Vaidialingam, J.

1. In both these appeals, Mr. Cyrus, learned counsel for the appellants, challenges the decrees and judgments of the learned Subordinate Judge of Mavelikara in I. A. R. Nos. 21/58 and 23/58 respectively, declining to recognise any title or interest in the respective appellants so as to entitle them to claim a share in the compensation amount awarded in proceedings taken under the provisions of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act (XI of 1089). A. S. No. 42 of 1960 arises out of the decision rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge in L. A. R. No. 21/58, and the 5th defendant therein is the appellant. Similarly, A. S. 43/60 arises out of the decree and judgment of the learned Judge rendered in L. A. R. No. 23/58, and the 2nd defendant therein is the appellant.

2. In view of the dispute that appears to have been raised regarding the title to the properties as well as the right to receive the compensation amount, there was a reference made by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer under Section 27 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act. There is no controversy before us between learned counsel appearing for the appellant, namely Mr. Cyrus, and learned counsel appearing for the respondent, namely Mr. S. Neelakanta Iyer A. S. Nos. 42 and 43 of 1960. Decided on 15--2--1965. that the provisions contained in the Travancore Land Acquisition Act are substantially in accordance with the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894). We are referring particularly to this aspect, because a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Neelakanta Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent, regarding the maintainability of these two appeals in this Court. According to the learned counsel, the question of considering the title of the persons to receive the compensation amount and the proportion in which the compensation amount is to be distributed was necessitated by reference being made to the court by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 27 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act. The learned counsel, relying upon a decision of our learned brother Joseph J., reported in Kesava Pillai v Uzhuthiraru (1964 K. L. J. 907) urged that in that decision the learned Judge has taken the view that under identical circumstances, when a decision is rendered by a court on reference being made under Section 27 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act, no appeal is maintainable at all. That is in short, the contention of the learned counsel is that the decision rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge is not a decree, and therefore no appeal lies to this Court unless the matter comes under the corresponding provision in the Indian Act, namely Section 54. No doubt, Joseph J., has taken the view that a decision rendered by a civil court, on a reference being made regarding the apportionment of compensation, under Section 27 of the Travancore Act, is not an award. If we may say so with respect, to that extent we are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. But the learned Judge has gone further and held that no appeal lies as against such decision rendered by the Civil Court.

3. Mr. Cyrus learned counsel for the appellant, has drawn our attention to a number of decisions of the other High Courts including a decision of the Privy Council reported in Ramachandra Rao v Ramachandra Rao (I. L. R. 45 Mad. 320), wherein it has been unanimously held that a decision rendered by a civil court on a reference being made to it under Section 30 of the Central Act (Corresponding to Section 27 of the Travancore Act), though not an award, and made specifically appealable under Section 54 of the Act, is nevertheless a decree rendered by the Civil Court and is appealable as such to the appellate authority. Those decisions are Raghunathdas v District Superintendent of Police (: A. I. R. 1933 Bombay 187), Chikhanna v Perumal (: A. I. R. 1940 Madras 474), Hanumanthappa v K. Sivalingappa (A. I. R. 1960 Mysore 139) & Venkata Reddi v Adhinarayana Rao (56 M. L. J. 357) wherein reference has been made to the decision of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v Ramachandra Rao (I. L. R. 45 Madras 320). No doubt it will be seen that under Section 11 of the Central Act, among the various matters which are to be contained in an award to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, provision is made to the effect that one of the items to be so dealt with is regarding the apportionment of the compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. But notwithstanding that, there is another specific provision contained in Section 30, which occurs in Part IV of the Act, regarding dispute about the apportionment of the compensation. Section 30 of the Central Act which corresponds to Section 27 of the Travancore Act, provides that when the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof, is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.

4. In this case there is no controversy that the Collector, in the award passed by him, has fixed the compensation regarding the properties acquired as such. But so far as the apportionment of the same is concerned as between the various claimants, the Collector has made a reference under Section 27 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act. Section 54 of the Central Act, providing for appeals, starts by saying "subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeal from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force. and provides for an appeal being maintainable against any proceedings under the Act, only to the High Court from the award or from any part of the award; and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal provision is made for further appeal to the Supreme Court. Pausing here, it may be stated that under Section 26 of the Act, the decision that is rendered by the Civil Court on reference made to it under Section 18 of the Act, is no doubt styled as an award; and under sub-section (2) of Section 26 it is also provided that the award shall be deemed to be a decree, and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2) and Section 2, clause (9) respectively of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It will be seen that Section 26 forms part of Part III of the Act which relates to reference to Court and procedure thereon, whereas, Section 30, as we have already indicated, occurs in Part IV relating to apportionment of compensation. The latter part of Section 54 no doubt specifically states that notwithstanding that it is an award passed by a Court, a right of appeal is given to the High Court against such an award that is passed; but in the earlier part of Section 54, as we have already stated, the right of appeal which the party will have as against the original decree under the Code of Civil Procedure is specifically preserved. In all the decisions that have been referred to by Mr. Cyrus, learned counsel for the appellant, the question that arose was to whether a decision rendered by a civil court on reference made to it under Section 30 of the Central Act is a decree or not. Admittedly it is not an award because it does not come under Section 26 of the Act. But surely, in our opinion it does constitute a decree rendered by the Civil Court, more especially when the title of the parties regarding the manner in which apportionment of the compensation is to be made arises for consideration. If that is so, in our view, apart from there being nothing in the statute itself which prohibits a right of appeal, in fact the earlier part of Section 54 of the Central Act, as we have already pointed out, clearly preserves a right of appeal against such a decision as a decree passed by a civil court. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. S. Neelakanta Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent, based upon the decision of Joseph J. referred to earlier, will have to be overruled; and to this extent we must indicate that we are not inclined to accept the view of Joseph J. when the learned Judge holds that when a decision is rendered by a civil court on reference made to it under Section 27 of the Travancore Act, corresponding to Section 30 of the Central Acts it does not amount to a decree. Nor do we with respect, agree with the learned Judge when he holds that after a decision is rendered by the Court, the answer will have to be communicated to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass a final award. We do not see any provision in the Travancore Act or in the Central Act to that effect. Inasmuch as the compensation for the land has been fixed by the Collector, the function of the court is only to apportion the compensation and any apportionment that is directed will have to be carried out by the authorities concerned. There is no question of a further award being passed.

5. Then the question is whether the appellant is entitled to any relief. We do not propose to go into the merits arising for decision in these appeals, because we have already indicated that on the basis that the appellant has got a right of appeal to challenge a decision rendered by a Civil Court, treating it as a decree, that appeal must be presented to the proper forum. In this case the decision was rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge; and however regrettable the final result may be, we have to hold that the appeals filed by the appellant to this court cannot certainly be sustained, especially as it is pointed out that the subject-matter of dispute is less than Rs. 10,000/-. Therefore, the appeals will have to be dismissed on that short ground without expressing any opinion whatsoever on the merits arising for decision. But there will be a direction to the effect that it is open to the appellant, if so advised, to take a return of the appeal memoranda and re-present the same before the appropriate appellate authority, after satisfying that authority regarding the reasons for the delay in filing the appeals. That Court, we dare say, will take into account all those circumstances and especially the fact that the question as to whether persons like the present appellants, have got a right of appeal in respect of decisions rendered by the Civil Court on reference made to it under Section 27 of the Travancore Act, was not free from doubt and therefore the appellant had some justification to come to this Court seeking relief. Subject to these directions and observations, both the appeals are dismissed, and parties will bear their own costs.