.M.L.P. School, Mangattumuri,

(iv) P.M.L.P. School, Kiraloor

were taken over by the State, in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Kerala Education Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the for short). As per the above proceedings, the private aided schools mentioned above were ordered to vest absolutely in the State Government. The said proceedings were the subject matter of challenge in W.P.(C) Nos. 25292, 25619, 25622, 25695 and 25790 of 2016 at the instance of the persons who were the Managers of the said Schools. All the writ petitions were considered together by the learned Single Judge and dismissed by the common judgment dated 23.11.2016 against which these appeals are filed. The petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos. 25695 of 2016, 25619 of 2016, 25292 of 2016 and 25790 of 2016 had preferred R.P. Nos. 1077 of 2016, 1081 of 2016, 1101 of 2016 and 1104 of 2016 before the learned Single Judge, seeking review of the judgment. As per order dated 20.12.2016, all the review petitions were dismissed. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 25622 of 2016 has not challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge either by filing a review petition or by filing an appeal as done by the others. These writ appeals are filed by the persons who were Managers of the remaining three Schools challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Since the issues that arise for consideration as well as the contentions urged are common, these writ appeals are considered and disposed of together.

2. As already noticed above, the appellants are the Managers of the three Schools that are taken over by the State as per the impugned resolution of the Legislative Assembly and the consequent notification that followed. They had been conducting the Schools located in the Districts of Thrissur, Malapuram and Kozhikode. The Schools were functioning in accordance with the and the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the KER for short). The KER entitles the Manager of the Schools to close down a School only after following the procedure stipulated therein. Section 7(6) of thecontains a prohibition against closure, as follows:

7. Managers of Schools

(6) No manager shall close down any school unless one years notice, expiring with the 31st May of any year, of his intention so to do, has been given to the officer authorised by the Government in this behalf.

Rule 24 of Chapter V of KER reads as under

24. Closure of private schools:- (1) No private school shall be closed down without giving the Director one years notice expiring with the 31st May of any year of the intention to do so.

Therefore, closure of a functioning School is permitted only in compliance with the provisions referred to above.

3. Accordingly, the appellants intimated the authorities of their intention to close down the respective Schools under their management, in compliance with the requirement of notice in Section 7(6) of the. However, the educational authorities took a stand that permission for closing down the Schools could not be granted. One of the Managers thereupon approached this Court by filing a writ petition. The Government took up a contention in the said writ petition that in view of the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the Right to Education Act for short), no such permission could be granted. However, this Court held that, in the absence of a proposal by the State Government to take over the management of the School, the right of the Manager to close down the Schools is not affected by the provisions of Right to Education Act. The decision has been reported as Padmanabhan A.A. v. Director of Public Instruction, Tvm and others (2015 (3) KHC 542 [LQ/KerHC/2015/1362] ). The said judgment was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 22.7.2015 in W.A. No. 1262 of 2015. A Special Leave Petition preferred by the State against the said judgment was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. In view of the above affirmation by the Apex Court, the writ petitions filed by the other Managers were also allowed by this Court. However, in spite of the directions so issued, the educational authorities did not take necessary action to close down the Schools. It appears that the PTAs (Parent Teacher Associations)functioning in the Schools as well as the local public were agitating against the closure of the Schools. In the above circumstances, contempt of court proceedings were initiated against the authorities. The said proceedings were closed on the authorities reporting that the Schools had been closed down. However, as noticed by the learned Single Judge in the judgment appealed against, even at that time the Government had informed this Court on affidavit that, they had decided to acquire the Schools by invoking the power under Section 15 of the. It has been further noticed in the judgment that the Chief Minister and Minister for Education had taken a decision on 7.6.2016 to initiate action for acquiring the Schools invoking Section 15 of the. Thereafter the said decision was approved by the State on 29.6.2016. The above decision was followed by a unanimous resolution of the Legislative Assembly dated 18.7.2016. The notification dated 27.7.2016 followed thereafter. The said notification was subsequently modified by another notification dated 3.8.2016 clarifying that the Schools would vest absolutely in the Government from the date of finalization of the compensation. It is the said proceedings that were under challenge in the writ petitions from which these appeals arise.

4. It was contended by the appellants that, the power under Section 15 of theto take over an aided school was available to the State only as long as the School was functioning. The moment a School is closed down, it ceases to be a School under the and the KER and therefore, it could not be acquired under Section 15 of the. If at all the State wants to take over a School that has been closed down, the land and the buildings would have to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It was therefore contended that, the impugned proceedings were unsustainable and liable to be set aside. The proceedings by which the Schools were purportedly taken over, were further attacked contending that going by the nothings of the Finance Minister and the Chief Minister, no decision to take over the Schools has in fact been taken. Therefore, according to the appellants, proceedings would have to be initiated under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as Act 30 of 2013 for short). Section 15 of theitself was attacked on the ground of repugnancy with the Central Legislation, Act 30 of 2013. Therefore, according to the appellants, compensation would have to be paid under the provisions of the Central enactment.

5. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State refuting the contentions of the appellants and pointing out that the decision to take over the Schools was taken when the Schools were continuing to retain their status as aided Schools. The Schools would not lose their character as aided schools simply by virtue of their closure. Therefore, the power under Section 15 of thewas available to the State to take over the Schools. The decision to take over the Schools itself was taken on 7.6.2016 and the same was ratified by the Council of Ministers that met on 29.6.2016. Thereafter, the procedural formalities of the acquisition had to be complied with before the same could be finalized. Therefore, as on the date of the decision of the Government, the Schools were aided Schools available to be taken over under Section 15 of the Act. The Kerala Education Act has been enacted for the purpose of regulating public education. Whereas, the Land Acquisition Act is intended to provide for acquisition of property. Since both the legislations exist in different fields, incidental encroachment upon the other field was permissible, it was contended.

6. The learned Single Judge considered the respective contentions and found that the decision to take over the Schools had been taken by the State Government before the actual closure of the Schools and therefore, the power under Section 15 was available for such take over. It has been further found that, since both the enactments occupy different fields, any incidental encroachment by one upon the other was not of much significance. The contention of the appellants that they were entitled to be paid compensation under the Central Act 30 of 2013 was therefore rejected. As already noticed above, the appellants had thereafter sought for a review of the judgment which also has been rejected. The aggrieved appellants therefore challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the writ petitions as well as the order in the review petitions.

7. According to the Senior Counsel Adv. Kurian George Kannanthanam, the power conferred on the State by Section 15 of theis a power to acquire any category of Schools. Therefore, such power is available only to acquire Schools that are in existence. Going by the definition contained in Section 2(1) of the Act, an aided School should be a recognized School in the first place and secondly, it should be receiving aid from the Government. Section 2(9) defines School, Section 2(7) defines a private school and Section 2(8) defines a recognized school. Therefore, the expressions that are used in the enactment are controlled by the definitions referred to above. Viewed in the light of the definitions, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that, the School would have to continue to exist as an aided school at all stages of the process of acquisition thereof, under Section 15 of the. The resolution of the Assembly accepts that the School is closed down. As per Section 7(1) the Managership of the School ceases upon closure of the School. Therefore, in the present case, the Schools ceased to be aided Schools upon closure of the Schools and for the said reason, the Government had no power to acquire them under Section 15 of the. According to the learned Senior Counsel therefore, any attempt to acquire the buildings and land that formed part of the School would have to be pursued under the provisions of Act 30 of 2013.

8. The decision to acquire the Schools itself is attacked pointing out that no specific decision was taken to acquire the Schools, either by the Chief Minister or the Finance Minister. In view of the fact that there is no decision to take over the Schools, the attempt to sustain the impugned action on the basis of the subsequent ratification by the Council of Ministers also would have to fail. The learned Single Judge has omitted to take note of the above crucial aspect, it is contended.

9. It is next contended that, Section 15 of theis in conflict with the provisions of Act 30 of 2013 in the matter of fixing and granting compensation to the appellants. The procedure that is stipulated by the provisions of Act 30 of 2013 is different and much more beneficial to the appellants than the procedure under Section 15 of the. Inasmuch as Section 15 of the said enactment is in conflict with the Central enactment, the said provision would have to yield to the provisions of the Central Act in view of Article 254 of the Constitution. Therefore, in the event of the impugned proceedings being sustained, the appellants are entitled to be paid compensation in accordance with the provisions of Act 30 of 2013. On the above grounds, according to the learned counsel, the judgment under appeal is required to be set aside.

10. Adv. Paul Mathew, who appears for the appellant in W.A. Nos. 333 of 2017 and 336 of 2017 supports the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel.

11. The contentions of the counsel for the appellants are refuted by the learned Advocate General, who appears for the respondents. According to the learned Advocate General, Article 21A of the Constitution obligates the State to provide free and compulsory education to all citizens between the age of 6 to 14 years. Section 3 of the Right to Education Act, 2009 also casts such an obligation on the State. It is for the purpose of discharging the said obligation that, the Schools in these cases have been taken over. The Schools were functioning as private aided Schools subject to the provisions of the and the KER. It is true that they had given notice of their intention to close down the Schools. But, considering the educational needs of the locality, such permission had not been granted initially. However, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, such permission was granted. At the same time, in the contempt proceedings that were pending, the State had filed an affidavit informing this Court that a decision to take over the Schools had been taken. The decision was taken on 7.6.2016 by the Chief Minister. The same was ratified by the Government on 29.6.2016. Thereafter, by the unanimous resolution of the Legislative Assembly dated 18.7.2016, sanction for such take over was also obtained. The final notification was issued on 27.7.2016. Even according to the appellants, the Schools were aided Schools on 7.6.2016. The ratification of the said decision by the Council of Ministers would date back and would validate the decision of the Chief Minister. Reliance is placed on the prayer in the writ petition to point out that the appellants wanted this Court to issue a direction not to take over the School without invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Advocate General places reliance on a number of decisions in support of his contentions. It is further pointed out that, the judgments against which these appeals are filed were in respect of four Schools. The present appeals are in respect of only three Schools. Therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge has become final in respect of one of the Schools, attracting the bar of res judicata. For the said reason, it is contended that these appeals are barred.

12. The counsel appearing for the appellants responds to the above contentions, pointing out that the appellants were not parties to the writ petition from which no appeal has been filed. Since the judgment that has become final was not between the same parties, it is contended that the principle of res judicata would not apply. Therefore, it is contended that these appeals are only to be allowed.

13. Heard. The facts in these cases are more or less admitted. The Schools that are the subject matter of these proceedings were functioning as private aided schools subject to the provisions of the and the KER. The Managers had given notices of their intention to close down the Schools as stipulated by Section 7(6) of theand Rule 24, Chapter V, KER in the year 2010. Since no action was taken to complete the formalities of closing down the Schools, they had approached this Court by filing writ petitions and had obtained directions to the authorities to complete the formalities. It is not in dispute that the said judgment has become final and binding inter parties. Later on, in contempt proceedings initiated by the appellants, it was submitted on behalf of the State that the Schools had been closed down. Since the Schools had been closed down in accordance with the provisions of the and the KER, it is contended that there were no Schools in existence in respect of which the power under Section 15 of thecould be exercised. What was available was only the land and the buildings which could be acquired only under the provisions of Act 30 of 2013.

14. In view of the above, what is required to be considered is whether the power under Section 15 of theis available to the State to take over the Schools as purported to be done. Section 15 of theis reproduced hereunder for convenience of reference.

15. Power to acquire any category of schools - (1) If the Government are satisfied that for standardizing general education in the State or for improving the level of literacy in any area or for more effectively managing the aided educational institutions in any area or for bringing education of any category under their direct control in the public interest it is necessary to do so, they may, by notification in the Gazette, take over with effect from any day specified therein any category of aided schools in any specified area or areas; and such schools shall vest in the Government absolutely with effect from the day specified in such notification;

Provided that no notification under this sub-section shall be issued unless the proposal for the taking over is supported by the resolution of the Legislative Assembly.

(2) Where any school has vested in the Government under sub-section (1), compensation shall be paid to the persons entitled thereto on the basis of the market value thereof as on the date of the notification:

Provided that where any property, movable or immovable has been acquired, constructed or improved for the purposes of the school with the aid or grant given by the Government for such acquisition, construction or improvement, compensation payable shall be fixed after deducting from the market value the amounts of such aids or grants:

Provided further that in the case of movable properties the compensation payable shall be the market value thereof on the date of the notification or the actual cost thereof less the depreciation, whichever is lower.

(3) In determining the amount of compensation and its apportionment among the persons entitled thereto the Collector shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed.

(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the District Court within whose jurisdiction the School is situate within sixty days of the date of such award and the decision of the Judge shall be final.

(5) Nothing in this section shall apply to minority schools.

15. As per the above provision, if the Government are satisfied that

(i) for standardizing general education in the State, or

(ii) for improving the level of literacy in any area or

(iii) for more effectively managing the aided educational institutions in any area, or

(iv) for bringing education in any category under their direct control in the public interest it is necessary to do so, the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, take over any category of aided schools in any specified area or areas, and such Schools shall vest in the Government absolutely with effect from the day specified in the notification. Therefore, the power available to the Government under Section 15 is for the purpose of achieving one of the objects specified therein, for standardizing general education in the State and improving the level of literacy and so on. The power, going by the provision, is available to take over any category of aided Schools in any specified area or areas. Therefore, the provision is worded in very wide terms, to confer on the State sufficient powers to achieve the objectives specified therein. In the present case, though it is not in dispute that the Schools were functioning as private aided Schools, the contention is that they had ceased to be so upon closure in accordance with Section 7(6) of the. Section 2(1) defines an aided School to mean a private School which is recognized by and is receiving aid from the Government. Sub section (7) of the same provision defines private school to mean an aided or recognized school and going by Section 2(8) a recognized School means a private school recognized by the Government under the said Act. School is defined by Section 2(9) to include the land, buildings, play-grounds and hostels of the school and the movable properties such as furniture, books, apparatus, maps and equipments pertaining to the school. In view of the above definition, it cannot be contended that, once the School loses its recognition or ceases to receive aid from the Government, it would become just the land and the buildings. Inasmuch as the definition of School takes in apart from the land, buildings, play-grounds of the School, all movable properties such as furniture, books apparatus, maps, equipments etc, the same would continue to be a School as per the definition. Viewed in the above perspective, the contention that the moment a School is closed down, it would be reduced to be mere land and buildings, cannot be accepted. At the same time, we hasten to add that the power under Section 15 of theis available to the State only in respect of any category of aided Schools. Therefore, the power under Section 15 of thewould be available only to take over an aided School.

16. In the present case, all the schools were aided schools. A decision to take over the said Schools was taken by the Chief Minister on 7.6.2016, as evident from the circulation note that is produced as Ext.R1(b) by the State. Elaborate contentions were advanced by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants to point out that though going by paragraph 80 of the said document, the recommendation was to invoke the power under Section 15 of the Act, the endorsement of the Finance Minister is to the effect that land was to be acquired as per the existing Rules. Therefore, it is contended that the land was decided to be acquired and not to be taken over under Section 15. We are not impressed by the said contention. The wordings of the Finance Minister can only be understood as an employment of the expression acquired in the loose sense. It is clear from paragraph 80 that the proposal was to take over the School invoking the power under Section 15 of the. No contrary proposal is available in the said document. Therefore, it is clear that what was considered was only the said proposal and the decision taken was also regarding the same. We notice that the Cabinet has concurred with the said decision on 29.6.2016. Thereafter, as per a unanimous resolution dated 18.7.2016, the Legislative Assembly has given its sanction to the said proposal as required by Section 15 of the. The notification dated 27.7.2016 is followed by another notification dated 3.8.2016. It is clear from the sequence of the above proceedings that a decision to take over the schools involved the Chief Minister, the Finance Minister, the Minister for Education, the Cabinet as well as the Legislative Assembly. All the authorities have endorsed the decision to take over the Schools invoking the power under Section 15 of the. It is worth noticing here that, the closure of the School in W.P.(C) No. 25292 of 2016 was effected on 10.6.2016, the closure of the School in W.P.(C) No. 25619 of 2016 was on 9.6.2016, the closure of the School in W.P.(C) No. 25622 of 2016 was on 8.6.2016, the closure of the school in W.P.(C) No. 25695 of 2016 was on 7.6.2016 and the closure of the School in W.P.(C). No. 25790 of 2016 was on 10.6.2016. As per the affidavits filed on behalf of the State Government in the Contempt of Court Case, the handing over of the records and other formalities for completing the closure of the Schools had taken place only thereafter. In the contempt proceedings itself, the State had informed this Court that a decision to take over the Schools in public interest had been taken. In view of the above factual scenario, the learned Single Judge has held that the Schools continued to be aided Schools as on the date of the decision of the Government, 7.6.2016. The learned Single Judge has further found that after the decision to take over the Schools was taken, what remained was only to comply with the procedural formalities to complete the take over. The time taken for completing the said formalities cannot be held to be of any serious consequence once the actual decision to take over the Schools was taken. Consequently, it has been held that, what is required to attract the power under Section 15 of thewas only that the Schools should continue to be aided schools as on the date on which the decision to take over is taken. In other words, once an aided School is decided to be taken over, a change in the character of the School during the stage of implementation of the decision would not denude the State of its power under Section 15 of the. We find that the interpretation placed on Section 15 is correct and that there are no grounds to take a different view of the matter. To accept the contentions put forward by the appellants, would be to take the teeth out of the provision, rendering it ineffective in achieving the object for which the power has been conferred.

17. The contention that the decision of the Chief Minister on 7.6.2016 had been subsequently ratified by the Cabinet, curing it of all its infirmities, is contested by the counsel appearing for the appellants. However, we find that such contentions are only to be rejected in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions on the point.

18. In Sri Parameshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India ((1973) 2 SCC 543 [LQ/SC/1973/221] ), the question as to whether action of the Chairman in terminating the services of an employee could be validated by a subsequent ratification of the Board of Governors was considered. The Apex Court has held that even if it is assumed that the decision to terminate the services of the employee was pursuant to an invalid resolution of the Board of Directors, the said decision could be subsequently ratified by the Board.

19. In Punjab University v. V.N. Tripathi ((2001) 8 SCC 179 [LQ/SC/2001/1877] ), the question as to whether the action of the Registrar of a University in filing an appeal without proper authorization could be ratified by the Senate on a later date was considered. After considering the question, the Apex Court has concluded the position in the following words:

The ratification has the effect of relating back to the time when the action was taken without authority. Despite the ratification by the competent authority, refusal to examine the matter on merits, would in no way serve the ends of justice.

20. In Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. v. Sunil, S/o. Pundikarao Pathak ((2006) 5 SCC 96 [LQ/SC/2006/367 ;] ">((2006) 5 SCC 96 [LQ/SC/2006/367 ;] [LQ/SC/2006/367 ;] ) the Apex Court has explained the effect of ratification in paragraph 7 of the judgment, as follows:

7. The High Court was right when it held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act can not be subsequently rectified by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur, namely, a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act. Therefore ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated.

21. In view of the above authoritative pronouncements, we have no doubt in our minds that the subsequent ratification by the Cabinet has rectified any infirmity that was there in the initial decision of the Chief Minister to take over the Schools. The collective authority of the Cabinet and the subsequent unanimous resolution of the Legislative Assembly are all to the effect that the Schools be taken over invoking Section 15 of the. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the impugned proceedings as contended by the appellants.

22. Another contention that has been put forward on behalf of the appellants is that, there is repugnancy between Section 15 of theand the provisions of Act 30 of 2013. It is pointed out that, the Central Act prescribes a separate procedure for the acquisition of land. Section 30 stipulates payment of solatium and as per Section 40(3) of the Act, payment of 80% of the compensation amount at the time of taking possession of the land is mandatory. There is provision for hearing of objections, apart from other safeguards. According to the appellants, the mode of computing compensation under Section 15 of theis different. Considerable prejudice would be caused to the appellants if compensation is computed under Section 15 of the. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Section 15 of theis in direct conflict with the mandatory procedure and stipulations contained in Act 30 of 2013. The Kerala Education Act and Rules are enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by Entry 25 of List III of VII Schedule of the Constitution, while the Central Legislation is enacted in exercise of the power under Entry 42 of the same list. Since both the subjects are under List III of the Constitution, in the event of conflict, the Central Legislation has to prevail. Therefore, in the matter of determination of compensation, it is contended that, the provisions of Act 30 of 2013 would have to prevail. Article 254 of the Constitution is relied upon to support the above contention.

23. There cannot be any dispute regarding the proposition that in the event of repugnance between a State law and a Central encactment, with respect to a subject under List III, the Central enactment would prevail. However, the Supreme Court has laid down the test to be applied to ascertain whether there is repugnancy between two enactments, in a particular case. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India ((1979) 3 SCC 431 [LQ/SC/1979/137] ), it has been held that, in the first place there must be a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act. Secondly, the inconsistency must be absolutely irreconcilable. Thirdly, the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts must be such as to bring the two Acts into direct conflict with each other. In other words, a situation should arise where it would be impossible to obey one without violating the other. Even in such a situation, the normal rule is that the doctrine of pith and substance should be applied to find out whether the enactment is in pith and substance one relating to a permissible subject. If the answer is in the affirmative, any incidental encroachment would be condoned. In the present case, as already noticed above, the Kerala Education Act is traceable to Entry 25 of List III, while Act 30 of 2013 is traceable to Entry 42 of the same list. Entry 25 deals with education, including technical education, medical education and Universities. Whereas, Entry 42 relates to acquisition and requisitioning of property. Therefore, the two subjects are entirely different. Section 15 of the Kerala Education Act has been enacted with the object of arming the State with sufficient powers to take over Schools for the purpose of ensuring that imparting of education in a particular area is carried on smoothly and without hindrance. While enacting a law in furtherance of the said object, the State has been empowered to take over Schools provided the stipulations in Section 15 of theare satisfied. The power is also hedged in with sufficient safeguards to ensure that it is exercised only in appropriate circumstances. The provision also provides the manner in which compensation is to be paid upon such take over. As already noticed, a School is not merely comprised of the land and its buildings. It is comprised of various other articles including furniture, books, laboratory equipments, teaching aids etc. Therefore, the take over of a School that is contemplated by Section 15 of thecannot be compared to the acquisition or requisitioning of land for a public purpose that is contemplated by Act 30 of 2013. It is thus clear that two enactments operate in two different spheres. The contention therefore that the appellants should be paid compensation in accordance with the provisions contained in Act 30 of 2013 cannot be sustained. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, the State has an obligation to provide free education to children as mandated by Article 21A of the Constitution. The Right to Education Act of 2009 also casts such an obligation on the State. It is in discharge of the said obligation that the State has decided to take over the Schools in these cases. The appellants are persons who wanted to close down the Schools paying scant regard to the educational need of the area. The State is duty bound to take into account the educational need as well as the welfare of the students. The appellants are not being deprived of their properties, without payment of compensation. The Kerala Education Act provides for payment of compensation. Therefore, we are not satisfied that Article 300A of the Constitution is violated, as contended.

24. Apart from the above, an examination of Section 15 of theshows that, the computation of compensation in respect of Schools that are taken over in exercise of the power under the said provision is different when compared to the provisions of Act 30 of 2013. Section 15 is concerned with take over of aided schools where, assets would have been acquired utilizing the aid granted by the State also. Therefore, Section 15 makes provision for deduction of the value of such assets while computing the compensation payable to Managers of the Schools that are taken over. As already noticed above, Schools are institutions where education is imparted to the children of a local area. Schools are sanctioned by the Government after ascertaining the educational needs of a particular locality. Such Schools are meant to meet the educational needs that are found to exist. It is for the above reason that, State aid is granted with the object of ensuring that imparting of instruction to the students is carried on efficiently, without being restricted by reason of paucity of funds. It is for the said reason that, the decisions to close down Schools of private Managers are regulated in the manner provided by the and the KER. Therefore, the acquisition of Schools under Section 15 of theis not akin to or comparable to the acquisition of land for a public purpose that is contemplated by Act 30 of 2013. Section 15 also provides for payment of compensation on the market value of the property. Considering the paramount importance of imparting education and the obligation cast on the State by the Right to Education Act, we find that the said action in this case in taking over the Schools in exercise of the power under Section 15 of thewas perfectly justified.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no grounds to interfere with the judgment appealed against. These appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.